The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DEBORAH MANEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 3:24-cv-01148
v. )
) JUDGE RICHARDSON
GUARDO WORLEL, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint
against Guardo Worlel, a hospital security guard at the Nashville General Hospital. (Doc. No. 1).
I. FILING FEE
Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”). (Doc. No. 2). According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals
$923 from Supplemental Social Security payments, she has no assets, her monthly expenses total
approximately $650, and she does not expect any major changes to her monthly income or
expenses in the next 12 months. (Id.) In her complaint, Plaintiff states that she is homeless. (Doc.
No. 1 at PageID# 2). Because her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial
resources to pay the full filing fee without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is
GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a).
II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires
sua sponte dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under
§ 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any
complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.
2010).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the
relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972), “liberal construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must
still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011). District courts “have no
obligation to act as counsel or paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231
(2004). Nor are they “required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him or her. Payne v.
Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003). And pro se litigants are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.
App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011).
III. ALLEGED FACTS
As best the Court can discern,1 the complaint alleges that Defendant, a security guard at
Nashville General Hospital, violated Plaintiff’s rights by “act[ing] out of conduct” and denying
Plaintiff the ability to see doctors “unless [she] [went] by 6 stipulations for no reason.” (Doc. No.
1 at PageID# 3). The complaint further alleges that Plaintiff “disagreed with certain treatment”
and a doctor “refused to allow [her] to see [her] own xray.” (Id.) The complaint also alleges that
Defendant “seemed to have a problem with [Plaintiff], seemed personal.” (Id. at PageID# 4). The
Court cannot decipher Plaintiff’s request for relief. (Id. at PageID# 5).
IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT
After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, cannot survive screening under
Section 1915(e)(2).
To state a claim under Section 1983 upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must
plead two elements: “(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution of laws of the United
States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433
F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 2006)). For a court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a Section
1983 claim, the alleged wrongdoer must be a state actor or a private party whose conduct can be
fairly attributable to the state. See Littler v. Ohio Ass’n of Pub. Sch. Emps., 88 F.4th 1176, 1180-
1 Plaintiff’s handwritten complaints are difficult to decipher, and it is difficult to distill her
statements into coherent narratives and causes of action.
81 (6th Cir. 2023); see also Brown ex rel. Estate of Henry v. Hatch, 984 F. Supp.2d 700, 707
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (citing Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court cases to explain that the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over a Section 1983 action if “neither Defendant is a state actor”).
Whether defendants are state actors is a question of law for the Court. Neuens v. City of
Columbus, 303 F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2002).
The Court is aware of at least one case where the court found a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether a security officer acted under color of state law. See Chapman v.
Higbee, 319 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 2003). That case involved an off-duty sheriff’s department officer
who worked part-time as a security guard at Dillard’s. While working as a security guard, he
stopped a customer (Chapman) suspected of shoplifting and ordered Chapman to a dressing
room, where he and a female store manager searched her purse and checked under her coat and
skirt. In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant security
guard, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that, although the security officer did not represent
himself as a police officer, threaten to arrest the plaintiff, wave his badge or weapon, or establish
any contact with the sheriff’s department, Dillard’s policy mandated police intervention in strip
search situations. Thus, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the initiation of
a strip search by an armed, uniformed sheriff’s deputy constituted an act that may be fairly
attributable to the state. Id. at 834.
The present case is distinguishable. The complaint does not allege that Defendant is
affiliated in any way with local law enforcement. Neither does the complaint allege that
Defendant detained Plaintiff, arrested or threatened to arrest Plaintiff, communicated with local
law enforcement about Plaintiff, wore an official sheriff’s department uniform, or displayed a
firearm or badge. The only allegations in the complaint pertaining to Defendant is that he denied
Plaintiff the ability to see doctors “unless [she] [went] by 6 stipulations for no reason” and that
Defendant “seemed” to have a personal problem with Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID# 3-4).
Without more, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support a finding that Defendant was
acting under color of law. See Smith v. Kennemore, No. 1:18-cv-00264-SKL, 2019 WL 6792754,
at *6-7 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2019) (holding that an off-duty sheriff’s deputy did not act under
color of state law, even though he was wearing his official sheriff’s department uniform, when
he entered the plaintiff’s home to retrieve a stick as evidence in a personal dispute and his
weapon and credentials were concealed the entire time and he never showed his badge). Thus,
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against
Defendant.
Even if the complaint had alleged that Defendant is a state actor or engaged in acts fairly
attributable to the state, Plaintiff’s allegations would fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Section 1983. Plaintiff, a private citizen, does not have a constitutional right to see
particular doctors at the time of her choosing. Even though the complaint alleges that Defendant
denied Plaintiff the right to see doctors unless she took certain steps, the complaint implicitly
concedes that Plaintiff was able to see a doctor by alleging that Plaintiff disagreed with the
course of treatment recommended by a doctor who would not permit Plaintiff to see her own x-
ray. Such allegations do not establish constitutional violations. Neither do Plaintiff’s other
allegations (that Defendant seemed to have a personal problem with Plaintiff) rise to the level of
constitutional violations.
V. CONCLUSION
As explained above, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis complaint does not invoke the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. The complaint does not allege that Defendant, a hospital security
guard, is a state actor. Neither does the complaint suggest a basis for considering Defendant a
state actor. Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CLi Richeardscnr
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE