The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
HYSON M. LEBLANC CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-615
HUNTINGTON INGALLS SECTION M (5)
INCORPORATED, et al.
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to remand filed by plaintiff Hyson M. LeBlanc.1 Defendant
Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (“Avondale”) responds in opposition.2 Having considered the
parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court denies the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury case arising from alleged exposure to asbestos. In the 1960s,
Avondale was contracted by the federal government to construct and refurbish vessels for the
United States Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Administration.3 LeBlanc worked at Avondale’s
shipyards from 1966 and 1969.4 In November 2024, LeBlanc was diagnosed with asbestos-related
lung cancer.5 He alleges that, through his work for Avondale, he used and handled asbestos-
containing products and was exposed to “dangerously high levels of asbestos fibers [which]
escaped into the ambient air of the workplace.”6 He brought this suit against Avondale and several
other defendants in state court on January 16, 2025, asserting that Avondale negligently failed to
1 R. Doc. 39.
2 R. Doc. 47.
3 See R. Docs. 47 at 5; 47-2 at 4-5.
4 R. Doc. 2-1 at 6.
5 Id. at 5.
6 Id. at 6. LeBlanc also alleges that he was exposed to asbestos in other occupational settings and brings
negligence and strict-liability claims against several manufacturer defendants and premise-owner defendants. See id.
at 10-12, 14-18.
provide him a safe place to work, warn him of the dangers of working with asbestos, and comply
with the asbestos-safety standards set forth by the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act.7 On March
28, 2025, Avondale removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal-officer jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), raising three federal defenses: preemption by the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950;
federal contractor immunity, established by Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988); and derivative sovereign immunity, established by Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction
Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940).8 LeBlanc now asks the Court to remand the case.9
II. PENDING MOTION
In his motion to remand, LeBlanc argues that, “[c]onsidering judges in the Eastern District
‘have consistently, if not uniformly, held [on summary judgment] that Avondale is not entitled to
the Boyle and Yearsley immunity defenses,’”10 this Court should remand the instant case, “finally
recognizing Avondale’s federal defenses as ‘immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction.’”11 While he acknowledges that there are “differing legal standards
applicable at the removal and summary judgment stages,”12 LeBlanc contends that Avondale’s
asserted defenses should no longer be deemed “colorable” for purposes of removal, because “at
least eight” courts in this district have granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on
Avondale’s government-contractor defenses in “nearly identical asbestos cases.”13 LeBlanc
7 Id. at 8-10, 12-14.
8 R. Doc. 2 at 9-10. The parties only brief the Boyle and Yearsley defenses. See R. Docs. 39-1 at 4-27; 47 at
19 n.85.
9 R. Doc. 39.
10 R. Doc. 39-1 at 1 (quoting Gomez v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 2024 WL 3496523, at *2 (E.D. La. July 22,
2024)).
11 Id. at 3 (quoting Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 297 (5th Cir. 2020)).
12 Id. at 2.
13 Id. at 4 (citing Adams v. Eagle, Inc., 2022 WL 4016749 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2022); Broussard v. Huntington
Ingalls, Inc., 2021 WL 5448795 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2021); Crossland v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 3d 491
(E.D. La. 2022); Matherne v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 2024 WL 216925 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2024); Gomez, 2024 WL
further argues that Avondale’s removal of this case is an “attempt to delay litigation, waste this
Court’s time and resources, and increase the costs of litigation”14 because, he says, relying on the
cited cases, its asserted Boyle and Yearsley defenses “ha[ve] no possibility of succeeding” in this
litigation.15 LeBlanc also contends that the Supreme Court’s recent unanimous holding in Royal
Canin – that, when a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled
removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental
jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court16 – “instructs that
allowing this case to remain in federal court contra to the wishes of the [p]laintiff, when there is
clearly no ‘federal anchor’ for federal subject matter jurisdiction, is wholly improper and violates
the [p]laintiff’s right to have ‘control over those matters.’”17
In its opposition, Avondale contends that “the Fifth Circuit’s binding precedent in Latiolais
and unanimous consensus in this [d]istrict” require the Court to deny LeBlanc’s motion to
remand.18 Avondale refutes LeBlanc’s argument that other courts’ summary-judgment rulings
against Avondale in similar cases demonstrate that its asserted defenses are not colorable because
“the propriety of remand must be decided ‘on the basis of the record as it stands at the time the
petition for removal is filed,’”19 and, even if those defenses are ultimately dismissed, “federal
3496523; LaGrange v. Eagle, Inc., 2024 WL 4107922 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2024); LeBoeuf v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.,
2025 WL 744152 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2025); Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 2022 WL 7540115 (E.D. La. Oct. 13,
2022)).
14 Id. at 9.
15 Id. at 11-27 (quote at 11).
16 Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 25-26, 39 (2025).
17 R. Doc. 39-1 at 9 (quoting Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 35, 39).
18 R. Doc. 47 at 2.
19 Id. at 16 (alteration omitted) (quoting Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 990 F.3d 852, 863 (5th Cir.
2021)).
jurisdiction survives the dismissal of federal defenses.”20 Avondale further argues that its defenses
are colorable, which is “all that is required” for federal jurisdiction under § 1442(a).21
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Section 1442(a)(1) makes removable a civil action commenced in a state court against
“[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer)
of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating
to any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The statute allows federal officers
to remove to federal court cases “that ordinary federal question removal would not reach.”
Latiolais, 951 F.3d at 290. “In particular, section 1442(a) permits an officer to remove a case even
if no federal question is raised in the well-pleaded complaint, so long as the officer asserts a federal
defense in the response.” Id.
“[T]o remove under section 1442(a), a defendant must show (1) it has asserted a colorable
federal defense, (2) it is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the statute, (3) that has acted pursuant to
a federal officer’s directions, and (4) the charged conduct is connected or associated with an act
pursuant to a federal officer’s directions.” Id. at 296. Courts are to give a broad interpretation to
§ 1442(a). Id. at 290-91. Thus, the question whether to remand cases removed under the statute
is weighed “without a thumb on the remand side of the scale.” Id. at 290 (quotation omitted).
After a 2011 amendment, “section 1442(a)(1) makes removable to federal court ‘a civil
action … that is against or directed to … any person acting under a federal officer … for or relating
to any act under color of such office.’” Id. at 292 (emphasis added; alterations omitted) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). In Latiolais the Fifth Circuit recognized that the statute “plainly expresses
that a civil action relating to an act under color of federal office may be removed (if the other
20 Id. at 17.
21 Id. at 19-25 (quote at 19).
statutory requirements are met).” Id. (emphasis in original). And, observed the Latiolais court,
the Supreme Court has recognized that “‘the ordinary meaning of the words “relating to” is a broad
one – “to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into
association with or connection with.”’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)).
To be “colorable,” the asserted federal defense need not be clearly sustainable, as
section 1442 does not require a federal official or person acting under him to win
his case before he can have it removed. Instead, an asserted federal defense is
colorable unless it is immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction or wholly insubstantial and frivolous. Certainly, if a defense is
plausible, it is colorable.
Id. at 296-97 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In this case, Avondale raises the Boyle government contractor immunity defense and the
Yearsley derivative sovereign immunity defense.22 Under Boyle, the government contractor
immunity defense applies “when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States.” 487 U.S. at 512. Avondale raised a Boyle defense in Latiolais, and the plaintiffs, like
LeBlanc here, argued that it was not colorable. See 951 F.3d at 296-98. The Fifth Circuit, based
on similar evidence to that before the Court here, held that Avondale’s asserted Boyle defense was
“not wholly insubstantial and frivolous” and, therefore, “that Avondale has a colorable federal
22 Derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley “shields contractors whose work was ‘authorized and
directed by the Government of the United States’ and ‘performed pursuant to an Act of Congress.’” Taylor Energy
Co. v. Luttrell, 3 F.4th 172, 175 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 167 (2016)).
The Court does not reach the Yearsley defense here, because the Court holds that Avondale’s asserted Boyle defense
is colorable, see infra at 6-8, and only one of Avondale’s federal defenses need be colorable to permit removal under
§ 1442(a). See Pitre v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 2017 WL 6033032, at *6 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2017) (declining to reach
Avondale’s second asserted federal defense upon holding that its Boyle defense was colorable).
defense.” Id. at 298. Accordingly, Avondale argues that “the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Latiolais
that Avondale’s Boyle defense is colorable is binding authority” in this case.23 The Court agrees.
In Latiolais, Avondale provided evidence tending to show that the federal government
imposed “reasonably precise specifications” requiring that asbestos be installed in its vessels, that
the materials provided by Avondale complied with that requirement, and that “the federal
government knew more than Avondale knew about asbestos-related hazards and related safety
measures,” such that “it is colorable that Avondale did not omit warning the government about
any dangers about which the government did not know.” Id. at 297-98. Likewise, here, Avondale
has submitted evidence tending to show that the vessels LeBlanc would have worked on at
Avondale were built and refurbished pursuant to federal contracts that “required Avondale to use
asbestos-containing materials”;24 Avondale conformed to those specifications;25 and there were no
hazards of asbestos exposure known to Avondale but not to the government.26 Thus, as in
Latiolais, because Avondale has made a showing that its Boyle defense is colorable, the motion
for remand must be denied.
Both of LeBlanc’s arguments that this Court should deviate from binding Fifth Circuit
precedent have been recently considered and rejected, for good reason, by another section of this
court. See LeBoeuf v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 2025 WL 1403139, at *2-3 (E.D. La. May 15,
2025). As to LeBlanc’s argument that Avondale’s asserted federal defenses are not colorable “[i]n
light of the many rulings” rejecting them on summary judgment,27 the likelihood of success of
Avondale’s defenses under a summary-judgment standard is immaterial at this stage of the case.
23 R. Doc. 47 at 22 (emphasis omitted).
24 Id. at 5. See R. Docs. 47-2 at 4-14; 47-3.
25 See R. Doc. 47-6.
26 See R. Docs. 47-2 at 14-15; 47-4; 47-24.
27 R. Doc. 39-1 at 6.
The standard for removal under § 1442(a) is colorability, and “[t]o be ‘colorable,’ the asserted
federal defense need not be ‘clearly sustainable,’ as section 1442 does not require a federal official
or person acting under him ‘to win his case before he can have it removed.’” Latiolais, 951 F.3d
at 296 (quoting Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999)). There may come a day when
the cumulative force of the cases rejecting Avondale’s federal defenses on summary judgment will
render those defenses uncolorable for purposes of removal. But whether that day has arrived is
not for this Court to decide. District courts in this circuit “remain[] bound by the Fifth Circuit’s
holding in Latiolais, unless or until it is overturned by another en banc decision of the circuit court
or a decision of the Supreme Court.” LeBoeuf, 2025 WL 1403139, at *2 (rejecting the argument
that “the volume of post-Latiolais district court cases rejecting Avondale’s argument for
government contractor immunity” warrants remand) (citing Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v.
Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1211 (5th Cir. 1991)).
The Court also rejects LeBlanc’s argument that the Supreme Court’s holding in Royal
Canin “instructs that allowing this case to remain in federal court … is wholly improper.”28 In
Royal Canin, the Court held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which confers supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims sharing a sufficient factual relationship with the federal claims,
“when the plaintiff in an original case amends her complaint to withdraw the federal claims,
leaving only state claims behind, she divests the federal court of adjudicatory power [and
consequently] supplemental jurisdiction.” 604 U.S. at 31, 33. Royal Canin thus arose in an
entirely different factual scenario (viz., the plaintiff’s amendment of her complaint), in a case
removed under a different removal provision (i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 1441). Cases removed under the
general removal statute entail a different analysis than cases removed under the federal-officer
28 Id. at 9.
removal statute, due to the latter’s “broad language and unique purpose.” LeBoeuf, 2025 WL
1403139, at *2. Unlike removal jurisdiction under § 1441, jurisdiction under § 1442(a) is not
“based only on the allegations in the plaintiff’s ‘well-pleaded complaint.’” Royal Canin, 604 U.S.
at 26. “A case against a federal officer may be removed even if a federal question arises as a
defense rather than as a claim apparent from the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint,”
St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 2d 524, 530
(E.D. La. 2011)), because “[t]he purpose of this removal statute is to protect the lawful activities
of the federal government from undue state interference.” Bartel v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 64 F. Supp. 3d
843, 852 (M.D. La. 2014), aff’d, 805 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2015). Thus, the same considerations that
motivated the Court’s holding in Royal Canin, namely, the plaintiff’s role as “the master of the
complaint” and her exercise of control over her claims by amending her complaint, Royal Canin,
604 U.S. at 35-38, are not implicated here. See LeBoeuf, 2025 WL 1403139, at *3 (“[T]he
dismissal of a federal defense by the Court does not involve an exercise of control by the plaintiff
over the subject and structure of its suit.”).
The scenario presented in Royal Canin differs from this case in another important respect:
a plaintiff’s excising federal claims from her complaint by amendment eliminates those claims
from the case “for good,” whereas “an appellate court may yet revive” claims (or in this case,
defenses), which gave rise to federal jurisdiction, when they were dismissed by the district court.
Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 33. Therefore, “federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) survives
the dismissal of federal defenses.” LeBoeuf, 2025 WL 1403139, at *3. In sum, Royal Canin has
no bearing on whether a case removed under § 1442(a) should be remanded.
Because neither the spate of district court cases rejecting Avondale’s federal defenses on
summary judgment, nor the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin, overcome binding Fifth
Circuit precedent holding that Avondale’s Boyle defense is colorable, LeBlanc’s motion to remand
is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that LeBlanc’s motion to remand (R. Doc. 39) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of May, 2025.
________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE