Sheets v. Woelk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ANDREW BRYANT SHEETS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:25-cv-61-JLB-KCD

v.

MATTHEW WOELK, IN

PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL

CAPACITY; CITY OF PUNTA

GORDA, MUNICIPALITY;

CHARLLOTTE COUNTY, RON

JANZ, IN PERSONAL AND

PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY;

WEISER SECURITY, MICHELLE

MALDONADO-FLORES,

CHARLOTTE COUNTY EVENT

MANAGER;

Defendants,

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Andrew Bryant Sheets sues a host of defendants under the

First Amendment. (See Doc. 37.) His claims stem from an incident where he

protested outside the Charlotte County Event Center and was trespassed.

(Id. ¶¶ 19, 23.)

Defendant Officer Matthew Woelk has moved to dismiss the complaint

based on qualified immunity. (Doc. 43.) He now asks the Court to stay

discovery while his motion awaits disposition. All Defendants also move for a

protective order to limit Sheet’s discovery requests served on April 10, 2025.

(Doc. 60.)1 Sheets responded in opposition. (Doc. 61.) For the reasons below,

Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), a court may, for good

cause, issue a protective order staying discovery pending resolution of a

dispositive motion. Caicedo v. DeSantis, No. 6:23-CV-2303-JSS-RMN, 2024

WL 1579675, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2024).2 But staying discovery is the

exception, not the rule. See Middle District Discovery Handbook (2021) at 5.

The pendency of a dispositive motion “will not justify a unilateral motion to

stay discovery pending [its] resolution.” Id.

Instead, “a stay should be granted only where the motion to dismiss

appears, upon preliminary review, to be clearly meritorious and truly case

dispositive.” Garvin v. Effingham Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. CV423-337, 2024 WL

2092990, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 7, 2024). This is because “[d]elays in discovery

can create case management problems which impede the Court’s

responsibility to expedite discovery and cause unnecessary litigation

expenses and problems.” Caicedo, 2024 WL 1579675, at *1.

Also relevant here, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that immunity

claims often call for protection from discovery because subjecting officials to

1 This document is not paginated, so the Court refers to the page numbers generated by its

electronic filing system.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have

been omitted in this and later citations.

traditional discovery for acts where they are immune would undercut the

protection immunity was meant to afford. See Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing,

LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The defense of sovereign or

qualified immunity protects government officials not only from having to

stand trial, but from having to bear the burdens attendant to litigation,

including pretrial discovery.”); Overcash v. Shelnutt, 753 F. App’x 741, 746

(11th Cir. 2018) (“The very purpose of the immunity defenses raised by the

judicial and officer defendants is to protect them from having to bear the

burdens attendant to litigation.”); Howe v. City of Enter., 861 F.3d 1300, 1302

(11th Cir. 2017) (finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it

ordered the defendant to submit a joint discovery plan because a potentially

immune defendant should not be subject to litigation “beyond the point at

which immunity is asserted”).

Because Officer Woelk’s motion to dismiss raises serious questions

about the viability of the complaint that must be resolved before he is

burdened with discovery and other pretrial obligations, a stay is appropriate.

(Doc. 43.) If Officer Woelk is indeed entitled to qualified immunity, his

motion to dismiss will dispose of Sheets’ entire case against him and moot

any discovery.

Sheets’ arguments about the need for discovery are unpersuasive when

weighed against Officer Woelk’s immunity claims. Further, Sheets has

already responded to the motions to dismiss without discovery. (Doc. 57.)

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court considers only the complaint

and any other judicially noticed facts. Discovery is simply unnecessary for the

Court to decide the issues now before it.3

As mentioned, the remaining Defendants seek to limit discovery under

Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(C). (Doc. 60 at 8-11.) They note that Sheets has already

served hundreds of discovery requests, including requests for admission,

interrogatories, and requests to produce, many of which are improper. (Docs.

60-1―60-12; Doc. 60 at 4-7.)

The Court “on motion or on its own” must limit discovery when: “(i) the

discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or

less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to

obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed

discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(2)(C). “In short, a district court may limit discovery when the burden of

compliance outweighs its likely benefit or relevance.” Pinehaven Plantation

Properties, LLC v. Mountcastle Fam. LLC, No. 1:12-CV-62 WLS, 2013 WL

6734117, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2013).

3 The other individual defendants—Maldonado and Janz—also move to stay discovery, but

it isn’t clear on what grounds. (Doc. 60 at 1, 11.) Their motions to dismiss do not raise

qualified immunity (Docs. 40, 45), and Defendants do not otherwise present any reason that

discovery should be stayed for these individuals.

Much of the discovery Sheets has served is improper, overbroad, and

unduly burdensome. For example, many requests have no temporal limit.

Without any temporal bounds, the discovery is unreasonable. See Great Am.

Ins. Co. v. Veteran’s Support Org., 166 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla.

2015); Medina v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, No. 15-14342-CIV, 2017 WL

5196093 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2017) (“There is generally no binding authority

limiting discovery to a certain period; rather, the time period must be

reasonable given the factual circumstances of the case.”). And some requests

for production request “any and all” communications, which are generally

improper. See, e.g., Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d

1292, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting request for “[a]ny and all documents

that support, evidence, prove or relate to the allegations made”); Goodbys

Creek, LLC v. Arch Ins. Co., No. 3:07-CV-947-J-34HTS, 2008 WL 4279693, at

*2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2008) (holding that a request for all communications is

overbroad); Great Lakes Transp. Holding LLC v. Yellow Cab Serv. Corp. of

Fla., No. 10-80241-CIV, 2010 WL 5093746, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2010). By

way of another example, document request number ten seeks every

document, record, or communication containing “Andrew Sheets” for the past

six years. (Doc. 60-3 at 2.) Literally construed, this discovery calls for every

record related to Sheets, no matter how irrelevant to his underlying claims.

Rule 26 allows reasonable discovery, not all-encompassing discovery.

Finally, some requests for admission improperly call for legal

conclusions. For example, number 137 asks Defendants to admit that “the

City of Punta Gorda knew that its administrative ordinance violation

hearings involved constitutional questions, including alleged retaliation for

exercising First Amendment rights.” (Doc. 60-1 at 16.) Although Rule 36(a)

authorizes a party to serve a request for admission relating to the application

of law to fact, a party may not seek an admission as to a pure conclusion of

law. See Disability Rts. Council v. Wash. Metro. Area, 234 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C.

2006) (“In 1970, Rule 36 was amended to allow for requests applying law to

fact. It is still true, however, that one party cannot demand that the other

party admit the truth of a legal conclusion.... For example, it would be

inappropriate for a party to demand that the opposing party ratify legal

conclusions that the requesting party has simply attached to operative

facts.”); Hanley v. Como Inn, Inc., No. 99 C 1486, 2003 WL 1989607, at *3

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2003) (“A party cannot be asked to admit a legal

conclusion.”); Tulip Computers Int’l, B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 210 F.R.D.

100, 108 (D. Del. 2002) (“[R]equests that seek legal conclusions are not

allowed under Rule 36.”).

For these reasons, the discovery in its current form is stricken. Sheets

may serve more targeted discovery on Defendants that complies with Federal

Rule 26. It is thus ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Joint Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Stay

Discovery (Doc. 60) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

2. Discovery and the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 16 are stayed as to Defendant Matthew Woelk pending a decision

on his motion to dismiss. (Doc. 43.) The request to stay discovery for the other

individual defendants is denied.

3. Defendants’ request to limit discovery is granted. Sheets’

discovery is stricken. He may serve more targeted discovery on Defendants

that complies with Federal Rule 26.

ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 23, 2025.

lee fe at cil

“ Vale C. Dudek

United States Magistrate Judge