“While a precise definition of a plaintiff’s ‘best case’ is elusive, this court often assumes a plaintiff asserts its best case after the plaintiff is ‘apprised of the insufficiency’ of the complaint.”
How later courts described this case
- “While a precise definition of a plaintiff’s ‘best case’ is elusive, this court often assumes a plaintiff asserts its best case after the plaintiff is ‘apprised of the insufficiency’ of the complaint.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
MARCUS L WILLIS,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 4:24-cv-0778-P
OFFICER DIAZ DE LEON, ET AL.,
Defendants.
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On May 19, 2025, the United States Magistrate Judge issued
Findings, Conclusions, and a Recommendation (“FCR”) in this case. ECF
No. 37. The FCR recommended the Court grant Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 33). Id. at 1. Plaintiff filed an Objection to the FCR on
May 19, 2025. ECF No. 38. The Court accordingly conducted a de novo
review of the FCR as to the parts Plaintiff objected to and a plain error
review of the rest.
As detailed below, the Court will ADOPT the reasoning in the
Magistrate Judge’s FCR (ECF No. 37) and OVERRULE Plaintiff’s
Objections (ECF No. 38).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marcus L. Willis (“Willis”) filed his original complaint on
August 15, 2024. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff has twice amended his complaint,
and his Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 30) serves as the active
pleading in this matter. In Willis’s Second Amended Complaint, he
raises five causes of action against Officer Diaz De Leon (“Officer De
Leon”), Chief Jeff Williams (“Chief Williams”), and the City of Bedford
(“Bedford”) (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 30. Willis’s five causes
of action are: (1) a claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,4 against Officer
De Leon for violating Plaintiff’s right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution; (2) a claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against
Officer De Leon for racial discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a claim, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Chief Williams, for failing to properly train
and supervise his officers; (4) a claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983,
against Bedford for municipal liability; and (5) a claim under Texas law
against Defendants for intentional discrimination.
Willis’s claims arise out of a traffic stop that occurred on or April 19,
2022. Willis was stopped by Officer De Leon in Bedford, Texas, for
driving without valid insurance. When Officer De Leon approached the
vehicle he indicated that he smelled marijuana and accused Willis of
possessing marijuana. Officer De Leon then conducted a search of
Willis’s vehicle, which produced no contraband. Officer De Leon
ultimately issued Willis a citation for driving without insurance. Willis
then filed a formal complaint against Officer De Leon with Chief
Williams. Willis alleges that Chief Williams mocked his complaint and
took no further action with regard to Officer De Leon. On March 4, 2025,
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 33. Willis wholly failed
to respond to the Motion and on May 19, 2025, Magistrate Judge Jeffrey
L. Cureton issued the FCR, recommending that Defendants’ Motion be
granted and all of Willis’s claims be dismissed. ECF No. 37. On May 19,
2025, Willis filed specific objections to the FCR’s findings with regard to
his Fourth Amendment Claim, Equal Protection Claim, Monell Claim.
ECF No. 38 at 1–2. Willis also specifically objects to the recommendation
as premature and the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the
undersigned should deny leave to amend. Id. The Court will address
each.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Magistrate Judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations
for a dispositive matter are reviewed de novo if a party timely objects.
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). The district court may then accept, reject, or
modify the recommendations or findings in whole or in part. Id. The
Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in objections
to the FCR. See United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir.
1992). Where no specific objections are filed, the Court reviews the
Magistrate Judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation only for
plain error. See Serrano v. Customs & Border Patrol, U.S. Customs &
Border Prot., 975 F.3d 488, 502 (5th Cir. 2020). When specific objections
are filed as to part of the of the Magistrate Judge’s findings, conclusions,
and recommendation, then the Court reviews those parts de novo and
the rest for plain error.
ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIONS
The Court will begin with the parts of the FCR that Willis did not
object to before turning to the parts to which he filed specific objections.
A. Plain Error
Willis did not specifically object to the FCR’s findings and
recommendations with regard to: (1) Willis’s claims against Officer
De Leon and Chief Williams in their official capacities (ECF No.
37 at 4–5); (2) Willis’s claims regarding failure to properly train
and supervise (Id. at 10–12); and (3) Willis’s claim under Texas law
for intentional discrimination (Id. at 13–24). Regarding these
claims and issues the undersigned reviewed the FCR for plain
error. Finding none, the undersigned believes that the Findings
and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct, and they are
accepted as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court.
B. De Novo
The Court now turns Willis’s specific objections. As discussed above,
Willis objected to the FCR’s findings regarding his Fourth Amendment
Claim, his Equal Protection Claim, his Monell Claim, and his request
for leave to amend.1 The Court will address each.
1. Fourth Amendment Claim
The United States Magistrate Judge thoroughly analyzed Willis’s
claim that Officer De Leon conducted an unlawful vehicle search in
1Plaintiff also objects to the timing of the FCR as Judge Cureton had
ordered the Parties to submit a proposed scheduling order. Judge Cureton
ruled on a Motion to Dismiss, on which Plaintiff’s Response Deadline had long
passed. This objection is not cognizable and, thus, will not be addressed herein.
violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights and concluded that Officer
De Leon is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because
“Plaintiff has not alleged a statutory or constitutional violation.” ECF
No. 37 at 5–9. Plaintiff objected to the FCR’s conclusion that “smelling
marijuana alone justified the warrantless search and seizure” because
the Magistrate Judge “misapplie[d] established precedent” that a
prolonged “stop for unrelated investigation absent reasonable suspicion
violates the Fourth Amendment,” especially when no drugs are found.
ECF No. 38 at 1.
The Fifth Circuit recently addressed a similar question in Terrell v.
Town of Woodworth, No. 23-30510, 2024 WL 667690 (5th Cir. 2024),
where a plaintiff alleged a violation of the Fourth Amendment because
an officer chose to search the plaintiff’s “vehicle based on his statement
that he smelled the odor of marijuana coming from the car, since there
was no marijuana ever found in the vehicle.” Id. at *8. The Fifth Circuit,
following well established precedent, concluded that the search and
seizure was not unlawful because “an officer’s detection of the odor of
marijuana coming from a vehicle is sufficient to support probable cause
to search the vehicle, regardless of whether marijuana is ever found.”
Id. at *9.
Applying that principle here, because Officer De Leon smelled
marijuana, Officer De Leon’s search of Willis’s vehicle was lawful and
supported by probable cause. Thus, the question then turns to whether
the stop was unreasonably prolonged, as Willis claims in his objection.
ECF No. 38 at 1. In his Second Amended Complaint, Willis alleges that
after Officer De Leon conducted a search of the vehicle and found no
drugs, Officer De Leon issued him a citation for driving without
insurance (which was the basis for the stop) and concluded the stop. ECF
No. 30 at 2. There are no specific allegations contained in the Second
Amended Complaint, nor Willis’s objection, that the stop was
unreasonably prolonged. Therefore, the Court finds that Willis has
failed to plead an unconstitutional search and seizure and, thus, Officer
De Leon is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Accordingly,
Willis’s objection is OVERRULED, and the Court adopts the Findings
and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as the findings and
conclusions of the Court.
2. Equal Protection Claim
Willis alleges that the FCR is erroneous because the Magistrate
Judge concluded that he had failed to plead specific facts of racial
discrimination because he pled “that he was stopped solely for being a
Black man, was immediately accused of smelling like marijuana, and
was forcibly removed from the vehicle without legal basis.” ECF No. 38
at 1. The following are the only allegations related to racial
discrimination: (1) “Plaintiff alleges that De Leon’s actions were racially
motivated;” (2) Plaintiff reported “De Leon’s unlawful search and racial
profiling;” (3) “De Leon’s stop and search were racially motivated;” and
(4) “Defendant intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on
race.” ECF No. 30. The Fifth Circuit has instructed that courts are not
to strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff and are not to accept
conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions.
See R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005). All of
Willis’s racial discrimination allegations are conclusory and lack
specificity. The only specific facts that Willis has pled are that he was
stopped for driving without insurance (making the stop proper) and that
the vehicle was searched because Officer De Leon believed he smelled
marijuana (making the search proper). ECF No. 30 at 2. Thus, Willis
has failed to state his equal protection claim. Accordingly, Willis’s
objection is OVERRULED, and the Court adopts the Findings and
Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as the findings and
conclusions of the Court.
3. Monell Claim
Next, Willis objects to the FCR’s analysis of his Monell Claim
because the Magistrate Judge failed to consider a “Supplement to Joint
Status Report Regarding Municipal Liability and Discovery Scope” (the
“Supplement”) when analyzing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF No.
38 at 2 (citing to ECF No. 36). Even assuming without deciding that the
Magistrate Judge was required to consider the Supplement when ruling
on Defendants’ Motion—which he was not—there is nothing contained
therein which effects the analysis here. As stated in the FCR, “Plaintiff
fails to plead specific facts, as opposed to conclusory allegations, to
establish: (1) a municipal policy (2) attributable to the City’s final
policy-maker (3) which caused Plaintiff to be deprived of a (4) federal
constitutional right.” ECF No. 37 at 9. Willis’s Supplement provides that
Chief Williams obtained a job at a different police department
subsequent to this lawsuit being filed. ECF No. 36. Plaintiff asserts that
this furthers his Monell claim because “upon information and belief, no
internal investigation was conducted into the allegations raised by
Plaintiff, and no discipline was issued to Chief Williams” prior to his
departure. Id. at 1. All of these allegations, taken as true, do not
alleviate any of the above identified deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Monell
claim. Accordingly, Willis’s objection is OVERRULED, and the Court
adopts the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as
the findings and conclusions of the Court.
4. Leave to Amend
Willis’s final objection is that the Magistrate Judge recommended
that the undersigned deny him leave to amend. ECF No. 38 at 2.
Specifically, Willis asserts that he should have been allowed to amend
his pleading so that he could “address any pleading deficiencies.” Id.
Willis has had two opportunities to amend his complaint in this case.
See ECF Nos. 9, 30. Willis’s Second Amended Complaint was filed after
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 16, 30. Defendants’ first
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) raised the same arguments as the
Motion at issue here (ECF No. 33). Consequently, Plaintiff has already
had the opportunity to amend his complaint in response to the alleged
pleading deficiencies. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
pled his best case and that further amendment would be futile. Dark v.
Potter, 293 F. App’x 254, 257 (5th Cir. 2008) (“While a precise definition
of a plaintiff’s ‘best case’ is elusive, this court often assumes a plaintiff
asserts its best case after the plaintiff is ‘apprised of the insufficiency’ of
the complaint.”). Accordingly, Willis’s objection is OVERRULED, and
the Court adopts the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate
Judge as the findings and conclusions of the Court.
CONCLUSION
Having conducted the appropriate review of the Motion to Dismiss,
the Magistrate Judge’s FCR, and Plaintiff's Objections, the Court
ADOPTS the reasoning in the Magistrate Judges FCR and
OVERRULES Plaintiffs Objection. Therefore, it is ORDERED that
Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED and this case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED on this 22nd day of May 2025.
MARK T. PITTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE