The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DR. KAMIAR ALAEI,
Plaintiff, 1:21-cv-00377 (BKS/TWD)
v.
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY,
Defendant.
Appearances:
For Plaintiff:
Joseph F. Castiglione
Young Sommer, LLC
500 Federal Street, 5th Floor
Troy, NY 12180
For Defendant:
Letitia James
Attorney General for the State of New York
David C. White
Matthew J. Gallagher
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of the Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Dr. Kamiar Alaei brings this action against his former employer, Defendant
State University of New York at Albany (“SUNY Albany” or the “University”), alleging that the
University discriminated against him on the basis of sex, in violation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”). (Dkt. No. 1). A jury trial in this
matter is scheduled to begin on September 22, 2025. Presently before the Court are Defendant’s
motion in limine, (Dkt. No. 110), and the parties’ response submissions, (Dkt. Nos. 123, 124,
125). The Court heard oral argument on the motion in limine on May 15, 2025, at the final
pretrial conference. For the following reasons Defendant’s motion is granted in part and denied
in part.
II. DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE
A. Evidence of Underlying Investigation
1. Investigative Report
Defendant seeks to admit at trial, the investigative report prepared collaboratively by the
University’s Title IX Office and Human Resources. (Dkt. No. 110, at 4–7 (citing Def’s Exh. 5);
see Dkt. No. 75-33 (sealed investigative report)). Defendant contends that it is admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) as a business record, that it is relevant to the “reasoning and
motivation behind Defendant’s decision to non-renew Plaintiff’s employment,” and “provides
essential context and information to the jury” regarding that decision. (Dkt. No. 110, at 5–6).
Plaintiff opposes admission of the investigative report on the grounds that it is “an unreliable,
one-sided document” that does not include “his side of the story,” contains inadmissible hearsay,
and will confuse and wrongfully prejudice the jury against him. (Dkt. No. 123, at 39–40).
“Subject to the applicable Federal Rules of Evidence, courts have routinely admitted the
reports of human resources investigations conducted in both the private and public sectors.”
Accely v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., No. 19-cv-5984, 2023 WL 3045795, at *2, 2023 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69699, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2023) (Chin, J.) (citing cases). In general, to
evaluate the admissibility of such a report, “courts have asked, first, whether a report (and any
out-of-court statements it may contain) satisfies one or more exclusions or exceptions to the rule
against hearsay and, second, whether the circumstances of the report’s preparation establish its
trustworthiness.” Id. 2023 WL 3045795, at *2, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69699, at *6 (citing
Paolitto v. John Brown E. & C., Inc., 151 F.3d 60, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1998)).
The undated, unsigned report (stamped “Draft 1”), “details” the University’s
“coordinated response” and investigation into Plaintiff’s possible violation of University policies
based on reports that Plaintiff (1) permitted his brother, Arash Alaei to conduct business on
behalf of a SUNY Albany-related research institute after Arash Alaei’s separation from the
University; (2) facilitated contact between Arash Alaei and institute staff and students during
Arash Alaei’s alternate assignment and after his separation from the University; and (3) that
Plaintiff violated the University’s sexual harassment policy by engaging in unwelcome conduct
of a sexual nature directed at a student. (Def’s Exh. 5, at 1). The report identifies the five
“investigators,” including Chantelle Botticelli from the Title IX office and Brian Selchick, from
HR, and lists the 43 individuals interviewed as well as the documents reviewed. (Id. at 1–3). The
11-page report1 sets forth “Investigative Findings” regarding the events that led to Arash Alaei’s
separation from the University the year before, namely sexual harassment allegations by three
female students, the role that Arash Alaei continued to play in University projects and business,
and the evidence that purported to show Plaintiff’s knowledge of that involvement. (Id. at 5–8).
It contains three paragraphs summarizing the report by the student intern alleging sexual
harassment, and two University employees regarding their knowledge of the alleged harassment.
(Id. at 8–9). The last three pages of the report summarize various issues reported by students and
employees, which appear to be unrelated to the three subjects of the investigation. (Id. at 9–11).
The University did not interview Plaintiff as part of the investigation.
1 There are 15 exhibits attached to the investigative report not discussed by either party and not discussed herein.
While some of the investigative report may be relevant to the University’s motivation for
non-renewing and terminating Plaintiff’s employment, to the extent it contains conclusions on
disputed facts, see, e.g., (Def’s Exh. 5, at 4–5 (citing “email sampling . . . showing that Kamiar
Alaei had knowledge that Arash continued to be involved in [institute] projects”), 8 (“several
witnesses indicated that they were directed by [Plaintiff] to work with Arash Aaei on projects”)
and was relied upon by the decision-makers, in the absence of Plaintiff’s version of events, there
is a danger of unfair prejudice to Plaintiff. Also, significant portions of the report detail the
circumstances leading to Arash Alaei’s separation from the University. Further, the University
fails to identify the relevance of the three pages summarizing “Other Concerns,” which appear
unrelated to the three policy violations enumerated above. The report thus presents several
dangers of unfair prejudice to Plaintiff and confusing the issues.
In addition, the investigative report itself raises questions about its reliability. Although
Defendant refers to this report as providing “the basis for the decision to non-renew Plaintiff’s
employment,” it contains no conclusion as to the claims it outlines or any recommendation as to
Plaintiff’s employment. As noted, it is undated, marked “Draft 1,” unsigned, and, more
importantly is entirely one-sided as Plaintiff was not interviewed, and Plaintiff claims it did not
consider any information he provided in his May 2018 interrogation or May 2018 submission.
(Dkt. No. 123, at 39); see Paolitto, 151 F.3d at 65 (observing that when a “party against whom
such a determination is admitted must attempt to expose the weaknesses of the report, [it is] an
effort that may well confuse or mislead the jury and result in an undue waste of time”). At oral
argument, Defendant explained that the individual who authored the report, the University’s Title
IX Coordinator Chantelle Cleary Botticelli, left prior to making the investigative report final, but
represented that it was complete. Nevertheless, despite questions from the Court, Defendant did
not indicate when the report was issued or to whom it was issued. Moreover, Defendant has
identified two of the “investigators” as witnesses in this case. As Defendant argues, at least
portions of the investigative report have probative value. However, the one-sided summaries of,
and conclusions about, Plaintiff’s alleged conduct, and the questions regarding the report (lack of
finalization, unsigned, and undated) reflect a lack of trustworthiness. See e.g., Fed. R. Evid.
803(6)(E). In any event, considering all of the factors, the Court finds that the probative value of
the investigative report is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice and
confusing the issues. Accordingly, the Court finds that the report is inadmissible.
2. Testimony Regarding the Investigation
Defendant seeks to introduce evidence and testimony at trial regarding the complaints
and underlying investigation “that resulted in the decision to non-renew Plaintiff.” (Dkt. No. 110,
at 5). Defendant argues that as it expects Plaintiff raise the fact that the HR office found the
allegations against Plaintiff to be “unsubstantiated,” it must be able to present evidence regarding
the underlying investigation and “explain to the jury what occurred leading up to the decision at
issue.” (Dkt. No. 110, at 7; see Dkt. No. 75-23, ¶ 27 (Brian Selchick explaining that although HR
determined the allegations against Plaintiff “were credible” because “there was insufficient
evidence for the University to prove the allegations beyond a preponderance of the evidence at a
disciplinary arbitration” absent subpoena power, HR found the “allegations . . . to be
unsubstantiated”)). Defendant further argues that testimony “pertaining to the underlying
investigation” is admissible as relevant, probative evidence under Rules 401 and 403 as the “crux
of the trial of this action is the reasoning and motivation behind Defendant’s decision to non-
renew Plaintiff.” (Id. at 4–5). Plaintiff opposes the introduction of testimony “from Title IX
investigation witnesses” on the ground that it is “totally irrelevant,” arguing that the “facts and
arguments show that” the decisions at issue were made by HR (Stark and Selchick) and
University officials (Rodriguez, Szelest, and Stellar), and none of the proposed witnesses were
“involved on the non-renewal and termination decisions.” (Dkt. No. 123, at 38–39).
In this case the jury will have to decide whether the decision-makers responsible for the
termination and “non-renewal” of Plaintiff’s employment unlawfully discriminated against
Plaintiff based on gender. The jury will thus need to consider the information relied upon by the
decision-makers, and what led them to make the decision that they made. Indeed, Defendant has
identified the HR officials (Stark and Selchick) and the University officials (Rodriguez, Szelest,
and Stellar) as witnesses who will testify regarding their “knowledge of, and involvement in, the
investigation into Plaintiff” and “regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the decision
to non-renew Plaintiff’s employment.” (Dkt. No. 109, at 1–2). Defendant has, however, also
identified an underlying complainant—Leah Furst— who “is expected to testify regarding . . .
her experiences with Plaintiff while on a trip to Beruit, Lebanon,” as well as six other students
and two employees, as possible witnesses, who are expected to testify regarding their
“interactions” or “experiences with Plaintiff.” (Dkt. No. 109 at 2–4). While information
considered by the decision-makers is clearly relevant and admissible, Defendant has not
explained how testimony from the underlying complainants is relevant and admissible under
Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403. To the extent Defendant seeks to introduce such testimony,
Defendant must submit a letter brief addressing this issue by August 4, 2025, and any response is
due by August 11, 2025.
B. Expert Medical Testimony
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from introducing expert medical testimony at trial.
(Dkt. No. 110, at 8–9). Defendant acknowledges that “Plaintiff may offer the testimony of any
treating physicians in support of his claims,” but argues that “such testimony must be limited to
the treatment provided by the medical provider.” (Id. at 8). Defendant further argues that
Plaintiff should be precluded from offering testimony “about his own injuries and/or medical
records” because the “alleged injuries are not readily comprehensible by a lay juror without
medical testimony” from a medical expert. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff agrees no experts have been
identified in this case and therefore does not oppose Defendant’s motion insofar as it seeks to
preclude expert evidence. (Dkt. No. 123, at 32). Plaintiff also agrees that his medical providers
“can only testify as fact witnesses to the treatment they provided to Dr. Alaei and their personal
knowledge.”2 (Id.). However, Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion to preclude him from
testifying about his own medical conditions. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff states he intends to
testify about “feeling depressed, not eating regularly, not being able to sleep regularly, losing
weight, suffering anxious feelings,” “hair loss, hives, and other skin conditions.” (Id. at 34).
“[E]xpert testimony is not necessary to establish causation . . . when the finder of fact
‘must draw only a common sense causal connection between a plaintiff’s injury and one
precipitating cause.’” Doe v. Doe, No. 16-cv-0332, 2017 WL 3025885, at *7, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109692 at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2017) (quoting Young v. Sw. Airlines Co., 409 F. Supp.
3d 110, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)). In contrast, “[e]xpert medical opinion evidence is required when
the subject-matter ‘is presumed not to be within [the] common knowledge and experience’ of the
jury.” Jimenez v. Supermarket Serv. Corp., No. 01-cv-3273, 2002 WL 662135 at *4, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7029 at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2002) (quoting Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124,
131 (2d Cir. 1991)) (applying New York law). “This is particularly true in cases . . . where a
plaintiff’s injuries have ‘multiple potential etiologies.’” Young, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 114 (quoting
Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2004)).
2 Plaintiff has listed nine medical providers as trial witnesses, including two psychiatrists, a psychologist, a
psychotherapist, two ophthalmologists, an otorhinolaryngologist, and two dermatologists, (Dkt. No. 127, at 3–5), and
intends to introduce the medical records from five of those providers, (Dkt. No. 131, at 9).
Plaintiff may testify about the symptoms he has experienced. But to the extent he seeks to
offer a lay opinion as to the cause of those symptoms, absent a “common sense causal
connection,” Doe, 2017 WL 3025885, at *7, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109692 at *20, such
testimony would be inadmissible without an expert, see Senchyshyn v. BIC Sport N. Am., Inc.,
No. 6:17-cv-0162, 2022 WL 5240586, at *5, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182963, at *15 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 2022) (allowing the plaintiff “to testify as to her feelings of depression and/or anxiety
related to what she believed was causing the physical pain in her hands” but reserving decision
for trial as to “whether any testimony sought from Plaintiff traverses the line between Plaintiff
describing her feelings at particular times and offering a lay opinion as to the cause of Plaintiff’s
feelings”). Accordingly, the Court reserves decision.
C. Foundation for Medical Records
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from admitting medical records at trial “absent the
proper foundation and/or authentication.” (Dkt. No. 110, at 10–11). Plaintiff responds that he
“intends to supplement his witness list shortly to include his relevant medical doctors,” who can
establish the foundation “for their own medical records.” (Dkt. No. 123, at 34). Indeed, Plaintiff
has done so; the medical provider for each set of medical records identified on Plaintiff’s exhibit
list is named on Plaintiff’s witness list. (Dkt. No. 127, at 3–5; Dkt. No. 131, at 9). Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion to preclude the introduction of Plaintiff’s medical records is denied as moot.
D. Evidence of Litigation involving Chantell Botticelli
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from introducing evidence of “an unrelated state
court action involving Ms. Botticelli” on the ground that it will force the parties to conduct a
“trial within a trial” and cause “needless delay.” (Dkt. No. 110, at 11–12). Plaintiff opposes
Defendant’s motion and asserts he should be permitted to introduce “evidence that constitutes
evidence impeachment, bias and character,” regarding Botticelli. (Dkt. No. 123, at 26, 31) (citing
Rules 404(a)(3) and 607).
The “evidence” at issue consists of two decisions issued by the Third Department of the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division: Alexander M. v. Cleary (“Alexander M. I”), 188
A.D.3d 1471 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) and Alexander M. v. Cleary (“Alexander M. II”), 205
A.D.3d 1073 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022). Both decisions concern a petition brought by a male SUNY
Albany student under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules seeking review
of SUNY Albany’s determination that the student violated its code of conduct. As relevant here,
the petitioner claimed that Botticelli, then SUNY Albany’s Title IX coordinator, had been biased
toward him during the underlying investigation and requested discovery on that issue before
submitting the matter for Article 78 review. The Appellate Division granted that request, noting
that “[a]s to the possibility of individual bias,” Botticelli had “admittedly altered the facts
reported to her” and that there was evidence that Botticelli had “raised her voice, physically
leaned toward petitioner and acted in an aggressive manner.” Alexander M. I, 188 A.D.3d at
1476; see id. (explaining that “[a]n impartial investigation performed by bias-free investigators is
the substantive foundation of the entire administrative proceeding” and the issue “must be
properly resolved before this proceeding can be considered by this Court”).
Following discovery, the Appellate Division considered the evidence of bias but
ultimately, was “not persuaded” that Botticelli’s conduct “evidenced bias on her part.” Alexander
M. II, 205 A.D.3d at 1081. However, in explaining its decision, the Appellate Division
specifically observed that Botticelli’s conduct “indicate[d] some misjudgment” and that the
“tone” she used with the petitioner was “unfortunate.” Id.
In this case, Defendant argues that because the Appellate Division’s bias finding
regarding Botticelli was “subsequently reversed,” impeachment would be “wholly improper,”
would result in a trial within a trial and cause needless delay. (Dkt. No. 110, at 11–12; Dkt. No.
124, at 1). Defendant’s suggestion that in not finding bias, the Appellate Division exonerated
Botticelli misrepresents the decision.3 As reflected above, the Appellate Division specifically
observed that Botticelli’s conduct “indicate[d] some misjudgment” and that she used an
“unfortunate tone” in her meeting with the petitioner. Alexander M. II, 205 A.D.3d at 1081. The
Court therefore finds the Appellate Division’s findings in Alexander M. II, may be an appropriate
ground for impeachment under Rule 607; the Court will consider this issue at trial. Moreover, as
Plaintiff does not appear to intend to do more than cross-examine Botticelli on this point, the
Court sees little danger of a trial within a trial or delay, and to the extent such danger arises, the
Court will address it during trial. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to preclude impeachment of
Botticelli is reserved.
E. Evidence Regarding Court of Claims Action for Breach of Contract and
Collateral Estoppel
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from “any discussion of the Court of Claims action
or the claims contained therein” on the ground that it would confuse the jury and cause unfair
prejudice. (Dkt. No. 110, at 13). Plaintiff responds that the decision on the Court of Claims
matter “is subject to collateral estoppel as to relevant determinations” but does not indicate
whether he intends to discuss these claims at trial. (Dkt. No. 123, at 35; see also Dkt. No. 115, at
3 In addition, Defendant’s representation that the Appellate Division “subsequently reversed” Alexander M. I, wholly
misstates the Appellate Division’s disposition. As discussed, in Alexander M. II, the Appellate Division was not
reviewing Alexander M. I, but returning to the matter after allowing discovery on the issue of bias.
15–19 (Plaintiff’s Trial Brief, arguing that “collateral estoppel applies to many relevant
determinations by” “the Court of Claims”)).4
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “precludes a party from relitigating in a
subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and
decided against that party . . . whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same.”
Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Ryan v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d
494 (N.Y. 1984)). “Under New York law, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue when
(1) the identical issue necessarily was decided in the prior application and is decisive to the
present action, and (2) the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action” Evans v. Ottimo, 469 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir.
2006) (citing Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 455–56 (N.Y. 1985)). In addition to
these factors, the “court must satisfy itself that application of the doctrine is fair.” Bear, Stearns
& Co. v. 1109580 Ont. Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2005).
“[T]he burden of proving identity of issue rests on the proponent of collateral estoppel[.]”
Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 730 (2d Cir. 2001). Courts
take “a functional approach” to “analyzing collateral estoppel in New York, and it should not be
applied rigidly.” Id. at 731. The question is whether there is “an identity of issue which has
necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive in the present action[.]” Schwartz v.
Public Adm’r of Cnty. of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71 (N.Y. 1969). “The prior decision or issue need
not have been explicit” for collateral estoppel to apply “ ‘if by necessary implication it is
contained in that which has been explicitly decided.’” Postlewaite v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 333
4 Plaintiff also argues that determinations in this Court’s decision on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
“constitute law of the case.” (Dkt. No. 115, at 19 (referring to Dkt. No. 91)). To the extent Plaintiff implies that this
Court’s decision contains factual findings to which the parties are bound, such implication is erroneous.
F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Norris v. Grosvenor Marketing Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 1285
(2d Cir. 1986)). “The ‘necessary implication’ requirement must be clearly met for a decision to
have collateral estoppel effect on an issue it does not explicitly address.” Fuchsberg &
Fuchsberg v. Galizia, 300 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2002).
At the final pretrial conference, the Court directed Plaintiff to file further briefing on this
issue.
F. Damages: Fringe Benefits, Lost Employment Opportunities, Medical
Expenses
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from testifying regarding lost fringe benefits as
damages on the ground that Plaintiff has not disclosed any documentary evidence or expert
testimony in support of such claim and that Plaintiff himself is “not qualified, to quantify, or
explain what these alleged benefits are.” (Dkt. No. 110, at 14). Defendant also seeks to preclude
Plaintiff from introducing evidence or testimony of lost employment opportunities and medical
expenses on the ground that he failed to provide such evidence as part of his initial disclosures
under Rule 26. (Dkt. No. 110, at 15–17 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii)). According to
Defendant, the only documentation Plaintiff provided was a table listing damages. (Dkt. No. 110,
at 16 (citing Dkt. Nos. 110-1, ¶ 4 (describing “damages spreadsheet provided by Plaintiff”); Dkt.
No. 110-3 (spreadsheet)).
Plaintiff responds that he can “testify to the fringe benefits that he received while at
SUNY Albany and therefore what he would have continued to receive” had his employment
continued. (Dkt. No. 123, at 25). Plaintiff further asserts that the Court can take judicial notice
under Rule 201(b)(2) that the University’s website “lists all available fringe benefits,” and that
trial witnesses Stark and Selchick, who were employed in the University’s HR department, can
testify to the benefits available in 2018. (Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2))). Regarding medical
expenses, Plaintiff asserts that he testified that he had incurred out-of-pocket medical expenses.
(Dkt. No. 110-6, at 202 (Plaintiff testifying that he incurred medical expenses but did not
“exactly remember” how much)). As to lost employment opportunities, Plaintiff testified that he
was a “finalist” for a deanship but that opportunity dissolved. (Dkt. No. 110-6, at 152). The
Court notes that Plaintiff’s Exhibit List does not contain any exhibits regarding fringe benefits,
lost opportunities, or medical expenses—although it does reference medical records. (See
generally Dkt. No. 131).
Defendant does not appear to dispute that lost benefits are available as a matter of law.
See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. United Health Programs of Am., Inc., No. 14-CV-
3673, 2017 WL 10088567, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2017) (finding, in Title VII action “that
evidence regarding lost benefits is important to plaintiffs’ claims because lost benefits are a
component of plaintiffs’ potential relief”). Instead, Defendant takes issue with the type of
evidence required to establish the amount of lost damages, arguing that expert evidence is
necessary. (Dkt. No. 110, at 14). However, the case Defendant cites in support of its argument,
Okraynets v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 555 F. Supp. 2d 420, 444–446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), (Dkt. No.
110, at 13–14), is unhelpful as it neither stands for the proposition that expert evidence is
required to prove lost benefits nor bears any factual or legal resemblance to this case. In
Okraynets the jury awarded the plaintiff, who was rendered a paraplegic in a work-place
accident, nearly $4 million in “future lost fringe benefits.” 555 F. Supp. 2d at 424–25. The court
observed that under New York law, proof of “economic loss, and future loss may be established
using expert testimony that assesses future probabilities.” Id. at 444 (emphasis added). Defendant
does not cite any case law establishing that expert testimony is required to establish lost benefits,
as a matter of law. While expert testimony may be required in cases where calculations are
complex, the Court has no basis for determining whether such complexity is present in this case.
Furthermore, based on the parties’ positions, as expressed in their briefing and at oral
argument, it is apparent that these issues require additional discussion and that Plaintiff has failed
to identify (and may have failed to disclose) specific evidence supporting these aspects of his
damages claim. Accordingly, the Court has directed Plaintiff to file additional briefing by June 5,
2025, with a response from Defendant due by June 19, 2025.
G. Punitive Damages
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from seeking punitive damages in this case on the
ground that the “sole remaining Defendant in this action” is a state agency. (Dkt. No. 110, at 14–
15). Plaintiff responds that he is not seeking punitive damages against Defendant. (Dkt. No. 123,
at 19 n.2). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion in limine regarding punitive damages is denied as
moot.
H. Previously Dismissed Claims
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from “introducing any evidence regarding
previously dismissed claims.” (Dkt. No. 110, at 17–18). Plaintiff responds that Defendant’s
motion is “unnecessary” as he acknowledges that “all other claims were dismissed and on[ly] the
Title IX claim remains, based on gender discrimination.” (Dkt. No. 123, at 38). Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion to preclude evidence of other claims is denied as moot.
I. Specific Dollar Amount
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from requesting “a specific dollar amount from the
jury.” (Dkt. No. 110, at 18–19). Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant’s motion in this
regard but stated at oral argument that he does not expect to request a specific dollar amount
from the jury. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to preclude the introduction of a specific dollar
amount is denied as moot.
J. Undisclosed Witnesses
Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from presenting witnesses who were not disclosed
during discovery. (Dkt. No. 110, at 19). Plaintiff responds that Defendant has not offered any
evidence of undisclosed witnesses and that the motion should therefore be denied. (Dkt. No. 123,
at 35). The Court agrees. Defendant’s motion to preclude Plaintiff from presenting undisclosed
witnesses at trial is denied as moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion in limine (Dkt. No. 110) is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that to the extent Defendant seeks to introduce trial testimony from
witnesses interviewed in connection with the joint Title IX Office/Human Resources
investigation, Defendant must submit a letter brief addressing the admissibility of any such
testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403 by August 4, 2025, and any response is due by
August 11, 2025; and it is further
ORDERED that in view of the parties’ disagreement regarding the admissibility of
Plaintiff’s medical records, (see Dkt. No. 131, at 9 (Plf’s Exhs. 56–62)), Defendant is directed to
submit a letter brief by August 4, 2025, identifying which exhibits it objects to and the basis for
its objection under the Federal Rules of Evidence and with citation to relevant caselaw. The
parties are further directed to provide the Court, by August 4, 2025, with copies of the medical
records in dispute, which may be filed as restricted medical records on ECF. Any response is due
by August 11, 2025; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's request, (Dkt. No. 140), for an extension of the deadline for
filing deposition designations and further briefing on the issues of collateral estoppel, lost
benefits, medical expenses, and lost opportunities, is GRANTED. Plaintiffs submissions on
these issues shall be filed by June 13, 2025, and any response is due by June 26, 2025.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 30, 2025
Syracuse, New York
Brenda K. Sannes
Chief U.S. District Judge
16