Amaya v. Mitchell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DANIEL AMAYA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 21-CV-01707-SPM

MAC-SHANE FRANK, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

Defendants Mac-Shane Frank, Michael Bailey, and Warden John Barwick (in his

official capacity only).1 (Doc. 62). Pro se Plaintiff Daniel Amaya filed a Response (Doc.

64), to which the Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 65). Having been fully informed of

the issues presented, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Daniel Amaya is an inmate presently incarcerated at Illinois

River Correctional Center in Canton, Illinois. (See Doc. 1). The instant suit arises

from the loss of legal materials belonging to Plaintiff Amaya while he was

incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center—he claims that Defendants Frank

(a Lieutenant with Internal Affairs) and Bailey (a Correctional Officer) intentionally

1 As the Government indicates, Pinckneyville Correctional Center Warden Barwick is the successor in

interest to Warden David Mitchell. (See Doc. 62, p. 1 n.1). Warden Barwick was added to this lawsuit

in order to carry out any injunctive relief ordered by the Court. (See id., p. 1).

mishandled them in retaliation against him. (See Doc. 1, pp. 12, 14, 17–18, 23; Doc.

10, pp. 8–9 (citing the same)). Plaintiff Amaya alleges that the lost materials included

affidavits of individuals now deceased, two witness statements, receipts from an

investigation, immigration reports, and various other materials. (See Doc. 10, p. 8

(citing Doc. 1, pp. 17–18)).

Amaya filed a Complaint alleging eight claims against seventeen Defendants

on December 17, 2021. (Doc. 1). This Court conducted preliminary review in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed all of Amaya’s claims without

prejudice except for his First Amendment access to courts claim against Defendant

Bailey and his First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Bailey and

Frank. (See Doc. 10). This Court also retained the Warden of Pinckneyville

Correctional Center in his official capacity only in order to effectuate any injunctive

relief that may be ordered. (See id., p. 13).

The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 20, 2024.

(Doc. 62). Amaya filed a Response on January 17, 2025 (Doc. 64), to which the

Defendants filed a Reply on January 31, 2025 (Doc. 65).

APPLICABLE LAW AND LEGAL STANDARDS

The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014)

(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). Once the moving party has set forth the basis for

summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go

beyond mere allegations and offer specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–

23 (1986). Stated another way, the nonmoving party must offer more than

“[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts,” to establish a genuine issue

of material fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v.

Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).

In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the

evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.

Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A genuine issue of material fact arises

only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists to permit a jury to

return a verdict for that party.” Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 640–41

(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2008)).

The nonmovant cannot simply rely on its pleadings; the nonmovant must present

admissible evidence that sufficiently shows the existence of each element of its case

on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Midwest Imps., Ltd. v. Coval, 71

F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 596

(7th Cir. 1995); Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391,

394 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24).

ANALYSIS

I. First Amendment Access to Courts

“The First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of

grievances includes the right of access to the courts.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541,

553 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.

508, 510 (1972); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis–Marion Cnty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287,

1294 n.5 (7th Cir. 1996)). This right extends to prisoners. Id. (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405

U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 561 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner,

J., concurring)). “While the right of access to the courts requires prison officials to

provide prisoners with the necessary tools ‘to attack their sentences, directly or

collaterally,’ and ‘to challenge the conditions of their confinement,’ it is not an

abstract, freestanding right to legal assistance.” Id. (first quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 355 (1996); then quoting Lewis at 351). In order to succeed on an access to

courts claim, a prisoner “must submit evidence identifying ‘(1) a non-frivolous,

underlying claim; (2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and (3) a remedy that

may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a suit or

settlement.’” Jones v. Van Lanen, 27 F.4th 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Harer v.

Casey, 962 F.3d 299, 308 (7th Cir. 2020); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415

(2002)). Moreover, “[a] prisoner asserting a denial of access claim must show an

‘actual injury’ in the form of interference with a ‘nonfrivolous legal claim.’” Bridges,

557 F.3d at 553 (quoting Lewis at 353). “In other words, the right of access to the

courts is tied to and limited by a prisoner’s right to ‘vindication for a separate and

distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong.’” Id. (quoting Lehn v. Holmes, 364

F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 2004)).

The events in question occurred in November 2019. (See Doc. 62, p. 2 (citing

id., Ex. A, 11:17–25; 13:4–10)). On November 4, prior to being removed from

Pinckneyville Correctional Center on a writ of habeas corpus to Stateville

Correctional Center, Plaintiff was removed from his cell and taken to the property

office so that he could verify the property that was removed from his cell (as is

standard procedure). (See id. (citing id., Ex. A, 11:17–25; 12:1–9; 13:4–10; 13:13–14:9;

4:22–15:5)). Plaintiff Amaya states that Defendant Bailey did not verify the presence

of each legal document in the one box that was present and insists that he told Bailey

that there were three other boxes of legal documents in his cell. (See id. (citing id.,

Ex. A, 15:9–16:12)). Plaintiff Amaya subsequently signed the appropriate property

paperwork. (See id. (citing id., Ex. A, 16:7–9)). Amaya states that there was also legal

documentation in the law library that he was not able to obtain because it was closed

for the day. (See id., p. 3 (citing id., Ex. A, 19:17–20:8)). Amaya alleges that he was

told by a lieutenant to hold his additional paperwork and that it would be provided

to property in the morning; Amaya states that he gave this additional paperwork to

Defendant Bailey on November 5, 2019. (See id. (citing id., Ex. A, 19:17–20:8; 22:2–

16)).

Amaya alleges that, once he arrived at Stateville, he testified that he only

received some of his legal paperwork and asked the judge presiding over his hearing

to return him to Pinckneyville instead of being remanded to county jail. (See id. (citing

id., Ex. A, 25:20–27:2; 48:19–49:1)). Amaya was permitted to proceed on his post-

conviction petition and appealed the ruling. (See id. (citing id., Ex. A, 49:2–9)). Amaya

states that he received most, but not all of his paperwork back when he returned to

Pinckneyville; he filed a grievance about his missing property on November 22, 2019.

(See id., p. 4 (citing id., Ex. A, 27:12–28:2, 30:9–12; id., Ex. B, pp. 70–71); see Doc. 64,

Ex. D). The reviewing grievance officer reported that no legal documents were

reported on Amaya’s property paperwork, but that Amaya did sign for legal papers

to be placed in legal storage. (See Doc. 62 (citing id., Ex. B, pp. 68–71)). Additionally,

when Amaya returned to Pinckneyville, he signed paperwork indicating that there

were no discrepancies with his property. (See id. (citing id., Ex. B, pp. 68–71)).

Based on the factual details supra, Defendant Bailey argues that “Plaintiff’s

version of facts is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury

could believe it.” (Id., p. 7). Bailey insists that “[a]lthough Plaintiff may have lost his

post-conviction matter, he cannot show that any actual injury was attributable to his

not having specific legal documents at that relevant hearing.” (Id., p. 8). In opposition,

Amaya argues variously that he lost $25,000 worth of legal work (Doc. 64, p. 2 (citing

Doc. 62, Ex. A, 55:13–16)) and that he lost $30,000 worth of legal work (id., p. 64

(citing id., Ex. L)). He argues that his actual innocence claims were dismissed in his

post-conviction relief petition, but that his petition was permitted to move forward.

(Doc. 62, Ex. A, 46:15–48:17).

In Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 1998), Judge Easterbrook assessed

a similar access to courts claim. In Nance, the prisoner sued the prison’s properly

clerk after he arrived at Stateville prison missing some of his legal documents, some

of which were never recovered. Id. at 590. Assuming that the defendant “spitefully

misdirected Nance’s papers,” Judge Easterbrook wrote that “Illinois maintains a

system of courts that can provide compensation for torts, and the opportunity to

recover damages for a rogue guard’s wrongful conduct supplies all of the process that

is due. Id. at 591 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by Daniels

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531–36 (1984);

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990); Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387 (7th

Cir. 1990) (en banc)).

Judge Easterbrook continued, stating that “[w]hat makes an access-to-the-

courts claim distinctive is the remedy—equitable relief to restore access, or damages

to compensate for the loss of the underlying litigation.” Id. at 592. Additionally,

“[w]hen neither remedy is sought (or appropriate) the access claim should be treated

the same way as a simple lost-or-stolen-property claim.” Id. Notably, Nance

specifically mentions circumstances where “irreplaceable documents” are lost or

where “a claim of actual innocence has been thwarted” as being the core factors

involved in an access to courts claim. 147 F.3d at 592. Judge Easterbrook also writes

in Nance that “it might clarify matters to say that when the only relief sought is the

value of missing property the prisoner is not making an ‘access’ claim at all.” Id.

Moreover, “[i]f the injury in question is losing the underlying case, then Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) . . . holds that a damages remedy that necessarily

implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction (or the loss of good-time credits) is

impermissible while that conviction stands.” Id. at 591 (citing Edwards v. Balisok,

520 U.S. 641 (1997)); see also Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531, 532–33 (7th Cir. 1999)

(“The district court dismissed the suit on the authority of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477 (1994), which forbids a convicted person to seek damages on any theory that

implies that his conviction was invalid without first getting the conviction set aside,

which Hoard has not done.”).

Amaya argues that the loss of his legal documents resulted in the dismissal of

claims in his Illinois Court of Claims case (see Amaya v. State of Illinois, 22-CC-1098

(Ill. Ct. Cl. 2023); see also Doc. 64, Ex. K) and resulted in adverse action in a post-

conviction petition in his original criminal case (see State of Illinois v. Amaya, 12-CR-

1319 (Ill. Cir. Ct.)). (See Doc. 62, Ex. A, 46:15–48:17). That being said, his Complaint

expressly seeks “an investigation into all counts, and the return of all seized property

or monetary damages for said property.” (Doc. 1, p. 26). Moreover, he claims in his

Response to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment that “[d]amages are for

physical loss of property worth $25,000” (Doc. 64, p. 2 (citing id., Ex. A, 55:13–16)),

yet also claims in his Response that $30,000 worth of legal work was lost (id., p. 4

(citing id., Ex. L)). Amaya later claims that “Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the

false narrative counselor Rodely and Officer Bailey made that ‘. . . On the inventory

sheet completed on Nov. 4th Offender had zero legal documents to be sent out with

his writ bag . . .’ [sic].” (Id., p. 5 (citing id., Ex. D)). Amaya alleges that Defendant

Bailey’s behavior “demonstrates his deception in covering up his misdeeds.” (Id.

(citing id., Ex. A, 27:15–29:13)). He argues that “Defendant Bailey acted maliciously

outside the scope of his employment[,] impeded investigations and was the main

cause for the Denial of access to Courts for Plaintiff.” (Id., p. 6). He alleges that “[t]he

property lost included approximately $25,000 of legal documents . . . include[ing]

various reports and investigations including billing information and receipts for

services rendered that were needed to prove the $25,000.00 claim in the Court of

Claims case.” (Id.).

Based on Amaya’s testimony in his deposition (Doc. 62, Ex. A) compared with

his Complaint (Doc. 1) and his Response to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 64), it appears that he is alleging that the loss of his legal

documentation impacted both his underlying criminal case (No. 12-CR-1319) and his

Court of Claims property case (No. 22-CC-1098). He states in his deposition that he

cannot recover some of the documentation that was lost. (See Doc. 62, Ex. A, 46:15–

49:9). Recall that the Defendants argue that Amaya “cannot show that any actual

injury was attributable to his not having specific legal documents at that relevant

hearing.” (Doc. 62, p. 8). This matter, then, turns on whether Amaya can prove that

he suffered a concrete injury due to the fact that the Defendants allegedly failed to

send his legal documents to him.

In line with Nance and Hoard, this Court hold that Amaya’s access to courts

claims as related to his post-conviction hearing is barred by Heck. See State of Illinois

v. Amaya, No. 12-CF-1319 (Ill. Cir. Ct.). Amaya states in his deposition that he

“couldn’t proceed with that claim, the actual innocence claim that I had regarding

that particular issue.” (Doc. 62, Ex. A, 46:17–19). If Amaya intends to argue that his

conviction was invalid, he must have that conviction set aside before he can seek

damages on that same theory. See Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531, 532–33 (7th Cir.

1999) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). Regarding his Illinois Court of

Claims case, the Illinois Court of Claims opinion (Doc. 64, Ex. K) indicates that the

Court of Claims case in question was filed because of the same loss of property involved

in the instant suit. Put another way, Amaya cannot argue that the loss of the legal

documents in question impacted a case in which he brought suit for the loss of those

same documents. As an example, if one brought suit seeking damages for a missing

chair, one could not argue that the lawsuit was adversely impacted because of the

loss of that same chair that provided the legally cognizable injury for the lawsuit in

the first place. As Judge Easterbrook wrote in Nance, “[the Plaintiff] has two options,

which are not mutually exclusive: to seek damages in state court for the value of the

photocopies as ordinary personal property, and to initiate a collateral attack or

request for pardon concerning the judgment that rests on his guilty plea.” 147 F.3d

at 592. Amaya has already pursued the first option via his Court of Claims case. See

Amaya v. State of Illinois, No. 22-CC-1098 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 2023); (see also Doc. 64, Ex. K

(citing the same)). Thus, unless and until his conviction is vacated, he cannot seek

money damages via an access to courts claim.

Therefore, Amaya’s First Amendment access to courts claim does not survive

the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and must be dismissed.

II. First Amendment Retaliation

“[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an

individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” Lavite v. Dunstan,

932 F.3d 1020, 1031 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398

(2019)). “To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show

that (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) he suffered a deprivation

likely to deter his free speech; and (3) his protected speech was at least a motivating

factor for the deprivation.” Id. (citing Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir.

2008); Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006)). “To prevail on such a

claim, a plaintiff must establish a ‘causal connection’ between the government

defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff’s ‘subsequent injury.’” Nieves, 587

U.S. at 398 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006)). More “[s]pecfically,

it must be a ‘but-for’ cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff

would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. (citing Hartman, 547

U.S. at 260).

“To prove causation on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff may

rely on both direct and circumstantial evidence.” Lavite, 932 F.3d at 1031 (citing

Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2013); Kidwell v.

Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2012)). “Direct evidence is evidence which,

if believed by the trier of fact, will prove the particular fact in question without

reliance upon inference or presumption.” Id. (quoting Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 965).

“Circumstantial evidence may include suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written

statements, or behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the

protected group.” Id. (quoting Long v. Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys. of Ill., 585 F.3d 344, 350 (7th

Cir. 2009)).

The Defendants insist that Amaya has admitted that Defendant Frank

conducted at least two investigations into his complaints about Defendant Bailey’s

purported retaliation and harassment. (Doc. 62, p. 4 (citing id., Ex. A, 30:13–22)).

Amaya stated that he filed grievances against Defendant Bailey every month or every

few weeks. (Id. (citing id., Ex. A, 39:15–19)). Amaya alleges that Frank retaliated

against him, as well. (Id. (citing id., Ex. A, 53:21–25)).

On April 24, 2020, Amaya filed grievance 1146-04-20 PNK. (See Doc. 64, Ex.

E; id., Ex. M, p. 2). He alleged that Defendant Bailey gave him CL-20 headphones as

an attempted bribe to prevent Amaya from suing him. (Id., Ex. E). Internal Affairs

conducted an investigation and determined that Amaya had falsely accused Bailey of

a criminal act. (Id., Ex. F). Amaya was placed on investigative status and received a

disciplinary ticket. (Doc. 62 (citing id., Ex. A, 43:1–5)). The investigation determined

that the headphones in question were properly logged and forwarded to Amaya from

the Pinckneyville Commissary. (Doc. 64, Ex. F). Amaya was found guilty by the

Adjustment Committee at Pinckneyville on May 26, 2020. (Id., Exs. G, I). Notably,

the inmates Amaya requested to corroborate his narrative “provided no relevant

information.” (Id., Ex. I). After Amaya filed a grievance, the Administrative Review

Board expunged this ticket and removed it from Amaya’s record on February 26,

2021. (Doc. 62 (citing id., Ex. A, 44:23–45:4); Doc. 64, Ex. J). Warden Jeffrey Dennison

at Pinckneyville submitted the disorderly conduct investigation of Amaya to the

Illinois State’s Attorney’s Office in Perry County for possible criminal prosecution on

August 14, 2024. (Doc. 64, Ex. M; id., Ex. Q, p. 2). On March 7, 2022 The State’s

Attorney declined the case “due to the current status of the administrative sanctions,

etc., against the inmate involved.” (Id., Ex. Q, p. 1).

First, filing a lawsuit or grievance to contest prison conditions or treatment is

clearly protected by the First Amendment, meaning that Amaya meets the first prong

of the test. See Lavite v. Dunstan, 932 F.3d 1020, 1031 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Woodruff

v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008); Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716

(7th Cir. 2006)). The Defendants do not dispute this fact. (See Doc. 62, p. 9). They do

argue, however, that “Plaintiff cannot show that he suffered any deprivation that

would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future or that his grievances were

at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take any action.” (Id.). The

Defendants insist that Amaya fails to show that any of the alleged retaliation (that

“Defendant Bailey took his legal documents, made threats, attempted to incite

individuals in custody to harm Plaintiff, refused Plaintiff a property box for excess

legal work, and engaged in on-going harassment” (Id., pp. 9–10)) deterred his ability

to exercise his First Amendment rights via filing grievances.

Amaya argues that Defendants Frank and Bailey “acted in tandem to protect

each others conduct [sic] and to punish Plaintiff for filing grievances and contacting

outside agencies.” (Doc. 64, p. 8). Amaya argues that “Defendant Bailey and Frank’s

intimidation attempts worked” because he submitted nine grievances in 2019, forty-

six grievances in 2020, twenty-five in 2021, seven in 2022, and four in 2023. (Doc. 64,

p. 11 (citing id., Ex. N, pp. 272–84)). He argues that “Defendant Frank’s investigation

was conducted with the intentions of harming Plaintiff by charging him criminally,

it was meant to deter Plaintiff from filing grievances, communicating with outside

sources which would have brought light to the conduct done by Defendants.” (Id., p.

10).

The Seventh Circuit assessed a similar retaliation claim in Jones v. Van Lanen,

27 F.4th 1280 (7th Cir. 2022). Jones alleged that the defendant prison officer “had a

motive to retaliate by seizing the documents from inmate Jackson and thereby

lessening the chance of any complaint against him ever hitting a court’s docket.” Id.

at 1284. They held that “[w]ithout more, these facts—even when viewed in the light

most favorable to Jones—are not enough to survive summary judgment on a First

Amendment retaliation claim.” Id. (citing Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584, 587 (7th

Cir. 2013) (concluding that a prisoner’s verified complaint that provided only

“speculation regarding the officers’ motive” for destroying his legal documents could

not survive summary judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim)). The

Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]o conclude otherwise would risk countenancing the

inference that every prison official on the receiving end of a grievance harbors a

retaliatory motive against a complaining inmate” and that they were not aware “of

[any] authority permitting such a sweeping finding, at least not at the level of

generality at which Jones presses the point.” Id. Jones’s claims were able to survive,

however, because “[b]uried within the thousand pages of submitted evidence are

sworn declarations from two Green Bay inmates corroborating Jones’s account of the

retaliatory statements made by [the defendant].” Id. at 1284–85.

The same is not true in the instant case. None of the witnesses questioned

during the Internal Affairs investigation corroborated Amaya’s account of the

interaction with Defendant Bailey. (See Doc. 64, Ex. I). Amaya does not provide

affidavits or sworn testimony from witnesses that corroborate his version of events.

Also recall that that Amaya must provide evidence of “a deprivation likely to deter

his free speech.” Lavite v. Dunstan, 932 F.3d 1020, 1031 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing

Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008); Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d

711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006)). By the Court’s tabulation of Amaya’s Cumulative

Counseling Summary (Doc. 64, Ex. N), he filed some seventy-five separate grievances

between September 2019 and April 2023. Considering the above, Amaya cannot make

a colorable argument that his First Amendment rights were restricted such that he

could not file grievances when he filed an average of 1.75 grievances per month, even

if he filed fewer grievances in 2022 and 2023. Therefore, he has failed to meet the

second prong of the analysis.

The Seventh Circuit has noted that “argument is insufficient to avoid summary

judgment; the nonmoving party needs to come forward with evidence.” Beatty v. Olin

Corp., 693 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 839

n.2 (7th Cir. 2001); Scherer v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 975 F.2d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Amaya has failed to prove the second or third elements of his First Amendment

retaliation case—because Amaya has not demonstrated that there are genuine issues

of material fact sufficient to submit his First Amendment retaliation claims to a jury,

his second claims does not the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, either.

III. Qualified Immunity

The Defendants also argue that “[g]overnment officials performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages if their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known” (Doc. 62, p. 11 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 817, 818 (1982))). “Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once it

is raised the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it.” Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d

873, 877 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688

(7th Cir. 2001)). “To overcome qualified immunity, the facts viewed in the light most

favorable to [the plaintiff] must ‘show that the defendant[s] violated a constitutional

right’ and that ‘the right was clearly established at [that] time.’” Id. (quoting Estate

of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2017)). Notably, “It is not enough that

the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be clear enough

that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the

plaintiff seeks to apply.” Henry, 969 F.3d at 785 (quoting District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). “The right must be established not as a general

proposition but in a particularized manner so its contours are clear to a reasonable

official.” Id. (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012)).

The Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s description of the issues with

Defendants do not support a finding that his constitutional rights have been violated

[because] Plaintiff had meaningful access to the courts and cannot show any actual

injury to any of his lawsuits.” (Doc. 62, p. 11). They also argue that “Plaintiff cannot

show that he suffered any deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment

activity in the future or that his grievances were at least a motivating factor in the

Defendants’ decision to take any action.” (Id.). They insist that to find otherwise

“would establish a new standard for First Amendment access to the courts claim[s].”

(Id.). Amaya does not address the Defendants’ qualified immunity defense in his

Response besides stating that “[q]ualified immunity should not attach.” (Doc. 64, p.

11).

First, because neither of Amaya’s First Amendment claims survive, this Court

need not assess whether or not qualified immunity would apply. However, this Court

notes that this is not the “rare case” where the Defendants’ “conduct was ‘so egregious

and unreasonable’ that the constitutional violation was ‘patently obvious’ to any

reasonable official.” Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 354 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Jacobs

v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 2000); Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705

F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013)). As assessed supra, even viewed in the light most

favorable to him, Amaya’s First Amendment claims do not survive scrutiny and, thus,

fail the first prong in the qualified immunity analysis. As the Seventh Circuit has

held, when a plaintiff fails to prove that his or her rights were not violated, “here is

no need to analyze whether it was clearly established.” Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d

873, 882 (7th Cir. 2020).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants Mac-Shane Frank, Michael Bailey,

and Warden John Barwick’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 62) is GRANTED.

This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

close this case on the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 29, 2025

/s/ Stephen P. McGlynn_

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge