Santana v. Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

CRISTOBAL SANTANA, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 24-3246

)

WILLIAM SMITH, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court for screening is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed by pro se Plaintiff

Cristobal Santana.

I. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient

claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In

reviewing the complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally

construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,

721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. FACTS ALLEGED

Plaintiff complains of events that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at the

Sangamon County Jail (“the Jail”), from November 2023 to present. His Complaint names

William Smith, Advanced Correctional Healthcare, and Doe correctional and healthcare

employees who worked under Smith and Advanced Correctional Healthcare as

Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that, on or about October 25, 2023, he suffered two broken legs,

resulting in five surgeries and rendering him unable to walk or bend his knees. Plaintiff

was bedridden, and doctors and specialists at Springfield Memorial Hospital ordered

him to have round-the-clock care.

On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff was transferred from the hospital to the Jail’s

medical unit, where he remained bedridden. Plaintiff was housed in the medical unit

from November 2023 to April 2024. Plaintiff was totally reliant on Doe Defendants for all

of his basic needs, including water, bathroom use, bathing, and dressing and bedding

changes.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith issued an order requiring that two

correctional officers be present during any and all staff interactions (medical or

otherwise) with Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith knew that this order

would impede Plaintiff’s care, due to staff shortages and availability issues as the medical

unit only had one correctional officer stationed in it at a given time. Plaintiff further

alleges the order made no sense because Plaintiff was bedridden and could not even

walk.

In addition, shortly after Plaintiff’s arrival at the Jail, Doe Defendants ceased

Plaintiff’s prescription pain medication, Tramadol, and substituted an ineffective pain

medication. The change in medication was allegedly due to Jail policy. Plaintiff alleges

he was in excruciating pain and that the change in medication was unnecessary for

security reasons because he was bedridden and confined to the medical unit where

nurses would watch him to ensure that he ingested any and all medication he received.

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Doe Defendants frequently ignored or refused to

assist him with basic needs, despite Plaintiff being wholly dependent upon them for his

care. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Doe Defendants regularly did not refill his drinking

water, leaving him dehydrated and suffering from sharp pains in his left kidney. The Doe

Defendants also frequently ignored or refused to assist Plaintiff with toileting needs,

causing Plaintiff to hold his bladder or bowels for hours or to attempt to use the portable

toilet without assistance. On occasion, Plaintiff urinated on himself or spilled the urinal

in his bed, after which he was also ignored and left to lay in his own urine for hours.

Plaintiff also fell when attempting to use the toilet by himself because Doe Defendants

did not respond to his request for assistance. Plaintiff alleges Doe Defendants did not

empty his toilet for days, leaving him exposed to feces, and Defendants often left Plaintiff

in filthy bedding for weeks at a time, causing him to develop rashes and bed sores.

Plaintiff alleges both that the Doe Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

need for basic care and that their acts were the natural result of the policy set by

Defendant Smith, requiring two correctional staff members to be present during any

medical staff interaction with Plaintiff.

On or about January 17, 2024, Defendant Smith and other staff placed Plaintiff in

the Jail’s psychiatric observation cell, which was covered in feces and urine stains and

odors and contained no mattress. Despite Plaintiff’s medical issues with his legs, he was

forced to sleep on concrete for days. Plaintiff was held in that cell for seven days before

being returned to the Jail’s medical unit.

Plaintiff was released from the Jail’s medical unit to the general population in

April 2024. At that time, Plaintiff was not allowed his crutches, even though doctors had

ordered Plaintiff not to bear any weight on his legs without assistance and the shower

stalls in general population had no chair or safety rails.

By May 2024, Plaintiff’s specialist doctor determined that he required daily

physical therapy. However, during the month of May, Doe Defendants failed to provide

Plaintiff with physical therapy on 12 occasions. In June 2024, Defendants failed to provide

Plaintiff’s daily physical therapy on 19 occasions. Plaintiff alleges that the same trends

continued in July and August 2024.

III. ANALYSIS

Based on the Court’s review, the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint are sufficient

to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for unreasonable medical care against

Defendants Smith and Does. See McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2022), citing

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

clause governs medical care claims of detainees in jail).

“In the case of those responsible for setting policy, liability will result from the

institution of a ‘policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation.’”

Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 440 (7th Cir. 2015), quoting Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235

F.3d 1000, 1013 (7th Cir. 2000)). Here, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendant

Smith set policies that, when enforced, caused Plaintiff constitutional deprivations in the

form of inadequate water, toileting assistance, and hygiene.

Plaintiff has also alleged sufficient facts to support a claim of unreasonable medical

care against Doe Defendants who knew that Plaintiff was bedridden with two broken

legs and required constant care but did not provide him with water, assistance with using

the toilet or changing/cleaning his sheets, necessary pain medication or, later, daily

physical therapy and walking assistance devices. See, e.g., Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722,

729 (7th Cir. 2016) (A doctor’s “refus[al] to take instructions from a specialist” may

constitute evidence that the doctor knew their treatment decisions created a serious risk

to an inmate’s health.).

In addition, Plaintiff states a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement

against Defendants Smith and the Doe Defendants, for lack of access to water, exposure

to feces and urine for extended periods of time, and placement in a cell where he was

forced to sleep on concrete despite having recently broken his legs. Hardeman v. Curran,

933 F.3d 816, 822-24 (7th Cir. 2019) (plaintiff states a plausible claim for unconstitutional

conditions of pretrial confinement when the alleged conditions are objectively

unreasonable and excessive in relation to any legitimate non-punitive purpose,

discussing the right to water for drinking and personal sanitation and to live in an

environment free of accumulated human waste); Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th

Cir. 1999) (“condition[s] may amount to punishment if prison officials are deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk to the detainee’s [health or] safety”).

Plaintiff does not state any claim against the owners of Advanced Correctional

Healthcare. There is no vicarious liability under § 1983 solely based upon an employer or

supervisory relationship. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Brown v. Randle, 847 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2017).

However, because Plaintiff seeks to sue Doe Defendants who are both correctional

staff and medical staff, the Court will add the Jail Superintendent Larry Beck, in his

official capacity only for the purpose of assisting Plaintiff in identifying the Doe

correctional Defendants, and the Court will allow Advanced Correctional Healthcare to

remain as a Defendant for the sole purpose of assisting in identifying the Doe Medical

Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with further directions and deadlines

regarding the identification of the Doe Defendants in a Scheduling Order. After the Doe

Defendants are identified, Defendants Beck and Advanced Correctional Healthcare will

be dismissed from this suit.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court’s Merit Review screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to proceed with Fourteenth

Amendment claims of unreasonable medical care and unreasonable conditions of

confinement against Defendant Smith and John Doe Defendants. Additional

claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion

by a party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) The Clerk is directed to add Sangamon County Jail Superintendent Larry Beck in

his official capacity only for the purpose of assisting Plaintiff with identifying

the Doe correctional Defendants. Defendant Advanced Correctional Healthcare

remains in this case only for the purpose of assisting Plaintiff with identifying

the Doe medical Defendants.

3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Status [5] is MOOT.

4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until

counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give

Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed

before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

5) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service.

Defendants have sixty days from service to file an Answer. If a Defendant has not

filed an Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of

this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After

Defendants have been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

6) If a Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for

whom the Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

Defendant’s current work address or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and

shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

7) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends the

waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an Answer. The Answer should

include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In

general, an Answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on

the merits of those positions unless and until a Defendant files a motion.

Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents that

Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendant’s counsel. However, this does not

apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are

not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk

will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’ counsel has filed an

appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

9) The Court grants Defendants’ counsel leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of

confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

10) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a

change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this

lawsuit with prejudice.

11) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect

formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant. Formal

service will require the Defendant to pay the associated costs under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

12) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

13) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard

procedures.

ENTERED May 23, 2025.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE