LEIPHART v. WARRICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER A. LEIPHART,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25cv547-TKW-HTC

STEVEN WARRICK, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________/

ORDER and

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Christopher A. Leiphart, proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to a shelter hearing in state court1 (Doc.

1) and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4). After reviewing Leiphart’s

complaint, the undersigned concludes this case should be DISMISSED as frivolous

because: (1) his damages claim against Judge Warrick is barred by absolute judicial

immunity; and (2) Santa Rosa County is not responsible for the acts of Judge

Warrick.2 In addition, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be denied.

1 Leiphart also filed exhibits related to the state court proceeding. Doc. 3.

2 Although federal courts may abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37 (1971) when a federal action interferes with ongoing state proceedings that implicate

important state interests, dismissal is appropriate here because Leiphart’s damages claims are

frivolous. See Marts v. Hines, 68 F.3d 134, 135 (5th Cir. 1995) (when considering whether to stay

or dismiss a damages claim under Younger, a district court should make “the threshold

determination whether the action is frivolous”).

I. Background

Leiphart sues two Defendants: (1) Circuit Court Judge Steven Warrick; and

(2) Santa Rosa County. His complaint sets forth the following factual allegations.

On April 24, 2025, Leiphart filed an “emergency verified motion for

temporary injunctive relief and protective order” in Santa Rosa County Juvenile

Dependency Case No. 2025 DP 29. The motion: (1) challenged “unlawful shelter

actions” initiated by the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) and the Santa

Rosa County Sheriff’s Office; and (2) sought to protect Leiphart’s child from an

unconstitutional seizure.

Judge Warrick failed to consider or rule on Leiphart’s emergency motion

before convening a shelter hearing on April 25, 2025. At the hearing, Judge Warrick

did not provide Leiphart a meaningful opportunity to be heard, did not rule on his

emergency motion, and did not require the State to present verified evidence of

imminent danger. Instead, Judge Warrick “reversed the burden of proof” and

required Leiphart to disprove unfounded allegations. The hearing resulted in

Leiphart’s child being “unlawfully” seized by law enforcement and DCF agents.

Based on the foregoing, Leiphart alleges the Defendants violated his due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. As relief, he seeks $5 million in

damages.

II. Legal Standard

By moving to proceed in forma pauperis, Leiphart has invoked the screening

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Whitted v. Sarasota Mem’l Hosp.,

2024 WL 4392784, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2024) (construing a pro se litigant’s

“failure to pay the filing fee as a request to proceed in forma pauperis” when

screening and dismissing his complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss Leiphart’s

complaint, or any portion thereof, if it determines it is frivolous or malicious, fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

III. Discussion

A. Judge Warrick is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

“A judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for actions

taken while acting in [the judge’s] judicial capacity, unless [the judge] acted in the

‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Higdon v. Tusan, 746 F. App’x 805, 810 (11th

Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The immunity applies even if the judge “made a

mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded his authority.” McCullough v. Finley, 907

F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

Here, Leiphart argues Judge Warrick acted in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction because he refused to rule on Leiphart’s emergency motion before

authorizing officials to take custody of the child, refused to give Leiphart a

meaningful opportunity to be heard at the shelter hearing, and shifted the burden of

proof to Leiphart. However, a judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction only

“if the matter upon which []he acts is clearly outside the subject matter jurisdiction

of the court over which []he presides.” Higdon, 746 F. App’x at 810-11 (noting

“[s]ince questions of subject matter jurisdiction often are difficult, ‘the scope of [a]

judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of

the judge’”). “A finding of judicial immunity depends on whether: (1) the act

complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the

judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending

before the judge; or (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge

in [his] judicial capacity.” Id. at 811 (citing Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070

(11th Cir. 2005)).

Leiphart’s allegations make it clear Judge Warrick is entitled to absolute

judicial immunity. First, Florida law provides a circuit court judge such as Judge

Warrick has jurisdiction to hold a shelter hearing. See Fla. Stat. § 39.402(6)(a) (“The

circuit court, or the county court if previously designated by the chief judge of the

circuit court for such purpose, shall hold the shelter hearing.”). Second, the acts

Leiphart complains of—determining when to rule on motions, what evidence should

be presented, and who has the burden of proof—are normal judicial functions. See

Cox v. Mills, 465 F. App’x 885, 887 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he misconduct that Cox

alleged below and now argues on appeal—that the state court judges held hearings,

disposed of motions, and made recusal decisions—are all, by their nature, normal

judicial functions.”).

The acts Leiphart complains about also: (1) occurred in open court at the

shelter hearing; (2) involved a dependency case pending before Judge Warrick; and

(3) arose out of a visit to Warrick in his judicial capacity. Thus, even if Judge

Warrick made legal errors or failed to follow certain provisions of state law, he is

entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-

57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took

was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will

be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all

jurisdiction.’”). Leiphart’s claim against Warrick, therefore, is frivolous and must

be dismissed.

B. Santa Rosa County is not responsible for the acts of Judge Warrick.

“A county is liable under § 1983 if one of its ‘customs, practices, or policies’

was the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional injury.” Grochowski v. Clayton

County, 961 F.3d 1311, 1321 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “To prevail on such

a claim, ‘a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2)

that the [County] had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to

that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.’” Id.

(quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Here, Leiphart alleges that Santa Rosa County: (1) through its customs or

policies, “allowed or failed to prevent” the “unlawful judicial practices” of Judge

Warrick, which constitutes “deliberate indifference to the rights of litigants in

dependency proceedings”; and (2) “failed to adequately supervise, monitor, or

discipline judges and officers under its authority, permitting the deprivation of due

process rights of parents and children.”

As an initial matter, these allegations regarding Santa Rosa County are

conclusory and insufficient to support a municipal liability claim under §1983. See

Holt v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 747 F. App’x 832, 833 (11th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal

of § 1983 municipal liability claim where plaintiff “had pled only conclusory

allegations of a policy, practice or custom”); Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803,

805 (11th Cir. 2013) (allegation that there is “a long standing policy, practice, and

custom of treating similarly situated prisoners differently in this application of gain

time” was vague, conclusory, and insufficient to support supervisory liability).

Nowhere in the complaint does Leiphart allege how Santa Rosa County’s customs

or policies influenced the decisions Judge Warrick made during the dependency

proceeding.

In addition, while Leiphart asserts the County “failed to adequately supervise,

monitor, or discipline judges and officers under its authority,” he does not allege any

facts to support that assertion. He does not allege the County was aware of

widespread misconduct by circuit court judges generally, or by Judge Warrick in

particular. See Depew v. City of St. Marys, Ga., 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir.

1986) (“To establish a policy or custom, it is generally necessary to show a persistent

and wide-spread practice. Moreover, actual or constructive knowledge of such

customs must be attributed to the governing body of the municipality. Normally

random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy.”)

(citation omitted).

Moreover, Santa Rosa County is not responsible for supervising and

disciplining circuit court judges. Indeed, Florida circuit court judges are considered

state officials, Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 212 (11th Cir. 2005), and the

Florida Constitution makes the Judicial Qualifications Commission and the Florida

Supreme Court responsible for disciplining circuit court judges. See Watson v. Fla.

Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, 746 F. App’x 821, 824 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The

Florida Constitution vests the JQC with jurisdiction to investigate and recommend

to the Florida Supreme Court the removal from office or discipline of any judge

whose conduct, during their term of office or otherwise, demonstrates a present

unfitness to hold office or warrants discipline.”) (citing Fla. Const. Art. V,

§ 12(a)(1)). Because Santa Rosa County is not responsible for the actions Judge

Warrick took during the dependency proceeding, Leiphart’s claim against the County

is frivolous.

IV. Conclusion

As described above, Leiphart’s claims are frivolous. In addition, because

Judge Warrick is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and Santa Rosa County is

not responsible for the actions of circuit court judges, Leiphart could not amend the

complaint to state a claim. Thus, giving Leiphart an opportunity to amend the

complaint would be futile, and this case should be dismissed. See Cornelius v. Bank

of America, NA, 585 F. App’x 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 2014) (“While a pro se litigant

generally must be given at least one opportunity to amend his complaint, a district

judge need not allow an amendment where amendment would be futile.”) (citation

omitted).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Leiphart’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4) is DENIED.

And it is RECOMMENDED:

1 That this case be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as

frivolous.

2. That the clerk close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 29th day of April, 2025.

/s/ Hope Thai Cannon

HOPE THAI CANNON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation.  Any different

deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only

and does not control.  An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon

all other parties.  A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and

legal conclusions.  See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.