NAH v. CARVANA CO.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ALBERT NAH,

Case No. 25–cv–04300–ESK–SAK

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION & ORDER

CARVANA, CO.,

Defendant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the renewed application

(Application) of pro se plaintiff Albert Nah to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP)

(ECF No. 4) after the Court denied plaintiff’s initial IFP application without

prejudice (ECF No. 3); and plaintiff having brought this action against

defendant Carvana Co. by filing an “Emergency Civil Complaint” (Complaint)

and “Emergency Motion” (see ECF No. 1 pp. 2–7; ECF No. 1–1; ECF No. 1–6);

and the Court finding,

1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), this Court may allow a litigant to

proceed without prepayment of fees if the litigant “submits an affidavit that

includes a statement of all assets” and “states the nature of the action, defense

or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.” “The

decision to grant [IFP] status turns on whether an applicant is ‘economically

eligible’ for such status.” Taylor v. Supreme Court, 261 F. App’x 399, 400 (3d

Cir. 2008) (quoting Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976)). “A person

need not be ‘absolutely destitute’ to proceed [IFP]; however, an [applicant] must

show the inability to pay the filing and docketing fees.” Id. (quoting Adkins v.

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)).

2. Plaintiff’s affidavit in support of the Application fails to sufficiently

establish his inability to pay the Court’s fees. Plaintiff claims that he “is not

employed and does not derive income through wages, salary, or traditional

employment.” (ECF No. 4 p. 1.) Instead, he explains that he “operates under

a lawful structured financial position utilizing secured credit instruments,

entitlements, and financial leverage for lawful tender.” (Id.) While plaintiff

indicates that he receives “no regular income … that would qualify under

traditional income guidelines” (id.), I am unable to discern what this means.

Given the ambiguity as to the meaning of the language used by plaintiff to

describe his financial situation, I cannot conclude whether plaintiff is eligible

to proceed without prepayment of fees.

3. Despite the filing fee not yet being paid or waived, I will consider the

merits of this action. See Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 659–60 (3d Cir. 2019)

(noting that a court reviewing an IFP application “has the authority to dismiss

a case ‘at any time,’ …. regardless of the status of a filing fee; that is, a court

has the discretion to consider the merits of a case and evaluate an [IFP]

application in either order or even simultaneously”). Thus, I will screen the

action to determine whether the Complaint: (a) is frivolous or malicious; (b) fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (c) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). The Court notes that while pleadings filed by pro se

plaintiffs are to be liberally construed and are held to a less stringent standard

than those filed by attorneys, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts

in their complaints to support a claim.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

4. When screening an action, the Court applies the same standard of

review that governs a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6). Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112

(3d Cir. 2002). To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint must also

comply with Rule 8, which requires that each allegation be “simple, concise, and

direct” yet provide enough specificity as to “give the defendant fair notice of

what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550

U.S. at 555.

5. Here, the Complaint does not meet the above standards. Count one

asserts “breach of performance,” which appears to be a claim for breach of

contract, and count two asserts breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

(ECF No. 1 pp. 4–6.) To establish a prima facie claim for breach of contract, a

plaintiff “must allege (1) a contract [existed] between the parties; (2) a breach

of that contract; (3) damages flowing therefrom; and (4) that the party stating

the claim performed its own contractual obligations.” Frederico v. Home

Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). Meanwhile, the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing is a ‘component of every contract’ that requires both

parties to a contract act in ‘good faith[,]’ that is, they must ‘adher[e] to

‘community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness.’” Evonik Corp.

v. Hercules Grp., Inc., No. 16–07098, 2018 WL 5095991, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 18,

2018) (alterations in original) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 N.J.

88, 109 (2007)). To succeed on such a claim, “a party must prove that ‘(1) the

[opposing party acted] in bad faith or with a malicious motive, (2) to deny the

[party] some benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties, even if

that benefit was not an express provision of the contract.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Yapak, LLC v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 2009 WL 3366464, at *2

(D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2009)). To prevail on these counts, there needs to be an

underlying contract. However, beyond plaintiff providing copies of a “Vehicle

Purchase Agreement & Security Agreement” (ECF No. 1–8 pp. 1–6, 17–21) that

are unsigned by defendant, there is no plausible allegation in the complaint or

evidence in the attachments of a fully executed agreement with defendant. See

In re The Score Bd., Inc., 238 B.R. 585, 591 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that a

contract requires an offer, which must then be accepted by either a formal

signature or performance). Plaintiff’s claims are thus deemed to be frivolous.

Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114 (noting that while a pro se plaintiff should generally

be provided the opportunity to cure deficiencies in a complaint, this rule is

inapplicable where granting an opportunity to amend would be futile).

Accordingly,

IT IS on this 27h day of May 2025 ORDERED that:

1. The Application (ECF No. 4) is denied without prejudice.

2. The Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this action and send a copy

of this Order to plaintiff by regular mail.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel

EDWARD S. KIEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE