Atkins v. Huddleson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

MAKEBA C. ATKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 5:25-cv-00594-LCB

)

SHERRY HUDDLESTON, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Vincent Makeba Atkins, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against Sherry

Huddleston, her former supervisor1 and the EV 70 Deputy Division/Chief/EV 73

Acting Branch Chief for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) in Huntsville, Alabama, for violations of the Family Medical Leave Act

(FMLA), Federal Employee Paid Leave Act (FEPLA) (Public Law 116-92), “Ethical

Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch,” and “Office of Government

Ethics, 5 CFR Part 2635 RIN 3209-AA43.” (Doc. 1, at 1-3, 8-9).

Atkins alleges that on August 1, 2024, Huddleston

issued targeted threats against [her], created a hostile work

environment, and undermined [her] ability to exercise her federally

protected rights under the FMLA. Ms. Huddleston further

demonstrated discriminatory intent by stating that her personal decision

1 Though Atkins’s Complaint does not clearly state whether she retains her employment, she states

in her motion to proceed in forma pauperis that she became unemployed in March 2025. (Doc.

2, at 3).

to avoid caregiving responsibilities for her terminally ill husband

informed her expectation that employees under her supervision should

fully dedicate themselves to work.

(Doc. 1, at 8). Huddleston also issued Atkins a formal warning for excessive

absences despite the fact that Atkins was on approved FMLA leave.

Huddleston’s actions

discouraged Ms. Atkins from utilizing leave types, including her

federally protected FMLA leave, to the extent that she ceased attending

essential medical appointments. This resulted in physical illness and

depression that impaired [Atkins’s] exceptional work performance.

[Atkins] feels robed of time necessary to care for her family member,

as Ms. Huddleston’s ongoing harassment and leave restrictions left her

unable to fulfill these obligations.

(Id.). Atkins asserts other supervisors within her organization “allowed employees

to utilize FMLA leave for consecutive years without reprimand, yet Ms. Huddleston

subjected Ms. Atkins to undue scrutiny and targeted harassment.” (Id.).

Atkins claims Huddleston’s actions constituted unlawful interference with her

FMLA rights, unlawful retaliation and discrimination under the FMLA, and

unlawful personal bias and interference with Atkins’s ability to utilize FMLA leave.

(Id. at 8-9).

Atkins also claims Huddleston’s actions violated the “Federal Employee Paid

Leave Act (Public Law 116-92)[, which] entitles federal employees to 12

administrative workweeks of Paid Parental Leave (PPL). Ms. Huddleston’s actions

2

effectively denied the Plaintiff her right to use this leave freely and without

harassment.” (Id. at 9).

As relief for her claims, Atkins requests: (1) $33,000 to cover the value of 12

weeks of parental leave; (2) “[r]eimbursement of $20,000 for 16 hours of unpaid

time and resources used defending herself”; (3) $142,659 for emotional distress,

professional harm, and career loss; (4) reimbursement of medical expenses; and (5)

“[f]ormal acknowledgment by the Court of Ms. Huddleston’s violations, ensuring

federal workplace standards are upheld to prevent future retaliation.” (Id. at 9; see

also id. at 4 (requesting “Legal Fees, Medical Fees, Pain and suffering, and loss of

employment amounting to $195,659”).

Atkins also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for

appointment of an attorney. (Doc. 2). The court GRANTS Atkins’s motion to

proceed in forma pauperis but DENIES her motion for appointment of an attorney.

However, for the reasons set out herein, the court DISMISSES this action WITH

PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction and failing to state a claim on which relief can

be granted.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides, in relevant part:

(e)(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that

may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the

court determines that—

* * * * *

3

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; .

. . .

In conducting its review of Atkins’s complaint, the court is mindful that

complaints by pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and subject to liberal construction. Taveras v. Bank of Am.,

N.A., 89 F.4th 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Tannenbaum v. United States, 148

F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)). However, the court may not “act as de facto

counsel or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Bilal v. Geo

Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of

Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).

According to the Eleventh Circuit, the FMLA does not grant a private right of

action to federal employees. Armstrong v. United States, No. 21-10200, 2021 WL

6101492, at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2021) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-87) (“Title II of

the FMLA grants federal employees the right to leave from work but does not

provide a private cause of action to address FMLA violations.”); see also Cavicchi

v. Sec’y of Treasury, No. 04-10451, 2004 WL 4917357, at *6 (11th Cir. Oct. 15,

2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2); 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387) (“Title I [of the

4

FMLA] expressly creates a right of action for private employees . . . ; however, Title

II[, which governs federal employees,] does not contain an analogous provision.”);

Harper v. Wormuth, No. CV423-104, 2023 WL 7009887, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 3,

2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV423-104, 2023 WL 7004970

(S.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2023) (“Courts have recognized that FMLA claims against the

Secretary of the Army brought by civilian employees are properly dismissed for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.”); Kinlocke v. McDonough, No. 1:22-CV-01490-

WMR-RGV, 2023 WL 6614446, at *11 n.13 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2023), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-CV-01490-WMR-RGV, 2023 WL 6614444

(N.D. Ga. May 17, 2023), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kinlocke v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t

of Veterans Affs., No. 23-13224-B, 2023 WL 10553973 (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2023)

(citations omitted) (“[T]o the extent her complaint could be construed as bringing a

claim pursuant to the FMLA, it is due to be dismissed, since Kinlocke . . . ‘is

considered a Title II employee for purposes of the FMLA,’ but Congress has not

“provided a private right of action . . . for Title II FMLA employees.’” (second

ellipsis in original)). Absent “an ‘unequivocal’ expression of Congressional intent”

to waive the United States’ sovereign immunity, the federal courts lack jurisdiction

to hear a statutory claim. Cavicchi, 2004 WL 4917357, at *6 (citing Franconia

Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 141 (2002)); see also Armstrong, 2021 WL

5

6101492, at *1 (“Title II of the FMLA does not provide a private cause of action, so

the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity to FMLA claims.”).2

Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over Atkins’s FMLA claim.

As other district courts within this Circuit have held, that conclusion also

extends to Atkins’s FEPLA claim. Sharmia-Washington v. Garland, No. 5:23-CV-

166-TKW-MJF, 2024 WL 3841992, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2024) (“[T]he FEPLA

does not provide a private right of action for federal employees because that act was

codified in the same statute that was at issue in Armstrong.”); Marshall v. Del Toro,

No. 5:23-CV-155-TKW-MJF, 2023 WL 9227934, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2023)

(“Although Armstrong was decided before the FEPLA was enacted, the FEPLA was

2 More concretely, the FMLA provides that the term “’eligible employee’ does not include . . . any

Federal officer or employee covered under subchapter V of chapter 63 of title 5.” 29 U.S.C. §

2611(2)(A)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.109(a) (“Most employees of the government of the United

States, if they are covered by the FMLA, are covered under Title II of the FMLA (incorporated in

Title V, Chapter 63, Subchapter 5 of the United States Code) which is administered by the U.S.

Office of Personnel Management (OPM).”). As a result:

Although Titles I and II of the FMLA grant similar leave rights to private sector

and federal civil service employees, respectively, Title II does not authorize a

private right of action for federal employees to enforce those rights or waive the

government’s sovereign immunity against such suits. The exclusive remedy for

civil service employees covered by Title II of the FMLA lies under the Civil Service

Reform Act. Employees must pursue their claims through grievance procedures or

agency management. In the event of an adverse decision, the employee may appeal

to the Merit Systems Protection Board, with judicial review available in the Court

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Such claims may not be reviewed in district

court under the Administrative Procedure Act.

THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT, ch. 2. § III.A.2 (William Bush & James M. Paul, eds.

2020) (ebook) (footnotes omitted).

6

codified within the same statute that was construed in Armstrong (5 U.S.C. § 6382)

and nothing in the FEPLA suggested that it created a new private right of action or

that it otherwise waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity from suit.

Thus, there is no reason why the holding in Armstrong does not apply with equal

force to claims under the FEPLA.”).

Even if sovereign immunity did not provide a jurisdictional bar to Atkins’s

claims under the FMLA and FEPLA, she cannot assert a viable claim under either

statute against Huddleston. Those statutes permit a claim only against an

“employer,” and NASA, not Huddleston, was Atkins’s employer. See Dawkins v.

Fulton Cnty. Gov’t, 733 F.3d 1084, 1090 (11th Cir. 2013) (“As to the individual

defendants, the district court correctly held in accordance with our prior decision in

Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683 (11th Cir. 1999), that public officials sued in an

individual capacity were not employers subject to individual liability under the

FMLA.”). Accordingly, even if this court had jurisdiction over Atkins’s statutory

claims, those claims would fail to state a claim upon which the court could grant

relief.

Atkins also cites “Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch,”

and “Office of Government Ethics, 5 CFR Part 2635 RIN 3209-AA43,” the federal

regulation that governs Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the

7

Executive Branch. However, “[t]hese regulations also do not create a private right

of action.” Freeman v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., No. 23-1133, 2024 WL 1928463,

at *6 n.6 (10th Cir. May 2, 2024) (citing 5 C.F.R. § 2635.106(c) (“A violation of this

part or of supplemental agency regulations, as such, does not create any right or

benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any person against the

United States, its agencies, its officers or employees, or any other person. Thus, for

example, an individual who alleges that an employee has failed to adhere to laws

and regulations that provide equal opportunity regardless of race, color, religion, sex

(including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age,

genetic information, or disability is required to follow applicable statutory and

regulatory procedures, including those of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission.”)); see also Atkins v. Stivers, No. 21-5798, 2021 WL 7084872, at *2

(6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2021) (“Atkins next complains that the defendants have violated 5

C.F.R. §§ 2635.704-05 (1997), which address ethical violations by executive

employees. Even assuming these provisions apply to the judiciary, there is no

private right of action to enforce their violation. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.106(c) (1997).”).

Because Atkins has asserted no viable basis for relief, and no basis for the

assertion of federal subject matter jurisdiction, the court will DISMISS this action

WITH PREJUDICE. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court will enter a

8

separate Final Judgment.

DONE and ORDERED May 27, 2025.

Ch SIE

LILES C. BURKE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE