Jones v. Jackson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

GREGORY D. JONES, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-3121-SEM-DJQ

)

JUDGE HOOKER, et al. )

Defendant. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER ON AMENDED COMPLAINT

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File Amended

Complaint (Doc. 21) filed by Plaintiff pro se Gregory D. Jones. For

the following reasons, the Motion is granted and Plaintiff may

proceed on an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.

I. Background

The Court entered a Merit Review Order (Doc. 19) on February

10, 2025, dismissing Plaintiff’s initial Complaint (Doc. 1) for failure

to state a claim that is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Dismissal was without prejudice, and Plaintiff was granted 21 days

in which to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Extension of Time

(Doc. 20), asking for an extension until March 21, 2025, in which to

file a proposed amended complaint. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for

Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) with a certificate of

service dated March 17, 2025.

Plaintiff’s Motions (Docs. 20, 21) are GRANTED. The Amended

Complaint is the operative pleading in this case and is now before

the Court for screening.

II. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and

dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if

warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1)

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the

Court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally

construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d

645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and

labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a

claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United

States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

III. Facts Alleged

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department

of Corrections (“IDOC”) at Pinckneyville Correctional Center

(“Pinckneyville”). His Amended Complaint relates to his time at

Western Illinois Correctional Center (“Western”) and identifies the

following Defendants: Western Lieutenant Jackson, Western Officer

Zanger, and IDOC Director Rob Jeffreys.

Plaintiff alleges that, sometime prior to the events at issue in

this suit, he was beaten by one or more members of the Vice Lords

gang, which required him to be flown to the intensive care unit

(“ICU”) for medical treatment.

On December 30, 2021, Plaintiff alleges that he asked

Defendant Jackson for protective custody and crisis team

intervention because Western staff tried to move a Vice Lord

member into his cell. Defendant Jackson allegedly told Plaintiff

that Plaintiff could “either take another helicopter ride (to hospital)

or get a ticket.” Defendant Jackson then wrote Plaintiff a

disciplinary ticket for disobeying a direct order by refusing housing.

Plaintiff alleges that, on January 4, 2022, he asked Defendant

Zanger for protective custody. Defendant Zanger allegedly

responded: “either go back where you got beat up or get a ticket.”

Defendant Zanger did not provide Plaintiff with protective custody

and issued Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket for disobeying a direct

order essential to safety and security by refusing to move cells. The

exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint show that this

disciplinary ticket was reduced to the minor offense of disobeying a

direct order because there was no substantiation the order was

essential to safety and security.

Plaintiff alleges that as IDOC Director Defendant Jeffreys failed

to issue any directives providing inmates with access to protective

custody in minimum and medium security facilities. Plaintiff

attaches a copy of 20 Ill. Admin. Code 501.300 et seq., which

provides for protective custody. Specifically, section 501.310(a)

requires “[e]ach maximum security facility [to] maintain an area for

placement of committed persons in protective custody” (emphasis

added).

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the discipline imposed by

Defendants Jackson and Zanger was cited by the Cook County

State’s Attorney’s Office when opposing Plaintiff’s executive

clemency petition in his underlying criminal case. Plaintiff attaches

a copy of the State’s Attorney’s letter to the Prison Review Board,

objecting to Plaintiff’s request for commutation of his sentence.

In that letter, the State’s Attorney summarized the facts of

Plaintiff’s underlying criminal conviction and then listed several

bases for objection. First, the State’s Attorney highlighted that

“[c]lemency is an extraordinary remedy and must be reserved only

for the most extraordinary cases.” Second, the State’s Attorney

emphasized the appropriateness of a mandatory life sentence for

Plaintiff, due to his conviction for the “brutal murder [of] two

people,” and argued against any reduction in sentence that would

undermine the decision of the trial court. The State’s Attorney

indicated that, despite Plaintiff’s purported remorse, the purpose of

the prison sentence was not only rehabilitative but also punitive.

Finally, the State’s Attorney’s objection included a description of

Plaintiff’s prison disciplinary record as “concerning” because it

included “a laundry list of major and minor tickets” including a

major ticket from January 2022 for disobeying a direct order.

The Court notes that Plaintiff has also attached a copy of his

disciplinary history, which not only lists the December 2021 and

January 2022 tickets issued by Defendants Jackson and Zanger

but also major offenses in September 2018 (assault, insolence, and

contraband), June 2019 (dangerous disturbance and insolence),

January 2020 (insolence and disobeying a direct order), and

December 2021 (fighting).

In Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, he asks for the following

relief: (1) an order for Defendant Jeffreys, or current IDOC Director

LaToya Hughes, to provide a clear directive for protective custody in

minimum and medium security facilities; (2) an expungement of the

disciplinary tickets for refusing housing; and (3) an order notifying

the criminal courts of the ticket expungements.

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim for

failure to protect.

To state a claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff needs to allege

that (1) the denial of his request for protective custody posed a

substantial risk of serious harm and (2) the defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to that risk. Hoban v. Godinez, 502 F. App’x

574, 578 (7th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994), Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008).

Here, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that denial of his request

for protective custody posed a substantial risk of serious harm, due

to his history of having been assaulted so severely by Vice Lords

members that he was hospitalized in the ICU. See Hoban, 502 F.

App’x at 578 (identified history of attacks sufficient to constitute a

substantial risk of serious harm), citing Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d

904, 911-12 (7th Cir. 2005).

So too, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendants

Jackson and Zanger were deliberately indifferent to that risk when

they explicitly acknowledged the past assault and then told Plaintiff

that he could either risk another assault or be disciplined. See

Perkins v. Givens, 688 F. App’x 397, 399 (7th Cir. 2017)

(characterizing a prison official’s response as unreasonable if they

offer a prisoner requesting protective custody the “Hobson’s choice

[of] . . . protection in the form of disciplinary segregation or no

protection at all”), citing Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475 (7th

Cir. 2015).

Plaintiff may also proceed on a failure to protect claim against

the IDOC Director for failure to provide protective custody in

minimum and medium security prisons. See Childress v. Walker,

787 F.3d 433, 440 (7th Cir. 2015) (“In the case of those responsible

for setting policy, liability will result from the institution of a ‘policy

that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation.’”). The

claim proceeds against the IDOC Director in his or her official

capacity only. Therefore, Acting IDOC Director LaToya Hughes will

be substituted in place of former IDOC Director Rob Jeffreys. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 25(d).

However, this Court lacks the ability to grant Plaintiff’s request

for expungement of the disciplinary tickets. So too, this Court

cannot interfere in Plaintiff’s request for executive clemency in his

underlying state court conviction.

As indicated in the prior Merit Review Order (Doc. 19, at 2-3),

Plaintiff may not use a Complaint filed under § 1983 to seek

expungement of a ticket. Further, “[h]abeas corpus…is the

exclusive federal remedy for a state prisoner to challenge the

validity of his conviction. Consequently an inmate may not

maintain a Section 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief solely to

facilitate an attack on a conviction in state court proceedings.”

Jones v. Burris, 825 F.Supp. 860, 861 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (internal

citation omitted), citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500

(1973); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time [20] is GRANTED.

2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

[21] is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to docket the

Amended Complaint and attached exhibits.

3) According to the Court’s Merit Review of Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has

alleged enough facts to proceed with an Eighth

Amendment claim of failure to protect against Defendants

Jackson and Zanger, in their individual capacities, and

against Defendant LaToya Hughes in her official capacity.

Additional claims shall not be included in the case, except

at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good

cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

4) The Clerk is directed to add Lieutenant Jackson, Officer

Zanger, and IDOC Director LaToya Hughes as Defendants

on the docket. The Clerk is further directed to terminate

Defendants Hooker, Clerk (Doe), and Grant as Defendants.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendants before filing any motions, to give Defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff

need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise

directed by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing

waivers of service. Defendants have sixty days from

service to file their Answers. If a Defendant has not filed

an Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days

of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendants have

been served, the Court will enter an order setting

discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

7) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the

address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that

Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to

the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not

known, said Defendant’s forwarding address. This

information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained

only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the

public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the

date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is

not an answer. The Answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims

stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth a

Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until a Defendant

files a motion. Therefore, no response to an Answer is

necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that,

after Defendants’ counsel have filed an appearance,

counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of

motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with

the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not

apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery

requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk.

Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and

responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery

requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned

unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a

motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until

Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, and the

Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain

the discovery process in more detail.

10) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

his place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall

arrange the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.

Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in the

dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals service on that Defendant and

will require that Defendant to pay the total costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified

protective order under the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendants under the standard procedures.

ENTERED May 22, 2025.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

____________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE