“As a prerequisite [for a § 1983 claim], a plaintiff ‘must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged.’ ”
How later courts described this case
- “As a prerequisite [for a § 1983 claim], a plaintiff ‘must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
DEMARCUS DEANTWON TAYLOR CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-cv-362 SEC P
#2024050096/57962
VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
STATE OF LOUISIANA ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Introduction
Demarcus Deantwon Taylor (“Plaintiff”), who is self-represented, filed this civil
rights action based on allegations of false arrest and defamation. He clarified in response
to a court order that the only defendants were (former) Sheriff Steve Prator and Deputy
Theressa Ruffin. Doc. 14. The court dismissed all claims against Sheriff Prator for lack
of any allegations of personal involvement. Docs. 21 & 25. Before the court is Deputy
Ruffin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 32) that challenges the claims against her
on the merits, raises qualified immunity, and argues that the claims are untimely. For the
reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion be granted based on the merits
attack.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A dispute
is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence so that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for either party. Anderson, supra; Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477
(5th Cir. 2000).
Relevant Facts
The facts relevant to summary judgment can be taken from certain uncontested
allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, as amended, and the declaration of Deputy Ruffin that
was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The relevant events began on August 22, 2020
when a Shreveport police officer encountered Plaintiff illegally parked in a handicap
parking spot. The officer arrested Plaintiff for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
and possession of Schedule II CDS. Plaintiff was booked into the Caddo Correctional
Center (“CCC”) on August 23, 2020 at 7:30 p.m.
Deputy Ruffin testifies that she was then employed by the Caddo Parish Sheriff in
the booking department at CCC. As part of Plaintiff’s booking process, another deputy ran
Plaintiff’s name to check for any open warrants. The search revealed an active arrest
warrant for Demarcus Deantwon Taylor dated July 14, 2020, issued by Judge Jeanette
Garrett, a Caddo Parish district judge, for charges of possession with intent to distribute
Schedule I and Schedule II CDS. Pursuant to policy, those two charges were added to the
charges on which Plaintiff was originally arrested, and he was also “arrested” on paper on
the two warrant charges. The sheriff’s office arrest report for the warrant charges was
prepared by another deputy.
Deputy Ruffin testifies that her only involvement with Plaintiff occurred when she
updated his charges in the computer per the sheriff’s office arrest report. At that time, she
confirmed that there was an open arrest warrant in the system. She had no actual contact
with Plaintiff or any other involvement in his criminal prosecution.
Plaintiff quickly bonded out of CCC on all pending charges on August 25, 2020.
Plaintiff alleges that he learned while out on bond that the arrest warrant should have been
for a Demarcus Dewayne Taylor. He asserts that he contacted CCC to inform them of this
mis-identity, but they did nothing.
Plaintiff’s criminal case proceeded, and defense counsel eventually filed a motion
to quash the warrant charges based on mistaken identity. Court minutes show that at a later
appearance in April 2024 the district attorney entered a dismissal of the warrant charges of
possession with intent to distribute Schedule I and Schedule II. Plaintiff states that he
entered a guilty plea on the charge of felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced
to ten years at hard labor. The drug possession charge stemming from the same arrest was
dismissed.
False Arrest
Plaintiff alleged that he was falsely arrested based on mistaken identity. He asserted
his claims in a complaint form made for asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “In order
to prevail in a § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that he was arrested
without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Parm v. Shumate, 513
F.3d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff must also show that Deputy Ruffin was personally
involved in his arrest. Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 291-92 (5th Cir. 2005)
(“As a prerequisite [for a § 1983 claim], a plaintiff ‘must identify defendants who were
either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally
connected to the constitutional violation alleged.’ ”).
It is not contested that there was a valid arrest warrant issued by the local state court
for a Demarcus Taylor. Plaintiff originally alleged that the warrant was for Demarcus
Dewayne Taylor but that he is Demarcus Deantwon Taylor. But after Deputy Ruffin filed
her motion for summary judgment with evidence showing that the warrant was entered in
the system under the name Demarcus Deantwon Taylor, Plaintiff filed a reply (Doc. 34)
and said that, after reading over Deputy Ruffin’s documents, he saw that a warrant did
issue for him. Plaintiff went on to speculate that a search warrant concerning Demarcus
Dewayne Taylor had somehow mistakenly resulted in the warrant issuing for Demarcus
Deantwon Taylor. Plaintiff then wrote:
I was told it’s the booking officer faught (sic) but reading your response, you
was only doing your job, my name was mixed up in something I had no
knowledge of, so it has to be the judge faught (sic) for signing a warrant to
search a house and the name wasn’t correct;
I apologize for anything I’ve caused you, but was only doing what I needed
to do to get the justice I deserve for receiving someone else’s charges, no one
else is responsible but the agent who was doing the investigation on that
house on Oakdale … cause my name shouldn’t have never been mentioned.
It appears now uncontested that Plaintiff was originally taken into custody by Shreveport
police for being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of drugs. Charges were
then added by the sheriff’s office based on a warrant issued in Plaintiff’s name, whether
correctly or by mistake. Deputy Ruffin played only a ministerial role in the events by
entering information into the computer system based on a facially valid warrant. There is
no indication that Plaintiff objected to Ruffin or anyone else at the time of booking that the
arrest warrant was based on some kind of mistake.
There is no factual or legal basis for a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against
Deputy Ruffin. “The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested.”
Baker v. McCollan, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695 (1979). And “[t]he Fourth Amendment is not
violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even if the wrong person is arrested, if the
arresting officer had a reasonable, good faith belief that he was arresting the correct
person.” Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1994).
Deputy Ruffin played only a minor administrative role in Plaintiff’s arrest on the
warrant charges. Even if she could be considered personally involved in the arrest, there
is no basis for finding a constitutional violation. The plaintiff in Baker was stopped for a
traffic violation and taken into custody, over his protest of mistaken identification, when a
warrant check revealed that he was wanted. It was eventually determined that the
plaintiff’s brother had obtained a duplicate of his driver’s license with the brother’s picture
on it and then was involved in criminal proceedings while falsely representing himself as
the plaintiff. It was determined after a few days that the plaintiff was not the guilty party.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no claim under the Fourth Amendment for
his three-day stay in jail because the arrest was made pursuant to a facially valid warrant
and the detention was of short duration.
By contrast, Plaintiff was taken into custody by an officer from another agency
based on gun and drug charges. The arrest warrant charges were added based on a warrant
that was issued in Plaintiff’s name. The record indicates that the arrest warrant was for
precisely Plaintiff’s name, not another name as he originally suspected and alleged. Even
so, Plaintiff did not spend one additional minute in jail based on the arrest warrant charges.
He was arrested on firearm and drug charges that resulted in his incarceration, and he would
not have spent any less time in custody if the warrant charges had never been made. These
facts do not provide any basis on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict finding
that Deputy Ruffin committed a Fourth Amendment violation. Summary judgment should
be granted dismissing all such claims against her.
Defamation
Plaintiff’s filings include references to a claim for defamation of character. His
complaint relies solely upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a claim only when federal
statutory or constitutional rights have been violated. Harm to reputation alone is
insufficient to establish Section 1983 liability because a damaged reputation alone does not
implicate any liberty or property rights protected by the Due Process Clause. Paul v. Davis,
96 S.Ct. 1155 (1976); Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1556 (5th Cir. 1988). While a
state may protect against injury to reputation by virtue of its tort law, ordinary claims of
libel, slander, or defamation are not cognizable under Section 1983. Longoria v. Remedies,
2024 WL 5278882 (W.D. La. 2024). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding defamation of his
character do not amount to a Section 1983 claim. Summary judgment should be granted
dismissing all such claims against Deputy Ruffin.
Accordingly,
It is recommended that Deputy Ruffin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 32)
be granted and that all claims against Deputy Theressa Ruffin be dismissed with prejudice.
Objections
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties
aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and
recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an
extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another
party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the
District Judge at the time of filing.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and
recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar
that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See
Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 30th day of April, 2025.
=|
Mark L. Hornsby
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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