Loveless v. Grady County Detention Center

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CHRIS ELROY LOVELESS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-24-00879-JD

)

GRADY COUNTY CRIMINAL )

JUSTICE AUTHORITY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”) issued by United

States Magistrate Judge Chris M. Stephens on January 7, 2025. [Doc. No. 19]. Judge

Stephens recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff Chris Elroy Loveless’s amended

complaint [Doc. No. 13] in its entirety and deny the two pending motions [Doc. Nos. 14,

15] as moot. Mr. Loveless filed a timely objection. [Doc. No. 20]. Upon de novo review

in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3),

the Court accepts the Report and Recommendation and dismisses the amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Loveless is a prisoner in state custody. Loveless initiated this 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action on August 26, 2024. [Doc. No. 1]. Loveless later filed a Motion for Leave

to File Supplemental Brief in Support [Doc. No. 10], which Judge Stephens, construing

the motion as one for leave to amend the complaint, granted [Doc. No. 11]. Judge

Stephens warned Mr. Loveless “that his Original Complaint [did] not ‘make clear exactly

who is alleged to have done what to whom.’” [Doc. No. 11 at 2] (quoting Robbins v.

Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)).

Mr. Loveless then filed an amended complaint on October 16, 2024. [Doc. No.

13]. At the time Mr. Loveless filed the amended complaint, he had pleaded guilty and

been sentenced for intimidation of a witness in Grady County District Court, but he was

still being held at the Grady County Detention Center.1 The amended complaint brings

one claim against the following defendants:

 The Grady County Criminal Justice Authority (“GCCJA”);

 “Unknown staff” of the GCCJA in their official capacities;

 Captain Winsett, a GCCJA employee, in his individual and official capacities;

 Sergeant McConnell, a GCCJA employee, in his individual and official capacities;

and

 Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Jeff Sifers of the Grady County District

Attorney’s Office in his individual and official capacities.2

Id. at 4–6.3

1 “[F]ederal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of proceedings

in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings

have a direct relation to matters at issue.” St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit

Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial

notice of the docket in State v. Loveless, Case No. CF-2024-89 (Grady Cnty., Okla.),

https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=grady&number=CF-2024-89

(last accessed May 29, 2025).

2 The Court, like Judge Stephens, liberally construes the amended complaint—

which does not specify the capacity in which ADA Sifers is sued—to raise a claim

against ADA Sifers in his official and individual capacities. R. & R. at 3 n.2.

3 The Court uses CM/ECF page numbering from the top of docket filings in this

Order.

Loveless alleges that defendants denied him “access to the courts” by refusing him

“access to the computer to view discovery.” Id. at 6, 10. According to the amended

complaint, a state judge issued an order regarding Loveless’s ability to access a computer

and printer to pursue his appeal in state court, and GCCJA staff either ignored this order

or lacked the training to understand it. Id. at 7–8. Loveless alleges that the mail was

stopped, he cannot get a notary, and GCCJA staff began opening his legal mail “and

deciding which of [his] documents can be copied and which ones were not copied.” Id. at

8–9. Loveless further alleges that these actions of the GCCJA staff “got [his] Court of

Appeals filings dismissed.” Id. at 8. The amended complaint lists the following requests

for relief:

 “Proper training to GCCJA Staff”;

 That Sergeant McConnell and Captain Winsett “receive program training

[and] a demotion from supervisor position”;

 “[C]ompensation both from individuals and official capacity”;

 That someone “[c]ontact Criminal Appeals Court and take responsibility

for delaying Mr. Loveless court filings”;

 “Monetary payment of $250,000.00”; and

 Other unspecified injunctive relief.

Id. at 9–10.

Judge Stephens recommends dismissing Loveless’s complaint in its entirety.

R. & R. at 18. The R. & R. recommends dismissing Loveless’s claim for damages against

ADA Sifers in his official capacity because he is not a suable “person” under § 1983 in

his official capacity and, alternatively, because he is immune from such relief. Id. at 5–9.

As for Loveless’s claim against GCCJA staff in their official capacities, Judge Stephens

recommends dismissing any claim for injunctive relief as moot because Loveless is no

longer detained by the GCCJA. Id. at 9–11. The R. & R. recommends dismissing the

claim for damages against these officials in their official capacity because Loveless has

failed to state a claim for municipal liability. Id. at 11–14. Judge Stephens recommends

dismissing the claim for damages against GCCJA officials in their individual capacities

for failure to state a claim. Id. at 15–17. Lastly, the R. & R. recommends denying as moot

Loveless’s two pending motions: the Supplemental Motion to Introduce Evidence Under

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) [Doc. No. 14] and the Motion for U.S. Marshal Service

Plaintiff’s Subpoena Duces Tecum [Doc. No. 15]. Id. at 17.

Mr. Loveless filed a timely objection. [Doc. No. 20]. Loveless argues that his

claim against ADA Sifers should not be dismissed because Mr. Sifers is a “nonservant

agent” and “contract attorney” who “has no official capacity.” Id. at 2. In addition,

Loveless argues that he seeks injunctive relief against ADA Sifers (although he does not

specify what injunctive relief he seeks), so his suit may proceed under Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1908). Id. at 5–6. Loveless argues that his claim for injunctive relief

against GCCJA staff is not moot because his claim “has nothing to do with current

conditions” of confinement, and “[t]he continuing adverse effects of the GCCJA’s staff is

apparent in the Oklahoma Appellate Court in Case No. C-2024-827.” Id. at 10–11.

Loveless objects that he has stated a claim for municipal liability because when Captain

Winsett and Sergeant McConnell “directed staff of jail and both parties documented

actions identified on the GCCJA inmate request logs this provides fact the policymakers

promulgated policy that caused the causation of ‘Denying Plaintiff Access to the

Courts.’” Id. at 14. Lastly, Loveless argues he has stated a claim against Captain Winsett

and Sergeant McConnell because “[t]he Amended Complaint specifically states the

GCCJA inmate request system provides fact for specific actions taken by Winsett and

McConnell in the deprivation of the Plaintiff’s right to access the courts.” Id. at 18.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

When a magistrate judge has entered a recommended disposition of a matter, the

Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[O]nly an objection that is sufficiently specific

to focus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in

dispute will . . . . preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for

appellate review.” United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).

“De novo review requires the district court to consider relevant evidence of record and

not merely review the magistrate judge’s recommendation.” In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580,

584 (10th Cir. 1995).

Judge Stephens recommends dismissal of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(a)–(b), which require dismissal of a civil action filed by

a prisoner who is proceeding in forma pauperis if the complaint fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted. The same standard applies to dismissals under these

provisions as dismissals for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Thus, the complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Under this standard, the Court

accepts the well-pleaded facts alleged as true and views them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice,” and the Court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” to

determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–

79.

When proceeding pro se, as Mr. Loveless is here, his “pleadings are to be

construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, “a pro se

plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged

injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a

claim on which relief can be granted.” Id. “[T]he court cannot take on the responsibility

of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.”

Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).

III. ANALYSIS

A. ADA Sifers in his official capacity is not a “person” who can be sued for

monetary damages under § 1983.4

Mr. Loveless seeks monetary damages against ADA Sifers in his official capacity.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against “every person who,” under color

of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).

States are not suable “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is

not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,” state

officials sued in their official capacities are also not “persons” who are subject to suit

under § 1983 for monetary damages. Id.

ADA Sifers works at the Grady County District Attorney’s Office. [Doc. No. 13 at

6]. Therefore, he is a state official. See Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs.,

4 Loveless argues that the amended complaint raises a claim for injunctive relief

against ADA Sifers and that this claim “is very apparent and clear in the Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint.” [Doc. No. 20 at 5]. Loveless points to the R. & R.’s reference to

“other unspecified injunctive relief” requested in the amended complaint as “providing

proof of injunctive relief sought by the Plaintiff’s suit.” Id. at 5–6. However, even

liberally construing the amended complaint, it is not clear what injunctive relief Loveless

seeks from ADA Sifers. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3) requires a claim to

contain “a demand for the relief sought,” and Loveless’s amended complaint does not

seek injunctive relief against ADA Sifers with sufficient specificity to satisfy this

requirement. See Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[P]ro se parties

[must] ‘follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.’” (citation

omitted)). Therefore, despite Loveless’s objection, the Court construes the amended

complaint to seek only damages, not injunctive relief, against ADA Sifers.

263 F.3d 1151, 1153–54 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nder Oklahoma law, a district attorney is

an arm of the state . . . .”); 19 Okla. Stat. § 215.30(B) (“All appointees and employees of

district attorneys . . . shall be deemed to be state officers or employees for all purposes.”).

Consequently, Loveless’s claim for monetary damages against ADA Sifers in his official

capacity must fail because he is not a suable “person” under § 1983.5 The Court dismisses

this claim with prejudice. See Tufaro v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 107

F.4th 1121, 1135 (10th Cir. 2024) (affirming a district court’s dismissal with prejudice on

grounds that state defendants were not suable “persons” under § 1983); Sutton v. Utah

State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 1999) (same).6

5 Because the Court concludes that § 1983 does not authorize a damages claim

against ADA Sifers in his official capacity, it need not address whether this claim is

barred by sovereign immunity. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.

Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2000) (explaining that because the “statutory question

[is] ‘logically antecedent to the existence of’ the Eleventh Amendment question” and

“there is no realistic possibility that addressing the statutory question will expand the

Court’s power beyond the limits that the jurisdictional restriction has imposed,” it is

generally “possible, and indeed appropriate, to decide the statutory issue first”).

6 See also Wolf v. N.M. Dep’t of Corr., No. 23-cv-1120-JCH-KBM, 2024 WL

2396852, at *2 (D.N.M. May 22, 2024) (dismissing the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against

New Mexico Department of Corrections “with prejudice” because the “[defendant] is not

a person subject to suit under § 1983” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted));

Buchanan v. Oklahoma, No. CIV-09-744-D, 2010 WL 1448856, *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 8,

2010) (“Dismissal is with prejudice because a § 1983 claim applies only to a person; the

individuals sued in their official capacities and the State and its agencies are not persons

for purposes of § 1983 . . . .”), aff’d, 398 F. App’x 339, 341–42 (10th Cir. 2010)

(unpublished) (affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims with prejudice).

B. The Court dismisses Loveless’s claim against GCCJA and GCCJA

staff—including Captain Winsett and Sergeant McConnell—in their

official capacities.

Mr. Loveless raises a claim for monetary and injunctive relief against GCCJA and

GCCJA employees—including Captain Winsett, Sergeant McConnell, and “unknown

staff”—in their official capacities.

1. Loveless’s claim for injunctive relief is moot because he is no longer in

GCCJA custody.

For injunctive relief, Loveless requests “[p]roper training to GCCJA Staff”;

“program training” and “a demotion from supervisor position” for Captain Winsett and

Sergeant McConnell; and that someone “[c]ontact Criminal Appeals Court and take

responsibility for delaying Mr. Loveless court filings.” [Doc. No. 13 at 9]. As noted in the

R. & R., Mr. Loveless is no longer in GCCJA custody; instead, he is now in the custody

of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (“ODOC”). See [Doc. Nos. 16, 17, and 18]

(notifying the Court of Plaintiff’s changes of address to ODOC facilities); see also

ODOC Offender Lookup, https://okoffender.doc.ok.gov/ (OK DOC #206437) (last

accessed May 29, 2025).

“When a prisoner files suit against prison officials who work in the institution in

which he is incarcerated, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of alleged

wrongful conduct by those officials, and then that prisoner is subsequently transferred to

another prison or released from the prison system,” then the suit presents “a question of

possible mootness.” Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1027 (10th Cir. 2011). “Where the

prisoner’s claims for declaratory or injunctive relief relate solely to the conditions of

confinement at the penal institution at which the prisoner is no longer incarcerated, courts

have concluded that they are unable to provide the prisoner with effective relief.” Id.

“Consequently, courts have routinely dismissed such penitentiary-specific conditions-of-

confinement claims as moot.” Id.

Loveless seeks injunctive relief against prison officials at the institution where he

was formerly incarcerated. Were Loveless to succeed on the merits, the equitable relief

he seeks “would amount to nothing more than a declaration that he was wronged, and

would have no effect on the defendants’ behavior towards him.” Green v. Branson, 108

F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 1997). Therefore, his claim for injunctive relief is moot, and

the Court dismisses this claim without prejudice against GCCJA, Captain Winsett,

Sergeant McConnell, and unknown GCCJA staff. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151,

1165, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[m]ootness deprives federal courts of

jurisdiction,” so dismissal “must be without prejudice” (citation omitted)).

2. Loveless has failed to state a claim for municipal liability.

Loveless seeks $250,000.00 in damages against these defendants. [Doc. No. 13 at

9]. GCCJA is a jail trust, so municipal liability standards apply to Loveless’s claim

against it for damages. See Bazemore v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs., No. CIV-10-420-M, 2010

WL 3824178, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 27, 2010) (“[T]he Grady County Criminal Justice

Authority . . . is a public trust responsible for the operation and management of the Grady

County Detention Center.”); see also Rife v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 854 F.3d 637,

653 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying municipal liability standards to a § 1983 action against a

jail trust). Likewise, Loveless’s claim against Captain Winsett, Sergeant McConnell, and

unnamed GCCJA staff in their official capacities is a claim against GCCJA, so municipal

liability standards apply. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)

(“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent . . . .”).

“Local governing bodies” such as municipalities and jail trusts are directly liable

under § 1983 only if an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation. Id. at

690–94. In addition, the policy must be “enacted or maintained with deliberate

indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury.” Schneider v. City of Grand

Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013). Thus, a successful municipal

liability claim must allege three elements: “(1) official policy or custom, (2) causation,

and (3) state of mind.” Id. “A challenged practice may be deemed an official policy or

custom for § 1983 municipal-liability purposes if it is a formally promulgated policy, a

well-settled custom or practice, a final decision by a municipal policymaker, or

deliberately indifferent training or supervision.” Id. at 770. “The custom or practice

giving rise to liability must be ‘so well settled and widespread that the policymaking

officials of the municipality can be said to have either actual or constructive knowledge

of it yet did nothing to end the practice.’” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 998 (10th

Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

The Court agrees with Judge Stephens’s conclusion that the amended complaint

does not state a municipal liability claim against GCCJA. Loveless does not allege that

any formal policy or final decision by a policymaker violated his right of access to the

courts, nor does he allege that a well-settled, widespread custom or practice caused the

constitutional violation. The amended complaint mentions a “lack of training” [Doc. No.

13 at 7], but Loveless has not supported this conclusory allegation with any specific

factual allegations to “nudge[]” his claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Keith v. Koerner, 843

F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 2016) (“It is not enough to allege ‘general deficiencies’ in a

particular training program.”).

Loveless argues that Captain Winsett and Sergeant McConnell both “directed

staff” and “documented actions identified on the GCCJA inmate request logs,” and that

this allegation is sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability. [Doc. No. 20 at 14]. On

the contrary, this allegation—which is not raised in the amended complaint—does not

allege that an official policy or custom caused Loveless to suffer an injury from a

constitutional violation.

The amended complaint fails to allege that any official policy or custom was the

moving force behind a violation of Loveless’s constitutional rights. Accordingly,

Loveless’s claim for damages against GCCJA, Captain Winsett, Sergeant McConnell,

and the unnamed GCCJA employees in their official capacities is dismissed without

prejudice for failure to state a claim.

C. Loveless has failed to state a claim against any individual defendant in

their individual capacity.

The Court, like the R. & R., construes the amended complaint to seek monetary

damages against ADA Sifers, Captain Winsett, and Sergeant McConnell in their

individual capacities. See R. & R. at 15. To state a § 1983 claim against an individual

defendant, a plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable” to § 1983 suits, id.,

this requirement also applies to supervisors: a plaintiff “must show an ‘affirmative link’

between the supervisor and the constitutional violation.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 767

(quoting Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010)). Where, as here, a

plaintiff has named various state actors in their individual capacities as defendants, “it is

particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have

done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the

claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state.”

Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2008).

The Court agrees with the R. & R. that Loveless has not alleged any specific

actions taken by any individual defendant that deprived him of a constitutional right. The

amended complaint states only that Captain Winsett is “captain over inmates” and that

Sergeant McConnell is “GCCJA Court officer over inmates”; the amended complaint

does not allege any actions taken by these defendants. [Doc. No. 13 at 4–5]. Regarding

ADA Sifers, the amended complaint alleges that he “[m]ade the statement in the Court

Transcript,” id. at 7, but it does not allege what statement ADA Sifers made or how it

violated Loveless’s rights. Because the amended complaint fails to allege any specific

actions taken by any individual defendant that violated Loveless’s constitutional rights,

the Court dismisses the claim against ADA Sifers, Captain Winsett, and Sergeant

McConnell in their individual capacities for failure to state a claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court ACCEPTS the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 19] and

DISMISSES Loveless’s complaint in its entirety. Loveless’s claim for monetary damages

against ADA Sifers in his official capacity is dismissed with prejudice; all other portions

of Loveless’s claim are dismissed without prejudice. The Court DENIES as moot

Loveless’s Supplemental Motion to Introduce Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence

404(b) [Doc. No. 14] and Motion for U.S. Marshal Service Plaintiff's Subpoena Duces

Tecum [Doc. No. 15].

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of May 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14