Willis v. Officer Diaz De Leon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

MARCUS L. WILLIS, §

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-778-P

§

OFFICER DIAZ DE LEON, ET AL., §

Defendants. §

§

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss [doc. 33] filed on March 4, 2025, by

Defendants City of Bedford, Officer Diaz De Leon (“De Leon”),1 and Chief Jeff Williams

(“Williams”).2 Having carefully considered the motion, and noting that Plaintiff wholly failed to

file a response, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Defendants’ motion [doc. 33] should

GRANTED.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

In his Second Amended Complaint [doc. 30],3 pro-se Plaintiff Marcus L. Willis

(“Willis”) alleges that, on April 19, 2022, he “was stopped by Defendant Officer Diaz De Leon

while driving in Bedford, Texas.” (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff claims that “De Leon

informed Plaintiff that he was stopped for allegedly driving without valid insurance.” (Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges:

1 De Leon is a “police officer employed by the Bedford Police Department.” (Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint (“Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl.”) at 1.)

2 Williams is the “former Chief of Police for the Bedford Police Department.” (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at

1.)

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff titled his Second Amended Complaint as “First Amended Complaint.”

However, as Plaintiff had already filed an original Complaint [doc. 1] and an Amended Complaint [doc. 9], the

Court will refer to the most recently filed Complaint [doc. 30] as Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.

and proceeded to search Plaintiff’s vehicle without consent, a warrant, or probable

cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

11. No marijuana or contraband was found, yet De Leon issued a

citation for driving without valid insurance, despite Plaintiff not knowing the car

didn’t have insurance.

12. Plaintiff alleges that De Leon’s actions were racially motivated,

violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

13. Plaintiff subsequently filed a formal complaint with Defendant

Chief Jeff Williams, reporting De Leon’s unlawful search and racial profiling.

14. Defendant Williams failed to take Plaintiff’s complaint seriously,

mocked him, and dismissed his concerns without a proper investigation, in

violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights.

15. Williams also stated that Plaintiff “should consider a career as a

car salesman”, further demonstrating his disregard for Plaintiff’s civil rights.

16. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Williams failed to train or

supervise his officers on constitutional search and seizure procedures, leading to

De Leon’s misconduct.

17. Defendant City of Bedford maintains a policy, custom, or practice

of inadequate training or supervision, which has lead to repeated constitutional

violations.

18. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff has suffered emotional

distress, reputational harm, and financial damages.

(Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2.)

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) a claim,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,4 against De Leon for violating Plaintiff’s right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States

4Willis seeks relief in this case under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (see Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2-3),

which “creates a private right of action for redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state

law.” Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 504 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984)). “‘Rather than creating substantive rights, § 1983 simply provides a remedy for the

rights that it designates.’” Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Johnson v. Harris Cty.

Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989)). “‘Thus, an underlying constitutional or statutory

violation is a predicate to liability under § 1983.’” Id.

in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a claim, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Williams, for failing to properly train and supervise his officers; (4)

a claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, against the City of Bedford for municipal liability; and (5)

a claim under Texas law against all Defendants for intentional discrimination. (Pl.’s Sec. Am.

Compl. at 2-4.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

(“Rule”) 12(b)(6) is generally viewed with disfavor. Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d

242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a

plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Reliable

Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); Guidry v. Am. Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007). A claim

satisfies the plausibility test “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability

requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. (internal citations omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,

it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of

action’s elements will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). The

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

When the allegations of the pleading do not allow the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of wrongdoing, they fall short of showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679.

the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bustos v. Martini

Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir.

2009)). While well-pled facts of a complaint are to be accepted as true, legal conclusions are not

“entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Additionally, a court is not to strain

to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff and is not to accept conclusory allegations,

unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions. R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th

Cir. 2005). Finally, although “pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,”5 the pleadings must still show specific, well-pled facts, “not mere

conclusory allegations” to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th

Cir. 1992).

In rendering a decision on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings.

Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). The pleadings include the complaint and

any documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th

Cir. 2000).

A. Claims Against De Leon and Williams in their Official Capacities

To the extent, if any, that Plaintiff is suing Defendants De Leon and Williams in their

official capacities, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that such claims should be dismissed as

duplicative of the claims asserted against the City of Bedford. See Chavez v. Alvarado, 550 F.

Supp. 3d 439, 450 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2021) (“Because the plaintiffs are suing the City of

Houston, their official-capacity claims against the individual officers are redundant and are

dismissed); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Thus,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this issue should be GRANTED.

5 Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981).

B. Claim Against De Leon for Unreasonable Search and Seizure

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant De Leon conducted

an unlawful vehicle search without probable cause consent, or a warrant, violating Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment Rights.” (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2.) De Leon, in the Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss, argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity as Plaintiff has failed to “plead any

specific facts which show that De Leon violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights” or that show

that the conduct of De Leon was not objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at

the time of the events giving rise to the suit. (Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss”) at 5.)

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from suit and liability

for civil damages under § 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Byers v.

Navarro Cty., No. 3:09-CV-1792-D, 2012 WL 677203, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2012) (citing

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). This is an affirmative defense that balances the important interests of holding “public

officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson,

555 U.S. at 231. Because an official is entitled to immunity from suit, not merely from liability,

immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in the litigation. Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “When a

defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden to negate the

(S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2018).

The Supreme Court has developed a two-step inquiry for resolving government officials’

qualified immunity claims: (1) whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged (at the motion-to-

dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings stage) or shown (at the summary-judgment

stage) make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) whether the right at issue

was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S.

at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); see Byers, 2012 WL 677203, at *2.

Although the Supreme Court previously mandated that the two steps be resolved in sequence, in

Pearson v. Callahan, it gave the lower courts permission to use discretion in deciding which of

the two prongs to address first in light of the circumstances of the particular case. Pearson, 555

U.S. at 236 (rejecting the prior holding in Saucier that the analysis was a mandatory two-step

sequence); see also Lytle v. Bexar Cty., Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2009). In conducting

the inquiry under the first prong—whether the Plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional

right—the Court is to “employ currently applicable constitutional standards.” Kinney v. Weaver,

367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

In resolving the second prong−−whether the right allegedly violated is “clearly

established” −−the contours of the right must be “clearly established” in a particularized sense to

the context of the case, so that a reasonable official could be expected to understand that what he

is doing violates that right.6 See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 349-50 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would

6 “This prong is comprised of two separate, but related, inquiries: “whether the allegedly violated

constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the defendant's conduct

was objectively reasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.” Backe v. City of Galveston, Tex., No.

10-CV-388, 2014 WL 794025, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis in original).

information available to him and the clearly established law.”7 Goodson, 202 F.3d at 736.

In this case, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claim against De

Leon arises out of De Leon stopping Plaintiff for allegedly driving without valid insurance. For

Plaintiff to succeed against De Leon’s assertion of qualified immunity, Plaintiff must, as set forth

above, allege that (1) De Leon violated a statutory or constitutional rights and (2) the right was

clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See id.

Thus, the first issue is whether Plaintiff has alleged that De Leon violated one of

Plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights. “Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited

by the Fourth Amendment.” Terrell v. Town of Woodworth, No. 23-30510, 2024 WL 667690, at

*8 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2024). In addition, traffic stops are seizures for the purpose of the Fourth

Amendment. United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005). “The legality

of a traffic stop is analyzed under the framework articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88

S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).”8 Lopez–Moreno, 420 F.3d at 430; see Terrell, 2024 WL

667690, at *8 (“This court analyze[s] the constitutionality of a traffic stop using the two-step

inquiry set forth in Terry v. Ohio.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations

in original).

Under the two-part Terry test, “[t]he court must evaluate (1) whether the officer's action

was ‘justified at its inception,’ and (2) whether the officer's subsequent actions were ‘reasonably

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’” United

States v. Smith, 506 F. App’x 319, 319 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 430).

7 “Objective reasonableness is a matter of law for the Court to decide.” See Goodson v. City of Corpus

Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000).

8 “‘A Terry stop is a special category of Fourth Amendment seizures, in which an officer may briefly detain

an individual for further investigation, if the officer has reasonable suspicion the individual is engaged in criminal

activity.’” Terrell, 2024 WL 667690, at *8 (quoting United States v. Wright, 57 F.4th 524, 530 (5th Cir. 2023)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

WL 667690, at *8. “As to the second prong, the ‘detention must be temporary and last no longer

than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, but if further reasonable suspicion

emerges during the stop and is supported by articulable facts, detention may continue until the

new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed.’” Brown v. City of New Orleans, No.

16-17080, 2017 WL 897875, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2017) (quoting United States v. Swan, 259

F. App’x 656, 659 (5th Cir. 2007)). “Reasonable suspicion exists when the detaining officer can

point to specific and articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inference from those

facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure.” Terrell, 2024 WL 667690, at *9 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

As to prong one of the Terry test, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, De Leon’s action was

justified at its inception as De Leon allegedly stopped Plaintiff for driving without valid

insurance. See United States v. Broca-Martinez, 855 F.3d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 2017) (“A state

computer database indication of insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion when the

officer is familiar with the database and the system itself is reliable.”) The Court next moves to

prong two of the Terry test, which analyzes whether the officer's subsequent actions were

“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first

place Plaintiff.” Smith, 506 F. App’x at 319. In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that De Leon, after stating that he was stopping Plaintiff for allegedly driving without

valid insurance, accused Plaintiff of possession marijuana and then unlawfully searched

Plaintiff’s vehicle without probable cause, consent, or a warrant. (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2.)

However, it is well established precedent that “an officer’s detection of the odor of

marijuana coming from a vehicle is sufficient to support probable cause to search the vehicle,

regardless of whether marijuana is ever found.” Terrell, 2024 WL 667690, at *9. Consequently,

vehicle did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and

seizure. Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this claim should be GRANTED as De Leon is

entitled to qualified immunity as Plaintiff has not alleged a statutory or constitutional violation.9

C. Claim of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause against

De Leon

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that “Defendant De Leon’s stop

and search were racially motivated, violating the Equal Protection Clause.” (Pl.’s Sec. Am.

Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff further claims that the stop was based on “racial profiling” and intentional

discrimination based on his race. (Id.) In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants again claim that

De Leon is entitled to qualified immunity as “Plaintiff alleges no specific facts that show the stop

was racially motivated.” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 5.)

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State

shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457

U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a § 1983 plaintiff

must allege either that (a) a state actor intentionally discriminated against [him] because of

membership in a protected class[,] or (b) he has been intentionally treated differently from others

similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Gibson v.

Tex. Dept. of Ins.—Div. of Worker’s Comp., 700 F.3d 227, 238 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). “Purposeful discrimination

requires more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences; it involves a

9 Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, De Leon

would still be entitled to qualified immunity as De Leon’s conduct was not objectively unreasonable in light of

clearly established law at the time of the events giving rise to the suit.

adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted) (alterations in original); see Cook v. City of Dallas, No. 3:12-cv-03788-P, 2015

WL 7352121, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2015).

While Plaintiff alleges, as set forth above, that his rights under the Equal Protection

Clause were violated, Plaintiff has not alleged any non-conclusory or non-speculative facts from

which this Court can reasonably infer that De Leon intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff

based on his race or treated De Leon differently from other individuals in similar situations

because of his race. In other words, while Plaintiff alleges that he was stopped because of his

race, he does not provide any specific facts that would enable the Court to infer that a

discriminatory intent triggered his traffic stop. Consequently, the Court FINDS and

CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Equal Protection Clause Thus,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss this claim should GRANTED. See, e.g., Brown v. Preyor-

Johnson, No. 06-CA-1093 WWJ, 2008 WL 11417071, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2008); Suggs

v. Lowndes Cty. Sch. Dist., 804 F. Supp. 2d 510, 519 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2011) (“Vague and

conclusory allegations of racial discrimination are insufficient to state a cognizable equal

protection claim.”).

D. Claim Against Williams for Failure to Properly Train and Supervise His

Officers

As to Plaintiff’s claim against Williams, as the Chief of Police, for failure to train and

supervise, Plaintiff alleges that “Williams knew or should have known of unconstitutional

practices within the Bedford Police Department but failed to implement proper training or

supervision” and that “Williams’ failure to investigate Plaintiff’s complaint shows deliberate

disregard for civil rights violations.” (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 3.) As Plaintiff has not alleged

that Williams was involved in the traffic stop, the section 1983 claim against De Leon is “the

without some predicate constitutional injury at the hands of the individual [state] officer, at least

in suits for damages.” Waybright v. Frederick Cty., MD, 528 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2008); see

Kennedy v. City of Arlington, Tex., No. 4:24-CV-208-P, 2024 WL 5176870, at *9 (N.D. Tex.

Oct. 16, 2024) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original), report

and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 20434 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 2025). Moreover, “[t]he Fifth

Circuit has instructed that to hold a defendant supervisor liable on a theory of failure to train or

supervise, the plaintiff must show that (1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the

subordinate official[;] (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the

violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate

indifference.” Jones v. Gooden, No. 21-00372-BAJ-EWD, 2022 WL 944288, at *2 (M.D. La.

Mar. 29, 2022). “Proof of more than a single instance of the lack of training or supervision

causing a violation of constitutional rights is normally required before such a lack of training or

supervision constitutes deliberate indifference.” Thompson v. Upshur Cty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447,

459 (5th Cir. 2001). “A supervisory official is deliberately indifferent only when the inadequate

training is so obvious that a constitutional violation would almost always result.” Stevenson v.

LeBlanc, No. 22-75-BAJ-RLB, 2022 WL 18776413, at *3 (M.D. La. Dec. 15, 2022).

In this case, Plaintiff, as set forth above, has not alleged a viable violation of his

constitutional rights based on the conduct of De Leon during the traffic stop. Moreover,

Plaintiff’s allegations that Williams “mocked” Plaintiff or dismissed Plaintiff’s concerns without

a proper instigation are not constitutional violations. See, e.g., Morgan v. Barnett, No. 7:09-cv-

167-O, 2012 WL 1033507, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2012) (stating that “[t]hreats, verbal taunts,

insults and even racial slurs, which may be viewed as offensive, do not give rise to liability under

the Civil Rights Act.”); Taylor v. Cockrell, No. 03-10933, 2004 WL 287339, at *1 (5th Cir.

constitutional claim). In addition, Plaintiff has not alleged with specificity a pattern of similar

violations such that inadequate training or supervision was so obvious that a constitutional

violation would almost always result. See, e.g., Jones, 2022 WL 944288, at *2 Consequently,

the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for failure to train

or supervise against Williams. Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this issue should be

GRANTED.

D. Claim for Municipal Liability Against City of Bedford

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff further alleges that the “City of Bedford has

a pattern or practice of failing to train and supervise officers on constitutional stop-and-search

procedures” and that the “City’s failure to discipline officers for unconstitutional conduct

demonstrates a policy of deliberate indifference.” (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 3.) Just as with

supervisors, the section 1983 claim against De Leon is “the gateway to all other section 1983

claims, for . . . municipalities cannot be liable under § 1983 without some predicate

constitutional injury at the hands of the individual [state] officer, at least in suits for damages.”

Waybright, 528 F.3d at 203 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in

original); see Jordan v. Gautreaux, 593 F. Supp. 3d 330, 356 (M.D. La. Mar. 25, 2022) (“The

Supreme Court has explained that a municipality cannot be liable [i]f a person has suffered no

constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer.”) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted) (alterations in original); Blair v. City of Dallas, 666 F. App’x 337, 342 (5th

Cir. 2016) (stating that there cannot be municipal liability under section 1983 without an

underlying constitutional violation). Moreover, municipal liability under section 1983 requires

proof of (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; (3) and a violation of constitutional rights

(5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

Because the Court has found and concluded, supra, that the none of the actions of De

Leon violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, De Leon’s conduct cannot form the basis of a

section 1983 liability claim against the City. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,

799 (1986) (holding that, because a jury had found that an officer had not violated the victim's

constitutional rights, there was no basis for municipal liability); Ross v. City of Dallas, No. 3:20-

CV-1690-E, 2023 WL 2753988, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2023). Consequently, the Court

FINDS and CONCLUDES that the claim against the City of Bedford should be DISMISSED.

Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this issue should be GRANTED.

E. Claim Under Texas Law for Intentional Discrimination Against All

Defendants

Plaintiff also brings a claim against all Defendants for intentional discrimination under

Texas law. (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 3.) While Plaintiff states that the “Texas Tort Claims Act

(TTCA) does not bar claims based on civil rights violation,” Plaintiff does not reference a

specific state statute that his claim for intentional discrimination falls under. (Pl.’s Sec. Am.

Compl. at 3-4.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the

TTCA10 against Defendant City of Bedford based on intentional torts. See Fobbs v.

Cunningham, No. 1:05-CV-239-C, 2006 WL 8436795, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2006); Chavez

v. Alvarado, 550 F. Supp. 3d, 439, 454 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“The Texas Tort Claim Act does not

waive immunity for claims arising out of intentional torts.”) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims for

intentional torts against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities, such claims

10 “A Texas municipality may not be held liable for Texas common law causes of action unless the Texas

legislature has waived its governmental immunity” and “[i]mmunity is only waived for claims brought under the

TTCA.” Khansari v. City of Houston, 14 F. Supp. 3d 842, 872 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2014).

Chavez, 550 F. Supp. 3d at 451.

F. Pro-se Plaintiff and Leave to Amend

Generally, a district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend unless it is apparent

that Plaintiff has pled his best case. See Ricks v. Khan, No. 20-20303, 2025 WL 1201763, at *2

(5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2025); Bazrowz v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998); Dark v. Potter,

293 F. App’x 254, 257 (5th Cir. 2008) (“While a precise definition of a plaintiff’s ‘best case’ is

elusive, this court often assumes a plaintiff asserts its best case after the plaintiff is ‘apprised of

the insufficiency’ of the complaint.”). In this case, the Court has already given Plaintiff two

opportunities to amend his complaint [docs. 6, 28], with one opportunity being given after

Defendants filed motions to dismiss notifying Plaintiff of the insufficiency of his complaint.

Because Plaintiff has already amended his complaint twice [docs. 9, 30], the Court FINDS and

CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has pled his best case.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

[doc. 33] be GRANTED.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file

specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate

Judge’s proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the

party has been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only

make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings, conclusions and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file, by the date stated above, a specific written objection to a

proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error

or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal

conclusions accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto

Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (Sth Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

ORDER

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until June 2,

2025, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings, conclusions and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed

and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7)

days of the filing date of the objections.

It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred

to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions and recommendation, be and

hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.

SIGNED May 19, 2025.

C ) K art loer.

JEPFREY L. CURETON

ED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15