WADDELL v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

)

AARON WADELL, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) 1:23CV34

v. )

)

TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.

Aaron Wadell, et al. (“Plaintiffs”)1 brought this action pursuant to the North Carolina

Consumer Finance Act, the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and

North Carolina’s usury statutes against TitleMax of Virginia, Inc., TitleMax of South Carolina,

Inc., TMX Finance of Virginia, Inc., and TitleMax of Georgia, Inc., and TitleMax of

Tennessee, Inc. (“Defendants”). (See ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 22, 28, 41.) Before the Court is

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, or, in the Alternative, to

Transfer Venue. (ECF No. 31.) For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion will be

denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this action are, or were, residents of North Carolina who allegedly entered

into car title loan transactions with Defendants. (ECF No. 10 ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs allege that

1While Plaintiffs in this action exceeds one hundred individuals as outlined in the Complaint, (See ECF

Defendants charged interest rates on their car title loans that exceed the rate allowed by the

North Carolina Consumer Finance Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1, 53-164 to -191. (Id. ¶¶

22, 28.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants failure to disclose that the loan was unlawful

constitutes unfair and deceptive trade practices within the meaning of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-

180(g) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1. (Id. ¶ 41.)

This action began in state court and Defendants removed it to federal court on the

basis of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) On January 12, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their

Complaint with this Court. (See ECF No. 10.) In their Complaint, Plaintiffs state that this

Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants “in that at all times relevant to the events and

transactions alleged herein, Defendants, via the internet, cellular telephone and/or other media

and communication methods solicited, marketed, advertised, offered, accepted, discussed,

negotiated, facilitated, collected on, threatened enforcement of, and/or foreclosed upon

automobile title loans with Plaintiffs.” (Id. ¶ 4.)

In Defendants’ answer, they assert a lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense, and

subsequently Defendants jointly filed the instant Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of personal

jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 13 at 7; 31 at 1.) On October 5, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for

Jurisdictional Discovery to “provide a full record [in] response to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.” (ECF No. 42 at 1.) This motion was granted, and the parties conducted

jurisdictional discovery. (ECF No. 51 at 2–4.)

In the instant motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that this Court lacks personal

jurisdiction because Defendants do not “maintain contacts with North Carolina in connection

with any [of] Plaintiffs’ claims.” (ECF No. 32 at 3.) Defendants alternatively argue for this

Court to transfer venue to the district court where each of the designated Plaintiffs’ “title loan

was executed[,] and the loan funds were conveyed.” (Id. at 17.) The Court will address each

argument in turn.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A. Standard of Review

Here, the parties are in dispute regarding the burden of proof Plaintiffs must satisfy to

show that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs must show personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence and Plaintiffs

counter that they need only make a prima facie showing. (ECF Nos. 59 at 1; 57 at 7.)

In a challenge to personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction. Grayson v. Anderson,

816 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst

Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit

has stated that the plaintiff's burden of proof “varies according to the posture of [the] case

and the evidence that has been presented to the court.” Grayson, 816 F.3d at 268.

Where the court decides a pretrial personal jurisdiction question without conducting

an evidentiary hearing — “reviewing only the parties’ motion papers, affidavits attached to the

motion, supporting legal memoranda, and the allegations in the complaint”— “a plaintiff need

only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction” to overcome a jurisdictional

challenge. Id. Where, however, the parties have engaged in discovery on the issue of personal

jurisdiction and have submitted evidence beyond the pleadings, the court “must hold the

plaintiff to its burden of proving facts, by a preponderance of the evidence, that demonstrate

the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id.; see also, e.g., AARP v. Am. Family

Prepaid Legal Corp., 604 F.Supp.2d 785, 797 (M.D.N.C. Feb 25, 2009) (holding the plaintiff to

a preponderance of the evidence standard because the parties had engaged in jurisdictional

discovery).

Here, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery, (ECF No. 51

at 2–3), and jurisdictional discovery was conducted. As the Court will look to evidence outside

of the pleadings in resolving the issue of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs are required to

establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Grayson, 816 F.3d at

269 (finding that the preponderance of the evidence standard was correctly applied as “full

discovery had been conducted and the relevant evidence on jurisdiction had been presented

to the court”).

A “preponderance of the evidence . . . simply requires the trier of fact to believe that

the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” Concrete Pipe and Prods. of

California, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). “[I]f a court requires the plaintiff to establish

facts supporting personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence prior to trial, it must

conduct an evidentiary hearing.” Grayson, 816 F.3d at 268 (internal quotations omitted).

However, evidentiary hearings do not require live testimony. Id. Evidentiary hearings require

that both parties are given a fair opportunity to present relevant jurisdictional evidence and

their legal arguments. Id.; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Receiver for Rex Ventures Grp., LLC.,

730 F. App’x 133, 136 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

This Court does not find an evidentiary hearing necessary in this case as the parties

were permitted to conduct jurisdictional discovery that included submitting requests for

productions, taking depositions, and obtaining documentation relating to the loans. (ECF No.

51 at 2-3.) Additionally, the parties have extensively briefed the issue of personal jurisdiction.

(See ECF Nos. 32; 57; 59.) Thus, both sides have had a fair opportunity to present

jurisdictional evidence and their legal arguments. See Grayson, 816 F.3d at 268. As the Court

has now determined that Plaintiffs must establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of

the evidence, it will now address whether they have met their burden.

A. Discussion

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority

to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,

283 (2014) (citation omitted). A federal district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant only if “(1) such jurisdiction is authorized by the long-arm statute of

the state in which the district court sits; and (2) application of the relevant long-arm statute is

consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Universal Leather,

LLC. V. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Regarding the first prong, North Carolina’s long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction

over “nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.”

Christian Sci. Bd. Of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir.

2001) (citation omitted). The two-prong test, therefore, “merges into [a] single question,”

allowing the court to proceed directly to the constitutional analysis. Universal Leather, 773 F.3d

at 558–59, 559. Therefore, the question the Court must now determine is whether asserting

personal jurisdiction over Defendants is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., id.

Under the Due Process Clause, two paths permit a court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.

Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 559. General jurisdiction “permits a court to assert jurisdiction

over a defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit.” Walden, 571

U.S. at 283 n.6. “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction

is the individual’s domicile.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924

(2011) (citation omitted). “[F]or a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the

corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Id. at 924. The Supreme Court has “not

foreclose[d] the possibility that in an exceptional case, . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum

other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial

and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman,

571 U.S. 117, 139 n.19 (2014).

This Court finds that it lacks general jurisdiction over Defendants. In their Complaint,

Plaintiffs state that Defendants are “foreign corporations organized and existing under the

laws of a state other than North Carolina.” (ECF No. 10 ¶ 3.) Defendants are not

incorporated in North Carolina, nor do they have their principal place of business here. (See

id. ¶¶ 2, 3.) Therefore, Defendants are not fairly regarded to be at home in North Carolina.

See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. The Court will now turn to whether there is specific jurisdiction

over Defendants. See Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 559.

The second path to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant is specific

jurisdiction, which “depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying

controversy.’” Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 n.6. (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S.

at 919). Courts employ a three-prong test to determine whether the exercise of specific

jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due process. Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 559.

Courts consider “(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting activities in the forum state; (2) whether the plaintiff's claims [arose]

out of those activities; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally

reasonable.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tire Eng’g & Distrib., LLC v. Shandong Linglong

Rubber Co., Ltd., 682 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2012)).

The first prong, purposeful availment, is grounded in the concept of minimum contacts

and contemplates whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum [s]tate

are such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Fed. Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Inc., 886 F.2d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 1989)). To satisfy

the minimum contacts requirement for specific jurisdiction, “the contacts [must] proximately

result from actions by the defendant [itself] that create a substantial connection with the forum

State.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citations omitted).

Relevant to the analysis is the quality and nature of the defendant's connections, rather

than the number of contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Tire Eng’g, 682 F.3d

at 301. The relationship between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation “must arise

out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S. at

284 (quoting Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475). The defendant cannot “be haled into a jurisdiction

solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts . . . or of the ‘unilateral

activity of another party or a third person.’” Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler

Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.

408, 417 (1984)) (additional citation omitted).

The Fourth Circuit has noted that this analysis is “flexible” and involves a case-by-case

consideration of several factors. Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 560 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Tire Eng’g, 682 F.3d at 302). Those factors include, but are not limited to,

evaluating: “(1) whether the defendant maintains offices or agents in the forum state; (2)

whether the defendant owns property in the forum state; (3) whether the defendant reached

into the forum state to solicit or initiate business; (4) whether the defendant deliberately

engaged in significant or long-term business activities in the forum state; (5) whether the

parties contractually agreed that the law of the forum state would govern disputes; (6) whether

the defendant made in-person contact with the resident of the forum in the forum state

regarding the business relationship; (7) the nature, quality and extent of the parties'

communications about the business being transacted; and (8) whether the performance of

contractual duties was to occur within the forum.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

(citation omitted).

With respect to the first and second factors it is undisputed that Defendants do not

maintain an office or place of business in North Carolina, nor do Defendants own property

in North Carolina. (ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 2, 3.) However, the third factor applies here as this Court

finds that Defendants have reached into the forum state to solicit or initiate business. Plaintiffs

submitted dozens of declarations that state how Plaintiffs first learned about Defendants.

Many Plaintiffs indicate that they learned about Defendants by hearing about them on the

radio while in North Carolina. (ECF Nos. 58-3 ¶ 3; 58-9 ¶ 3; 58-25 ¶ 3; 58-26 ¶ 3; 58-30 ¶ 3.)

Others state that they learned about Defendants on the internet while they were in North

Carolina. (ECF Nos. 58-4 ¶ 3; 58-10 ¶ 3; 58-33 ¶ 3; 58-36 ¶ 3.) Or they heard about Defendants

from a television advertisement in North Carolina. (ECF Nos. 58-8 ¶ 3; 58-12 ¶ 3; 58-21 ¶ 3;

58-27 ¶ 3.)

While Defendants submit a declaration of a TMX Finance employee that states,

“[Defendants] never personally solicited, while physically present in North Carolina, any of

the named plaintiffs in the actions,” this does not contradict Plaintiffs’ assertions that they

were solicited via radio, television, and the internet. (ECF No. 32-2 ¶ 35.) Defendants

advertising to Plaintiffs manifests a general intent to do business with North Carolina

residents. Bassett v. Strickland’s Auto & Truck Repairs, Inc., 1:17CV590, 2018 WL 3542868, at *4

(M.D.N.C. July 23, 2018) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S.

102, 112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality op.); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

286, 295 (1980).

This Court also finds that Defendants deliberately engaged in significant or long-term

business activities in the forum state, the fourth factor. Defendants do not contest Plaintiffs

assertion that Defendants recorded liens with the North Carolina Department of Motor

Vehicles. Defendants instead argue that the recording of a vehicle lien in North Carolina is a

“de minimis interaction” as it requires “nothing more than filing a form.” (ECF No. 32 at 11

(citations omitted).)

A defendant “creat[ing] continuing obligations between [it]self and residents of the

forum” may give rise to specific jurisdiction. Purdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A., 814 F.3d 185, 190

(4th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

While recordation of the liens with the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles may

not by itself be enough to assert personal jurisdiction, in recording the lien and entering into

the loan agreements with Plaintiffs, Defendants created continued obligations between

themselves and residents of North Carolina. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 285 (upholding the

assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who “have purposefully reach[ed] out beyond their

State and into another by, for example, entering a contractual relationship that envisioned

continuing and wide-reaching contacts in the forum state.” (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).

Here, Defendants advertised to North Carolina customers, entered into lien

agreements with the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, and accepted continuing

payments from Plaintiffs residing in North Carolina. The Court finds that Defendants have

made sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina to support personal jurisdiction over

them by this Court. See Leake v. AutoMoney, Inc., 877 S.E.2d 22, 30, 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022)

(finding personal jurisdiction where Defendant called potential North Carolina borrowers,

offered loans over the phone to North Carolina residents, directed North Carolina residents

to travel out of state, accepted payments from North Carolina, sent collection letters into

North Carolina, and recorded liens with the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles).

As the Court has determined that Defendants have purposefully availed itself of the

privileges of conducting business in North Carolina, it will now move to the remaining factors

in the specific jurisdiction inquiry. See Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273,

278 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that “if and only if” the court finds plaintiff has satisfied the

purposeful availment prong, does the court need to consider the remaining prongs of the

specific jurisdiction test).

The second prong of the specific jurisdiction test asks whether Plaintiffs’ claims arose

out of Defendants’ activities in the state. Id. at 278–79 (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs’

claims allege that Defendants charged interest rates exceeding the maximum amount allowable

under state law, that Defendants failed to “properly and legally record liens,” and that

Defendants failed to disclose unlawful loans. (ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 21–46.) These claims arise out

of Defendants contacts with the state as Defendants contacts all relate to entering into loan

agreements with Plaintiffs.

The third and final prong of the specific jurisdiction test, that the exercise of personal

jurisdiction be constitutionally reasonable, has also been proven by Plaintiffs. Consulting Eng’rs,

561 F.3d at 279. This prong permits a court to consider additional factors related to the

appropriateness of the forum. These factors include: “(1) the burden on the defendant of

litigating in the forum; (2) the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the

plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the shared interest of the

states in obtaining efficient resolution of disputes; and (5) the interests of the states in

furthering substantive social policies.” Id.

The Court finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally reasonable

as the forum is appropriate. First, Defendants do not have a significant burden if they were

to litigate in this forum, and Defendants do not argue that there is one. (See ECF No. 32.)

Additionally, Plaintiffs’ claims arise under the consumer protection laws of North Carolina

giving this forum a large interest in adjudicating the dispute. (See ECF No. 10.)

In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of proving that

this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants by a preponderance of the evidence.

Accordingly, Defendants motion to dismiss is denied.

III. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

Defendants moved in the alternative to transfer venue pursuant to 1404(a). (See ECF

No. 32 at 17.) Defendants argue that this action should be transferred to the “appropriate

district court encompassing the TitleMax location where that Plaintiff’s title loan was executed

and the loan funds were conveyed.” (Id.) Defendants submitted charts outlining the district

court they believe each Plaintiff’s case should be transferred. (ECF No. 32-2 at 8–18.) They

move for the actions to be transferred to several district courts located throughout Virginia,

South Carolina, Tennessee, and Georgia. (Id.) Plaintiffs counter that piecemealing their

actions and transferring the matter to different districts “does not serve efficiency or justice.”

(ECF No. 57 at 19.) This Court agrees with Plaintiffs.

The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) states in relevant part: “[f]or the convenience of parties

and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any

other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In this

Circuit, a four-factor standard governs § 1404(a) motions. Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l

Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 444 (4th Cir. 2015). Courts consider “(1) the

weight accorded to plaintiff's choice of venue; (2) witness convenience and access; (3)

convenience of the parties; and (4) the interest of justice” (hereinafter “the Pipefitters factors”).

Id. “Ultimately, the party seeking transfer has the burden of persuasion.” Davis v. Stadion

Money Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:19CV119, 2019 WL 7037426, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2019)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

Regarding the first element, this Court affords substantial weight to the Plaintiffs’

choice of venue. Pipefitters, 791 F.3d at 444 (citation omitted); see also Speed Trac Tech., Inc. v.

Estes Express Lines, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 799, 803 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2008) (citing In re Carefirst

of Md., Inc., 305 F.3d 253, 260 (4th Cir. 2002)). This is especially true when plaintiff’s chosen

forum is the plaintiff’s home or has a significant relationship with the cause of action. See

Campbell v. Apex Imaging Servs., Inc., Nos. 1:12CV1366, 1:12CV1365, 2013 WL 4039390, at *3

(M.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s choice, however, receives less weight

if the suit is filed in a foreign forum or the cause of action bears little relation to the chosen

forum. Speed Trac Techs., 567 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (citations omitted).

Defendants argue that since “none of the conduct complained of occurred in the forum

and the forum has no connection with the cause of action,” Plaintiffs’ choice of forum should

be given little weight. (ECF No. 32 at 17.) However, the cause of action does bear relation

to the chosen forum as Plaintiffs, at the time these allegations occurred, resided in North

Carolina, were solicited to enter into loan agreements from North Carolina, and paid

Defendants from North Carolina. Defendants’ argument that the “content of the loan

agreements” occurred entirely outside this forum is unpersuasive. (Id.)

The second and third Pipefitters factors require this Court to consider the convenience

of this District for the witnesses and parties. See Pipefitters, Inc., 791 F.3d at 444 (citations

omitted). “[E]ven though a defendant may be inconvenienced by litigating an action in a

plaintiff's home district, a transfer is not appropriate where it would likely only serve to shift

the balance of inconvenience from the plaintiff to the defendant.” comScore, Inc. v. Integral Ad

Sci., Inc., 924 F.Supp.2d 677, 687 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(citations omitted).

Defendants do not provide sufficient factual evidence to show that they will suffer

inconvenience by litigating in this District, nor do they show why splitting up this case

throughout several different states would be more convenient for Plaintiffs. Defendants argue

that since “no Defendant is located within North Carolina . . . there is no evidence, physical

premises, or witnesses within the forum.” (ECF No. 32 at 18.) This Court does not find this

argument persuasive. Additionally, access to tangible evidence and witnesses, is less of a

barrier today for litigation because of modern technology. See Wyandotte Nation v. Salazar, 825

F.Supp.2d 261, 271 (D.D.C. 2011). Further, a transfer of venue would heavily burden

Plaintiffs given that Plaintiffs would possibly need to find counsel to represent them in the

other districts.

Finally, for the fourth Pipefitters factor, the interest of justice, weighs heavily against

Defendants. See Pipefitters, Inc., 791 F.3d at 444 (citations omitted). In examining this factor,

this Court considers “the pendency of a related action, the court's familiarity with the

applicable law, docket conditions,” and other factors related to systemic integrity and judicial

economy. Menk v. MITRE Corp., 713 F.Supp.3d 113, 139 (D. Md. 2024) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (citations omitted).

The interest of judicial economy is a significant factor in this case as many Plaintiffs

have filed suits against Defendants in this District and this Court is very familiar with the case.

Additionally judicial efficiency would be affected if the Court were to split these Plaintiffs

amongst several different states and several different district courts as Defendants suggest.

Plaintiffs have filed almost identical Complaints, and the risk of inconsistent judgments arises

from trying these cases separately. See, e.g., Bluestone Innovations, LLC v. LG Elecs., Inc., 940

F.Supp.2d 310, 320 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2013).

In weighing the factors, the Court finds that the balance of hardships would be borne

by Plaintiffs’ if the case were transferred to separate districts. See, e.g., Collins v. Straight, Inc.,

748 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that unless when weighing the factors this Court

finds the balance of hardships is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of

forum should not be disturbed) (citation omitted). Therefore, this Court finds that

Defendants have not met its burden to prove that transfer of venue is warranted here, and

Defendants motion in the alternative to transfer venue is denied.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following:

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No.

31), is DENIED.

This, the 29th day of May 2025.

/s/ Loretta C. Biggs

Senior United States District Judge