Joseph v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MECHALLE JOSEPH,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

23-CV-4562(EK)

-against-

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Mechalle Joseph challenges the Social

Security Administration’s denial of her claim for disability

insurance benefits. Joseph is proceeding pro se. Before the

Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the

pleadings. Joseph argues that the administrative law judge

failed to develop the record, and therefore seeks remand or an

order of benefits. The Commissioner, on the other hand, seeks

affirmance of the denial order. For the following reasons, I

grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny Joseph’s motion.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

In October 2019, Joseph applied for disability

benefits, alleging a disability onset date of June 26, 2018.

Administrative Tr. (“Tr.”) 216, ECF No. 9.1 The agency denied

her claim. Id. at 137, 149. On June 22, 2021, administrative

law judge (“ALJ”) Mark Solomon held a hearing on Joseph’s claim.

Id. at 53. The ALJ then held a supplemental hearing on

September 10 of that year. Id. at 31. The ALJ concluded that

Joseph was not disabled and therefore not entitled to disability

benefits. Id. at 16. The Appeals Council denied Joseph’s

request for review of the ALJ’s decision, rendering it final.

Id. at 1. Joseph timely sought review of that decision in this

Court.

B. The ALJ’s Disability Evaluation

Under the Social Security Act, “disability” is defined

as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Administration’s

regulations require ALJs to follow a five-step sequence in

evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is

engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). If not, then at step two, the ALJ

1 Page numbers in citations to the Administrative Transcript refer to

the native pagination, not the ECF pagination.

evaluates whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” — that

is, an impairment or combination of impairments that

“significantly limits” the claimant’s “physical or mental

ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). If

the ALJ identifies a severe impairment, then at step three, she

must determine whether it meets or equals one of the impairments

listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations (the “Listed

Impairments”). Id. § 404.1520(d); id. pt. 404, subpt. P,

app. 1. If it does, the ALJ will deem the applicant disabled.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

Here, the ALJ determined that Joseph had not engaged

in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date.

Tr. 17. The ALJ also determined that Joseph suffered from

several severe impairments: degenerative disease of the cervical

and lumbar spines, right shoulder arthritis, and post-traumatic

stress disorder. Id. at 18. However, the ALJ concluded that

none of these severe impairments rose to the level of a Listed

Impairment. Id.

When an ALJ finds that the claimant has severe

impairments that do not meet or equal the Listed Impairments, he

or she must determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”), which is the most a claimant can do in a work setting

notwithstanding her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).

The ALJ concluded here that Joseph had the RFC to perform “light

work” subject to certain limitations. Tr. 19. Those

limitations include restrictions on sitting or standing for more

than six hours per day, lifting or carrying more than twenty

pounds, and stooping or crawling more than “occasional[ly].”

Id.

At step four, the ALJ considers whether the claimant

could perform “past relevant work” in light of the RFC

determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). Here, the ALJ found

that Joseph could not perform her past work as a security guard

or maintenance worker. Tr. 24.

At step five, the ALJ evaluates whether the claimant

could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the

national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). At this step,

unlike the prior steps, the burden is on the Commissioner.

Heagney-O’Hara v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 646 F. App’x 123, 127 (2d

Cir. 2016). The ALJ determined that Joseph could perform such

jobs, including as a hand packager, production worker, or

production inspector. Tr. 23-25. Given that conclusion, the

ALJ concluded that Joseph was not disabled. Id. at 25.

II. Standard of Review

A district court has jurisdiction to review the final

judgment of the Commissioner denying an application for Social

Security disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The review

is limited to two questions: whether substantial evidence

supports the Commissioner’s decision, and whether the

Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Moran v.

Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009).

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burgess v.

Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008).2 “[I]f supported by

substantial evidence,” the Commissioner’s factual findings

“shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

III. Discussion

A. Joseph’s Cross-Motion3

Joseph raises only one argument in her cross-motion.

She claims that the ALJ sent subpoenas for two of her medical

providers to the wrong addresses. Pl.’s Ltr. in. Opp. to Gov’t

Mot. for J. on Pleadings 2, ECF No. 12. That is, she suggests

that the ALJ failed to develop the administrative record. See

Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (courts

construe pro se filings to “raise the strongest arguments that

they suggest”). The providers in question were Brooklyn Cancer

2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

3 Joseph does not label her filing as a cross-motion. However, she

requests that the Court “grant [her] the relief [she has] wrongly been

denied.” Pl.’s Ltr. in Opp. to Gov’t Mot. for J. on Pleadings 2. Given the

obligation to construe pro se filings liberally, the Court construes Joseph’s

opposition brief as a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. Okolo v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-CV-4273, 2015 WL 5781417, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

30, 2015).

Care (where Joseph received infusions to treat an iron

deficiency) and APOS Therapy (where Joseph was evaluated for

“special orthopedic shoes”). Tr. 36, 62. Joseph does not

explain what, if any, further light these providers’ records

would have shed on the nature of her impairments. Nevertheless,

she requests either an order of benefits or, alternatively, a

remand to the Commissioner for reconsideration. Pl.’s Ltr. in.

Opp. to Gov’t Mot. for J. on Pleadings 2.

As set out below, the record does not suggest that the

ALJ sent the subpoenas to the wrong address. And the ALJ made

reasonable efforts to develop the administrative record. So,

the Court denies Joseph’s cross-motion.

1. The Subpoenas Appear Properly Addressed

In ruling on a claim for disability benefits, an ALJ

“has an affirmative obligation to develop the administrative

record.” Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). In

doing so, the ALJ must develop a claimant’s “complete medical

history” for at least the preceding twelve months, and make

“every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical

evidence from [the claimant’s] own medical sources.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.912(b)(1). This obligation is even more pronounced when

the plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d

8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990).

When an ALJ sends a subpoena to the wrong address, and

thereby fails to obtain medical records from a source identified

by the claimant, he violates his duty to develop the

administrative record. Walton v. Saul, No. 18-CV-4306, 2019 WL

13222734, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2019); accord Jones v.

Berryhill, No. 16-CV-6042, 2017 WL 2222245, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. May

22, 2017). A failure to develop the administrative record may

be grounds for remand. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 (2d

Cir. 1999).

Here, however, nothing in the record or briefing

suggests that the ALJ sent the Brooklyn Cancer Care subpoena to

the wrong address. The subpoena was addressed to 672 Utica

Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Tr. 211. That is the same

address that Joseph gave the ALJ. Tr. 68. It is also the same

address that appears on the letters from Brooklyn Cancer Care

that Joseph submitted with her responsive briefing.4 Pl.’s Ltr.

in. Opp. to Gov’t Mot. for J. on Pleadings 3. Furthermore,

Joseph identifies no alternative address to which the subpoenas

should have gone. Id. at 2. Accordingly, the Court cannot

conclude that the ALJ subpoenaed Brooklyn Cancer Care at the

wrong address.

4 Some of these letters identify the organization as Brooklyn Cancer

Center Medical P.C. See Pl.’s Ltr. in. Opp. to Gov’t Mot. for J. on

Pleadings 3. But other letters, which bear the name of the same physician as

the first set of letters, use the name “[B]rooklyn [C]ancer [C]are,” which

implies that the two names are interchangeable. See, e.g., id. at 7-10.

The Court cannot conclude that the ALJ misaddressed

the APOS subpoena either. That subpoena was addressed to 300

Park Avenue in Manhattan. Tr. 208. This is the address listed

for “AposCare NYC” on the AposHealth website.5 See Jones, 2017

WL 2222245, at *2 (comparing subpoena address with addresses

available on provider’s website); James v. Venture Home Solar,

LLC, 715 F. Supp. 3d 203, 211 n.5 (D. Conn. 2024) (taking

judicial notice that a company’s street address on a contract

matched the one appearing online). And when the ALJ followed up

by telephone, the answering employee did not say that the

subpoena had gone to the wrong address. Tr. 349. On the

contrary, the employee said he “would check to see if it was

received and assist in processing.” Id. So, the ALJ received

no indication that he had sent the subpoena to an incorrect

address. Moreover, Joseph again identifies no alternative

address to which the subpoena should have gone. Thus, there is

nothing in the record to suggest that the APOS subpoena was

misdirected.6

There is one potential complication here. In her

briefing, Joseph included medical records from a physical

therapy provider called Hands of Hope PT PC. Pl.’s Ltr. in.

5 See https://www.aposhealth.com/locations/#New-York.

6 As explained in more detail below, the ALJ’s follow-up efforts were

sufficient under prevailing Social Security regulations.

Opp. to Gov’t Mot. for J. on Pleadings 31. Those records

indicate that Joseph received “AposTherapy treatment” at Hands

of Hope, which is located at 1423 Bedford Avenue in Brooklyn.

Id. Therefore, it is possible that when Joseph told the ALJ

that she received “APOS physical therapy,” Tr. 61, she was not

referring to a clinic or treatment facility called “APOS

Therapy” (or some variant thereof). Rather, she was referring

to a type of treatment that she was receiving at Hands of Hope.

In other words, it is possible that Joseph inadvertently

conflated the type of treatment she was receiving with the

provider of that treatment. If that is the case, then it is

conceivable that the ALJ’s subpoenas should have gone to 1423

Bedford Avenue (i.e., where Hands of Hope is located), not 300

Park Avenue.

Still, it is Joseph’s responsibility — not the ALJ’s —

to identify her “medical source[s].” See 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.912(a)(1)(i). And despite diligent questioning by the

ALJ, Joseph consistently stated that she received physical

therapy from “APOS” or “APOS physical therapy.” See, e.g.,

Tr. 36, 51, 61. Nothing in the administrative record indicated

that Joseph was a patient at Hands of Hope, and Joseph cannot

now fault the ALJ for failing to subpoena a treating source that

she never identified. See Brown v. Colvin, 47 F. Supp. 3d 180,

188-89 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (rejecting claim that ALJ failed to

develop the record by not obtaining opinions from treating

physicians, because plaintiff “ha[d] not identified a treating

source for the Commissioner to contact”).

Moreover, when a claimant appends new evidence to her

appeal to the district court, the court may only order the

government to consider that evidence “upon a showing that [it]

is material and that there is good cause for the failure to

incorporate such evidence in the record in a prior proceeding.”

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Fox v. Barnhart, 137 F. App’x 395,

396 (2d Cir. 2005). Joseph has not shown good cause for her

failure to notify the ALJ that Hands of Hope was a treatment

source. Nor has she shown that the records from Hands of Hope

were material — that is, that there was a “reasonable

possibility” that they would have changed the ALJ’s ruling. See

Fox, 137 F. App’x at 396. Thus, the possibility that the ALJ

could subpoena Hands of Hope does not justify a remand here.

2. The ALJ Made Reasonable Efforts to Develop the

Record

The ALJ ultimately did not receive records from

Brooklyn Cancer Care or APOS. But absent any evidence that the

subpoenas were misaddressed, we need only ask whether the ALJ

made “every reasonable effort” to obtain those records. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.912(b)(1). He did.

An ALJ satisfies the “every reasonable effort”

obligation by making an initial request and, if the requested

records are not forthcoming, making a follow-up request at some

point between ten and twenty calendar days after the initial

request. Id. § 416.912(b)(1)(i). ALJ Solomon satisfied this

requirement. He sent the initial evidentiary requests on June

3, 2021. Tr. 618, 623. Then he sent follow-up requests on June

15 — a week before the initial hearing. Id. at 639, 642. He

followed up again by issuing subpoenas on October 25. Id. at

208, 211. And then he called APOS and Brooklyn Cancer Care

directly on November 30 to inquire about the status of the

subpoenas. Id. at 349, 351. Clearly, the ALJ did not abdicate

his duty to develop the administrative record.

For these reasons, Joseph’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings is denied.

B. The Government’s Cross-Motion

Joseph has not responded to the substantive arguments

outlined in the government’s cross-motion for judgment on the

pleadings. However, the Court cannot accept the government’s

arguments simply because Joseph did not address them. Rather,

it must “review the record and determine whether the

[government] has established that the undisputed facts entitle

it to judgment as a matter of law.” Samuels v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 16-CV-5507, 2019 WL 2526943, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 21,

2019); see also Polanco v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 304 F. Supp. 3d

345, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (”Where, as here, the Court is

presented with an unopposed motion, it may not find for the

moving party without reviewing the record and determining

whether there is a sufficient basis for granting the motion.”).

Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that

the ALJ both applied the correct legal standard and reached a

conclusion supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ properly

applied the five-step process outlined above. See Tr. 17-25.

And substantial evidence supported his findings at each step.

At step one, the ALJ reasonably found that Joseph was

not engaged in substantial gainful activity. Joseph earned only

$6,000 from self-employment in the year after the alleged onset

of her disability. Id. at 17, 60. She also testified that she

was unemployed and spent her days visiting her mother, friends,

and children. Id. at 63.

At step two, the ALJ surveyed extensive medical

evidence suggesting the “severe impairments” of “degenerative

disease of the cervical and lumbar spines,” “right shoulder

arthritis,” and “post-traumatic stress disorder.” Id. at 18-23.

Furthermore, at step three, the ALJ reasonably

concluded that these impairments did not rise to the level of

the Listed Impairments. The closest physical Listed Impairments

were Sections 1.15 and 1.16, which deal with skeletal spine

injuries. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. But those

Listed Impairments require (1) a documented need for a two-

handed mobility device or (2) an inability to use one (or, in

the case of Section 1.15, both) of the upper extremities for

work activities involving “fine and gross movements.” Id.;

Tr. 18. As the ALJ reasonably concluded, the record did not

suggest that these requirements had been met.7 See, e.g., Tr.

65, 603-05.

As for mental Listed Impairments, the closest

candidates were for depressive disorders (12.04), anxiety and

obsessive-compulsive disorders (12.06) and trauma and stressor-

related disorders (12.15). Id. at 18. But while Joseph’s

psychiatric evaluations revealed that she suffered from

“dysphoric moods, crying spells, irritability, . . . and

fatigue,” they also found that these symptoms did not interfere

with her “ability to function on a daily basis.” Id. at 452-54.

And Joseph admitted she had no problem following instructions or

getting along with others. Id. at 269. So, her mental symptoms

did not result in the “extreme limitation of one, or marked

limitation of two, of the four areas of mental functioning”

7 For the same reason, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Joseph’s

shoulder injuries did not meet the requirements for any relevant Listed

Impairment. Tr. 18.

necessary to satisfy the requirements of these Listed

Impairments. Id. at 18-19; 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1.

Accordingly, at step four, the ALJ reasonably

concluded that while Joseph could not perform her prior work as

a security guard or maintenance worker, she could perform “light

work” that involved “simple instructions and decisionmaking.”

Tr. 19-24. This RFC conclusion was consistent with those of

state medical consultants, as well as the record as a whole.

See, e.g., id. at 93, 112-17.

Finally, at step five, the ALJ reasonably relied on

the testimony of the Commissioner’s vocational expert to

conclude that Joseph could perform jobs existing in significant

numbers in the national economy. Id. at 24-25; see also id. at

45-50, 344-46.

In sum, because the ALJ applied the appropriate legal

standard and reached a conclusion supported by substantial

evidence, his decision must be affirmed.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the government’s

cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. Joseph’s

cross-motion is denied. The Clerk of Court is respectfully

directed to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State

s District Judge

D ated: May 27, 2025

Brooklyn, New York