LEWIS v. ALDI INC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

PRESTON LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No.: 3:24cv622/TKW/ZCB

ALDI INC., et al.,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a pro se case filed by Plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis.

(Docs. 1, 2, 4). The Court previously informed Plaintiff of deficiencies in

his initial complaint and instructed him to file an amended complaint.

(Doc. 8). Plaintiff has now filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 10).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (Doc. 4), the Court must

review the amended complaint to determine if it is subject to dismissal

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Having reviewed the amended

complaint, Plaintiff’s federal law claims should be dismissed for failure

to state a claim on which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1 And the Court should decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

I. Factual Allegations2

Plaintiff alleges that on December 7, 2024, he went to the Aldi

grocery store on Navarre Parkway. (Doc. 10 at 6). Plaintiff claims that

Aldi employee Kathleen Bridgman refused to ring up his items because

he is an African American with a disabling lung disease. (Id. at 5-6, 15).

After a back and forth between Ms. Bridgman and Plaintiff, another Aldi

employee arrived to assist. (Id. at 6-7). When that worker arrived, Ms.

Bridgman explained why she refused to serve Plaintiff. (Id. at 7). The

second employee then also refused to serve Plaintiff. (Id.).

According to Plaintiff, a customer then came over to try to “rectify

the situation.” (Id.). The customer allegedly told Plaintiff to leave, but

Plaintiff refused. (Id.). Plaintiff says he then had a physical altercation

1 As previously mentioned, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend

his complaint when a prior version was found deficient. (Doc. 8).

Although Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, it is also deficient.

Thus, dismissal is warranted. See generally Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428

F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[o]rdinarily, a party must

be given at least one opportunity to amend before the district court

dismisses the complaint”).

2 The Court assumes the allegations are true.

with the customer, during which Plaintiff “defended” himself. (Id. at 8).

The police were then called. (Id.).

Defendant Deputy Sheri Leann Stovall (referred to in the amended

complaint as “Sheriff Sheri”) and other deputies from the Santa Rosa

County Sheriff’s Office arrived at the Aldi store. (Id.). According to

Plaintiff, he tried to walk away from Defendant Deputy Stovall when she

asked for his identification. (Id.). Plaintiff was then handcuffed and told

to sit on a bench while deputies investigated the situation. (Id. at 9). The

deputies informed Plaintiff that they were responding to a report of an

altercation and Plaintiff met the description of a person involved. (Id. at

10).

Defendant Deputy Stovall reviewed a video of the incident and

stated that it “showed that [Plaintiff] assaulted the customer in the store

first.” (Id. at 11). Nonetheless, the customer decided not to press charges

against Plaintiff. (Id. at 12). The store, however, decided to “trespass”

Plaintiff. (Id.). So, Plaintiff was told to leave the store. (Id.).

Plaintiff proceeded to get in his car to drive away, but he was told

by a deputy that he had a suspended license and would be arrested if he

started driving. (Id.). Plaintiff claims he had a valid driver’s license, but

the threat of arrest forced him to leave the premises without driving his

car. (Id. at 12-13).

In his complaint, Plaintiff brings a claim against Aldi for violating

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), along with state law claims

for negligence and premises liability. (Id. at 14-16). Plaintiff also claims

the Santa Rosa County Sheriff, the individual deputies, and the Santa

Rosa County Board of Commissioners violated his Fourth and Fifth

Amendment3 rights as well as the ADA. (Id. at 17-19). He seeks

$5,000,000.00 in damages. (Id. at 19).

II. Statutory Screening Standard

To survive dismissal at the screening phase, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plausibility standard is

met only where the facts alleged enable “the court to draw the reasonable

3 Plaintiff mentions the Fourteenth Amendment in his claims against

these Defendants, but Plaintiff does not appear to bring a separate

Fourteenth Amendment claim. (See Doc. 10 at 17-19). But even if

Plaintiff did intend to bring a separate Fourteenth Amendment claim,

his claim would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. His factual allegations provide no basis for

believing that any Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Plausibility means “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id.

The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation.” Id. at 678 (cleaned up). “While legal conclusions

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations.” Id. at 679. Thus, “assertions devoid of further

factual enhancement” are insufficient. Id. at 678.

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff has not stated a plausible ADA claim against

Defendant Aldi.

Plaintiff does not specify the provision of the ADA under which he

is proceeding. Based on the nature of his allegations, however, it appears

that Plaintiff intended to bring a claim under Title III of the ADA. Title

III prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals by private

entities that qualify as places of public accommodation. Price v. City of

Ocala, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2019). Grocery stores, such

as Defendant Aldi, are places of public accommodation for purposes of

Title III of the ADA. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d

1323, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief from Defendant Aldi

for its alleged violation of Title III of the ADA. (Doc. 10 at 19). He is not

entitled to either type of relief. Plaintiff cannot obtain damages from

Defendant Aldi because an injunction “is the only form of relief available

to plaintiffs suing under Title III of the ADA.” Id. Thus, dismissal of

Plaintiff’s ADA claim for damages against Defendant Aldi is warranted.

See Berkery v. Kaplan, 518 F. App’x 813, 814 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming

dismissal of ADA claim because “there is no private right of action for

money damages under Title III”).

Regarding Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief under Title III of

the ADA, dismissal is warranted because Plaintiff lacks standing to seek

an injunction. There are three requirements for standing under Article

III of the Constitution: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) a causal connection between

the injury-in-fact and the defendant’s alleged actions; and (3) the injury

claimed will be redressed by a favorable decision. Houston, 733 F.3d at

1328. “The injury-in-fact demanded by Article III requires an additional

showing when injunctive relief is sought.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted). That additional showing requires a plaintiff to “show a

sufficient likelihood that he will be affected by the allegedly unlawful

conduct in the future.” Id. at 1328 (cleaned up). This means “a party has

standing to seek injunctive relief only if the party shows a real and

immediate—as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical—threat

of future injury.” Id. at 1329 (cleaned up).

Applying that here, to have standing to pursue injunctive relief

against Defendant Aldi under the ADA Plaintiff would have to

sufficiently allege not just past injury but “a real and immediate threat

of future injury,” id. at 1328, by Defendant Aldi. Plaintiff has not done

so. His complaint is devoid of factual allegations “giving rise to an

inference that he will suffer future discrimination by the defendant.”

Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiff

failed to plausibly allege future injury as required for standing to seek

injunctive relief under the ADA). Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to

seek injunctive relief against Defendant Aldi.

B. Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim against Defendants

Santa Rosa County Board of Commissioners and Santa Rosa

County Sheriff.

A plaintiff suing a municipal entity such as Defendants Santa Rosa

County Board of Commissioners and the Santa Rosa County Sheriff4

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show (1) “his constitutional rights were

violated,” (2) the entity “had a custom or policy that constituted

deliberate indifference to that constitutional right,” and (3) “the policy or

custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289

(11th Cir. 2004). In other words, Plaintiff must identify a particular

municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the constitutional injury. Bd.

of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). To establish a

county policy, a plaintiff must “identify either (1) an officially

promulgated county policy or (2) an unofficial custom or practice of the

county shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the

county.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2003).

“Because a county rarely will have an officially-adopted policy of

permitting a particular constitutional violation, most plaintiffs . . . must

4 A suit against a county official in his or her official capacity is the

equivalent of a suit against the county itself. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

show that the county has a custom or practice of permitting it and that

the county’s custom or practice is the moving force behind the

constitutional violation.” Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330 (cleaned up).

Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged facts that sufficiently tie

any of the deputies’ actions on December 7, 2024, to a custom or policy of

the county. Instead, Plaintiff has made only vague and conclusory

allegations of a custom or policy. For this reason, he has not stated a

plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Santa Rosa

County Board of Commissioners or the Santa Rosa County Sheriff.5

5 To the extent Plaintiff has attempted to sue the Santa Rosa County

Sheriff in his individual capacity, such a claim fails. There is no

allegation that the Sheriff himself personally participated in the events

that occurred on December 7, 2024. Nor are there sufficient factual

allegations asserting a causal connection between the actions of the

Sheriff and the alleged constitutional violation experienced by Plaintiff.

See Mann v. Taser Int’l., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009)

(explaining that the “standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her

individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous”

and requires either that “(1) the supervisor personally participates in the

alleged constitutional violation, or (2) there is a causal connection

between the actions of the supervisor and the alleged constitutional

violation”).

C. Plaintiff has not stated a plausible Fourth Amendment

claim against Defendants Deputy Stovall and Deputy

Ramirez.

Plaintiff claims Defendants Deputy Stovall and Ramirez violated

the Fourth Amendment by seizing him “without probable cause or

warrant.” (Doc. 10 at 17). As explained below, Plaintiff’s allegations are

insufficient to state a plausible Fourth Amendment unconstitutional

seizure claim.

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures[.] . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. There are two types

of law enforcement seizures of people: arrests and Terry stops. See

United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2006).

An arrest requires probable cause. Id. “Probable cause is not a

high bar.” Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 2023)

(cleaned up). It “exists when the facts, considering the totality of the

circumstances and viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer,

establish a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.”

Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

And it “does not require anything close to conclusive proof or proof beyond

a reasonable doubt that a crime was in fact committed, or even a finding

made by a preponderance of the evidence.” Davis, 78 F.4th at 1334

(cleaned up).

A Terry stop is less intrusive than an arrest and can be based on

reasonable suspicion. United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186-87

(11th Cir. 2011). The reasonable suspicion standard requires

“considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the

evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.”

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014). To determine the

existence of reasonable suspicion, courts “look to the totality of the

circumstances.” Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186. Reasonable suspicion and

probable cause can be based on information provided to an officer by

others and need not be based on an officer’s personal observations. Id.

The line between a Terry stop and an arrest can be hard to discern.

United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 1993).

And it is unnecessary to discern it here because Plaintiff fails to state a

Fourth Amendment claim under either standard. That is so because

under the facts as alleged by Plaintiff, Defendants Stovall and Ramirez

had reasonable suspicion to detain him and probable cause to arrest him.

Plaintiff admits that he had a physical altercation with another

individual inside the Aldi store. (Doc. 10 at 8). He further admits that

the deputies were summoned to the store after somebody called 911 to

report the altercation. (Id.). Upon arrival at the scene, the deputies

encountered Plaintiff and determined that he matched the 911 caller’s

description of the individual involved in the altercation. See generally

United States v. McCall, 563 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding

reasonable suspicion to stop car that matched 911 caller’s description of

car involved in criminal activity and was found in the same vicinity as

the reported criminal activity). And, according to Plaintiff’s allegations,

Plaintiff refused to provide identification when requested by the deputies

and instead walked away from them.6 (Doc. 10 at 8). Moreover, Plaintiff

6 Under Florida law, the deputies had authority ask Plaintiff to identify

himself during the detention. See Fla. Stat. § 901.151(2). And his refusal

to comply with the request provided probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for

resisting or obstructing an officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty,

in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.02. See Moore v. Pederson, 806 F.3d 1036,

1049 (11th Cir. 2015) (“When an officer lawfully conducts a Terry stop,

Fla. Stat. § 843.02 authorizes the officer to arrest a person who refuses

to provide identification in response to requests.”); see also K.A.C. v.

State, 707 So. 2d 1175, 1176-77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (finding officers had

probable cause to arrest individual under Fla. Stat. § 843.02 because,

after being lawfully stopped, the individual failed to identify himself

when requested by officers).

has alleged that Defendant Deputy Stovall reviewed a video from inside

the store and concluded that it showed Plaintiff physically assault the

other customer. (Doc. 10 at 11). “[C]onsidering the totality of the

circumstances [as alleged by Plaintiff] and viewed from the perspective

of a reasonable officer,” there was “a probability or substantial chance of

criminal activity” involving Plaintiff. Washington 25 F.4th at 898. Thus,

because Defendants Deputy Stovall and Ramirez lawfully seized

Plaintiff, his Fourth Amendment claim should be dismissed.

D. Plaintiff has not plausibly stated a Fifth Amendment claim.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Deputy Stovall and Deputy

Ramirez violated the Fifth Amendment by continuing to speak with him

after he invoked his Miranda right to counsel. (Doc. 10 at 10). This claim

lacks merit. Even if Plaintiff could show that Defendants continued to

interrogate him after he invoked his Miranda right to counsel, Plaintiff

would not be entitled to relief under § 1983. The law is clear that a

plaintiff may not prevail on a § 1983 claim premised on a violation of the

Miranda procedures because “a violation of Miranda is not itself a

violation of the Fifth Amendment.” See Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 152

(2022) (refusing to permit § 1983 claims based on violations of Miranda);

see also Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding

that plaintiff could not prevail under § 1983 on a claim that officers

improperly interrogated him after he invoked his Miranda right to

counsel). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot obtain relief on his claim that

Defendants Deputy Stovall and Deputy Ramirez violated the Fifth

Amendment by questioning him after he invoked his Miranda right to

counsel.

E. Supplemental jurisdiction should be declined over

Plaintiff’s state law claims.

In addition to his federal law claims, Plaintiff has brought several

state law claims. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims when, among other things, it has

“dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). “A district court’s decision whether to exercise [supplemental]

jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original

jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.,

556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009).

The Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged” district courts to exercise

that discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction “when . . . the federal

claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370

F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, a district court “will rarely err

by declining supplemental jurisdiction after the federal claims that

supported its jurisdiction are dismissed.” Silas v. Sheriff of Broward

Cnty., 55 F.4th 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2022). The stage of the federal court

proceedings is an important consideration, with the “preference for

declining supplemental jurisdiction” being “particularly strong when the

federal claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages.” 68V

BTR Holdings, LLC v. City of Fairhope, 737 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1239 (S.D.

Ala. 2024) (internal quotations omitted).

Considering that the current case is in its infancy, the Court should

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims if

the federal law claims are dismissed as recommended above.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s federal law claims be DISMISSED with

prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

2. The Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state law claims and DISMISS such claims without

prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing them in state court.

3. All pending motions be DENIED as moot.

4. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 24th day of April 2025.

/s/

Zachary C. Bolitho

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to the Parties

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must

be filed within fourteen days of the date of the Report and

Recommendation. Any different deadline that may appear on the

electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not

control. An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all

other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s

findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation

waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28

U.S.C. § 636.