Jose M. Ruvira Guerra v. U.S. Attorney General

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13857

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JOSE M. RUVIRA GUERRA,

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A024-655-569

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13857

Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jose Ruvira Guerra petitions for review of an order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of a

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that denied his application

for relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture

and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punish-

ment (“CAT”). On appeal, Ruvira Guerra argues that the record

compels a conclusion that he is eligible for CAT relief and that the

BIA failed to give his case reasoned consideration. After careful re-

view, we deny Ruvira Guerra’s petition.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ruvira Guerra, a native citizen of Cuba, was admitted to the

United States in May 1980 after coming to the United States as part

of the Mariel boatlift. 1 In 1987, he became a lawful permanent res-

ident, and the adjudgment was dated back to 1980. In 2012, he was

convicted of two counts of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms

or more of cocaine. Later, the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”) served Ruvira Guerra with a notice to appear alleging that

he was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) for having been convicted of: (i) two crimes involving

1 For background on the Mariel boatlift and some of its effects on federal law,

see United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1273–78 (11th Cir. 1982), and

United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1075–1105 (11th Cir. 2011) (Tjoflat,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

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moral turpitude, INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii);

(ii) a crime related to a controlled substance, INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i),

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); and (iii) a drug trafficking crime that

constituted an “aggravated felony” as defined in the INA, INA

§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). See also INA

§ 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felony).

With counsel present, Ruvira Guerra appeared before an IJ and

conceded that he was removable as charged.

Ruvira Guerra applied for asylum, withholding of removal,

and CAT relief in March 2017. In his application, he stated that he

was seeking protection based on his political opinion, his member-

ship in a particular social group, and under the CAT. He later con-

ceded he was ineligible for all relief except deferral of removal un-

der the CAT.

Ruvira Guerra’s application explained that he had been ar-

rested and tortured in Cuba when he was 15 years old due to his

anti-revolutionary beliefs and actions. He tried to flee Cuba, but

the Cuban border patrol arrested him. After his arrest, he was in-

terrogated, and officers “cracked” his head, told him that his par-

ents had been jailed, and demanded information about anti-Castro

regime flyers that he had been distributing. He faced a one-day

trial where he was found guilty of being an anti-revolutionary and

was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. While imprisoned, offi-

cials beat and tortured Ruvira Guerra, and he suffered injuries such

as broken fingers and head trauma. During that time, officials de-

prived him of medical treatment, food, and water for prolonged

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13857

periods of time. After almost a year in prison, Ruvira Guerra was

transferred to a government re-education center where he contin-

ued to face abuse. Even so, he was ultimately released after 18

months, under a law prohibiting the incarceration of minors. After

his incarceration, Ruvira Guerra was afraid to return to school be-

cause of his political beliefs and struggled to find work because he

had been labeled an anti-revolutionary. He eventually found work

and remained in Cuba until May 1980, when he fled to the United

States.

Ruvira Guerra feared returning to Cuba because of the tor-

ture he had faced there as a former political prisoner. He explained

that he had distributed anti-Castro and anti-communist flyers and

had attempted to flee the country, leading to his arrest. He was

also accused of being an anti-revolutionary traitor because his fa-

ther and uncles were in the government under Fulgencio Batista

and because he had attempted to flee Cuba. After Castro came into

power, his father and uncles had been stripped of military rank,

jailed, and tortured. Their lives were ultimately saved because

there were no “records of their anti-revolutionary acts.” In a sworn

declaration, Ruvira Guerra also alleged that his father had been

sent to Mexico by the former Cuban regime to assassinate Fidel

Castro but had been unsuccessful. Before leaving Cuba, Ruvira

Guerra learned that, during the Mariel boatlift period, the Cuban

government had been looking to reimprison him, because some-

one Ruvira Guerra knew, a member of the state security apparatus,

had told him that he was being followed. His declaration also high-

lighted his cooperation with the government during his criminal

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case. 2 He submitted evidence in addition to his declaration, includ-

ing country conditions evidence.

The country conditions evidence stated that Cuba was an

authoritarian state controlled by the Communist party and ex-

plained that there were “reports of an unlawful and arbitrary killing

by police; torture of political dissidents, detainees, and prisoners by

security forces; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbi-

trary arrest and detention; holding of political prisoners,” and that

“[i]mpunity for the perpetrators” of human rights abuses “re-

mained widespread.” Moreover, the evidence reflected that there

are restrictions on—and even violent responses to—free expres-

sion, assembly, and political activity in opposition to the govern-

ment and retribution, including harassment and job loss, for those

who opposed the government or departed (or attempted to depart)

the country. The evidence also showed that there was significant

interference with privacy in the country, including the use of sur-

veillance, informants, and neighborhood committees, designed to

monitor opponents of the government, as well as restrictions on

freedom of movement. The evidence showed that the govern-

ment “continued to hold political prisoners,” but that the exact

number was unclear—“the CCDHRN established there were 120

political prisoners, while other credible groups put the number

2 At another point in his application, Ruvira Guerra stated that he feared retri-

bution for assisting in the prosecution of various others who have family in

Cuba, but he does not press this issue on appeal, so we conclude it is aban-

doned. See Alkotof v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 106 F.4th 1289, 1295 n.9 (11th Cir. 2024).

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13857

slightly higher.” Even so, “short-term arbitrary arrests” were more

common, with more than 3,700 reported arrests between January

and August 2017. The government uses arrests to “harass and in-

timidate critics, independent activists, political opponents, and oth-

ers.”

An IJ held an individual hearing on Ruvira Guerra’s applica-

tion. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties submitted the

documentary evidence summarized above, without objection.

The IJ explained that the documents submitted were relevant, but

that it would only “give any material weight to documents that

[were] specifically referenced by page and part during [the] hear-

ing . . . because there’s a difference between what is relevant and

what is material.” Neither party objected to the IJ’s evidentiary

procedure.

Ruvira Guerra then testified, and his testimony was largely

consistent with his written application. He explained that he was

born in Cuba in 1952 and remained a Cuban citizen. He testified

that he has four children, all of whom are American citizens, and

worked as a chauffeur until he stopped working because of disabil-

ity. He recounted that, when he was 15, he went to jail for

“conspir[ing] against the Cuban government” by distributing flyers

and attempting to leave the country. He then recounted that, he

tried to flee Cuba and boarded a boat to the United States but was

captured by the Cuban Coast Guard and imprisoned. He explained

that he had tried to leave because he did not “like communism”

and because his family was in the military before Castro came to

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power. He testified that his father had been imprisoned, beaten,

“treated . . . like a dog,” and “tortured” for his military service. Fur-

ther, he stated, even after his release from prison, people would

throw stones at his family’s house, and his other family members

who had been in the military suffered similar treatment.

After a one-day trial, Ruvira Guerra was sentenced to

25 years in jail and served 18 months in prison. In prison, he was

not allowed visitors, and he was tortured. He was repeatedly in-

terrogated and told that his parents were in jail and was hit in the

head with “the butt of a gun.” On other occasions, he was hit with

a stick. Authorities also broke his hand, leaving a wound that re-

mained visible at the time of the hearing. He received some med-

ical care—stitches—but they did not treat his pain with medication.

He was ultimately transferred between three jails. The conditions

were poor; at one point he was kept in a small cell with eight men,

and none of them were permitted to leave the cell at any point of

the day or night. He was given very little food. The third prison

was a re-education camp, and people from the government “would

come all the time and . . . say that the government was good” in

one-on-one discussions with prisoners.

Ultimately, Ruvira Guerra was released because a law was

passed “saying that there couldn’t be so many young men in jail

who were counter-revolutionaries.” He returned home but never

went back to school. He was also excluded from obligatory mili-

tary service because he had been a political prisoner. He became a

mechanic assistant, but life remained difficult for him and his

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13857

family. Government supporters threw stones at his family’s home

and “sa[id] things” negatively about him. Little by little, his family

started coming to the United States. When he departed Cuba in

1980 as part of the Mariel boatlift, he was no longer engaged in

counter-revolutionary activities, but the government still wanted

to put him in jail as a counter-revolutionary because, according to

Ruvira Guerra, “once you have a problem, you’re marked.” Ruvira

Guerra explained that he feared returning to Cuba because he

could be put back into jail and the government could do “what they

did before.” He explained that the government would “finish” him

because he opposes the Cuban government and communism and

because his family was in the military under the prior regime.

On cross-examination, Ruvira Guerra explained that his fa-

ther had been imprisoned for his service in the military, but that

the records were ultimately destroyed—leading to his father’s re-

lease. He also explained that his parents had given him the money

he used to build the boat he had attempted to flee Cuba on when

he was 15. He also conceded that his wife’s cousins visit Cuba and

return to the United States, which he acknowledged was impossi-

ble for many years. Still, he explained, he had never returned to

Cuba. He acknowledged that he remained in Cuba from the time

he was 16 or 17 (when he was released from prison) until he was

28 (when he fled as part of the Mariel boatlift) without being rein-

carcerated. He also conceded that he was not tortured during that

period, even though he faced mistreatment. Finally, he conceded

that the Cuban government permitted him to leave in 1980.

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In closing arguments, Ruvira Guerra explained that he “pro-

vided some country reports concerning Cuba and the conditions in

Cuba for the general population as well as political prisoners as

well.” He noted that he was a former political prisoner who had

been tortured and that the Cuban government was still looking for

him at the time he left the country. He noted that he provided

information regarding his family’s military service in Cuba before

the revolution. Based on the record, he requested that the IJ grant

CAT relief. The government argued that Ruvira Guerra was not

credible and highlighted the fact that he had lived in Cuba without

being tortured from the age of 16 until he left the country.

The IJ issued an oral decision. The IJ first noted that it had

“considered all of” the record “evidence in its entirety[,] whether

or not specifically mentioned in th[e] decision[,] and afforded such

evidence the appropriate weight . . . .” Yet it reiterated that it

“would not provide any evidentiary weight to documents not spe-

cifically referenced by page and part during the hearing” and re-

minded the parties that no one had objected to that procedure. Af-

ter summarizing the testimony, the IJ concluded that Ruvira

Guerra was a credible witness, at least “as to his own subjective

understanding of the experiences and information to which he tes-

tified.” Still, having considered the CAT regulations, see 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(3), the IJ concluded that Ruvira Guerra had not shown

it was more likely than not he would be tortured if removed to

Cuba.

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The IJ acknowledged that “there c[ould] be little dispute”

that Ruvira Guerra “was tortured by the Castro regime when he

was beaten, imprisoned in poor conditions, repeatedly interro-

gated, held at a reeducation camp, [and] deprived of access to his

family or counsel.” All the same, the IJ noted that, “[d]espite th[at]

atrocious treatment,” Ruvira Guerra remained in Cuba without

imprisonment from when he was 17 until he was 28, nearly 40

years had passed since that time, and some of his family had re-

turned to Cuba without incident. Therefore, the IJ held there was

“simply no clear record evidence to demonstrate that respondent

would be targeted by the current Cuban government due to his

actions in trying to leave Cuba when he was 15 years old.” The IJ

remarked that it was denying the application “with a heavy heart.”

It also explained that “while the country conditions evidence

demonstrate[d] some continuing violations of human rights in

Cuba,” they did “not provide evidence for those similarly situated

to” Ruvira Guerra. Thus, the IJ denied Ruvira Guerra’s applica-

tions and ordered him removed to Cuba.3

Ruvira Guerra administratively appealed the IJ’s decision,

arguing that he was eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT.

He highlighted his testimony during the hearing and noted that he

had been put in jail and tortured in the past. He also noted that

Cuba has serious human rights issues, which, together with his past

3 The IJ also “impress[ed] upon DHS” that it believed Ruvira Guerra’s case was

one “to consider for [a] form of discretion” because of Ruvira Guerra’s “ad-

vanced age.”

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torture, made torture in the future likely. He also reiterated that

the country conditions evidence showed arbitrary detention and

horrific conditions. He argued that his 30 years in the United States

would place him under the suspicion of the Cuban government

given his previous activities.

A single member of the BIA dismissed Ruvira Guerra’s ad-

ministrative appeal in November 2023. It explained that it would

review questions of fact under the clearly erroneous standard,

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), and all other issues de novo, id.

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii). 4 Regarding Ruvira Guerra’s request for deferral

of removal under the CAT, the BIA “adopt[ed] and affirm[ed] the

[IJ]’s decision,” concluding that the factual findings were not clearly

erroneous, and that Ruvira Guerra’s arguments were not persua-

sive. Accordingly, the BIA dismissed the administrative appeal.

Ruvira Guerra timely petitioned for review. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(1).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review legal issues de novo. Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

451 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 2006). “We review the BIA’s decision

as the final judgment, unless the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s

4 The BIA concluded that Ruvira Guerra had “waived” any argument that the

IJ erred in finding: (i) that he was removable; or (ii) that he was convicted of a

particularly serious crime that rendered him ineligible for asylum, withholding

of removal under the INA, and withholding of removal under the CAT. Ru-

vira Guerra does not challenge these conclusions before us, so any issue in this

respect is abandoned. See Alkotof, 106 F.4th at 1295 n.9.

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-13857

decision.” Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir.

2016), abrogated in part on other grounds by Loper Bright Enters. v. Rai-

mondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412–13 (2024). When the BIA agrees with the

IJ’s reasoning, we will also review the IJ’s decision to that extent.

Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009).

In deciding whether to uphold the BIA’s decision, we are limited to

the grounds upon which the BIA relied. Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403.

We review the BIA’s factual determinations under the sub-

stantial evidence standard. Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1351. In re-

viewing for substantial evidence, we will affirm the BIA’s decision

“if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evi-

dence on the record considered as a whole.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft,

386 F.3d 1022, 1026–27 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Al Najjar

v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled in part

on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 419-23 &

n.2 (2023)). 5 We “view the record evidence in the light most favor-

able to the agency’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of that decision.” Id. at 1029. The substantial evidence

“standard is high: we will not reverse a finding of fact unless the

record compels reversal.” Laguna Rivera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 130 F.4th

915, 919 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing Adefemi, 386 F.3d at 1026–27).

5 In 2023, the Supreme Court held that the obligation to exhaust administra-

tive remedies in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdic-

tional limitation, and is subject to waiver and forfeiture, overturning our prior

precedent to the contrary. Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 419-23 & n.2.

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III. DISCUSSION

Ruvira Guerra argues that, considering all relevant evi-

dence, he has established that it is more likely than not that he

would be tortured if he is removed to Cuba, and thus, we are com-

pelled to reverse the agency’s denial of deferral of removal under

CAT. He urges us to review both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions.

The whole record, he contends, shows that he experienced torture

before, and the Cuban government will imprison him and torture

him again if he is returned. He explains that he has not changed

his political beliefs and continues to oppose the Cuban govern-

ment—which was the reason he was tortured. He notes that the IJ

found him credible and that credible testimony, alone, can be suf-

ficient to prove eligibility under the CAT. He contends that he was

not required to show that relocation within Cuba would be “im-

possible” and that the IJ failed to give reasoned consideration to the

evidence he presented on that point. He also argues that the IJ’s

statement that it would not “give any material weight to docu-

ments that were not specifically referenced by page and part”

showed that the IJ failed to consider all the evidence. Viewing the

whole record, he maintains, shows that he would face future tor-

ture if returned and could not avoid torture by relocating. He also

claims the IJ failed to give reasoned consideration to the evidence

presented about Cuba, including that there was gross, flagrant, or

mass violations of human rights throughout the country. Properly

viewed, he argues, the record shows that there remains torture of

political dissidents like himself in Cuba.

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Ruvira Guerra also asserts that the IJ incorrectly found that

he lived without imprisonment or harm from the time he was 17

to 28 years old because he had testified that, during that time, he

experienced mistreatment, insults, government surveillance, and

denial of access to education and employment; stones were thrown

at his house; he was treated poorly and insulted; and he was fol-

lowed by government agents. He maintains the IJ put too much

weight on the fact that some of his wife’s family members have

returned to Cuba without incident; especially because there is no

evidence about whether those family members shared his political

opinions. He argues that the IJ failed to consider the reason for his

persecution in the first place: his family’s counter-revolutionary ac-

tions, including his own attempt to flee the country which led to

his own imprisonment and torture. Finally, he states that the same

party and ideology are in power in Cuba as at the time when he

was tortured, and “the repression against government opposers

continues.”

The government argues that we should deny the petition. It

concedes that Ruvira Guerra “suffered appalling torture during his

time in Cuba.” Still, it argues that there is not sufficient evidence

Ruvira Guerra will suffer torture in the future. It asserts “the pas-

sage of time, changes of national leadership, and even new atti-

tudes” all counsel against a finding that Ruvira Guerra would be

tortured again. Moreover, it notes, Ruvira Guerra had lived for

over a decade in Cuba without being tortured. It contends that,

while some facts weighed in favor of the application, the IJ’s

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decision reflected careful consideration of the record and was

within the realm of acceptable decisions.

The BIA must give reasoned consideration to the issues pre-

sented to it, meaning that its decision must show that it has “con-

sidered the issues raised and announced its decision in terms suffi-

cient to enable a reviewing court to know that it has heard and

thought and not merely reacted.” Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d

792, 803 (11th Cir. 2016) (alterations adopted) (quoting Seck v. U.S.

Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 1356, 1364 (11th Cir. 2011)), overruled in part on

other grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 419-23 & n.2. We have

found the BIA’s analysis was enough to show reasoned considera-

tion when it listed the basic facts of the case, referred to relevant

statutory and regulatory authority, and accepted several grounds

on which the IJ denied the petitioner’s request for relief. Bing Quan

Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 874–75 (11th Cir. 2018), overruled

in part on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 419–23 & n.2.

On the other hand, the BIA fails to give reasoned consideration to

a claim when it “misstates the contents of the record, fails to ade-

quately explain its rejection of logical conclusions, or provides jus-

tifications for its decision which are unreasonable and which do not

respond to any arguments in the record.” Id. at 874. A reasoned

consideration inquiry is a question of law. Jeune, 810 F.3d at 799.

“To establish eligibility for CAT relief, an applicant must

show that it is more likely than not that [s]he will be tortured by,

or with the acquiescence of, government officials if returned to the

designated country of removal.” Todorovic v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-13857

621 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010); Lingeswaran v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

969 F.3d 1278, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020); see also 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). “Torture is an extreme form of cruel

and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel,

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that do not

amount to torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2); see also id.

§ 208.18(a)(1). “[T]o constitute torture, an act must be specifically

intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” Id.

§ 208.18(a)(5). “An act that results in unanticipated or unintended

severity of pain and suffering” does not qualify as torture. Id. “[T]o

constitute ‘torture’ under the CAT, the harm the petitioner alleges

must be ‘inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or

acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official

capacity.’” Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1241

(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)).

In assessing an applicant’s eligibility for CAT protection, we

consider all evidence “relevant to the possibility of future torture,”

which includes “(1) whether the applicant has experienced past tor-

ture; (2) whether he could avoid future torture by relocating within

the country; and (3) evidence about wider country conditions, in-

cluding whether there have been gross, flagrant or mass violations

of human rights in the country.” K.Y. v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 43 F.4th

1175, 1181 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2506 (2023)

(mem.), overruled in part on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S.

at 419–23 & n.2; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3). While all relevant

evidence is to be considered, “[t]he evidence must demonstrate

that the applicant will be specifically and individually targeted for

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23-13857 Opinion of the Court 17

torture.” K.Y., 43 F.4th at 1181 (emphasis in original); see also In re

J-E, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 300–01 (BIA 2002) (en banc) (describing the

“specific intent” requirement for torture under the CAT). The bur-

den to show an individualized risk of torture means that “evidence

of generalized mistreatment and some isolated instances of tor-

ture” is insufficient on its own to qualify for CAT protection.

Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).

“It’s not always the case that credibility equals factual accu-

racy, nor does it guarantee a legal victory.” Garland v. Ming Dai,

593 U.S. 357, 372 (2021). To this end, “the agency may

weigh . . . ‘credible testimony along with other evidence of rec-

ord.’” Id. at 371 (quoting INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)). “[E]ven credible testimony may be outweighed

by other more persuasive evidence or be insufficient to satisfy the

burden of proof.” Id. at 373. “The only question for judges review-

ing the [agency’s] factual determinations is whether any reasonable

adjudicator could have found as the agency did.” Id. at 368 (em-

phasis in original).

Here, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, so we

review both decisions as the agency’s final decision. Jeune, 810 F.3d

at 799. 6 Having reviewed the decisions, we conclude the agency

gave reasoned consideration to Ruvira Guerra’s arguments.

6 In passing, the government suggests that Ruvira Guerra has raised new ar-

guments before us, but it does not fully flesh out this issue. Section 1252(d)(1)

of the INA provides that a court can review a final order of removal only if the

noncitizen “has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-13857

While Ruvira Guerra asserts that the agency failed to give

reasoned consideration to whether he could avoid torture by relo-

cating within Cuba, the IJ concluded that Ruvira Guerra had not

made a threshold showing that he would likely be tortured any-

where in Cuba. Because the IJ determined Ruvira Guerra had not

shown he would face torture anywhere, the IJ was not required to

analyze whether he could relocate, i.e., whether there were areas

more or less dangerous for him in Cuba. See INS v. Bagamasbad,

429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (explaining that generally, “courts and agen-

cies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of

which is unnecessary to the results they reach”); Farah v. U.S. Att’y

Gen., 12 F.4th 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2021) (same), overruled in part on

other grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 419-23 & n.2.

Despite the IJ’s statement that it had considered all the evi-

dence the parties submitted, regardless of whether it was

[noncitizen] as of right.” INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). However,

exhaustion is “not a stringent requirement,” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779

F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015), overruled in part on other grounds by Santos-Zac-

aria, 598 U.S. at 419–23 & n.2, and the exhaustion requirement is a claims-pro-

cessing rule, so we generally apply it only when it has been asserted by a party,

Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 83 F.4th 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2023). The government’s

brief does not plainly and prominently raise the issue of exhaustion (nor use

the term), so we consider the issue forfeited. See Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561

F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[S]imply stating that an issue exists, without

further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue . . . .”).

In any event, we rarely find reasoned consideration claims unexhausted be-

cause to hold such a claim unexhausted would “fault” a petitioner “for raising

an argument about the lack of reasoned consideration displayed by a [BIA]

decision not yet in existence.” Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1299.

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23-13857 Opinion of the Court 19

referenced in its decision, Ruvira Guerra also argues the IJ’s eviden-

tiary procedures reflect a lack of reasoned consideration. Having

reviewed the IJ and BIA decisions, along with the record, the

agency’s discussion of the evidence was sufficient such that we can

undertake meaningful appellate review, so Ruvira Guerra’s rea-

soned consideration argument about the IJ’s evidentiary procedure

also fails. Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1302. 7 At bottom, we are satisfied

that the agency “consider[ed] the issues raised and announced its

decision in terms sufficient to enable [us] to know that it has heard

and thought and not merely reacted.” Jeune, 810 F.3d at 803.

Therefore, we proceed to the merits.

Our review of the agency’s factfinding is deferential, and we

conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision.

We address two of the three categories of evidence our precedent

has typically looked to and explain why the agency reasonably con-

cluded that Ruvira Guerra failed to satisfy his burden. K.Y.,

7 Ruvira Guerra has not raised a due process challenge to the IJ’s evidentiary

procedure, so we do not address any issue in that respect here. Accordingly,

we do not hold that the IJ’s evidentiary procedure—which gave material

weight only to evidence cited by page and part—was optimal or complied with

due process. Indeed, generally the agency must consider all the evidence sub-

mitted by a petitioner. See Tan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1369, 1374 (11th Cir.

2006). We simply conclude that, on this record, the IJ’s procedure did not

create a reasoned consideration problem—the record does not show that the

agency failed to “consider the issues raised.” Jeune, 810 F.3d at 803. As a final

note, Ruvira Guerra had an opportunity to identify any potential evidentiary

errors in the IJ’s ruling in his administrative appeal and, to the extent that a

different evidentiary procedure would have been better, neither party ob-

jected nor suggested one to the IJ.

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20 Opinion of the Court 23-13857

43 F.4th at 1181. As explained above, the agency did not need to

resolve the second category we have looked to—“whether he

could avoid future torture by relocating within the country,” id. —

because it concluded he had not established he would suffer torture

anywhere, Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. at 25.

First, the IJ concluded that Ruvira Guerra underwent past

torture in Cuba when he was 15. See K.Y., 43 F.4th at 1181 (consid-

ering “whether the applicant has experienced past torture”). The

record supports the IJ’s conclusion on this issue and the govern-

ment no longer challenges Ruvira Guerra’s credibility—so we con-

clude that finding of past torture is supported by substantial evi-

dence. See Adefemi, 386 F.3d at 1026–27. Still, a finding of past tor-

ture, while relevant, does not necessarily mean that an applicant

has shown that it is more likely than not that they will be tortured

in the future, if removed. See K.Y., 43 F.4th at 1181; Ming Dai, 593

U.S. at 373 (explaining that “even credible testimony may . . . be

insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof”).

We understand the IJ to have given Ruvira Guerra’s past tor-

ture less weight because of several other facts in the record, and we

conclude it was not unreasonable to do so. The IJ found, and Ru-

vira Guerra conceded at least in part, that he lived without govern-

ment interference in Cuba—and “without imprisonment or

harm”—for ten years, from when he was released from imprison-

ment until he left the country. Many years have passed since Ru-

vira Guerra was last in Cuba and no evidence in the record suggests

that the Cuban government will still perceive him the same way it

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23-13857 Opinion of the Court 21

perceived him in the 1960s and 1970s. See, e.g., Eritsian v. Att’y Gen.,

845 F. App’x 826, 839 (11th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (noting, as facts

supporting the agency’s decision, that the petitioner’s “last known

incident of harm in Azerbaijan was in 1990—almost three decades

ago” and that the petitioner “ha[d] not resided in Azerbaijan since

1994”); Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2022)

(“Petitioner hasn’t received a single threat while in the United

States and, combined with the twenty-year distance between his

last incident and the present day, there is no evidence that he cur-

rently faces any particularized risk of harm.”).

Further, as the IJ found, some members of Ruvira Guerra’s

extended family have returned to Cuba (and traveled between

Cuba and the United States) without issue, suggesting some differ-

ences from the 1960s and 1970s. After the IJ relied on his family

members’ travel, Ruvira Guerra did not submit evidence in his ad-

ministrative appeal to support his argument before us that there

were material differences between himself and those family mem-

bers. As noted above, the burden to establish eligibility for CAT

relief fell on him, the applicant, and we must draw reasonable in-

ferences in favor of the IJ’s decision. Adefemi, 386 F.3d at 1029;

Todorovic, 621 F.3d at 1324.

The IJ also recognized that Ruvira Guerra’s ten years in

Cuba post-imprisonment were not easy and discussed how Ruvira

Guerra’s testimony showed that he still faced a “difficult life” be-

cause of his political ideology. This mistreatment, while contempt-

ible, does not establish that he will face torture, rather than

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22 Opinion of the Court 23-13857

mistreatment, on his return to Cuba, as torture “does not include

lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-

ment . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2); see, e.g., Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d

1173, 1195 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying deference to the BIA’s defini-

tion of torture and concluding that some “forms of police brutality

in Haiti—beatings with fists, sticks, and belts—did not rise to the

level of severity necessary to constitute CAT-prohibited torture”),

abrogated in part by Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412-13; see also K.Y.,

43 F.4th at 1182 (“Extortion or discrimination are not the same as

torture.”). Moreover, some of the mistreatment he described in his

testimony, such as the stones being thrown at his family’s house,

was not alleged to have been done either by the government or

with the acquiescence of the government, so it does not constitute

torture under the CAT for that additional reason. Reyes-Sanchez,

369 F.3d at 1241. For all these reasons, we conclude that the record

does not compel a different weighing of Ruvira Guerra’s past tor-

ture, even if another fair adjudicator might have given it more

weight. See Laguna Rivera, 130 F.4th at 919.

Second, while Ruvira Guerra submitted various country ev-

idence in support of his application, see K.Y., 43 F.4th at 1181 (look-

ing to “evidence about wider country conditions, including

whether there have been gross, flagrant or mass violations of hu-

man rights in the country”), the evidence did not tie the Cuban

government’s misconduct to any facts showing that he—or others

similar to him—will be targeted individually for torture. The IJ

recognized that there were “some continuing violations of human

rights in Cuba,” but reasoned that Ruvira Guerra had not shown

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23-13857 Opinion of the Court 23

that he would be a target for that treatment. The IJ’s view of the

record is supported. While there is evidence in the record about

torture and human rights violations in Cuba, Ruvira Guerra did not

present any evidence showing that the Cuban government today

would still perceive him as a political enemy for his conduct 50 or

60 years ago. See Laguna Rivera, 130 F.4th at 919. Without that tie,

the evidence of Cuba’s country conditions does not strongly assist

Ruvira Guerra in proving that he “will be specifically and individually

targeted for torture.” K.Y., 43 F.4th at 1181 (emphasis in original);

see also Jean-Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1324.

IV. CONCLUSION

“The only question for judges reviewing the [agency’s] fac-

tual determinations is whether any reasonable adjudicator could

have found as the agency did.” Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 368 (emphasis

in original). In light of that standard, Ruvira Guerra has not estab-

lished that the agency’s determination—that he had not shown he

is more likely than not to face torture if returned to Cuba—is un-

supported by substantial evidence. Todorovic, 621 F.3d at 1324; Lin-

geswaran, 969 F.3d at 1293. Ruvira Guerra has also not shown that

the agency failed to give his case reasoned consideration. Accord-

ingly, we deny the petition for review.

PETITION DENIED.