Opinion

Hall v. Rhoden

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
May 27, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.8%

“[O]fficial-capacity suits ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”

How later courts described this case

  • “[O]fficial-capacity suits ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”
  • holding that an officer’s use of a taser three times was not excessive force when the handcuffed plaintiff sat on the ground with his legs crossed and refused to walk to the police car
  • “The limit of the force to be used by the police is set at the exercise of such force as reasonably appears necessary to carry out the duties imposed upon the officers by the public.”
  • “the Sheriff has the unquestioned authority to respond to 911 calls within his jurisdiction.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ERIC THOMAS HALL,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:23-cv-929-TJC-LLL

v.

SCOTTY RHODEN, in his capacity

as Sheriff of Baker County,

ANDREW PAUL THAMES, and

JASON REEDER,

Defendants.

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the Court on the pending motions for summary

judgment, motion for sanctions, and motion to withdraw admissions. Plaintiff

Eric Hall has been derelict in responding to summary judgment in that he took

no discovery, failed to timely respond to discovery without justification, and

provides no cites to the record in his brief summary judgment response.

Nevertheless, the Court has given him every benefit of the doubt, but ultimately

concludes that summary judgment against Hall is proper.

II. BACKGROUND1

On May 8, 2021, a fire broke out on the property adjacent to Hall’s

residence in Macclenny, Florida. Hall used a garden hose to spray water to keep

the fire from spreading. Defendant Andrew Paul Thames, a Baker County

Sheriff’s Office deputy sheriff, responded to a dispatched call of the fire, arrived

at the location, and directed Hall to release the hose (and per Thames, step

away from the fire). Hall refused to follow Thames’s orders because he believed

he was lawfully exercising his constitutional right to protect his property from

the fire. Thames then used force to restrain Hall. Both individuals fell to the

ground during this altercation. Defendant Jason Reeder, another deputy

sheriff, arrived on the scene, and at Thames’s direction, discharged his Taser to

subdue Hall. Hall was then transported to the Baker County Detention Center;

state law charges against Hall were brought and dropped.

Hall filed this lawsuit in state court for damages sustained during the

altercation and while detained, alleging state and federal law violations.

1 The court “must view all the evidence and all factual inferences

reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party” and “resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of

the non-movant.” Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th

Cir. 2000) (quoting Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d

1278, 1285 (11th Cir.1997) and United of Omaha Life Ins. v. Sun Life Ins. Co.,

894 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir.1990)).

(Doc. 4).2 Defendants removed the case to federal court. (Doc. 1). Defendants

answered the complaint (Docs. 11−13) and filed a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim. (Doc. 14). Hall responded to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 21).

Defendants filed a notice of and motions for summary judgment (Docs. 22−25),

Hall filed his response (Doc. 30), and Defendants replied (Doc. 34). The Court

decided to carry the motion to dismiss forward and address it in conjunction

with the motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 28).

As evidence to support the motions for summary judgment, Defendants

filed: declarations from Thames, Reeder, and Defendants’ counsel (Docs. 22-1–

22-3), the information with Hall’s state law charges (Doc. 22-4 at 1–2), the

arrest report from the altercation between Hall, Thames, and Reeder (Doc. 22-

4 at 3–6), the witness statement of Lieutenant Trevor Bedell (Doc. 22-4 at 7),

Hall’s citizen complaint form filed with the Baker County Sheriff’s Office

(Doc. 22-5), Hall’s recorded sworn interview (Doc. 22-6), Thames’ first requests

for admission to Hall (Doc. 22-7) and Reeder’s Taser data report, which included

information of the Taser’s use on the date of the altercation with Hall (Docs. 34-

1 and 34-2).

Not submitted as evidence, but part of discovery, Defendants also served

three sets of interrogatories, a request for production, and requests for

2 Thames and Reeder are sued in their individual and official capacities.

Rhoden is sued only in his official capacity.

admission (Doc. 33 at 2) to which Hall failed to timely respond. This caused

Defendants to move for sanctions (Doc. 33) and to ask that their requests for

admission be deemed admitted.

The Court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the

record of which is incorporated by reference. (Doc. 36). There, Plaintiff

expressed frustrations with his counsel but agreed to be represented by his

lawyer during the hearing. Hall’s counsel acknowledged the untimely discovery

responses, and the Court permitted the parties to brief the possibility of relief

from admissions for the late responses. (Docs. 38, 40). After the hearing, the

Court directed Hall’s lawyer to either file a motion to withdraw as counsel or a

notice of continued representation. (Doc. 37). Hall’s counsel did neither, but did

file a motion to withdraw admissions (Doc. 38). Thus, Hall’s counsel still

represents him.

III. DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS3

Hall had no justification for his months-long delay in responding to

discovery. Nor has Hall provided a basis to withdraw the damaging admissions

he made by failing to timely respond to Defendants’ requests for admission.

3 A video containing part of the interaction between Hall, Thames, and

Reeder was filed (perhaps inadvertently) with the motion for sanctions.

However, that video was not considered as part of the record or in the Court’s

summary judgment analysis. However, even if the Court had considered the

video in its assessment, the video’s contents would not alter the Court’s

conclusion as to summary judgment.

However, because the Court has determined, without regard to Hall’s discovery

violations, that summary judgment is due to be granted on the merits, the Court

will not further address the discovery violations.

IV. MOTION TO DISMISS

Count III: Violation of Hall’s Constitutional Rights (Thames

and Reeder) and Count IV: Unlawful Seizure (Thames)

Hall has consented to the dismissal of Counts III and IV as duplicative.

(Doc. 21 ¶ 14; Doc. 30 at 6). Therefore, Counts III and IV are due to be dismissed

with prejudice.

V. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To show the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact,

a movant must cite to materials in the record or show that an adverse party

cannot produce admissible evidence to support a fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A

genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To defeat a properly supported motion, the

nonmoving party must produce its own evidence to “designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party

must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts

showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315,

1320 (11th Cir. 2006). “[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting

facts have no probative value.” Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986

(11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).

A. Federal Claims

Plaintiff’s federal claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which

states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

To successfully bring a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) “allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States”

and (2) “show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Count V: Unlawful Arrest (Thames and Reeder)

Hall alleges that his arrest and detention were an unlawful restriction of

his liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 4 ¶ 117).

Defendants argue that Thames and Reeder had probable cause to arrest Hall,

and Hall’s claims asserting section 1983 claims for any unlawful arrest or

seizure should be dismissed. (Doc. 23 at 8–11; Doc. 24 at 8–11). Hall does not

provide a response. See (Doc. 30; Doc. 34 at 4).

“In opposing a motion for summary judgment, a party may not rely on his

pleadings to avoid judgment against him.” Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43

F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument

that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.”

Id. (citation omitted). Instead, “the onus is upon the parties to formulate

arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary

judgment are deemed abandoned.” Id. (citations omitted).

In Clark v. City of Atlanta, 544 F. App’x 848, 855 (11th Cir. 2013),4 the

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that plaintiffs abandoned

certain claims that were not addressed in the response to a motion for summary

judgment. The district court properly treated as abandoned claims “which were

alleged in the complaint, but not addressed in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment.” Id. For the same reasons, Hall has abandoned his

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent,

however, they may be cited when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir.

2022).

unlawful arrest claim, and the motions for summary judgment are due to be

granted as to Count V.

Count VIII: Use of Excessive Force (Thames) and Count IX:

Use of Excessive Force (Reeder)

Hall alleges Thames and Reeder violated his Fourth Amendment right to

be free from excessive force when (1) Thames allegedly assaulted him when he

refused to release the hose, and (2) Reeder allegedly used the Taser three times.

(Doc. 4 at 15−17).

Defendants seek summary judgment on Counts VIII and IX based on

qualified immunity. In the qualified immunity context, the Court must resolve

all issues of material fact in Hall’s favor and then answer the legal question of

whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under that version of

the facts. Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations

omitted). Defendants who establish there is no genuine issue of material fact

preventing them from being entitled to qualified immunity should be protected

under the doctrine at the summary judgment stage. Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879

F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2018).

To be entitled to qualified immunity, a government official must show he

was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority at the time of the

alleged wrongful acts. Davis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2022).

“[A] government official can prove he acted within the scope of his discretionary

authority by showing ‘objective circumstances which would compel the

conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his

duties and within the scope of his authority.’” Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558,

1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121

(5th Cir. 1981)). The relevant inquiry is “whether the act complained of, if done

for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related to, the outer

perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties. The scope of immunity should be

determined by the relation of the [injury] complained of to the duties entrusted

to the officer.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998)

(alteration in original) (quoting In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 594 (4th Cir. 1997))

(additional citations omitted).

The facts viewed in the light most favorable to Hall establish that Thames

and Reeder’s actions were undertaken consistent with the performance of their

official duties and were within the scope of their authority as deputy sheriffs.

See Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1054 (Fla. 2009) (“the Sheriff has the

unquestioned authority to respond to 911 calls within his jurisdiction.”); see also

§ 30.07, Fla. Stat. (deputy sheriffs “have the same power as the sheriff

appointing them”). Here, Thames and Reeder were responding to a dispatched

call about the structure fire. There can be no doubt their actions to limit any

real or perceived threat of safety that Hall posed to himself or others by

potentially obstructing the incoming fire personnel’s ability to attack the fire,

fell within their official duties or their scope of authority. See (Doc. 22-1 at 2−3;

Doc. 22-2 at 2).

It then becomes the plaintiff’s duty to show defendants violated a

constitutional right that was “clearly established.” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d

1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019). The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from

unreasonable searches and seizures includes the right to be free from excessive

force. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). Whether the force

used is reasonable turns on “the facts and circumstances of each particular case,

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Thornton v.

City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1400 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396). Courts also “consider the justification for the application of force, the

relationship between the justification and the amount of force used, and the

extent of any injury inflicted.” Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1182 (11th

Cir. 2022) (citing Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014). An

officer will be entitled to qualified immunity if his actions were “objectively

reasonable”—that is, if a reasonable officer in the same situation would have

believed that the force used was not excessive. Thornton, 132 F.3d at 1400

(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)).

The Court views the circumstances from the perspective “of a reasonable

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” and allows

for the fact that officers are often required to make “split-second judgments—

in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,

572 U.S. 765, 775 (2014) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). The facts,

however, are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Tolan v. Cotton,

572 U.S. 650, 655–56 (2014).

It is undisputed that Thames attempted to detain Hall after Hall refused

to comply with Thames’s orders to release the hose and step away from the

surrounding fire. See Thames’ declaration (Doc. 22-1 at 2–3); see also witness

statement by Lieutenant Bedell (Doc. 22-4 at 7) (“CPL Andrew [T]hames asked

the subj[ect] to back away from the fire, and the subj[ect] didn’t comply.”). The

facts, even viewed in the light most favorable to Hall, support an objectively

reasonable belief that Thames could use the amount of force he did, especially

given Hall’s resistance. As a matter of law, Thames’s use of force was not

unreasonable under the circumstances.

The same is true as it relates to the excessive force claim against Reeder

for the Taser use. Defendants argue the Taser was used only to subdue Hall

after he refused to comply with Thames’ orders and “is an effort to cease [Hall’s]

combative behavior.” (Doc. 22-2 at 2).

The only dispute with Hall’s excessive force claim as to Reeder is how

many times the Taser was discharged. Hall alleged the Taser was discharged

“not once, not twice, but three times.” (Doc. 4 ¶¶ 153−54; Doc. 30 at 2, 7−8).

However, the record reflects that Reeder pulled his Taser and yelled “taser”

three times before deploying his Taser on Hall. See witness statement by

Lieutenant Bedell (Doc. 22-4). Thames’ and Reeder’s motions and declarations

state the Taser was deployed only once during the time of the incident. This is

confirmed by the Taser report. (Doc. 34-2 at 12). 5

Drawing all inferences in favor of Hall, Thames and Reeder acted in an

objectively reasonable manner under the circumstances, and their responses

were not disproportionate to the circumstances. Thus, they did not violate Hall’s

Fourth Amendment right to be free from the excessive use of force.

Even if these attempts to detain Hall constituted a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, Thames and Reeder are entitled to qualified immunity because

Hall failed to show that Thames and Reeder violated a constitutional right that

was “clearly established” at the time of the conduct. Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 778.

Official conduct violates clearly established law if the “contours of [a] right [are]

5 As part of the reply to the motions for summary judgment, Defendants

included an affidavit from John Blanchard, the Director of Emergency

Management at Baker County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 34-1). The Taser data

reflects an approximately twenty-eight-minute discrepancy due to a time sync

issue in which Reeder’s Taser was running faster than a reference clock, which

is called a “clock drift.” Id. at 2−3. This does not affect the Court’s conclusion.

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would [have understood] that

what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741

(2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). Because Fourth

Amendment qualified-immunity determinations turn on the reasonableness of

an officer’s acts in a certain set of facts, the determination of whether a legal

right was already clearly established “must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Mullenix v.

Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (citations omitted).

Hall does not provide, nor could this Court find, any binding cases which

clearly established a Fourth Amendment violation in these circumstances,

Indeed, there are similar cases which indicate the opposite. See Buckley v.

Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 798 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that an officer’s use of

a taser three times was not excessive force when the handcuffed plaintiff sat on

the ground with his legs crossed and refused to walk to the police car); see also

Hembree v. Rojas, Case No. 2:22-cv-562-SPC-NPM, 2024 WL 2187331 at *2

(M.D. Fla. May 15, 2024) (plaintiff admitted he “was not cooperating” with the

defendant’s orders, which weighs in favor of qualified immunity). The Fourth

Amendment right was not clearly established in the specific context of this

case. Therefore, Thames and Reeder are entitled to qualified immunity as to

Counts VIII and IX.

Count XII: Vicarious Liability (Rhoden in his official

capacity)

Hall sues Rhoden in his official capacity under a vicarious liability theory.

(Doc. 4 ¶ 183). Hall alleges that Rhoden “direct[ed] and manage[d] policing

functions . . . where Thames and Reeder acted at all times relevant” to this

action, and thus Rhoden is liable for Thames’ and Reeder’s alleged wrongful

conduct. Id. ¶¶ 184, 186.

Rhoden noted that “[i]t is entirely unclear whether this Count is aimed at

[Hall’s] state law claims or his claims under section 1983 since it appears to

incorporate both.” (Doc. 25 at 6). However, Rhoden is correct that (a) vicarious

liability cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 1983, and (b) where

an officer is sued in his official capacity under section 1983, the suit is

proceeding against the entity the officer represents. (Doc. 25 at 7–8); see Hafer

v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“[O]fficial-capacity suits ‘generally represent

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is

an agent.’”) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)); see also

Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115

(11th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, Hall’s claim against Rhoden in his official

capacity as Sheriff of Baker County is a claim against the Sheriff’s Office.

A county or municipality may be liable in a section 1983 action “only

where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.”

Cook, 402 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must establish that

an official policy or custom of the municipality was the “moving force” behind

the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978). Here, Hall has not even attempted to identify any

policy or custom maintained by Sheriff Rhoden. Therefore, to the extent Count

XII is based upon section 1983, the Court rejects it and summary judgment

against Hall is appropriate.

Alternatively, although section 768.28, Florida Statutes attaches liability

to Rhoden, in his official capacity, for the alleged tortious acts of his deputies

committed within the course and scope of their employment, summary

judgment is appropriate here. As discussed below, Hall has failed to

demonstrate any genuine dispute that Thames or Reeder committed tortious

acts within their scope of employment. Hall therefore also fails to show how

Rhoden has any liability for Thames’s or Reeder’s actions. Thus, the motion for

summary judgment is due to be granted as to Count XII.

B. State Law Claims

Hall contends Defendants violated state law and brings six different state

law claims: negligent hiring, negligent training, battery, assault, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

An officer cannot be held personally liable for acts committed in “the scope

of her or his employment or function” unless he “acted in bad faith or with

malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of

human rights, safety, or property.” § 768.28 (9)(a), Fla. Stat. Bad faith is defined

as actual malice, and willful and wanton conduct that is “worse than gross

negligence . . . and more reprehensible and unacceptable than mere intentional

conduct.” Kastritis v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1225

(M.D. Fla. 2011) (citations and quotation omitted).

An officer acts within the scope of his employment if “(a) it is the type of

conduct which the employee is hired to perform, (b) it occurs substantially

within the time and space limits authorized or required by the work to be

performed, [and] (c) the conduct is activated at least in part by a purpose to

serve the employer.” Craft v. John Sirounis and Sons, Inc., 575 So.2d 795, 796

(Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Hall does not contest that Defendants were acting in the

scope of their employment during the altercation. Moreover, “a plaintiff's

threadbare recital that a defendant ‘acted maliciously and in bad faith is

conclusory’ and insufficient to pierce an officer’s immunity.” Bowman v. Hunter,

No. 3:22-cv-545-MMH-MCR, 2024 WL 1299280, at *7 (M.D. Fla. March 17,

2023) (quoting Brivik v. Law, 545 F. App’x 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2013)).

Here, Hall alleges that “Thames . . . unilaterally attacked Plaintiff” and

that “Reeder’s conduct was outrageous . . . [and] beyond all bounds of decency .

. . .” (Doc. 4 ¶¶ 14, 178). But, these conclusory allegations are insufficient; and

Hall has identified no facts to pierce the sovereign immunity conferred on

Thames or Reeder. Thus, they are protected by Florida sovereign immunity.

However, even if the Court did not find that sovereign immunity applies,

summary judgment is still appropriate as to Thames and Reeder for the

remaining state law claims against them.

Count I: Negligent Hiring and Count II: Negligent Training

and Supervision (Rhoden in his official capacity)

Hall alleges that Rhoden negligently hired, trained, and supervised

Thames as a Deputy Sheriff, that this negligent hiring is “operational, and not

discretionary,” and thus “not barred by the [d]octrine of [s]overeign

[i]mmunity.” (Doc. 4 ¶¶ 45–79). Rhoden counters that these claims are barred

by sovereign immunity. (Doc. 25 at 5–6).

Governmental entities are immune from tort liability based on actions

that involve discretionary functions under Florida law, such as hiring and

training employees. Hammer v. Lee Mem’l. Health Sys., No. 2:18-cv-347-PAM-

MRM, 2020 WL 999775, at *3 (M.D. Fla. March 2, 2020) (“Hiring is a

discretionary function, and a government entity is ‘immune from tort liability

based on actions that involve its discretionary functions.’”) (quoting Cook v.

Sheriff of Monroe Ctny., 402 F.3d 1092, 1117 (11th Cir. 2005)); Gualtieri v.

Bogle, 343 So. 3d 1267, 1276 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“the ‘decision regarding how

to train [law enforcement] officers and what subject matter to include in the

training is clearly an exercise of governmental discretion regarding

fundamental questions of policy and planning.’”) (quoting Lewis v. City of St.

Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001). Even apart from these legal

principles, Hall has put forward no evidence to support these claims. Therefore,

Rhoden’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted as to Counts I and

II.

Count VI: Battery and Count VII: Assault (Thames)

Hall also brings state law claims for battery and assault against Deputy

Thames for making offensive and unwanted contact with Hall. Thames

contends that he is entitled to summary judgment because the amount of force

during the arrest was ordinary and reasonable. (Doc. 23 at 16−17). In response,

Hall states that “[p]lainly, Thames committed a battery upon Plaintiff on May

8, 2021” and that “Thames assaulted Plaintiff on May 8, 2021, after issuing a

threat to harm” him. (Doc. 30 ¶¶ 48–49).

Florida law defines an assault as “an intentional, unlawful offer of

corporal injury to another by force, or exertion of force directed toward another

under such circumstances as to create a reasonable fear of imminent peril.”

Sullivan v. Atl. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 454 So.2d 52, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

A battery is defined as “the intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive

contact upon the person of another.” Id.

Police officers, however, receive a presumption of good faith in Florida.

See Ermini v. Scott, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2017). Officers are

only liable where the force used is “clearly excessive.” Davis v. Williams, 451

F.3d 759, 768 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So.2d 46,

47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)); see City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23, 26 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1960) (“The limit of the force to be used by the police is set at the exercise

of such force as reasonably appears necessary to carry out the duties imposed

upon the officers by the public.”); see also Pena v. Marcus, 715 F. App’x 981, 988

(11th Cir. 2017) (“To determine whether an officer’s actions are an assault and

battery, courts inquire whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable.”)

(applying Florida law) (citations omitted).

As a matter of law, the amount of force Thames used was reasonable

under the circumstances. Thames directed Hall to release the hose, and Thames

used force to restrain Hall after Hall refused to follow Thames’s commands. His

use of force during the arrest was reasonable and does not give rise to either an

assault or battery claim under Florida law. See, e.g., Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th

1241, 1273 (11th Cir. 2022) (deputy’s use of brief and restrained force in

grabbing the plaintiff, forcing him to the ground, and pulling his arm up was

necessary to subdue a resisting suspect). There is no genuine dispute of material

fact about whether Thames committed battery or assault. Thus, Thames is

entitled to summary judgment on Counts VI and VII.

Count X: Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress

(Thames) and Count XI: Intentional Infliction of Severe

Emotional Distress (Reeder)

Hall alleges Thames’s and Reeder’s conduct amounted to intentional

infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Thames and Reeder seek summary

judgment because Hall’s allegations fail to meet the state law threshold to

impose liability. Hall responds that Thames and Reeder, joined together to

assault him, and while doing so, employed excessive force.

Under Florida law, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s intentional

conduct was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and

utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson,

467 So. 2d 277, 278–79 (Fla. 1985). Even tortious or criminal intent, or intent

to inflict emotional distress, standing alone, is not enough. See id. at 279. The

conduct must be evaluated on an objective basis; the plaintiff’s subjective

response to the conduct does not control. Whether the alleged conduct satisfies

this high standard is a legal question “for the court to decide as a matter of

law.” Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 983 F.2d 1573, 1575 n.7 (11th Cir.

1993) (quoting Baker v. Fla. Nat’l Bank, 559 So. 2d 284, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA

1990)). In situations involving government authority, courts “are . . . required

to give greater weight to the fact that the defendants had actual or apparent

authority over [a plaintiff] as police officers.” Gallogly v. Rodriguez, 970 So. 2d

470, 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Here, viewing the facts in favor of Hall, the Court finds as a matter of law

that Thames’ and Reeder’s conduct was not so outrageous, atrocious, or utterly

intolerable as to constitute IIED. As discussed above, both Thames’ and

Reeder’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances at the

time. Thus, summary judgment as to Counts X and XI is due to be granted.

VI. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is GRANTED in part.

Counts III and IV are DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 23, 24, and 25)

are GRANTED as to Counts I, II, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII.

3. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 33) and Plaintiff’s Motion

for Relief from Technical Admissions (Doc. 38) are MOOT.

4. The Clerk should enter judgment in favor of Defendants Scotty

Rhoden, Andrew Paul Thames, and Jason Reeder, and against Plaintiff Eric

Hall and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, the 27th day of May,

2025.

Cimotbeg g. Corrig on

Ww, TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

Senior United States District Judge

jed

Copies:

Counsel of record

22

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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