The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
APRIL ELISHA RANDLE,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 2:25-CV-00234-GSL-JEM
SHARDAI PEARSON, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
On May 23, 2025, April Randle, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint [DE 1], Motion to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis [DE 2], and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order [DE 3]. For
the below reasons, the Court denies the in forma pauperis and TRO motions.
Discussion
Notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee, the in forma pauperis statute calls for a
court to dismiss the case if the court determines the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In other words, her complaint is subject to
a review on the merits. See Northern v. Pedcor Mgmt. Corp., 2022 WL 1449610, *1 (N.D. Ind.
May 9, 2022). Under this standard, a meritless complaint, such as one that does not support the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, must be dismissed. See id. Here, Plaintiff seemingly raises two
federal claims: one under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and one claiming a violation of her
1 Since “the question is exactly the same under Rule 12(b)(6) and [§] 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),” there is “‘no
reason to treat dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) differently[.]’” Coleman v. Labor and Industry Rev.
Comm’n of Wisconsin, 860 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Therefore, to survive review under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, (2007)).
Fourth Amendment rights. [DE 1, ¶¶ 13–14]. As pleaded, however, these claims have no
possibility of success. And since the other claims are brought under state law, and there are no
allegations that the parties are diverse from one another, dismissal of the entire complaint
without prejudice is appropriate.
Based on the Complaint [DE 1] and the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [DE 3],
this appears to be a landlord-tenant dispute. Plaintiff is suing the property manager, the property
management company, and a corporate officer of the property management company. [Id., ¶¶ 7–
9]. She alleges that the unit she is renting has cockroaches, leaking pipes, mold, mice, broken
windows, faulty plumbing, and a lack of security features. [Id., ¶ 10]. She also alleges that the
security cameras installed in the garbage area violate her Fourth Amendment rights. [Id., ¶ 14].
“The Fair Housing Act contains provisions making it unlawful for a person to
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin
in the sale or rental of housing.” Northern, at *1 (cleaned up). “[I]t does not generally establish a
right to a habitable home.” Id., at *2 (cleaned up). It seems Plaintiff is alleging that the
conditions of her unit are retaliatory actions in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617, which prohibits the
coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with any person’s right granted in other parts of
the FHA statute. Plaintiff, who does not identify those rights, also fails to state the basis for the
alleged discrimination. Therefore, since she does not claim to belong to any of the protected
categories enumerated in the FHA, her Complaint does not state a viable FHA claim. Plaintiff’s
allegation that her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated also fails. The Fourth
Amendment protects private citizens from government action. See U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
406–07 (2012). This complaint lacks sufficient allegations to state a Fourth Amendment
violation under a civil rights statute, since there are no allegations concerning state action.
As for the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [DE 3], this fails for the same
deficiencies found in the Complaint. Moreover, it does not meet the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65, which requires specific facts, set forth in an affidavit or a verified
complaint, that clearly show immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the
movant before the adverse party may respond. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Though Plaintiff
claims that the conditions of her rental unit are injurious to her children, she does not do so with
the required specificity. Finally, despite the alleged inhabitability, she seeks a TRO to “preserve
the status quo.” [DE 3, ¶ 20]. This seemingly refers to the requested injunction of future eviction
proceedings. Aside from being premature, the Court is unable to decipher exactly what relief is
requested. So, the TRO would fail for those reasons, too. As a result, her remaining requests, for
a Preliminary Injunction and a “Relocation Order” are also denied.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted by this Court, her Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [DE 2] is DENIED, and her
Complaint [DE 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. She will be afforded until June
24, 2025, to refile her complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis. If Plaintiff fails to
timely refile, the Court will direct the Clerk to close the matter without further notice to Plaintiff.
Consequently, and for the reasons discussed in this order, her Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order [DE 3] is also DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: May 27, 2025
/s/ GRETCHEN S. LUND
Judge
United States District Court