Bell v. Ardery

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARL EDWARD BELL, :

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-2003

Plaintiff :

(JUDGE MANNION)

v. :

KIM ARDERY, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court in this prisoner civil rights case is remaining

Defendant, Kim Ardery’s, the supervisor of Benner Township State

Correction Institution’s (“SCI-Benner Township”) medical department,

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 84). In support of the motion, Defendant

filed a brief (Doc. 89) and a statement of facts (Doc. 88) in accordance with

Local Rule 56.1. Plaintiff has not opposed the motion and by default admits

to the statement of material facts.1 For the reasons set forth below, the

motion for summary judgment will be granted and the matter terminated.

1 Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to the motion or respond to the

statement of material facts by the extended deadline of March 31, 2025,

(Doc. 94), after he was warned that “[f]ailure to timely file an opposition brief

will result in the motion being deemed unopposed… [and] [f]ailure to timely

I. Background

Plaintiff, Carl Edward Bell, was an inmate confined at SCI-Benner

Township at all relevant times. (Doc. 1). According to the complaint, Bell was

seen by Defendant Tiffany Sottile, a nurse practitioner in the prison, for

complaints of loss of feeling in his toe on June 8, 2022. (Doc. 1 at 7). Sottile

examined his foot and diagnosed him with “Morton’s Neuroma,” a benign

tumor. (Id. at 8; Doc. 88 ¶ 2). Medical staff ordered medication for Bell and

scheduled him for an ultrasound examination for further diagnosis in a little

over three months’ time on September 22, 2022. (Doc. 88 ¶ 3). Bell was

informed that he would be seen by a podiatrist who would inject a steroid into

his foot. (Doc. 1 at 8).

On June 16, 2022, experiencing continuous pain in his foot, Bell filed

a sick call request. (Id. at 9). He was subsequently seen by nurse Taylor.2

(Id.). Bell asked the nurse whether his ultrasound examination could be

moved up sooner, insisting that “he cannot wait until September because he

has a ‘benign tumor in his foot’” and that “‘he is not one to wait to get things

2 Taylor is not named as a defendant.

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taken care of.’” (Doc. 88 ¶ 7). Nurse Taylor said she could not move up his

ultrasound because there was a backlog of ultrasounds that needed to be

performed, and that his ultrasound was the “next available.” (Doc. 88 ¶ 8.)

Nurse Taylor also explained to Bell that she could not refer him for an

appointment with a podiatrist, but directed him to make such a request in

writing to the medical department—which he did. (Doc. 1 at 9).

On June 22, 2022, the medical department responded to Bell’s

request, confirming that September was indeed the earliest date for an

ultrasound and directed Bell to sign up for a sick call appointment if his pain

ever worsened for a re-evaluation. (Doc. 88 ¶ 10). A couple of weeks later,

on July 2, 2022, Bell submitted another sick call request in which he stated

that he was experiencing sharp pain in his foot and requested that the tumor

be removed. (Doc. 1 at 10). On July 11, 2022, Bell was x-rayed for the

purposes of ruling out a fracture, and was reminded that there was a backlog

for ultrasounds. (Doc. 88 ¶ 12). At the time, Bell said he understood and

declined any pain medication. (Id.)

On September 15, 2022, an ultrasound on Bell’s foot was completed.

(Id. ¶ 13). On October 27, 2022, the results of the ultrasound and x-ray test

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were reviewed with Bell and a medical provider. (Id.) It was determined that

both results were benign. (Id.) However, despite the benign diagnosis, Bell

“appear[ed] convinced that he has a tumor on his toe that needs removed.”

(Id. ¶ 14). Bell was “[a]dvised that [he could be scheduled] for a podiatry

consult, but that consults go through an approval process based off of

standard of care.” (Id.) Bell reportedly replied, “[d]on’t worry I can get this

approved.” (Id. ¶ 15). When Bell was told that he might not even have a

tumor, Bell believed otherwise and insisted that “the ultrasound machine

was[n’t] working that well. The lady had to really press down and like slap

the machine to get it to work.” (Id.)

On September 19, 2022, before receiving the results of his ultrasound

examination, Bell filed grievance no. 998550, whereby he alleged that the

medical department of SCI-Benner Township at large did not provide him the

necessary treatment when he received his ultrasound on September 15,

2022. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17). In his grievance, Bell complained about the wait for the

ultrasound, the alleged deficient facilities and equipment in the prison, and

prison’s staff alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. (Id.

¶ 18; Doc. 1 at 12). After not receiving a response within fifteen days, Bell

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appealed the grievance to Defendant Houser, the superintendent of the

prison. (Doc. 1 at 12). On October 12, 2022, Bell received a response from

Defendant Ardery, the supervisor of the medical department, who stated that

his ultrasound had been completed and that it showed no abnormalities. (Id.)

Notably, Defendant Ardery—the remaining defendant in this action—was not

named in the grievance, nor was she named in the appeal of that grievance

to the facility manager. (Doc. 88 ¶ 19). The only point Ardery is mentioned

during the grievance process is at Bell’s appeal to final review, where Bell

accuses Ardery of “lying” in her initial review response to his claim. (Id. ¶ 20).

In that initial review response, Ardery had explained to Bell that his

ultrasound scheduled date was made as soon as available, there was no

report that the ultrasound machine was faulty, and he was scheduled to

speak with a medical provider to review his results and discuss any further

treatment, if needed. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22). Despite the fact that such a follow-up

did occur and Bell was informed that the results were benign, Bell

nevertheless insisted on making his final appeal in November of 2022. (Id.

¶¶ 23-24). In that appeal, Bell argued that the ultrasound machine was

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broken and continued to assert his claim of medical deliberate indifference.

(Id. ¶ 25).

Defendant Houser responded to Bell’s grievance on November 3,

2022, and urged Bell to participate in any treatment provided to him by the

medical department. (Doc. 1 at 11). On November 15, 2022, Bell submitted

another request to Defendant Ardery in which he asked to be seen by a

podiatrist, to have his tumor removed, and whether the prison had acquired

a new ultrasound machine. (Id. at 14). Two days later, on November 17,

2022, Bell appealed his grievance to Defendant Little, the then-acting

Secretary of the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). A month afterwards,

Bell filed a complaint with this court regarding the above events, which was

received and docketed on December 16, 2022. (Doc. 1).

The complaint asserted claims for deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need, negligence, and medical malpractice. (Id. at 16). Bell sought

declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. (Id. at 16-17). Defendant

Sottile moved to dismiss the complaint on March 10, 2023. (Doc. 31).

Defendants Ardery, Houser and Little moved to dismiss on March 29, 2023.

(Docs. 35-36). By issue of multiple orders, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s

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negligence and malpractice claims with prejudice; dismissed Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Sottile, Houser, Little, and

Tracy without further leave to amend the complaint; and permitted the case

to proceed solely as to plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Ardery. (See Docs. 52, 57, and 65).

Defendant Ardery filed the instant motion for summary judgment on

September 30, 2024. (Doc. 84). On October 15, 2024, Defendant Ardery filed

a brief in support of her motion and a statement of material facts. (Docs. 88

and 89). Plaintiff has failed, despite being provided a warning and time

extensions, to file an opposing brief and a response to the statement of facts.

With the brief unopposed and the statement of facts deemed admitted, the

motion is now ripe for disposition.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery

and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Turner v. Schering-Plough

Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). “[T]his standard provides that the

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mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original);

Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d Cir. 1990). A disputed fact is

“material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome

of the case under applicable substantive law. Id.; Gray v. York Newspapers,

Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is

“genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514,

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283,

1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing

the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79

F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir. 1996). Although the moving party must establish an

absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it need not “support its motion

with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.”

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Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It can meet its burden by “pointing out ...

that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

claims.” Id. at 325.

Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must go

beyond the pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories

or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a

genuine issue. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (stating that the non-

moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”); Wooler v. Citizens Bank, 274

F. App’x 177, 179 (3d Cir. 2008). The party opposing the motion must

produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its

case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because “a complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

323; see also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). “[T]he

non-moving party ‘may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own

pleadings; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a

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genuine issue for trial.’” Picozzi v. Haulderman, 2011 WL 830331, *2 (M.D.

Pa. 2011) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)). “Inferences should be drawn in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving

party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be

taken as true.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d

1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).

If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322. The adverse party must raise “more than a mere scintilla of

evidence in its favor” and cannot survive by relying on unsupported

assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions. Williams v. Borough

of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). The mere existence of some

evidence in support of the non-movant will not be adequate to support a

denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to

enable a jury to reasonably find for the non-movant on that issue. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249–50.

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Local Civil Rule 56.1 requires a motion seeking summary judgment to

include a statement of material facts not in dispute and requires the non-

moving party to file a responsive statement of material facts. L. Civ. R.

56.1(a). Where, as here, a party fails to file a responsive statement of

material facts, L. Civ. R. 56.1(a) deems a movant’s statement of material

facts undisputed for the purposes of the summary judgment motion.

Although a motion for summary judgment may not be granted by default

merely because it goes unopposed, Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. Of Tax

Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990), the motion may be granted if the

undisputed facts warrant judgment as a matter of law. Miller v. Ashcroft, 76

F. App’x 457, 462 (3d Cir. 2003); Houston v. Twp. of Randolph, 934 F. Supp.

2d 711, 723 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d, 559 F. App’x 139 (3d Cir. 2014).

III. Discussion

Defendant Ardery presents three separate arguments in favor of

finding she is entitled to summary judgment. The court will address each in

turn.

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A. Whether Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative

remedies.

Defendant Ardery argues that she is entitled to summary judgment

because, arguendo, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by

failing to identify her by name in his initial grievance. The court disagrees.

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner must

pursue all available avenues of relief through the applicable grievance

system before initiating a federal civil rights action. See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a);

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (“[A]n inmate must exhaust

irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative

avenues.”). Section 1997e provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o action shall

be brought with respect to prison conditions under [S]ection 1983 of this title,

or any other [f]ederal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). An inmate must comply with the PLRA

exhaustion requirement as to any claim that arises in the prison setting,

regardless of the nature of the claim or of the relief sought. Porter v. Nussle,

534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6 (2001).

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“[I]t is beyond the power of ... any ... [court] to excuse compliance with the

exhaustion requirement, whether on the ground of futility, inadequacy or any

other basis.” Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000). Failure to

exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be pled

and proven by the defendant. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002)

(reasoning that “[p]rison officials are likely to have greater legal expertise

and, as important, superior access to prison administrative records in

comparison to prisoners”). Further, the PLRA mandates that an inmate

“properly” exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court,

which demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other procedural

rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d

218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that the PLRA includes a procedural

default component). A procedural default by the prisoner, either through late

or improper filings, bars the prisoner from bringing a claim in federal court

unless equitable considerations warrant review of the claim. McKinney v.

Kelchner, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71958, *8 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Spruill v.

Gills, 372 F.3d 218, 227–32 (3d Cir. 2004); Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279

(3d Cir. 2000)). In Pennsylvania, “[i]nmates who file grievances related to …

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conditions of confinement are required to follow a formal grievance

procedure of DC-ADM 804.” Peter v. Wynder, 2008 WL 2943354, *5 (M.D.

Pa. July 29, 2008).

In her brief in support of the instant motion, Defendant Ardery claims

the following:

Additionally, those filing grievances in accordance with DC-ADM

804, must provide a statement of facts relevant to the underlying

claim and must specifically name persons within the grievance,

“if practicable.” Robinson v. Johnson, 343 F. App’x 778, 781 (3d

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234. The inmate

grievance filer must also “specifically state any claims he/she

wishes to make concerning violations of Department directives,

regulations, court orders or other law.” Robinson, 343 F. App’x at

781.

Plaintiff has procedurally defaulted any claim against Defendant

Ardery, as he has failed to obey these requirements. Plaintiff

failed to name any individual against whom he was bringing the

allegations contained in his grievance, including Defendant

Ardery. (SMF ¶¶ 16,19.) Instead, Plaintiff only names “the

Medical Department staffing/facilities” as responsible for “not

providing the necessary medical treatment 9/15/2022”. (Id.) Such

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a vague reference does not satisfy DC-ADM 804’s naming

requirements, and fails to serve the naming requirements

purpose of providing “prison officials. . . notice of the persons

claimed to be guilty of wrongdoing”, such that officials can take

corrective action. See, Sanders v. Beard, 2013 WL 1703582

(M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2013).

(Doc. 89 at 6-7). The court disagrees with this analysis. Defendant

Ardery cites to Spruill for the limited holding that an inmate’s failure to identify

a defendant in a grievance may result in the procedural default of a claim

against that defendant. (See supra at 14). But Defendant Ardery fails to

analyze whether it was practicable for Plaintiff to identify Defendant Ardery

in his grievance, discounts the fact that Defendant Ardery was ultimately

identified in Plaintiff’s appeal of his grievance, and overlooks the Spruill

court's conclusion that such a procedural default can be excused.

In Spruill, the Third Circuit determined that DC–ADM 804 requires an

inmate to identify specific persons in the grievance “if practicable”. Id. 372

F.3d at 234. However, it is only the “unexplained failure to identify a

responsible prison official in a grievance [that] constitutes a procedural

default of the claim.” Freeman v. Dep't of Corr., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17045,

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*12 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230). Additionally, the Spruill

court concluded that “the prison can excuse an inmate’s failure to [name an

individual] by identifying the unidentified persons and acknowledging that

they were fairly within the compass of the prisoner’s grievance.” Spruill, 372

F.3d at 234 (reasoning that while the “point is close ..., the grievances and

the suit are about a larger-scale denial of adequate medical care, in which

prison officials clearly knew [the defendant] was alleged to be implicated”).

The Court explained that the “purpose of the regulation here is to put the

prison officials on notice of the persons claimed to be guilty of wrongdoing.”

Id.

Here, Bell filed the relevant grievance on September 15, 2022, alleging

that the medical department of SCI-Benner Township at large did not provide

him the necessary treatment when he received his ultrasound. (Doc. 88 ¶¶

16-17). Although the reference in question may be characterized as

overinclusive, it is not impermissibly vague as it specifically identifies the

medical department at SCI-Benner Township over which Defendant Ardery

exercised supervisory authority. The court does not deem it a foregone

conclusion that Bell would have access to the identities of the relevant prison

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officials in charge of the medical department to name them in his initial

grievance. Thus, the court is not convinced that it was necessarily practicable

for Bell to identify Defendant Ardery by name in his initial grievance.

Nevertheless, even if such a failure did constitute a procedural default, the

prison’s grievance process excused it as Defendant Ardery is “fairly within

the compass of the prisoner’s grievance.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234. Indeed,

by identifying the medical department as a whole, Bell did satisfy the

“purpose of the regulation here … to put the prison officials,” such as the

medical department supervisor in the case at hand, “on notice of the persons

claimed to be guilty of wrongdoing.” Id. This conclusion is further

substantiated by the fact that it was Defendant Ardery herself who responded

to the initial grievance, thereby demonstrating actual notice and involvement.

Our finding here is consistent with the holding in Robinson, Defendant

Ardery’s second cited to case, wherein the court found that any procedural

default of failing to name a defendant was excused when that defendant in

question “personally denied [the plaintiff’s] ‘Appeal to Facility Manager.’” 343

F. App’x at 78. Doing so achieved “[t]he primary purpose of a grievance

[which] is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice

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to a particular official that he may be sued.” Id. (quoting Williams, 482 F.3d

at 640). Similarly, here, Defendant Ardery was the person who responded to

Bell’s initial grievance when it was on appeal, demonstrating that his

grievance achieved the primary purpose of alerting Defendant Ardery to the

problem he faced. Accordingly, the court is unpersuaded by Defendant

Ardery’s argument and finds that Plaintiff’s failure to specifically name her in

the initial grievance does not constitute a sufficient basis to warrant summary

judgment in her favor.

B. Whether Plaintiff can establish Defendant Ardery’s personal

involvement.

Defendant Ardery argues that she is entitled to summary judgment

because, arguendo, Plaintiff cannot establish Defendant Ardery’s personal

involvement in his alleged denial of care. The court agrees.

Section 1983 provides that persons acting under color of state law may

be held liable if they deprive an individual of “any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See

42 U.S.C. §1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two

essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a

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person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws

of the United States. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v.

George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Individual liability can be imposed

under Section 1983 only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the

alleged misconduct, and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of

respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fishser, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)

(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). In other

words, a defendant “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs

... shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge

and acquiescence[.]” See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 270 (3d Cir.

2003) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

Allegations of personal involvement must be made with appropriate

particularity in that the complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time,

place, and personal responsibility. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845

F.2d at 1207-08. Subsequent knowledge of an incident is insufficient to

demonstrate that a state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged

misconduct. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08 (the after-the-fact submission

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of a grievance is “simply insufficient” to establish a defendant’s knowledge

of an underlying constitutional violation at the time it occurred); Dooley v.

Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (Grievance Coordinator and

Superintendent’s involvement in review and denial of grievance insufficient

to establish personal involvement). It is the plaintiff’s burden to “show that

each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his

rights.” Kirk v. Roan, No. 1:04-CV-1990, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 14, 2006) (quoting Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353). Allegations that broadly

implicate multiple defendants without delineating individual conduct are

legally insufficient. See Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 F. App'x 66, 69-70 (3d

Cir. 2015).

Here, Bell failed to offer any specific material facts, admissible at trial,

to establish Defendant Ardery’s personal involvement in the alleged refusal

to treat his medical needs other than her response to his grievance in an

adverse Initial Review Response. (Doc. 88 ¶¶ 16, 19-21). “[T]he failure of a

prison official to act favorably on an inmate’s grievance is not itself a

constitutional violation.” Little v. Mottern, 2017 WL 934464, at *11 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 7, 2017) (quoting Rauso v. Vaughn, 2000 WL 873285, at *16 (E.D. Pa.,

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June 26, 2000). Such allegations are insufficient to establish a defendant’s

personal involvement under Section 1983. See Watkins v. Horn, 1997 WL

566080 at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concurrence in an administrative appeal

process is not sufficient to establish personal involvement); Mitchell v.

Keane, 974 F.Supp. 332, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“it appears from the

submissions before the court that [Plaintiff] filed grievances, had them

referred to a prison official, and received a letter reporting that there was no

evidence to substantiate his complaints. [Plaintiff]'s dissatisfaction with this

response does not constitute a cause of action.”); Caldwell v. Beard, 2008

WL 2887810, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2008) (“Such a premise for liability

[i.e., for performing a role in the grievance process] fails as a matter of law.”),

aff’d, 2009 WL 1111545 (3d Cir. April 27, 2009); Orrs v. Comings, 1993 WL

418361, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1993) (“But an allegation that a defendant

failed to act on a grievance or complaint does not state a Section 1983

claim.”). Furthermore, Bell lacks competent, admissible evidence to

demonstrate that Defendant Ardery was involved in the scheduling of his

medical appointments or cancellation thereof. Accordingly, the court finds

that Defendant Ardery is entitled to summary judgment.

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C. Whether Plaintiff can establish a prima facie medical indifference

claim.

In its earlier memorandum, the court found that the complaint, at that

stage of the proceedings, sufficiently stated a claim of deliberate indifference

against Defendant Ardery for allegedly receiving the information of the need

to treat Bell’s benign tumor and failing to schedule him for a second

ultrasound or any other treatment. (Doc. 51 at 8-9). Defendant Ardery now

argues that Bell lacks the competent, admissible evidence to establish

material facts which would make a prima facie medical deliberate

indifference claim. The court agrees.

For the delay or denial of medical care to rise to a violation of the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner

must demonstrate “(1) that defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his]

medical needs and (2) that those needs were serious.” Rouse v. Plantier,

182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d

Cir. 2003). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s

serious medical needs when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk

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to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Allegations

of medical malpractice and mere disagreement regarding proper medical

treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Spruill v.

Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).

“A medical need is serious, ... if it is one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth

Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)

(internal quotation marks omitted). A ““failure to treat [the serious medical

need] can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering.”

See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).

In its earlier memorandum, this court held that Bell had plausibly

pleaded that he had a tumor in his foot, which caused him significant pain

and loss of feeling in that foot, constituting a sufficient serious medical need.

However, after a review of the record, at this stage of the proceedings, the

court agrees with Defendant Ardery’s assessment that Bell failed to present

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competent, admissible evidence sufficient to establish that his benign tumor

presented a serious medical need. Other than Bell’s bare allegations to the

contrary, the record is devoid of any competent, admissible evidence that

Bell suffered significant pain as result of the tumor or a loss of feeling in his

foot.

Furthermore, even if Bell sufficiently showed a serious medical need,

his claim still cannot succeed as he lacks competent, admissible evidence

demonstrating Defendant Ardery was deliberately indifferent to that need.

Courts apply a subjective test when determining whether a prison

official was deliberately indifferent to the risk of attack and harm to a plaintiff.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. For a prison official to be liable for acts or omissions

resulting in harm to a plaintiff, such official must have actual knowledge of

the substantial risk of harm, not mere constructive notice. Id. at 841.

Furthermore, where the prisoner receives some amount of medical

treatment, prison officials facing a deliberate indifference claim are afforded

considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners. See

Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993). Allegations of merely

negligent treatment or even medical malpractice do not trigger the Eighth

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Amendment’s protections. Estelle v. Gamble, 529 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976).

“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is

over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to

second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which

sound in tort law.” United States ex rel. v. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., Pa., 599

F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Here, Bell failed to present any competent, admissible evidence to

establish that Defendant Ardery had personal knowledge of any serious

medical need Bell faced before he filed his grievance on September 22,

2022—a week after his ultrasound examination was conducted. Nor did Bell

present any competent, admissible evidence to establish that Defendant

Ardery had actual knowledge of any serious medical need he faced when

Defendant Ardery responded to the grievance—where she explained to Bell

that the ultrasound showed no abnormalities. But even if the tumor was more

serious, Bell failed to present any competent, admissible evidence to

demonstrate that Defendant Ardery appreciated the level of severity or the

potential harm the tumor presented to Bell. The medical staff at SCI-Benner

Township, including Defendant Ardery, is entitled to deference for the

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medical care provided to Bell, which included two diagnostic tests (an x-ray

and ultrasound examination), prescription drugs, pain medication (which Bell

refused to take), and a consultation with a medical provider. Bell has failed

to present any competent, admissible evidence sufficient to rebut the

presumption of appropriate medical care. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim fails, and Defendant Ardery is

entitled to judgment in her favor.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, will be granted.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

Dated: May 28, 2025

22-2003-01

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