Shrader v. Massillon City School District Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Monica Shrader, Case No. 5:24CV1292

Plaintiff,

-vs-

JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

Massillon City School District

Board of Education, et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.

Currently pending is Defendant Guy Oberhauser’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff

Monica Shrader’s First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 17.) Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition on

February 20, 2025, to which Defendant replied on March 6, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 19, 20.) For the

following reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

I. Factual Allegations

The First Amended Complaint sets forth the following factual allegations. At all times

relevant herein, Plaintiff Monica Shrader (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Shrader”) and Defendant Guy

Oberhauser (hereinafter “Defendant” or “Oberhauser”) were employed as teachers at the Defendant

Massillon City School District (hereinafter “MCSD”). (Doc. No. 16 at ¶ 1, 3.)

On September 2, 2022, Shrader filed a lawsuit in this Court against the MCSD, in which she

asserted claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under federal and state law based, in part, on

alleged actions by Oberhauser during the 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 school years (hereinafter

“Shrader I”).1 See Shrader v. Massillon City School District Board of Education, Case No.

5:22CV1559 (N.D. Ohio). See also Doc. No. 16 at ¶ 10. At that time, both Shrader and Oberhauser

were seventh grade teachers. (Doc. No. 16 at ¶ 11.)

On September 30, 2022, the MCSD and the Massillon Education Association (“MEA”)

“entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, a Hall Plan and Supportive Measures (collectively

referred to as “MOU”) in which the parties agreed that during full-district professional development

events and convocation, [] Shrader and [] Oberhauser would be assigned seats in different locations

in the venue.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) The MOU specified that Oberhauser was not to intentionally encounter

Shrader. (Id.) Several months later, in February 2023, the parties reached a settlement agreement in

Shrader I and the matter was dismissed. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

Meanwhile, Shrader “bid out” of her seventh-grade position due to the harm caused by

Oberhauser, which included “such severe anguish and emotional distress that for the first time in her

life she sought counselling to address the severe depression and anxiety she suffered.” (Id. at ¶ 11.)

Shrader bid into the fifth grade, which was housed in the one of the buildings that comprised the

Middle School Complex. (Id. at ¶ 15.) The MCSD moved Oberhauser to an elementary school

1 For purposes of providing background and context only, the Court briefly summarizes Shrader’s allegations regarding

Oberhauser in Shrader I. In that case, Shrader alleged that Oberhauser made several comments in the workplace about

women generally, and about Shrader in particular, that were discriminatory in nature. See Shrader I, Case No. 5:22cv1559

(Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 12, 13, 15.) Shrader also alleged that, during the Covid pandemic, her students told her that Oberhauser

had “licked the computer keyboard, picked up the phone in the room and coughed on it and openly passed gas in the

teacher’s chair,” in a classroom which they both used. (Id. at ¶ 14.) After Shrader complained, she alleges that Oberhauser

“verbally assaulted” her in front of her student teacher and made her feel “physically threatened.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) Shrader

alleged that Oberhauser “essentially stalked” her outside of her classroom. (Id. at ¶ 23.) She also alleged that her students

told her that Oberhauser was continuing to make derogatory comments about her. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Shrader claimed that, as

a result of Oberhauser’s conduct, she was ostracized by her peers. (Id. at ¶¶ 29, 30, 49, 50.) According to Shrader, in

March 2021, the MCSD removed Oberhauser from his seventh-grade position and reassigned him to a high school

building to teach students remotely. (Id. at ¶ 42.) The Court notes that, while it has summarized Shrader’s allegations in

Shrader I, it will not assume the truth of Shrader’s specific allegations in that case in resolving the instant Motion to

Dismiss.

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physical education position for the 2022- 2023 school year. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Even after Oberhauser was

reassigned to the elementary school, however, Shrader continued to suffer “severe anguish and

emotional distress that would be exacerbated when she would need to attend district-wide meetings

of teachers.” (Id. at ¶ 13.)

Prior to the start of the 2023-2024 school year, Oberhauser bid into a seventh-grade teaching

position in the Middle School Complex. (Id. at ¶ 14.) The Middle School Complex is comprised of

two separate buildings joined by a common central area. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Oberhauser was assigned a

classroom on another floor in a separate building from where Shrader was teaching her fifth graders.

(Id.) MCSD Superintendent Paul Salvino told the MEA President that he “was concerned there would

be issues” with Oberhauser and Shrader but, despite his concerns, the MCSD took no action to ensure

that Oberhauser “would not continue to engage in the retaliatory actions he engaged in that gave rise

to” Shrader I. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17.)

Shrader alleges that several incidents occurred during the 2023-2024 school year that caused

her extreme emotional distress. On October 20, 2023, at a pep rally for fourth and fifth graders,

Oberhauser (“who for some unknown reason served as the emcee even though his seventh grade

students were not in the pep rally”) “intentionally, with intent to harass and retaliate against Mrs.

Shrader, approached Mrs. Shrader in the gymnasium which caused Mrs. Shrader immediate severe

anxiety and emotional distress resulting in a panic attack and she had to leave the gymnasium.” (Id.

at ¶ 20.) She fled to another teacher’s classroom. (Id.) The teacher took her to the restroom where

Shrader proceeded to throw up. (Id.) She ultimately returned as her class was still in the pep rally.

(Id.) At that time, Oberhauser was some distance away from her. (Id.) While she, staff and students

were exiting the gymnasium, Oberhauser stood at the doorway, knowing Shrader would have to pass

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by him. (Id.) Shrader was left with no choice but to go past him. (Id.) This caused, and continues

to cause, Shrader “severe anxiety and emotional distress.”2 (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 24.)

Several weeks later, on November 3, 2023, Shrader was teaching her fifth grade ELA class

when her students were distracted by Oberhauser “parading his students in the hallway outside her

classroom.” (Id. at ¶ 26.) Shrader was caught off guard when the students started saying

Oberhauser’s name and saying "hi" to him. (Id.) While Shrader did not see Oberhauser, her students

told her he was waving at them and that he had been their gym teacher in the elementary school the

previous year. (Id.) Shrader became agitated and experienced yet another panic attack. (Id. at ¶ 27.)

Her students were concerned because her voice became shaky, and they thought she was upset with

them. (Id.) She did not want to have an anxiety attack or cry in front of her students, so she used a

technique learned in therapy to calm her in the moment. (Id.) Shrader “never expected Mr.

Oberhauser to parade his students during his scheduled math class or otherwise, past her classroom

when he should have been teaching math according to the Massillon City Schools Schedule for 7th

grade, … particularly since his classroom is in a different building in the Middle School complex.”

(Id.)

After this, another male seventh grade teacher (whose classroom is in the same section of the

Middle School complex as Oberhauser’s classroom) was on several occasions observed “parading

his students past Mrs. Shrader’s classroom.” (Id. at ¶ 29.) This male teacher is a colleague of

2 Shrader alleges that MCSD administrators with full knowledge of Oberhauser’s prior conduct were present at the Pep

rally but did nothing to prevent Oberhauser from serving as emcee at an event they knew Shrader would attend with her

students, or to prevent him from encountering Shrader. (Id. at ¶ 21.) In addition, during and after the pep rally, Shrader

complained to her Union representatives who immediately contacted MCSD administrators. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Shrader alleges

that the MCSD did nothing to restrict Oberhauser’s conduct. (Id. at ¶ 23.)

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Oberhauser, and also allegedly engaged in some of the conduct that was the subject of Shrader I.

(Id.) According to Shrader, “[t]eachers whose classrooms have been in this hallway for years had

never seen Mr. Oberhauser, or for that matter any other teachers from his section of the Middle School

Complex parade their students in this section of the Middle School complex.” (Id. at ¶ 30.)

On October 26, 2023, November 3, 2023 and November 8, 2023, Shrader, through her union

representative, complained to MCSD administrators about Oberhauser’s conduct. (Id. at ¶ 31.) On

November 9, 2023, Shrader’s union representative met with building principals to lodge a complaint

against Oberhauser, and Shrader’s counsel sent correspondence to Superintendent Salvino about “the

harassing and retaliatory actions of Mr. Oberhauser toward Mrs. Shrader.” (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34.) Shrader

filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) in December 2023, alleging that she was subjected to retaliation due to her complaints

about Oberhauser’s retaliatory conduct.3 (Id. at ¶ 36.)

The next incident occurred on January 18, 2024. On that date, Shrader attended a 5th grade

ice cream social with her students and fellow teachers. (Id. at ¶ 39.) No other grades participated.

(Id.) Oberhauser and the same 7th grade teacher who “paraded his class past Mrs. Shrader’s

classroom” “left their assigned post, abandoning their assigned duties, and entered the ice cream

[social] and began interacting with the 5th grade students.” (Id.) Oberhauser and his colleague knew

or should have known that Shrader would attend the ice cream social with her 5th grade class, and

despite the MOU and prior warnings, intentionally encountered Shrader. (Id.) Shrader tried to

maintain her composure, as she did not want to have an anxiety attack or cry in front of her students.

3 In addition, Shrader and/or her union representative attended “Grievance meetings” with school administrators in

December 2023 and January 2024, but the MCSD took “no remedial action” in response to her grievances. (Id. at ¶¶ 35,

37, 38.)

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(Id.) However, “[o]nce again, the actions of Mr. Oberhauser caused Mrs. Shrader severe anxiety and

emotional distress.” (Id.) Specifically, Shrader experienced a severe migraine headache and became

sick to her stomach. (Id.) She was still physically sick the next day and intended to call in sick, but

the MCSD cancelled school due to weather conditions. (Id.)

On January 18, 2024, Shrader, through her union representative, complained to school

administrators about Oberhauser’s conduct at the ice cream social. (Id. at ¶ 40.) Nonetheless, the

following day Superintendent Salvino denied MEA’s level three grievance regarding Oberhauser and

stated that Oberhauser “is allowed to be near Mrs. Shrader in the workplace.” (Id. at ¶ 41.) At the

urging of the School Resource Office, Shrader met with the Massillon Police Department to complain

that she was being subjected to retaliatory conduct by Oberhauser that she felt constituted menacing

by stalking. (Id. at ¶ 42.) Shrader had an anxiety attack in the middle of the police station and

vomited. (Id.) The Massillon Police Department investigated the matter and spoke with Oberhauser

and a MCSD administrator. (Id. at ¶ 43.) According to Shrader, a MCSD administrator told the

investigating officer that there was an agreement in place to cover this situation. (Id. at ¶ 44.)

Shrader subsequently filed a formal internal Title VII complaint against Oberhauser and

Superintendent Salvino with the MCSD. (Id. at ¶ 45.) On February 2, 2024, “in retaliation for Mrs.

Shrader’s protected activity and filing a police report, [] Oberhauser filed a false internal Title VII

complaint with the Massillon City Schools alleging that [] Shrader was harassing him.” (Id. at ¶ 46.)

On February 8, 2024, Shrader received a plan from the MCSD that required her and Oberhauser to

stay away from their respective classroom areas and to refrain from contact in common areas of the

Middle School complex. (Id. at ¶ 47.)

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On February 21, 2024, the MCSD retained a third party to investigate Shrader’s complaints

and Oberhauser’s complaint. (Id. at ¶ 50.) On May 10, 2024, “the third party issued findings that,

inter alia, Oberhauser did not engage in any harassment or violate any [MCSD] policies or rules and

that the [MCSD] should implement guidelines to prevent interactions between Mrs. Shrader and

Defendant Oberhauser.” (Id.) According to Shrader, during the investigation, Oberhauser “did state

[that] he let his anger at Mrs. Shrader take control and he acted inappropriately.” (Id.)

As a result of Oberhauser’s conduct, Shrader “has been ostracized by her colleagues with

whom she has had professional and personal relationships for years.” (Id. at ¶ 81.) She “does not

feel safe in the workplace and suffers from extreme daily fear and anxiety as she never knows when

Mr. Oberhauser will intentionally and maliciously seek her out.” (Id. at ¶ 77.) Shrader alleges that,

since Oberhauser again began his harassment of her in 2023, she “has daily uncontrolled migraine

headaches which cause her severe anxiety.” (Id.) She also suffers from “panic attacks, fear, anxiety

and depression and becomes sick to her stomach to the point of vomiting in the workplace on account

of Mr. Oberhauser intentionally encountering her and harassing her.” (Id. at ¶ 78.) Shrader

“continues to seek counselling, therapy and medical treatment to address the fear, anxiety and

depression she has and continues to suffer due to the acts of Mr. Oberhauser.” (Id.)

II. Procedural History

On July 29, 2024, Shrader filed a Complaint in this Court against MCSD and Oberhauser,

asserting the following claims: (1) Title VII Retaliation against MCSD (Count I); and (2) Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress against Oberhauser (Count II). (Doc. No. 1.) MCSD filed its Answer

on September 27, 2024, and Oberhauser filed his Answer on November 12, 2024. (Doc. Nos. 7, 8.)

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On December 18, 2024, the Court conducted a Case Management Conference (“CMC”), in

which it set the following deadlines: (1) pleadings to be amended and new parties joined by January

9, 2025; (2) non-expert and expert discovery to be completed by September 12, 2025; and (3)

dispositive motions to be filed on October 7, 2025. (Doc. No. 14.)

Meanwhile, on December 5, 2024, Oberhauser filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

with respect to Shrader’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim in Count II. (Doc. No.

12.) Shrader filed a Brief in Opposition on January 6, 2025, and then her First Amended Complaint

on January 9, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 15, 16.) In the First Amended Complaint, Shrader asserts the same

claims against MCSD and Oberhauser, but includes additional factual allegations in support of those

claims. (Doc. No. 16.) On January 10, 2025, the Court denied Oberhauser’s Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 12) as moot in light of the filing of the First Amended Complaint.

Shortly thereafter, on January 21, 2025, Oberhauser filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. No.

17.) Shrader filed a Brief in Opposition on February 20, 2025, to which Oberhauser replied on March

6, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 19, 20.)

III. Standard of Review

In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain (1)

‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,’ (2) more than ‘formulaic recitation of a cause

of action's elements,’ and (3) allegations that suggest a ‘right to relief above a speculative level.’”

Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting in part Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–556 (2007)). For purposes of both Rule 12(b)(6) and

Rule 12(c), “all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken

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as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to

judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted).

The measure of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge — whether the Complaint raises a right to relief

above the speculative level — “does not ‘require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Bassett v. National Collegiate

Athletic Ass'n., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting in part Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–556).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible is

a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 679.

Consequently, examination of a complaint for a plausible claim for relief is undertaken in

conjunction with the “well-established principle that ‘Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires

only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Specific

facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting in part Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)). Nonetheless, while “Rule 8 marks a notable

and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era ... it does not

unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679.

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IV. Analysis

Oberhauser argues that Shrader’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) claim

should be dismissed because she fails to sufficiently allege any conduct that rises to the level of

extreme and outrageous behavior. (Doc. No. 17.) Oberhauser asserts that Shrader relies on four

instances to support her IIED claim but notes that, for each of these instances, Shrader does not allege

that she had “any actual interaction or contact with” him. (Id. at PageID# 112.) Rather, Oberhauser

maintains, Schrader alleges that his “mere presence in her vicinity and his filing of an administrative

complaint against her caused her to suffer severe emotional distress.” (Id.) Oberhauser maintains

that his “presence in the workplace, even in the context of Plaintiff and Mr. Oberhauser’s past

workplace experiences, does not constitute a ‘most extreme wrong’ or a ‘gross violence to the norms

of civilized society’” sufficient to state a claim for IIED. (Id. at PageID# 119) (quoting Flagg v.

Staples The Officer Superstore East, Inc., 138 F.Supp.3d 908, 921 (N.D. Ohio 2015)). Oberhauser

further asserts that “the conduct of filing a complaint against a coworker does not constitute extreme

and outrageous conduct” for purposes of an IIED claim. (Id.) Lastly, Oberhauser argues that Shrader

“makes inadequate, conclusory allegations that [his] presence has caused her severe emotional

distress, including migraines and vomiting.” (Id. at PageID# 120.)

In response, Shrader argues that Oberhauser’s Motion should be denied because “his severe

and pervasive conduct towards [her] was beyond mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty

oppressions, or other trivialities and was so severe that no reasonable person could endure it.” (Doc.

No. 19 at PageID# 138.) Shrader maintains that, despite knowing that he was required to stay away

from her, Oberhauser intentionally sought her out, enlisted a colleague to harass her, and persistently

taunted her, including when she was with her students. (Id. at PageID# 143.) She argues that

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Oberhauser’s conduct “was premeditated and predatory and went beyond menacing by stalking.”

(Id.) Shrader further maintains that Oberhauser’s conduct alleged in the First Amended Complaint

“is a continuation of his conduct that gave rise to” Shrader I and should be viewed “as a pattern of

unwelcome, intentional, or reckless conduct.” (Id. at PageID# 138, 145.) Taken as a whole, Shrader

asserts, Oberhauser’s “calculated, intentional behavior …. was so extreme as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency.” (Id. at PageID# 145.) Lastly, Shrader argues that she has sufficiently

alleged that Oberhauser caused her severe mental distress, including daily fear, anxiety, depression,

and vomiting that has prompted her to seek counselling, therapy, and medical treatment. (Id. at

PageID# 144.)

In his Reply Brief, Oberhauser argues that Shrader’s Brief in Opposition “impermissibly uses

conclusory allegations to support her claim,” including allegations that his interactions with Shrader

were “premeditated” and “predatory.” (Doc. No. 20 at PageID# 150.) Oberhauser next asserts that

IIED claims in Ohio are analyzed using an objective reasonableness standard, “not by a particular

plaintiff’s subjective sensibilities.” (Id. at PageID# 151.) Oberhauser maintains that “[a]n average

member of the community … would not view Mr. Oberhauser’s mere presence in his own workplace

as ‘extreme and outrageous conduct.’” (Id. at PageID# 152.) He emphasizes that Shrader does not

even allege that he talked to her any of the interactions set forth in the First Amended Complaint and

that his conduct “cannot and does not, as a matter of law, constitute utterly intolerable behavior, when

viewed under an objective, reasonableness standard.” (Id.) Lastly Oberhauser argues that Shrader

has failed to provide any authority or case law that establishes that his alleged conduct herein is

sufficient, as a matter of law, to state an IIED claim. (Id. at PageID#s 153-154.)

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To avoid dismissal of a claim for IIED under Ohio law, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege

that: (1) the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff emotional distress or knew or should have known

that his actions would result in emotional distress; (2) the defendant's “conduct was so extreme and

outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and was such that it can be considered as

utterly intolerable in a civilized community;” (3) the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of

the plaintiff's injury; and (4) the plaintiff's “mental anguish ... is serious and of a nature that no

reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.” Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d

601, 619 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pyle v. Pyle, 463 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)). See also

Ritter v. Board of Education of Arcadia Local Schools, 535 F.Supp.3d 690, 697 (N.D. Ohio 2021)

(quoting Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1100 (6th Cir. 2008)); Mitchell

v. Fujitec America, Inc., 518 F.Supp3d 1073, 1102-1103 (S.D. Ohio 2021).

The Ohio Supreme Court has elaborated upon what constitutes “extreme and outrageous

conduct” sufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as follows:

“ * * * It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is

tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even

that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which

would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been

found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in

degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one

in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would

arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’

“The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,

petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our society are still in need

of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be

expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to

occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for

the law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt. There must still

be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left

through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.”

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Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 671-672 (Ohio 1983) abrogated on other grounds by

Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051 (Ohio 2007) (citing Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965)

71, Section 46(1)). See also Hayward, 759 F.3d at 619 (citing same passage); Wilson v. Columbus

Bd. of Educ., 589 F.Supp.2d 952, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (same).

As the Sixth Circuit has noted, “[t]o say that Ohio courts narrowly define ‘extreme and

outrageous conduct’ would be something of an understatement.” Hayward, 759 F.3d at 619 (quoting

Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246, 1269 (N.D. Ohio 1993)). See also Godfredson v. Hess

& Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 1999); Culler v. Exal Corp., 193 F.Supp.3d 850, 851-852

(N.D. Ohio 2016); Rogers v. Horwitz, 2023 WL 6383796 at * 16-18 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2023);

Harris v. Pentair Flow Technologies LLC, 2020 WL 2558028 at * 6 (N.D. Ohio May 20, 2020);

Stewart v. Suarez Corp. Indus., 2015 WL 8272951 at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2015). Moreover, and

notably, “Ohio places a particularly high bar on ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct in the employer-

employee relationship.” Culler, 193 F.Supp.3d at 851-852 (collecting cases). See also Ritter, 535

F.Supp3d at 696; Harris, 2020 WL 22558028 at * 7; Blair v. Frenchko, 2023 WL 130838 at * 2 (N.D.

Ohio Jan. 9, 2023).

“The issue of whether conduct rises to the level of ‘extreme and outrageous’ is a question of

law.” Burks v. Dayton Public Schools Bd. of Education, 212 N.E.3d 1197, 1214 (Ohio App. 2nd

Dist. 2023) (quoting Spitulski v. Bd. of Edn. of the Toledo City School Dist., 121 N.E.3d 41, 57 (Ohio

App. 6th Dist. 2018)). “A trial court may dismiss a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress [at the pleading stage] where the alleged conduct does not, as a matter of law, reach the level

of ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct.” Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co., LPA, 915 N.E.2d 696,

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714 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. 2009) (collecting cases). See also 180 Industrial LLC v. Brunner Law

Firm Co. LPA, 2021 WL 4955268 at * 3 (6th Cir. July 13, 2021).

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Shrader has not sufficiently alleged that

Oberhauser’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous and beyond all possible bounds of possible

decency.” Accepting the allegations in the First Amended Complaint as true, Shrader has

undoubtedly alleged conduct that is inconsiderate and unkind. Indeed, construed in her favor, Shrader

alleges that Oberhauser “acted with an intent which is … characterized by ‘malice[.]’“ Yeager, 453

N.E.2d at 671-672. However, the Court finds that Oberhauser’s alleged conduct does not rise to the

level of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law, even when considering it in the

context of the past alleged incidents between Shrader and Oberhauser set forth in Shrader I. Rather,

the Court concludes that Oberhauser’s alleged conduct of attending two school events when Shrader

was present and occasionally “parading past” her classroom with his students (despite knowing that

he was supposed to stay away from Shrader) is simply not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme

in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly

intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. Nor is the fact that Oberhauser filed an allegedly false

complaint against Shrader sufficient to constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct. See Mitchell,

518 F.Supp.3d at 1102-1103 (dismissing IIED claim where plaintiff alleged that the defendant made

false sexual harassment allegations against her, and finding that “[w]hile false allegations such as

those… may be reprehensible, they fall short of extreme and outrageous”); Adkins v. DuPont Vespel

Parts & Shapes, Inc., 2007 WL 1643208 at * 2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 7, 2007) (“As a matter of law,

we hold that it is not extreme or outrageous to report conduct which may violate company policy,

even when the alleged infraction involved no ill will or animus.”)

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Indeed, courts have dismissed IIED claims at the pleading stage under similar (and, in some

instances, arguably worse) circumstances. See, e.g., Ross v. Path Master, Inc., 2023 WL 2477582 at

* 6 (N.D. Ohio March 13, 2023) (dismissing IIED claim alleging that defendant’s “unlawful conduct”

included “extreme ridicule, stalking (being following and watched), …, intimidation, threats of

violence, hostile work environment, verbal abuse, abuse of authority, bullying, …., humiliation [and]

embarrassment”); Conrad v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 391 F.Supp.3d 780, 792 (S.D. Ohio 2019)

(dismissing IIED claim alleging that defendants targeted, harassed, bullied, embarrassed, and

ultimately discharged plaintiff due to age or in retaliation for complaining about harassment, bullying,

and disparate treatment in the workplace); Wolfe v. Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc., 2009 WL 1255023

at * 2-3 (N.D. Ohio May 4, 2009) (dismissing IIED claim alleging that defendants commented, made

fun, ridiculed and made other inappropriate and sexually-charged remarks to plaintiff in the

workplace, filed a false charge of sexual harassment against plaintiff, and falsely imprisoned plaintiff

for four hours without food or water while they “interrogated, intimidated, harassed, and embarrassed

her”).

Accordingly, and for all the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Shrader has failed to

allege sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct required to state a claim for IIED as a matter of

law.4 The Court therefore dismisses Shrader’s IIED claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

V. Conclusion

4 Because the Court finds that dismissal is warranted on this basis, the Court need not (and will not) address Oberhauser’s

argument that Shrader “makes inadequate, conclusory allegations that [his] presence has caused her severe emotional

distress, including migraines and vomiting.” (Doc. No. 17 at PageID# 120.)

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For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant Guy Oberhauser’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of

Plaintiff Monica Shrader’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 17) is GRANTED. Count II of the

First Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Pamela A. Barker

PAMELA A. BARKER

Date: May 27, 2025 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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