The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
COX AUTOMOTIVES, INC., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:24-cv-00292-DGK
)
SUPER DISPATCH INC., )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER DENYING PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
This case arises from Plaintiff Cox Automotives, Inc’s (“Cox”) allegations that Defendant
Super Dispatch Inc. (“Super Dispatch”) is engaging in false advertising and unfair competition
and has also committed various business torts against Cox. Super Dispatch denies the allegations.
Now before the Court is Super Dispatch’s partial motion to dismiss Cox’s Second
Amended Complaint. ECF No. 117. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED.
Standard
A claim may be dismissed if it fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court “must accept as true all of
the complaint’s factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[].”
Stodghill v. Wellston Sch. Dist., 512 F.3d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 2008). To avoid dismissal, a
complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
plaintiff need not demonstrate the claim is probable, only that it is more than just possible. Id.
Background
Accepting the Second Amended Complaint’s factual allegations as true, viewing these
allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and drawing all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds the facts to be as follows for purposes of the pending motion.
Cox operates an online platform called CentralDispatch that facilitates the transportation
of automobiles by connecting vehicle shippers with vehicle carriers. In the automotive industry,
this is known as a “load board.” CentralDispatch is a subscription-based service that requires
users to login with a username and password and to agree to the platform’s terms of use which
expressly prohibit transmitting information to third parties.
The platform functions as follows. Shippers post vehicles that require transport along with
information related to the vehicle. Carriers view those listings and coordinate with the shipper to
transport a vehicle. Shippers can review the carrier’s profile to verify it meets their criteria and
assign a carrier to transport the vehicle. At any given time, CentralDispatch hosts more than
50,000 vehicles for transport and facilitates millions of transactions a year. Over 13,000 carriers
with over 40,000 trucks use CentralDispatch to find vehicles to ship each week.
A significant percentage of vehicle listings are posted exclusively on CentralDispatch and
not cross-listed on other public load boards. As a result, CentralDispatch provides its subscribers
with information that is not publicly available. Each listing typically includes: a description of
the vehicle (including dimensions and weight); the origin and destination; the price and payment
terms; the desired delivery date; details about the shipper, including the name of the
owner/manager, address, telephone number, email address; and a rating score based on reviews
from other carriers.
This information—which is collected for millions of transactions each year—powers
features such as CentralDispatch’s “Price Compare.” This feature, available only to subscribers,
provides pricing information for transporting vehicles along similar routes (i.e., similar origins and
destinations). In addition, the information gives Cox valuable insight into its customer base,
enabling it to develop, refine, and market its products more effectively.
Super Dispatch operates a competing load board called Super Loadboard. As part of its
platform, Super Dispatch offers a browser extension and a mobile app that allow users to export
listing information from CentralDispatch into Super Loadboard. Beyond individual exports,
Super Dispatch has also developed and used a software tool—commonly known as a “scraper”—
to collect similar information from password-protected areas of CentralDispatch.
Cox’s Second Amended Complaint Super asserts seven counts against Super Dispatch.
Super Dispatch seeks dismissal of Counts II (misappropriation of trade secrets) and V (unjust
enrichment) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court rules as follows.
Discussion
I. Cox has alleged a trade secret under Count II.
Super Dispatch argues Count II should be dismissed because Cox fails to allege the
existence of a trade secret under the Missouri Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“MUTSA”). Cox
contends that its compiled listing data qualifies as a trade secret.
To state a claim under MUTSA, Cox must demonstrate “(1) the existence of protectable
trade secrets, (2) misappropriation of those trade secrets by the defendant, and (3) damages.”
LifeScience Techs., LLC v. Mercy Health, 632 F. Supp. 3d 949, 956 (E.D. Mo. 2022) (citing Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 417.453(2)). MUTSA defines a trade secret as:
information, including but not limited to, technical or nontechnical
data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that: (a) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 417.453(4). Super Dispatch contends that Cox fails to allege facts supporting
either factor of the definition.
First, Super Dispatch argues that Cox’s compiled listing information is not a trade secret
because the information originates from and is accessible by CentralDispatch’s subscribers. This
argument is unpersuasive. As the Eighth Circuit has explained, “the fact that some or even most
of the information [is] publicly available is not dispositive of the first factor in the [M]UTSA
definition.” AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir.
2011). Rather, compilations of public information “can be valuable so long as the combination
affords a competitive advantage and is not readily ascertainable.” Id.; see also Conseco Fin.
Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 F.3d 811, 819 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a financial
services company’s lead sheets were trade secrets under MUTSA even if the underlying
information was provided by the consumers and publicly available through other means).
Further, the value of compiled information
is not dependent on how much of the information is otherwise
unavailable because the effort of compiling useful information is, of
itself, entitled to protection even if the information is otherwise
generally known. . . . The fact that information can be ultimately
discerned by others—whether through independent investigation,
accidental discovery, or reverse engineering—does not make it
unprotectable. Instead, the court must look at whether the
duplication of the information would require a substantial
investment of time, effort, and energy.
AvidAir, 663 F.3d at 972–73 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Applying these principles here, Cox sufficiently alleges that its listing information is a trade
secret, even if the information originates from and is accessible by CentralDispatch’s subscribers.
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Cox utilizes the listing information to power
CentralDispatch’s “Price Compare” feature and to improve the platforms products and services.
Therefore, one could reasonably infer that it is Cox’s “combination” of listing information that
“affords [it] a competitive advantage.” See AvidAir, 663 F.3d at 972; Conseco, 381 F.3d at 819.
This is especially true where, as alleged here, a significant percentage of CentralDispatch’s listings
are exclusive to the platform such that Cox can generate data insights not available to its
competitors.
Further, given the scale and scope of CentralDispatch’s platform, it is reasonable to infer
that Cox’s listing information requires a substantial investment of time, effort, and resources. By
contrast, duplicating this compilation—that is, amassing millions of transactions to power
analytical tools—would require significant time, effort, and expense from a competitor like Super
Dispatch. Thus, one could reasonably infer that Super Dispatch utilizes it browser extension,
mobile app, and scraping tool to collect listing information—whether piecemeal or en mass—to
bolster its own data analytic functionality. That is, one could reasonably infer that Super Dispatch
obtains economic value from the disclosure and use of the exported listing information.
Accordingly, Cox has plausibly alleged the first factor in MUTSA’s definition.
Second, Super Dispatch argues Cox failed to allege facts stating it made efforts to maintain
the secrecy of the listing information. This argument is unpersuasive. Cox has sufficiently
alleged its reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of its listing information. Access to listing
information is limited to subscribers, protected by password authentication, and governed by
policies prohibiting unauthorized disclosure. Such measures are more than adequate at the
pleading stage. See id. at 974 (noting “secrecy need not be overly extravagant, and absolute
secrecy is not required”). Accordingly, because Cox has also plausibly alleged the second factor
in MUTSA’s definition, dismissal of Count II is not warranted here.
II. Cox has stated a claim for unjust enrichment under Count V.
Super Dispatch argues Count V should be dismissed because Cox fails to allege that it
conferred a direct benefit, opposed to an indirect benefit, on Super Dispatch. This argument is
unavailing. “Federal courts interpreting Missouri unjust enrichment law have consistently
rejected the contention that the plaintiff must directly confer the benefit upon the defendant.”
Pietoso, Inc. v. Republic Servs., Inc., No. 19-CV-00397, 2024 WL 124719, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Jan.
11, 2024) (collecting cases from the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri). While these
cases are not binding, the Court finds them persuasive and finds Cox sufficiently alleged that it
conferred an indirect benefit on Super Dispatch. Accordingly, dismissal of Count V is not
warranted here.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Super Dispatch’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: May 23, 2025 /s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT