Kenneth Brown v. State of Tennessee

05/28/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs May 6, 2025

KENNETH BROWN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

Nos. 11-02623, 11-07432 Lee V. Coffee, Judge

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No. W2024-01291-CCA-R3-ECN

___________________________________

In October 2012, a jury convicted Petitioner, Kenneth Brown, of one count of first degree

premeditated murder, twelve counts of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder,

twelve counts of aggravated assault, one count of employment of a firearm during a

dangerous felony, and one count of reckless endangerment, for which he received an

effective sentence of life imprisonment plus 308 years. In August 2023, Petitioner filed

pro se petitions for post-conviction DNA and fingerprint analysis and a petition for writ of

error coram nobis. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petitions. On

appeal, Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court improperly dismissed the petition

for post-conviction fingerprint analysis and the petition for writ of error coram nobis.

Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE

AYERS and STEVEN W. SWORD, JJ., joined.

Kenneth Brown, Whiteville, Tennessee, pro se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; and Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of

Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 3, 2010, Dena Watkins and Nakia Greer “flagged down” Petitioner outside

a house on Northmeade Avenue in Memphis to ask about purchasing marijuana. State v.

Brown, No. W2013-00329-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 5092906, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct.

9, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2015). Petitioner returned a few minutes later

and conversed with Ms. Watkins for a few minutes before again leaving. Id. About twenty

minutes later, Petitioner and two co-defendants returned and confronted Ms. Greer with an

accusation that Ms. Watkins, who had left to go to the store, had stolen some marijuana

from him. Id. at *1, 3. Ms. Watkins’ brother-in-law, Felix Williams, gave Petitioner $5

and asked him to leave. Id. at *3.

Petitioner returned to his car and began to drive away, but as he was doing so, he

nearly struck a man named Robrecus Braxton. Id. at *2. Mr. Braxton responded by

throwing a beer can through the passenger window of Petitioner’s car. Id. Petitioner then

stopped his car, and he and his co-defendants engaged in a fist fight with Mr. Braxton and

two of Mr. Braxton’s friends. Id. After the fight broke up, Petitioner and his co-defendants

were leaving when one of them said either, “We’ll be back” or “All right, that’s what up[,]”

which Mr. Braxton understood to mean the men would return. Id. at *2-3.

Later, as Mr. Williams was walking his niece, Kimberly Jamerson, to her car parked

at the Northmeade house, someone shot several bottle rockets at them. Id. at *3. Seconds

later, gunfire started. Id. Witnesses at the Northmeade house testified to hearing upwards

of fifty gunshots. Id. at *2, 4. Two people at the Northmeade house, Steven and Mark

Chambers, returned fire with two 9mm handguns. Id. at *4. During the gunfire, one bullet

struck Ms. Jamerson in the head and killed her. Id. at 7. Mr. Williams later identified

Petitioner as one of the shooters. Id. at *1.

During the investigation into the shooting, law enforcement obtained several

statements from Petitioner, in which Petitioner admitted to participating in the fist fight

with Mr. Braxton and in the shootout. Id. at *7. Petitioner stated that, after the fist fight,

he returned to his home but that his family was angry. Id. at *8. He further stated that he

and his two co-defendants then drove to a house on Helmwood, jumped out of the car, and

began firing guns. Id. Petitioner claimed that he fired a .45 caliber handgun into the air

six to eight times. Id. Petitioner said that one co-defendant fired a shotgun twice and that

the other co-defendant also fired a gun, but he could not provide a type fired or the number

of shots. Id.

Law enforcement ultimately discovered sixty-eight shell casings outside the

Helmwood home. Id. Of the sixty-eight, thirty-two were .30 carbine casings, eight were

.45 casings, twenty-five were LC05 casings, and three were 20-gauge shotgun casings. Id.

at *7. At the Northmeade location, law enforcement found five 7.62x39mm casings and

nine 9mm casings. Id. Ballistic testing of a bullet fragment recovered from Ms. Jamerson’s

head revealed she had been struck with a .30-caliber bullet. Id. at *9. Additionally, this

fragment matched a bullet fragment that was recovered from the Northmeade location,

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meaning the two bullets were fired by the same firearm. Id. at *7-9. The State’s ballistics

expert opined that a .30-caliber bullet could be loaded in a 7.62x39mm casing but that this

was “very rare[.]” Id. at *9. He testified that .30-caliber bullets were more typically fired

in a .30 carbine cartridge. Id.

Petitioner was tried separately from his co-defendants in October 2012. Id. at *1.

The jury convicted Petitioner of one count of first degree premeditated murder, twelve

counts of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, twelve counts of aggravated

assault, one count of employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one count of

reckless endangerment in connection with the shooting. Id. The trial court merged the

attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions and sentenced Petitioner to life

imprisonment plus 308 years. Id. Petitioner filed a timely motion for new trial, which the

trial court denied on December 18, 2012.1

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

murder and attempted murder convictions and that the trial court erred in failing to suppress

his confession. Id. In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court summarized

the evidence against Petitioner, as follows:

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence at trial

showed that [Petitioner] and two others fired weapons at a large gathering of

people on Northmeade, killing one and wounding one. [Petitioner] was on

the losing end of a fist fight after he accused Dena Watkins of stealing $5

worth of marijuana from him. His car was damaged in the aftermath of the

fight. Later, [Petitioner], David Richardson, and Devon Brown gathered

firearms, and [Petitioner] drove them to the Helmwood location. The

forensics revealed that four weapons were fired from that location, and the

police collected thirty-two .30 carbine cartridge cases, eight .45 auto

cartridge cases, twenty-five .223 Remington caliber cartridge cases, and

three .20 gauge shot shell cases. The men disposed of the weapons after the

shooting, and the weapons were never found. T[ennessee Bureau of

Investigation] Special Agent Scott testified that the bullet that killed

Kimberly Jamerson was consistent with a .30 carbine.

[Petitioner] confessed his involvement in the shooting but claims on

appeal that he “had no intent to kill.” However, it is clear that either

[Petitioner] or one of the men with him fired the shots that killed Ms.

1

To assist in the resolution of this proceeding, we take judicial notice of the record from Petitioner’s

direct appeal and post-conviction appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(c); State v. Lawson, 291 S.W.3d 864,

869 (Tenn. 2009); Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tenn. 1987); State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Bomar,

376 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tenn. 1964).

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Jamerson and wounded Mr. Moore. Because it is unknown which of the men

fired the murder weapon, it is appropriate to apply a criminal responsibility

theory to determine [Petitioner’s] guilt. See State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d

735, 744-48 (Tenn. 2013) (concluding that evidence of the shooter’s

premeditation was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for attempted

premeditated murder when defendant solicited the aid of the shooter and

when the shooting was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s

actions). In this case, the State sufficiently showed that [Petitioner] shared

the intent required for premeditated murder with his accomplices and that he

actively promoted the commission of the crime. [Petitioner] and his

accomplices procured weapons before the crime, set up at a location where

the victims would be unable to see them, and used deadly weapons on

unsuspecting, unarmed victims. The killing of Ms. Jamerson and the

wounding of Mr. Moore were the natural and probable consequences of

firing upon a crowd of people. Thus, [Petitioner] was criminally responsible

for Ms. Jamerson’s murder and the attempted murders of Mr. Moore and the

other named victims. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient for any

rational jury to find [Petitioner] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first

degree premeditated murder and attempted premeditated murder.

Id. at *12. This court ultimately affirmed the judgments of conviction, and the Tennessee

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. Id. at *1.

Petitioner subsequently filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief.

Brown v. State, No. W2017-01755-CCA-R3-PC, 2019 WL 931735, at *2 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Feb. 22, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 25, 2019). Following the appointment

of counsel, an amended petition was filed, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied

relief. Id. at *3-5. On appeal, Petitioner argued that he was entitled to post-conviction

relief because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to: present Agent

James Davis at trial; present Beatrice Vaulx at trial; and request a jury instruction on

proximate cause of death. Id. at *6. Upon review, this court affirmed the denial of post-

conviction relief, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied further review. Id. at *1.2

2

Petitioner has also pursued relief from his convictions and sentence in federal court. On April 27,

2020, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. Petitioner

presented the following claims: (1) denial of right to compulsory process due to the trial court’s failure to

compel the production of Beatrice Vaulx or, alternatively, due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel

in failing to subpoena Vaulx or demand a material witness warrant; (2) admission of involuntary confession;

and (3) omission of jury instruction on proximate cause of death, including that counsel was ineffective in

failing to request such an instruction. Brown v. Fitz, No. 2:20-cv-02315-SHL-atc, 2023 WL 6279523, at

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On August 4, 2023, Petitioner filed pro se an omnibus pleading titled, “Petition for

DNA Post Conviction Relief[;] Petition for Post Conviction Fingerprint Analysis[;]

Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis.” Regarding his post-conviction petitions for DNA

and fingerprint analysis, Petitioner requested that the trial court order the testing of touch

DNA profiles and fingerprints “found on the 7.62x39mm shell casings that the police

recovered from the residence [on] . . . North[m]eade . . . where the victim Kimberly

Jamerson was fatally shot.” Petitioner asserted that the 7.62x39mm shell casings contained

fingerprints and DNA profiles of “the rivaling shooters at Northmeade[,]” Felix Williams,

Mark Chambers, and Steve Chambers. He argued that the evidence would “clearly and

convincingly” disprove the State’s prosecutorial theory and that the information “would

have resulted in a jury finding that Petitioner was actually innocent of the premeditated

murder of Kimberly Jamerson.”

In his petition for writ of error coram nobis, Petitioner alleged that newly discovered

evidence showed that the State “knowingly suppressed pertinent impeachment evidence

regarding non-prosecution agreements with Felix Williams, Nakia Greer, and other State

witnesses.” He asserted:

[T]here is evidence of cars that were reported as being stolen, were present

at the scene of the shooting; and were actually in the possession of people

who were firing and discharging weapons from the residence . . . where the

victim was killed, and that the Shelby County [D]istrict Attorney’s office

entered into a de facto non-prosecution agreement with the state witnesses,

like Felix Williams, who owned these vehicles.

....

There existed a non-prosecution agreement between the State and

various witnesses who were present at the residence [on] . . . North[m]eade

that was purposefully suppressed and withheld from Petitioner . . . that dealt

with these witnesses[’] immunity for: (a) solicitation of a controlled

substance; (b) possession of stolen vehicle; and (c) being a convicted felon

in possession of a firearm[.]

*3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2023). The district court denied relief, and the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Brown v. Wardlow, No. 23-5966, 2024 WL

4729429, at *1 (6th Cir. May 20, 2024). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which

was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. Brown v. Adams, 145 S.Ct. 1336 (Mar. 10, 2025)

(Mem).

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Petitioner asserted that he was “only able to obtain copies of this illicit conduct suppressed

by the State, within the last 12 (twelve) months” and that he was entitled to due process

tolling of the one-year statute of limitations.

On November 14, 2023, Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of error coram

nobis and a petition to reopen post-conviction proceedings, alleging that there was new

scientific evidence establishing that he was “actually innocent of the offense or offenses

for which [he] was convicted.” Specifically, Petitioner asserted that he had newly

discovered evidence that TBI Special Agent Scott’s ballistics testimony “lacked a sufficient

indicia of reliability because it was not subject to a blind peer review” as required by TBI

policy. Petitioner alleged that Special Agent Scott “conducted a forensic analysis on

7.62x.39[mm] shell casings, but did not have his findings verified by a 2nd examiner,

which undermined the validity of his findings in the final report on his examination of the

firearms, bullets, and shell casings[.]” In support of his claim, Petitioner attached a letter

to the petition from former Shelby County District Attorney Amy Weirich dated July 28,

2021, which discussed possible financial misconduct by a different TBI agent than Special

Agent Scott.

On July 29, 2024, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed all motions in a

lengthy written order. The court found that any DNA or fingerprints recovered from the

shell casings “would not have been of any value[,]” meaning that Petitioner had not shown

a reasonable probability that an exculpatory result would have resulted in his not being

prosecuted, not being convicted, or receiving a more favorable verdict or sentence. The

court also found that Petitioner failed to establish that, after fourteen years, any meaningful

testing could be done to determine fingerprint results in the case. Regarding the petition

for writ of error coram nobis, the court determined that the evidence was not newly

discovered and that it had been in Petitioner’s possession for more than fourteen years.

This timely appeal follows.

II. Analysis

A. Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis

On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court abused its discretion

by summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction fingerprint analysis.3 Petitioner

asserts that the post-conviction court based its decision on his “prior 2014 appeal

determination rather than following the appropriate ‘Reasonable Probability Threshold

3

In his brief, Petitioner does not challenge, and makes no argument regarding, the dismissal of his

petition for post-conviction DNA analysis.

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Inquiry’ requirement” found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-404. He

contends that,

[v]iewed in light of the appropriate Reasonable Probability Threshold, if the

results from the fingerprint analysis upon the 7.62x39[mm] caliber casings

yield favorable evidence such as fingerprints belonging to [Mr.] Williams or

belonging to any of the [State’s] witnesses from the party on the night of the

shooting death of [Ms.] Jamerson, [Petitioner] likely would have been

acquitted.

The Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021 (“the Fingerprint Analysis

Act”) provides that a person convicted of and sentenced for first degree murder, among

other offenses, may file a petition

requesting the performance of fingerprint analysis of any evidence that is in

the possession or control of the prosecution, law enforcement, laboratory, or

court, and that is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in a

judgment of conviction and that may contain fingerprint evidence.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-403(a), (b)(3)(A).

The Fingerprint Analysis Act provides that the court shall order fingerprint analysis

if the court finds that:

(1) A reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have

been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained

through fingerprint analysis;

(2) The evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that

fingerprint analysis may be conducted;

(3) The evidence was never previously subjected to fingerprint

analysis, was not subjected to the analysis that is being requested which could

resolve an issue not resolved by previous analysis, or was previously

subjected to analysis and the person making the motion under this part

requests analysis that uses a new method or technology that is substantially

more probative than the prior analysis; and

(4) The application for analysis is made for the purpose of

demonstrating innocence and not to unreasonably delay the execution of

sentence or administration of justice.

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Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-404. Additionally, the court may order fingerprint analysis if

the court finds that:

(1) A reasonable probability exists that analysis of the evidence will

produce fingerprint results that would have rendered the petitioner’s verdict

or sentence more favorable if the results had been available at the proceeding

leading to the judgment of conviction;

(2) The evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that

fingerprint analysis may be conducted;

(3) The evidence was not previously subjected to fingerprint analysis,

was not subjected to the analysis that is now requested which could resolve

an issue not resolved by previous analysis, or was previously subjected to

analysis and the person making the motion under this part requests analysis

that uses a new method or technology that is substantially more probative

than the prior analysis; and

(4) The application for analysis is made for the purpose of

demonstrating innocence and not to unreasonably delay the execution of

sentence or administration of justice.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-405.

The Fingerprint Analysis Act, other than substituting the word fingerprint for DNA,

is identical to the test in the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, which provides for

mandatory testing in certain cases and discretionary testing in others. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§§ 40-30-304, -305; Smith v. State, No. M2021-01339-CCA-R3-PD, 2022 WL 854438, at

*13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2022). Because

of the similarity in the statutory language, Tennessee courts may look to jurisprudence

governing the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act for guidance in dealing with cases

involving the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act. See, e.g., Smith, 2022 WL

854438, at *13; Barnes v. State, No. M2022-00367-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 4592092, at

*6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sep. 30, 2022), no perm. app. filed.

In Powers v. State, our supreme court explained that “[u]nder either the mandatory

or discretionary provision, all four elements must be met before DNA analysis will be

ordered by the court.” 343 S.W.3d 36, 48 (Tenn. 2011). A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the conviction or prosecution. Id. at 55.

In conducting its analysis of a petitioner’s claim, a post-conviction court must presume that

the DNA analysis would produce favorable results to the petitioner. Id. The post-

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conviction court is afforded considerable discretion in its decision whether to grant a

petitioner relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, and its judgment will not

be reversed unless unsupported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. State, No. W2014-

02306-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL 3882813, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 24, 2015), perm.

app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2015); State v. Downs, No. W2019-01485-CCA-R3-CD, 2020

WL 6779971, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 2020), no perm. app filed.

A post-conviction court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to

decide whether testing should be granted. Powers, 343 S.W.3d at 56. Instead, it may rely

on stipulations offered by the parties and recitation of facts in prior appellate opinions

detailing the trial evidence. Id. at 55-56. The court, however, must “look at the effect the

exculpatory DNA evidence would have had on the evidence at the time of trial or at the

time the decision to prosecute was made, not on the evidence as construed by an appellate

court in the light most favorable to the State.” Id. at 56-57 (footnote omitted). If it is

apparent that not all prerequisites can be met, “summary dismissal is appropriate.” Downs,

2020 WL 6779971, at *5. The petition itself must lay out a prima facie case for relief or

be subject to summary dismissal. Id. Applying this jurisprudence to cases involving the

Fingerprint Analysis Act, a court dealing with a petition for post-conviction fingerprint

analysis need not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether testing should be

granted; testing may only be granted if all four elements of the test are satisfied; courts

should presume the testing will be exculpatory; and the court’s determination is reviewed

for abuse of discretion. Barnes, 2022 WL 4592092, at *6.

In this case, the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the

petition for post-conviction fingerprint analysis. First, as found by the post-conviction

court, Petitioner did not demonstrate that the relevant shell casings still exist in a condition

that would allow for meaningful testing. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-404(2), -405(2).

Petitioner did not address the continued existence of the shell casings or their condition in

either his petition for post-conviction fingerprint analysis or in his brief.

Moreover, Petitioner asserted that, if the 7.62x39mm shell casings found at the

Northmeade location were analyzed for fingerprints, they would be shown to contain the

fingerprints of “the rivaling shooters at Northmeade”—Felix Williams, Mark Chambers,

and Steve Chambers. However, even if fingerprints belonging to one of these individuals

were found on the 7.62x39mm shell casings, Special Agent Scott testified at Petitioner’s

trial that the bullet fragments removed from Ms. Jamerson’s head matched a .30 carbine

caliber bullet and that those fragments were not consistent with the 7.62x39mm cartridge

cases. See Brown, 2014 WL 5092906, at *9. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that

exculpatory results from fingerprint analysis on the 7.62x39mm shell casings would have

created a reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict or sentence or a reasonable

probability of Petitioner not being prosecuted or convicted. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-

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30-404(1), -405(1). Under these circumstances, the post-conviction court’s summary

dismissal was appropriate.

B. Writ of Error Coram Nobis

Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by summarily

dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis without an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner claims that, at trial, the court erred by admitting into evidence the “unqualified

expert opinion” of ballistics examiner Special Agent Scott. As “newly discovered

evidence” in support of this claim, Petitioner cites the letter from former Shelby County

District Attorney Amy Weirich dated July 28, 2021, that “revealed . . . the Tennessee

Bureau of Investigation maintains a verification procedure and policy for laboratory

analysts when submitting reports on ballistic microscopic comparisons and tool marking.”

Petitioner asserts that Special Agent Scott’s firearms report was “defective” because it

contained the signature of only Special Agent Scott; he argues that this shows Special

Agent Scott did not have a second examiner review his work, in violation of a TBI policy.

A writ of error coram nobis in criminal cases is an “extraordinary procedural

remedy,” filling only a “slight gap into which few cases fall.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d

661, 672 (Tenn. 1999). “A writ of error coram nobis will lie for subsequently or newly

discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial . . . if the judge

determines that such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been

presented at the trial.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105(b). The writ comes “with stringent

statutory requirements[,]” and “the petition must be pled with specificity.” Clardy v. State,

691 S.W.3d 390, 400 (Tenn. 2024). A trial court may grant the writ only when the coram

nobis petition is in writing and describes “with particularity the nature and substance of the

newly discovered evidence” and “demonstrates that it qualifies as newly discovered

evidence.” Nunley v. State, 552 S.W.3d 800, 816 (Tenn. 2018) (citing Payne v. State, 493

S.W. 3d 478, 484-85 (Tenn. 2016)). Error coram nobis relief is only available “[u]pon a

showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to present certain

evidence at the proper time.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105(b). A trial court may dismiss

a petition for a writ of error coram nobis “on the face of the petition, without discovery or

an evidentiary hearing, and even prior to notification to the opposing party.” Nunley, 552

S.W.3d at 825. The decision to grant or deny coram nobis relief rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court. State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527-28 (Tenn. 2007).

Petitions for writ of error coram nobis are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103. “The statute of limitations is computed from the date the

judgment of the trial court becomes final, either thirty days after its entry in the trial court

if no post-trial motions are filed or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed, post-

trial motion.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010). “Timeliness under the

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statute of limitations . . . is not an affirmative defense; rather, it is one of the essential

elements of a coram nobis claim.” Clardy, 691 S.W.3d at 401. If a coram nobis petition

“does not show on its face that it is filed within the one-year statute of limitations, the

petition must set forth with particularity facts demonstrating that the prisoner is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 829. “[T]he coram

nobis statute of limitations may be tolled only if the petitioner produces newly discovered

evidence that would, if true, establish clearly and convincingly that the petitioner is actually

innocent of the underlying crime of which he was convicted.” Clardy, 691 S.W.3d at 407.

In this case, the limitations period normally would have begun to run on January 17,

2013, thirty days after the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for new trial. Therefore,

the statute of limitations would have expired on January 17, 2014, more than nine years

before Petitioner filed his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The petition was clearly

untimely. Moreover, the alleged newly discovered evidence set out in the petition, even if

true, does not clearly and convincingly establish that Petitioner is actually innocent of first

degree murder. Thus, summary dismissal was appropriate.4

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

s/Robert L. Holloway, Jr.

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

4

As a final matter, Petitioner raises an issue in his brief regarding a motion he filed in the post-

conviction court requesting that the court “take judicial notice of the fact that [Petitioner’s] original

judgment sheets never bore the statutorily mandated ‘File-Stamp’ by a duly empowered court clerk[,

thereby] nulling and voiding all subsequent appellate proceedings held in result of the error.” Petitioner

acknowledges, however, that the post-conviction court never ruled on the motion and that this court lacks

jurisdiction to address the issue on appeal. See Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 459 (Tenn. 2020) (holding

that, in post-conviction cases, this court is without authority to review issues not addressed by the post-

conviction court).

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