Norwood v. Mulberry Medical Aesthetics, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT COLUMBIA

ELIZABETH NORWOOD )

) Case No. 1:24-cv-00061

v. )

)

MULBERRY MEDICAL AESTHETICS, LLC )

et al. )

To: Honorable William L. Campbell, Jr., Chief United States District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This pro se civil case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings under

28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1 and the Local

Rules of Court. (Docket No. 34.)

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Elizabeth Norwood’s unopposed motion for default

judgment against Defendants Mulberry Medical Aesthetics, LLC (“Mulberry Medical”), Theron

Hutton (“Hutton”), and Mulberry Clinics, PLLC (“Mulberry Clinics”). (Docket No. 44.) The

undersigned has reviewed and considered the motion, memorandum, and declarations filed in

support of the motion. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned finds that this matter can be

resolved without hearing and respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment

(Docket No. 44) be GRANTED IN PART with respect to Mulberry Medical and Hutton and be

DENIED with respect to Mulberry Clinics.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this action against Mulberry Medical and Hutton on June 11, 2024. (Docket

No. 1.) These two defendants filed an answer to the complaint on September 13, 2024. (Docket

No. 13.) On January 14, 2025, Plaintiff amended a first amended complaint, with leave of Court,

1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

to name a third defendant, Mulberry Clinics. (Docket No. 29.) In her first amended complaint,

Plaintiff alleges the following facts:

Plaintiff is a licensed nurse practitioner. (Id. at 15.) She worked as the Director of Mulberry

Medical, of which Hutton is the sole member, from approximately November 2020 to June 2023.

(Id. at ¶¶ 3, 16.) As the Director, Plaintiff provided services directly to patients, attended

mandatory trainings and meetings, interviewed and hired employees, and had supervisory and

management duties. (Id. at ¶ 18.) However, Plaintiff was paid only for services that she provided

directly to patients and was not paid for at least 2,060 hours of other work that she performed in

her role as Director for Mulberry Medical. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 24–25.)

Plaintiff also worked as a nurse practitioner for Mulberry Clinics from approximately June

2019 to April 2024, with Hutton serving as her supervisory physician. (Id. at ¶ 34, 36–37.) In

March 2024, Hutton emailed Plaintiff and asked her to answer certain questions “before he would

continue to serve as [Plaintiff’s] supervising physician.” (Id. at ¶ 35–36.) Plaintiff indicated that

she was not comfortable answering Hutton’s questions. (Id. at ¶ 39.) A few days later, Hutton told

Plaintiff he would no longer serve as her supervising physician as of April 15, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 41.)

Plaintiff did not find a new supervising physician prior to April 15, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 42.) On April

16, 2024, Plaintiff was fired. (Id. at ¶ 43.) During the termination meeting, Hutton indicated that

he believed Plaintiff opposed gender discrimination. (Id. at ¶¶ 43–46.)

Based on these alleged facts, Plaintiff asserts the following three claims against the three

defendants: violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for failure to pay minimum wages

as to Mulberry Medical and Hutton (Count I); unjust enrichment as to Mulberry Medical and

Hutton (Count II); and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) as to

Mulberry Clinic (Count III). (Id. at ¶¶ 51–67.)

On February 13, 2025, the Court entered a default against Mulberry Medical because it

failed to respond to the first amended complaint or otherwise defend itself by retaining counsel,

despite numerous reminders from the Court. (Docket No. 38.) On February 14, 2025, Plaintiff

moved for entry of default as to Mulberry Clinics and Hutton. (Docket No. 40.) On March 5, 2025,

the Court granted the motion and entered a default against Mulberry Clinics because it failed to

respond to the first amended complaint or otherwise defend itself by retaining counsel, despite

numerous reminders from the Court, and against Hutton because he failed to respond to the first

amended complaint and as a sanction under Rule 37 for his conduct in failing to cooperate in

discovery. (Docket No. 43.)

Now, Plaintiff seeks default judgment against all three defendants. (Docket No. 44.)

Specifically, she asks the Court to award her monetary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, and to

order Hutton and Mulberry Clinics to provide her with certain patient contact information. (Id. at

1–2; Docket No. 45 at 2–8.) None of the three defendants have responded to the instant motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

The decision to grant a default judgment is within the sound discretion of district court. See

Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 108 (6th Cir. 1995). Under Rule 55(b)(2), a court may

enter a default judgment if that court has jurisdiction, and the movant has met certain procedural

requirements. Id. at 108–09. For a court to grant a motion for default judgment, the complaint must

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Allstate Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Tyler-Howard,

No. 3:19-cv-00276, 2019 WL 4963230 at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2019) (internal citations omitted).

Once default has been entered against a party under Rule 55, the defaulting party is deemed

to have admitted all the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint regarding liability,

including any jurisdictional averments. Visioneering Constr. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 661 F.2d 119,

124 (6th Cir. 1981); Antoine, 66 F.3d at 110–11. Here, due to the three defendants’ defaults, the

Court is entitled to accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint. I Love Juice

Bar Franchising, LLC v. ILJB Charlotte Juice, LLC, No. 3:19-cv-00981, 2020 WL 4735031, at *3

(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2020) (citing Vesligaj v. Peterson, 331 F. App’x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2009)).

A. Liability

Plaintiff argues that the three defendants are liable under three theories: (1) Mulberry

Medical and Hutton violated the FLSA by failing to pay minimum wages; (2) Mulberry Medical

and Hutton were unjustly enriched by receiving the benefit of Plaintiff’s work without paying her;

and (3) Mulberry Clinic retaliated against Plaintiff by removing her supervising physician and

terminating her employment because of its belief that she engaged in protected activity, all of

which is in violation of Title VII. (Docket No. 29 at ¶¶ 51–67.) Default judgment on well-pleaded

allegations establishes only liability, not the extent of damages for which a particular defendant is

responsible. Antoine, 66 F.3d at 110. The Court must, therefore, determine the extent to which the

three defendants may be held liable for the full amount of damages claimed by Plaintiff.

1. FLSA – Mulberry Medical and Hutton

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint establishes that Mulberry Medical and Hutton

are liable under the FLSA for failing to pay Plaintiff minimum wage. Plaintiff alleges that she was

an employee of Mulberry Medical (Docket No. 29 at ¶¶ 6), that Mulberry Medical was her

employer (id. at ¶ 11), and that Mulberry Medical and Hutton were an enterprise engaged in

commerce under 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) (id. at ¶ 12). With respect to minimum wage, the FLSA

requires employers to pay a minimum hourly wage of $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C).

Plaintiff alleges that that was paid for services that she provided directly to patients, which totaled

$1,250.00 in 2021, $2,426.70 in 2022, and $3,271.99 in 2023. (Id. at ¶ 19.) However, she asserts

that Mulberry Medical and Hutton otherwise failed to pay her for any other work that she

performed. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

Suits under the FLSA must be brought “within two years after the cause of action accrued,

except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three

years after the cause of action accrued[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). A violation under the FLSA is willful

if “the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct

was prohibited by the statute.” Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832, 842 (6th

Cir. 2002) (quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988)). Under the

continuing violation doctrine, “a cause of action is deemed to accrue, as a general rule, at each

regular payday immediately following the work period during which the services were rendered

for which the wage or overtime compensation is claimed.” Penley v. NPC Int'l, Inc., 206 F. Supp.

3d 1341 (W.D. Tenn. 2016) (quoting Archer v. Sullivan Cnty., Nos. 95–5214, 955215, 1997 WL

720406, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 1997)). An action is commenced when a plaintiff files a complaint.

29 U.S.C. § 256(a). Plaintiff commenced this action on June 11, 2024 when she filed her complaint.

In her first amended complaint, she alleges that Mulberry Medical and Hutton knew that she was

performing work without pay and that they intentionally, repeatedly, knowingly, and willfully

failed to pay her for all hours that she worked. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 30–31.) The Court finds that Plaintiff

has adequately alleged that the FLSA violation was willful such that the statute of limitations is

three years after the cause of action accrued.

In sum, Plaintiffs’ complaint establishes that Plaintiff was an employee, that Mulberry

Medical and Hutton were Plaintiff’s employers, and that Mulberry Medical and Hutton failed to

pay Plaintiff minimum wages. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to default judgment under the FLSA

and is entitled to recover unpaid minimum wages and an equal amount in liquidated damages for

Mulberry Medical and Hutton’s FLSA violations. See 29 U.S.C. § 2016(b).

2. Unjust Enrichment – Mulberry Medical and Hutton

“Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual theory or is a contract implied-in-law in which a

court may impose a contractual obligation where one does not exist.” Whitehaven Cmty. Baptist

Church v. Holloway, 973 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tenn. 1998) (citing Paschall's Inc. v. Dozier, 219

Tenn. 45, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154–55 (1966)). Under an unjust enrichment theory, courts impose a

contractual obligation where there is “no contract between the parties or the contract has become

unenforceable or invalid,” and the defendant will be unjustly enriched unless the court imposes a

quasi-contractual obligation. Id.

The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are “(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant

by the plaintiff, (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit, and (3) acceptance of such

benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without

payment of the value thereof.” Fam. Tr. Servs. LLC v. Green Wise Homes LLC, 693 S.W.3d 284,

304 (Tenn. 2024) (quoting Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 525

(Tenn. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted). Unjust enrichment claims made under Tennessee state

law are independent of FLSA claims and are not preempted by FLSA claims. See Cayton v. Metro.

Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:20-cv-00859, 2022 WL 183437, at *6 (M.D. Tenn.

Jan. 19, 2022); Lynch v. GCA Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-02624, 2017 WL 11477229, at *3

(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 19, 2017).

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she conferred a benefit upon Mulberry Medical

and Hutton by working for Mulberry Medical; that Mulberry Medical and Hutton appreciated and

accepted those benefits from her; and that it would be unjust for Mulberry Medical and Hutton to

appreciate those services without paying Plaintiff or with paying Plaintiff only minimal wage.

(Docket No. 29 at ¶¶ 57–50.) Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently alleged a claim for unjust

enrichment as to Mulberry Medical and Hutton.

3. Title VII Retaliation – Mulberry Clinics

Title VII makes it unlawful to retaliate against employees for engaging in protected

conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Protected conduct includes opposing any practice made unlawful

by Title VII, or making a charge or testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. Id. Reporting or complaining of

discrimination to management also constitutes protected conduct. Fite v. Comtide Nashville, LLC,

686 F. Supp. 2d 735, 753 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Pendleton v. Bob Frensley Chrysler Jeep Dodge

Ram, Inc., No. 3:14 C 02325, 2016 WL 2927983, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. May 19, 2016).

To make a prima facie showing of Title VII retaliation, an employee must demonstrate that

“(1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the exercise of the protected right,

(3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against the employee, and (4) there was

a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Laughlin

v. City of Cleveland, 633 F. App’x 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins.

Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted). For a plaintiff to establish a

qualifying “protected activity,” she must show that she took an “overt stand against suspected

illegal discriminatory action.” Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co., 973 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 288 (6th Cir. 2012)). “In other words, an employee

may not invoke the protections of the Act by making a vague charge of discrimination.” Id.

(quoting Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 288; Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that she engaged in “protected activity” under Title

VII. In the complaint, Plaintiff describes her “protected activity” as either not responding to an

email from Hutton “demanding that she answer questions about allegations of inappropriate

behavior that had been made against him” (Docket No. 29 at ¶ 35) or as being believed by Hutton

to oppose gender discrimination (id. at ¶ 46). She broadly alleges that “Mulberry Clinics believed

that Norwood engaged in activity protected by Title VII” (id. at ¶ 64), but does not explicitly state

what the “activity” was. Plaintiff uses similarly broad language in her supporting memorandum:

“Plaintiff was terminated from the Clinic on April 16, 2024 in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964.” (Docket No. 45 at 5.) Based on the allegations in the first amended complaint

and the argument in Plaintiff’s supporting memorandum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not

sufficiently asserted a claim for retaliation under Title VII because she has not alleged a qualifying

“protected activity.” For these reasons, default judgment against Mulberry Clinics and Hutton for

a violation of Title VII is not appropriate.

B. Damages

To determine damages, the trial court can, but is not required to, hold an evidentiary

hearing. “[A] hearing is not necessarily required if the moving party submits uncontested, sworn

affidavits sufficient to establish the amount of damages.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. Marler, No. 1:09-

cv-193, 2009 WL 3785878, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 12, 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (A

district court “may conduct hearings . . . when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to: (A)

conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of any

allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.”); Vesligaj, 331 F. App’x at 354 (Rule

55(b)(2), “by its terms, allows but does not require the district court to conduct an evidentiary

hearing”).

Plaintiff seeks a default judgment against the three defendants in the following amounts:

Count Category of Damages Defendant(s) Amount

I. FLSA Violation Unpaid minimum wages Mulberry Medical, Hutton $8,765.31

Unpaid minimum wages – Mulberry Medical, Hutton $8,765.31

liquidated damages

II. Unjust Enrichment Mulberry Medical, Hutton $178,834.69

III. Title VII Lost past wages Mulberry Clinics $155,826.00

Violation, Retaliation

Future wages Mulberry Clinics $733,104.00

Emotional damages Mulberry Clinics $100,000.00

Attorney’s fees Mulberry Medical, Hutton, $24,970.00

Mulberry Clinics

Costs Mulberry Medical, Hutton, $405.00

Mulberry Clinics

(Docket No. 45 at 2–8.)

Plaintiff also asks the Court to order Hutton and Mulberry Clinics to provide her with

contact information for “all patients seen by Plaintiff in her last thirty-six (36) months of

employment at [Mulberry Clinics], so that she can notify them of her departure and their option to

continue their medical care with her, pursuant to Rules of The Tennessee Board of Nursing Rule

1000-04-.12(e)(2).” (Id. at 8.)

1. FLSA Violation – Mulberry Medical and Hutton

Plaintiff requests $8,765.31 in unpaid minimum wages and $8,765.31 in liquidated

damages for unpaid minimum wages from Mulberry Medical and Hutton, jointly and severally.

(Id. at 2–4.) In her declaration, Plaintiff states that she worked 20 hours per week for 108 weeks,

or a total of 2,160 hours, during the three years leading up to the filing of this lawsuit. (Docket No.

45-1 at ¶ 14.) She states that she was paid a total of $6,894.69 during that time period. (Id. at ¶ 9.)

Because Plaintiff was entitled to a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour under the FLSA,

worked for 108 weeks, and worked 20 hours per week, she is entitled to $15,660.00 in unpaid

minimum wages. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $15,660.00 in

unpaid minimum wages less $6,894.69 in paid wages, for a total of $8,765.31.

Under the FLSA, successful claimants are entitled to “an additional equal amount as

liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). A court “in its sound discretion” may reduce the amount

of liquidated damages only if an employer “shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or

omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for

believing that his act or omission was not a violation of [FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. § 260. See also 29

C.F.R. 790.22(b); Jordan v. IBP, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 790, 815 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).

Here, the Court finds that an award of liquidated damages is appropriate. Mulberry Medical

and Hutton have not shown that their failure to pay Plaintiff was “in good faith” or that they had

“reasonable grounds” to believe that their failure to pay Plaintiff was a not a violation of the FLSA.

The Court therefore finds that an award of liquidated damages for Plaintiff’s unpaid minimum

wages in the amount of $8,765.31 is appropriate.

2. Unjust Enrichment – Mulberry Medical and Hutton

Plaintiff requests $178,834.69 in damages for her unjust enrichment claim from Mulberry

Medical and Hutton, jointly and severally. (Id. at 4–5.) In her declaration, Plaintiff states that

$70.00 per hour is a reasonable rate for a Spa Director with her experience and credentials in her

area during the relevant time. (Docket No. 45-1 at ¶ 13.) She also states that she worked a total of

2,680 hours from November 2020 to June 2023, but was not compensated for this time. (Id. at ¶

14.) Based on those work hours, Plaintiff seeks $187,600.00 in unpaid wages, less the $8,765.31

in unpaid minimum wages that she is seeking through her FLSA claim, for a total of $178,834.69.

The undisputed evidence in this case establishes that: Plaintiff agreed to work for Mulberry

Medical and Hutton as a Director; a reasonable hourly rate is $70.00 per hour; Plaintiff worked

2,680 hours; and Plaintiff was not compensated for her work. The Court therefore finds that

allowing Mulberry Medical and Hutton to retain the compensation due to Plaintiff would be unjust.

See Knisley v. Johnson, No. 3:21-CV-420, 2022 WL 17718637, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Jul. 22, 2022).

Given Plaintiff’s unrebutted declaration and the lack of objection from Mulberry Medical and

Hutton, the Court finds that an award of liquidated damages for Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim

in the amount of $178,834.69 is appropriate.

3. Title VII Violation – Mulberry Clinics

Plaintiff requests past wages of $155,826.00, future wages of $733,104.00, and emotional

distress damages of $100,000.00 from Mulberry Clinics for its alleged violation of Title VII.

(Docket No. 45 at 5–7.) However, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

not sufficiently alleged a claim under Title VII. For that reason, the Court will not award Plaintiff

the damages she requests under this claim.

4. Attorney’s Fees and Costs – Mulberry Medical, Hutton, Mulberry Clinics

Plaintiff requests $24,970.00 in attorney’s fees and $405.00 in costs from all three

defendants. (Docket No. 45 at 7–8.) She states that she can recover attorney’s fees and costs under

the FLSA, specifically 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This statute states: “The court in such action shall, in

addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to

be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Court finds that this

statute is applicable and provides a basis for Plaintiff to recover fees and costs from Mulberry

Medical and Hutton.2 However, pursuant to Local Rule 55.01(b)(3),3 Plaintiff must make a

separate request for attorney’s fees and costs in accordance with Local Rule 54.01. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s request to recover attorney’s fees and costs is denied but without prejudice to refiling.

5. Patient Contact Information – Hutton, Mulberry Clinics

Plaintiff also asks the Court to order Hutton and Mulberry Clinics to provide her with

contact information for “all patients seen by Plaintiff in her last thirty-six (36) months of

employment at [Mulberry Clinics], so that she can notify them of her departure and their option to

continue their medical care with her, pursuant to Rules of The Tennessee Board of Nursing Rule

1000-04-.12(e)(2).” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff did not include any reference to this Rule or make any such

2 Plaintiff also states that she can recover attorney’s fees and costs under Title VII,

specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). (Docket No. 45 at 7.) However, for the reasons set forth above,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim under Title VII. Accordingly, the

Court will not award Plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs under this claim. The Court therefore finds

that Mulberry Clinics is not obligated to pay any attorney’s fees or costs.

3 The Local Rules were updated on May 15, 2025 to include new instructions for the filing

of motions for default judgment under Rule 55(b). See Local R. 55.01(b). These new instructions

include that parties should not include requests for attorneys’ fees in such a motion, but instead

should make such requests separately in accordance with Local Rule 54.01. See id.

request in her first amended complaint. The Court therefore finds no basis to order Mulberry Clinic

or Hutton to provide this information to Plaintiff.

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s unopposed motion (Docket No. 44) for default judgment be GRANTED

IN PART as to Defendants Mulberry Medical Aesthetics, LLC and Theron Hutton, but be

DENIED as to Defendant Mulberry Clinics, PLLC.

2. Plaintiff be awarded damages of $196,365.31 assessed against Defendants

Mulberry Medical Aesthetics, LLC and Theron Hutton, individually and jointly and severally,

comprised of (a) unpaid minimum wages in the amount of $8,765.31; (b) liquidated damages for

unpaid minimum wages in the amount of $8,765.31; and (c) damages under a theory of unjust

enrichment in the amount of $178,834.69.

3. Plaintiff’s request to recover $24,970.00 in attorney’s fees and $405.00 in costs be

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Defendants Mulberry Medical Aesthetics, LLC and

Theron Hutton, but be DENIED as to Defendant Mulberry Clinics, PLLC.

4. Plaintiff be DIRECTED to file a separate request for attorney’s fees and costs from

Defendants Mulberry Medical Aesthetics, LLC and Theron Hutton in accordance with Local Rules

54.01 and 55.01(b)(3).

5. Plaintiff’s request for the Court to order Defendants Theron Hutton and Mulberry

Clinics, PLLC to provide Plaintiff with the contact information of all patients seen by Plaintiff in

her last thirty-six (36) months of employment at Mulberry Clinics, PLLC be DENIED.

6. A FINAL JUDGMENT be entered in this action in accordance with Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 58.

ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of

Court within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation and must state with

particularity the specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is made.

See Fed. R. of Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Local R. 72.02(b). Failure to file written objections within the

specified time can be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal the District Court’s Order regarding

the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas vy. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.

Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Any response to the objections must be filed within fourteen

(14) days after service of objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Local R. 72.02(b).

Respectfully submitted,

United States Magistrate Judge

13