“[T]he question is whether the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust appears on the face of the complaint. If it does, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he question is whether the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust appears on the face of the complaint. If it does, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim.”
- “Florida’s ‘Inmate Grievance Procedure’ (contained in Chapter 33-103 of the Florida Administrative Code) sets out steps for ‘the administrative settlement’ of prisoner complaints.” (citing Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.001(1))
- “On this record, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint, pursuant to § 1915A, because Okpala’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies—an affirmative defense—was clear from the face of the complaint.”
- “[A]n inmate alleging harm suffered WAS INV. LITE VTL ITS TD LN from prison conditions must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available under that procedure before pursuing a § 1983 lawsuit.” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-22349-BLOOM
DANIEL R. DOTSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.
_______________________________/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon a review of pro se Plaintiff Daniel R. Dotson’s
(“Plaintiff”) “Notice of Intent to Sue for Injunctive Relief,” liberally construed as a Complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff, a state prisoner, seeks injunctive relief against the
Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”), claiming that it has violated his rights under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) by failing to provide him with
a religious diet. The Court has screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the following
reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was
deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Griffin v. City of Opa Locka,
261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Because Plaintiff is a prisoner who has filed suit against a
governmental entity, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A apply. Under that statute,
courts must review “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and shall “dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” § 1915A(a)–(b); see also Thompson v. Hicks, 213 F. App’x 939, 942
(11th Cir. 2007).
A pleading fails to state a claim for relief when it does not contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint need
not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must provide as grounds for relief something more
than “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). To survive dismissal, a complaint must “state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The same standard for dismissal
for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) applies to § 1915A. See Jemison v. Wise,
386 F. App’x 961, 963 (11th Cir. 2010).
The Court holds pro se pleadings “to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys” and construes them liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998). This leniency, however, “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for
a party or to rewrite and otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v.
Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot commence a civil action by filing a “Notice of Intent
to Sue.” See Short v. Alldredge, No. 3:24-CV-502-AW-HTC, 2024 WL 4795255, at *2 (N.D. Fla.
Oct. 17, 2024) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly told Short he cannot initiate a civil action by filing a
‘Notice of Action.’”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, “[a] civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. In addition, the Local Rules of this Court
require that complaints under § 1983 “must substantially follow the forms” prescribed by the
Court. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 88.2(a)(4). Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the district court’s local rules. See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th
Cir. 2007). A district court may sua sponte dismiss a case for failure to comply with a court order
or the Federal Rules. See Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.
2005).
Plaintiff’s filing, which states, “[t]his is a notice of intent to inform the Defendant as well
as the Honorable Court of my intention to sue,” is not a complaint, nor is it on this Court’s form
for civil rights complaints. ECF No. [1] at 1. Because Plaintiff has not filed a formal complaint,
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action, and summary dismissal is warranted.
See Romagnano v. Byrd, No. 3:23-CV-8294-TKW-HTC, 2023 WL 3466656, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Apr.
28, 2023) (“[T]he Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiff has not
filed a civil complaint . . . [w]ithout a complaint, there is no case or controversy before this Court”);
Romero v. FCI Marianna Health Serv. Adm’r, No. 5:21-CV-145-TKW-MJF, 2021 WL 3728268,
at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 29, 2021) (“Because Plaintiff has not filed a complaint, there is no case or
controversy to be heard . . . [t]he District Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s
request for a preliminary injunction.”)
In any event, even construing the pleading as a complaint, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), a prisoner may not file a suit “with respect to prison conditions” under any federal law,
including § 1983, “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Although the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, “[a] district court may dismiss an action sua
sponte . . . if an affirmative defense—including failure to exhaust—appears on the face of the
complaint.” Booth v. Allen, 758 F. App’x 899, 901 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citations
omitted); see also Wells v. Brown, 58 F.4th 1347, 1357 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he question is
whether the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust appears on the face of the complaint. If it does, the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim.”).
Here, Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust is clear from the face of his Notice/Complaint. Plaintiff
states, “[i]f the Defendant does not approve the certified food option for me . . . I will exhaust the
administrative remedy requirements of the Department and then sue the Department under the
RLUIPA for injunctive relief.” ECF No. [1] at 4. In other words, Plaintiff concedes that he has not
yet exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claim against the FDOC for a
religious diet. As a Florida state prisoner, Plaintiff must comply with Florida’s “Inmate Grievance
Procedure,” as set forth in Chapter 33-103 of the Florida Administrative Code, before filing suit
under § 1983. See Sims v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 75 F.4th 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 2023)
(“Florida’s ‘Inmate Grievance Procedure’ (contained in Chapter 33-103 of the Florida
Administrative Code) sets out steps for ‘the administrative settlement’ of prisoner complaints.”
(citing Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.001(1))). Because Plaintiff acknowledges that he has not
exhausted his administrative remedies, his Complaint is subject to dismissal under § 1915A for
failure to state a claim. See Okpala v. Drew, 248 F. App’x 72, 73 (11th Cir. 2007) (“On this record,
the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint, pursuant to § 1915A, because Okpala’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies—an affirmative defense—was clear from the face of
the complaint.”). In effect, Plaintiff’s Complaint is premature. Plaintiff is advised that he may refile
his Complaint in a new case after he has exhausted his administrative remedies with the FDOC.
See Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n inmate alleging harm suffered
WAS INV. LITE VTL ITS TD LN
from prison conditions must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available under that
procedure before pursuing a § 1983 lawsuit.” (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. [1], is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
3. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, all deadlines are TERMINATED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on May 28, 2025.
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Daniel R. Dotson, PRO SE
127542
Everglades Correctional Institution
Inmate Mail/Parcels
1599 SW 187th Avenue
Miami, FL 33194