Mark H. Wilson v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida

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No. SC2023-0320

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MARK H. WILSON,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

May 22, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Mark Howard Wilson appeals his convictions and sentences of

death for the first-degree murders of his girlfriend’s young nephews

in 2020. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For

the reasons explained, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 26, 2020, Sarah Baker awoke to find her sons,

twelve-year-old Robert and fourteen-year-old Tayten, brutally

murdered in her home. Their heads were beaten with a hammer

and their throats cut. Appellant Mark Wilson was the boyfriend of

Sarah’s sister, Cynthia Guinan (Cindy). Five days before the

murders, Wilson, Cindy, and their fourteen-month-old daughter,

K.W., moved into a shed on the Bakers’ property at Sarah’s

insistence, after Sarah learned that their rental was infested with

fleas and had no power, and they had no food and were smoking

marijuana in the house with K.W. present.

Wilson, Cindy, and K.W. moved to the Bakers’ property on

August 21, 2020. Sarah lived there with her husband, Chad, the

victims, and her other son, who was four years old at the time. The

shed did not have a working bathroom, so Wilson had access to the

Bakers’ house to use the bathroom and kitchen, and to do laundry.

Sarah said that nothing was out of the ordinary on August 25,

2020, which was the day before the murders. Cindy had a doctor’s

appointment scheduled for the morning of the 26th to confirm a

positive home pregnancy test, and Sarah gave her and Wilson ten

dollars for gas to get to the appointment. That night, Tayten slept

in the “pool table room” and Robert slept in the living room.

Around 2 or 3 a.m. on the morning of August 26, Sarah saw Wilson

when she went outside to smoke. Wilson was on the porch

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sharpening his knife and was acting normal and did not seem

impaired. Sarah went to bed soon after.

When Sarah woke later that morning, she saw blood on the

floor as she entered the pool table room. When she removed

Tayten’s blanket, she saw that he was covered in blood. His throat

appeared to be severed to the bone, and he had no pulse. Tayten

borrowed Sarah’s phone the previous night, and she could not find

it so she ran to Cindy and Wilson’s door but they were not there.

Sarah then ran back to the house, screaming at Robert to call 911,

but when she removed Robert’s blanket, she saw that he too was

covered in blood. Sarah then drove to her father’s house on the

next street to call for help.

Investigators found a hammer and a fillet knife under a sink in

another detached building on the property. Both appeared to have

blood on them and were wrapped in placemats. Blood-soaked

paper towels were found in the trash outside. A note that was

handwritten by Wilson was also found. The note read:

Honey, if I could find words for what you do to make

me completely whole, I would. I get so frustrated, baby,

cause most of the time I come off as angry or

confrontational, but you have to understand that you

[sic] and [K.W.] by my side, I am way more than ordinary.

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I can’t even try to imagine life without you and her. I

can’t lose you two. [K.W.] is so extraordinary. She really

is our greatest achievement. Please promise me that she

will always know that her dada is a soldier and that he

loved you from day one and will always love you both

until the end of time.

Wilson returned to the Baker home after Cindy’s doctor

appointment. He was informed about the murders and gave three

brief interviews to Putnam County Sheriff’s Detective Jacob

Higginbotham at the scene. In all three of these interactions,

Wilson was responsive and did not appear to be impaired in any

way.

The day after the murders, Wilson’s mother, Chrisy Adkins,

told Wilson that he needed to cooperate with law enforcement and

take a polygraph to clear his name. Wilson said he could not do

that. Adkins asked him, “[D]id you hurt those babies?” to which

Wilson responded, “Yes, Mom, I did it.” Shortly after the

confession, Adkins drove to the sheriff’s office and informed law

enforcement that she believed Wilson was responsible for the

murders. She agreed to have another conversation with Wilson

about the murders while wearing a wire.

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The recorded conversation between Adkins and Wilson took

place in Adkins’s car. Wilson said that he and Cindy had made a

plan in which he would kill Robert and Tayten and Cindy would kill

Sarah and Sarah’s four-year-old son. After hearing Wilson’s

admissions on the wire, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop on

the vehicle and arrested Wilson. Wilson was transported to the

sheriff’s office and agreed to speak with law enforcement and to

provide a DNA sample.

Wilson began by detailing what he and Cindy did on the

morning of August 26, which included trips to Cindy’s parents’

home, a convenience store, the doctor’s office, and their prior

residence to feed his dog. Wilson could recall in detail all the

specific roads he and Cindy traveled when making those stops.

Wilson also described having sex with Cindy early that morning,

and he recalled the medication she took for an upset stomach.

Wilson initially denied involvement in the murders, but after

learning about the recorded conversation with his mother and being

told that Cindy had implicated him and revealed their murderous

plan, he admitted using his hammer to hit each of the boys multiple

times and cutting their throats with a fillet knife. He claimed to

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believe that the boys were physically and sexually abusing K.W. and

said the boys were probably having sex with Cindy too, although he

later backtracked on that allegation. 1 Wilson also said that he

thought Cindy was covering up the boys’ sexual abuse of K.W.

Wilson agreed that his motive for killing the boys was “pretty much”

because he felt like they were abusing and hurting Cindy and K.W.

He also said that Cindy was messing with his head and that she

indirectly told him to kill the boys. Wilson said that he and Cindy

were using methamphetamine on the day of the murders and that

he had been awake for two to three days.

Wilson said the murders occurred in the morning on August

26 after he and Cindy returned from picking up coffee around 7:00

a.m. but before they left for the doctor appointment at 9:00 a.m. He

said Cindy was right outside while he was in the house killing the

boys and that she saw them after they were dead. Both boys were

sleeping when Wilson began the attack. Wilson claimed that he

blacked out during the attack, that his memory was “foggy,” and

1. Law enforcement investigated the allegations regarding the

boys and Cindy and K.W. and found no evidence to support them.

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that he recalled “bits and pieces.” Wilson admitted to being “cold

and emotionless”—as opposed to upset or in a rage—while he was

committing the murders.

FDLE tested evidence for fingerprints, DNA, and blood. A

bloody handprint found on the wall near Tayten’s body was

identified as Tayten’s. Tayten’s blood and DNA were on Wilson’s

hammer. DNA matching both Tayten and Robert was found on

Wilson’s fillet knife. The blood-stained, black, hooded sweatshirt

Wilson was wearing on the morning of the murders contained the

DNA of Robert, Tayten, and Wilson.

Predrag Bulic, M.D., 2 conducted the autopsies on both boys.

In short, the cause of death for both was sharp force injuries to the

neck and blunt force trauma to the head. Dr. Bulic determined the

blunt force trauma was caused by a hammer.

In detail, Robert had a large, incised wound to his neck, which

transected both the carotid arteries and jugular veins on both sides

of his neck as well as his larynx and the large muscles supporting

2. Dr. Bulic passed away before the trial so the chief medical

examiner for the district, James Fulcher, M.D., testified about the

autopsies at trial.

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the head. There were three smaller incised wounds to the neck.

The large wound started at the front of the neck and extended all

the way to the spine. A mark was found on the third cervical

vertebrae, indicating the knife had struck the vertebrae. The

“satellite wounds” to the large wound suggested that a sawing

motion was used to achieve the depth of the primary wound. The

wound suggested as many as six different entries by the knife in the

process of the cutting. There was a wound to the left side of the

jaw, which appeared to have been caused by the inserting and

twisting of a knife.

Robert also had numerous impact injuries to his skull. These

included blunt force trauma and a more severe wound, a depressed

skull fracture, corresponding to the blunt trauma on the right side

of his head. The medical examiner opined that the depressed skull

fracture would have resulted in loss of consciousness due to injury

to the brain. There were other skull wounds with bone fragments

pushed inward, consistent with being inflicted by the round face of

a hammer. The major loss of blood suggested that Robert was alive

when the neck injuries were inflicted. But the evidence overall

indicated that the head injuries were inflicted first, likely resulting

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in unconsciousness, and the neck injuries followed while Robert

was still alive, but likely unconscious.

Tayten suffered similar injuries to his head and neck. His

neck was cut as many as twelve times, likely in a sawing motion.

These wounds transected the right carotid artery and jugular vein.

There was a mark on Tayten’s third cervical vertebrae consistent

with a knife striking the vertebrae. The medical examiner opined

that after this wound and the resulting blood loss, Tayten likely

would have lost consciousness within thirty seconds. Tayten

suffered twenty stab wounds. He had an incised wound on one of

his fingers, which appeared to be a defensive wound.

Tayten also suffered multiple blunt force injuries to his head.

There was trauma to his lip, which was likely caused by his face

being forced against the ground, while the back of his head was

struck. He was found face down on the floor. Two of the blunt

force wounds to the back of Tayten’s head displayed a curvilinear

shape consistent with a hammer. At least one of the wounds

displayed a clean “punched out” shape of skull consistent with the

shape of a hammer head. The two wounds to the occipital scalp

resulted in depressed skull fractures that would have resulted in

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unconsciousness and could have resulted in death due to brain

swelling. There were at least seven blows to Tayten’s head.

The medical examiner reviewed the photographs of the blood

trail in the pool table room, which extended around the table to

where Tayten’s body was found. On the wall near Tayten’s body

there was a bloody handprint, determined to be Tayten’s, which

suggested that Tayten had been alive when the print was placed.

The evidence strongly suggested that the attack on Tayten

commenced with knife wounds inflicted at the end of the pool table

and completed with the hammer wounds near the other end of the

table where the handprint was found.

Wilson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder,

burglary with assault or battery, and burglary of a dwelling while

armed.3

3. The jury was instructed in accordance with section

810.02(1)(b)2.c., Florida Statutes (2020), that the burglary counts

required the State to prove that (1) Wilson had permission or

consent to enter a structure owned by or in the possession of Chad

and/or Sarah Baker; and (2) after entering the structure, Wilson

remained therein with the intent to commit or attempt to commit a

forcible felony, namely, aggravated assault, aggravated battery,

manslaughter, second-degree murder, or first-degree premeditated

murder.

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At the penalty phase, the State presented victim impact

statements from the victims’ family members and a friend. The

State relied on the trial testimony to establish the proposed

aggravating factors. Wilson called several family members and

seven expert witnesses in support of his proposed mitigating

circumstances. Wilson’s experts included: Susan Skolly-Danziger,

PharmD, who testified as an expert in toxicology, pharmacy, and

pharmacology; an education mitigation expert; a neuroradiologist;

an expert in corrections policies, practices, and procedures; an

expert in neuropsychology; an expert in neurology and pediatric

neurology; and an expert in psychology. The State called two

experts in rebuttal: William Meadows, Ph.D., a consulting forensic

psychologist; and a psychiatrist.

As to the murder of Robert Baker, the jury unanimously found

that each of the three proposed aggravating factors—(1) the

defendant was previously or contemporaneously convicted of

another capital felony; (2) the capital felony was committed while

the defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary; and (3)

the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and

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premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal

justification (CCP)—was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

As to the murder of Tayten Baker, the jury found that the

same three aggravating factors were proven beyond a reasonable

doubt plus a fourth: the capital felony was especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel.

The jury also unanimously found as to both murders: that the

aggravating factors were sufficient to warrant a sentence of death;

that at least one or more jurors found that one or more mitigating

circumstances was established by the greater weight of the

evidence; that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating

circumstances; and that Wilson should be sentenced to death.

The trial court agreed with the jury that the three aggravating

factors proposed as to Robert’s murder and all four aggravating

factors proposed as to Tayten’s murder were proven beyond a

reasonable doubt, and gave great weight to each aggravator. The

trial court did not find any statutory mitigating circumstances

established as to either murder.

As to the proposed other factors in Wilson’s background that

would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty under

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section 921.141(7)(h), Florida Statutes (2022), the trial court found

as follows: Wilson endured challenges directly related to his

geographical address (slight weight); through education and

employment, Wilson overcame, at least in part, the negative aspects

of his traumatic childhood (slight weight); Wilson was sexually

assaulted as a child in elementary school (slight weight); Wilson has

exemplary courtroom behavior (moderate weight); Wilson has been

a compliant and cooperative county jail inmate for years (slight

weight); Wilson has the potential for rehabilitation (slight weight);

notable Seventh Judicial Circuit first-degree murder convictions 4

(slight weight); Wilson has a mental health diagnosis of attention

deficit disorder (slight weight); Wilson was abused by his adult

caretakers as a child (slight weight); Wilson lacked parental

guidance as a child (slight weight); Wilson suffered complex trauma

during his childhood (little weight); Wilson experienced recurrent

residential relocations and school changes as a child (slight weight);

Wilson’s psychological and emotional development was critically

4. The trial court interpreted this proposed mitigator as

suggesting that it conduct a proportionality assessment across

recent cases from the Seventh Judicial Circuit.

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impacted because he was introduced to maladaptive behaviors at

an early age by the adult caretakers in his life (slight weight);

Wilson abused methamphetamine as an adult (slight weight);

Wilson suffered from depression in childhood (slight weight); Wilson

suffered from at least one traumatic brain injury (slight weight);

Wilson maintains a relationship with his mother, sister, and aunt

(little weight); twelve to zero death overrides to life sentence 5 (the

court found this to be worthy of consideration and gave

considerable reflection and deliberation on the ability of the court to

exercise its discretion in favor of life). 6

5. The gist of this proposed mitigator was that there is

precedent for a judicial override of a death recommendation even in

cases where the jury recommendation vote was 12-0.

6. There were also a number of proposed mitigating

circumstances that were given no weight because the court found

them to be duplicative or they were considered by the court as

bearing on other circumstances rather than standalone

circumstances. These included the following: a life sentence will

provide the victims’ family with closure; Wilson’s mother was the

victim of domestic violence when she was pregnant with him;

Wilson witnessed multiple episodes of domestic violence throughout

his childhood; Wilson’s parents abused illegal substances during

his youth; Wilson’s stepparents introduced him to illegal

substances during his youth; Wilson abused inhalants as a child;

Wilson abused cocaine as a child, teenager, and a young adult;

Wilson was raised in severe poverty; Wilson was repeatedly

abandoned by his primary caretakers for days at a time; Wilson

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The trial court ultimately followed the jury’s recommendations

and sentenced Wilson to death for each of the murders and to a

consecutive life sentence for burglary while armed. 7 This appeal

followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. CCP

Wilson first argues that the trial court erred by allowing the

experienced chronic exposure to trauma during his childhood;

Wilson had an immediate family member who was incarcerated

during his childhood; Wilson had limited protective factors as a

child; Wilson was unlawfully removed from his mother by his father

at a very young age; Wilson has intelligence deficits; Wilson’s

maternal family has a history of mental illness; Wilson’s paternal

family has a history of mental illness; Wilson abused drugs and

inhalants as a child, impacting his brain development; Wilson was

sleep deprived at the time of the offenses; Wilson suffers from PTSD;

Wilson suffered from depression as an adult; Wilson can be

redeemed; Wilson can serve as an inmate worker if sentenced to life

in prison without parole; Wilson took responsibility for the deaths of

Tayten and Robert Baker within one day of the crime; Wilson

suffers from generational family psychological dysfunction; Wilson

suffers from mental illness; Wilson had abnormal brain imaging;

Wilson has brain damage; Wilson suffers from deficits in executive

function; Wilson has neurological deficits; and Wilson lives his life

in flight or fight mode.

7. A nolle prosequi was entered as to the burglary with an

assault or battery count after Wilson was sentenced on the

remaining three counts.

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jury to consider the CCP aggravator. At the close of the guilt phase,

the jury was instructed:

If you return a verdict of guilty to the charge of first-

degree murder, it is not necessary that all of you agree

the State proved first-degree premeditated murder, and it

is not necessary that all of you agree the State proved

first-degree felony murder. Instead, what is required is

that you[ ]all agree the State proved either first-degree

premeditated murder or first-degree felony murder.

The verdict forms originally provided to the jury gave the following

three options for a verdict of guilty as to the first-degree murder

counts:

____GUILTY as charged of both First-Degree Premeditated

Murder and First-Degree Felony Murder

____GUILTY as charged of only First-Degree Premeditated

Murder

____GUILTY as charged of only First-Degree Felony

Murder

Two hours into deliberations, the jury sent out a question

indicating confusion regarding an apparent discrepancy between

the instructions and the verdict forms.8 The jury listed the three

8. Although the jury’s question appeared to refer to the

“verdict form” as a whole, the record does not indicate whether the

question was relevant to one or both of the murder counts. We will

assume the question was relevant to both counts.

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options provided on the verdict forms and asked, “But, [the

i]nstructions state if [we find the defendant guilty of] 1st Degree

[murder, it is] not necessary for all to agree on pre-med[itation.] So

– if we are not unanimous as to pre-med[itation] – which line on the

form do we use?”

Recognizing the error on the verdict forms that caused the

confusion, the trial court amended the verdict forms to change the

jury’s first option regarding first-degree murder to say “guilty as

charged of first-degree murder.” The verdict forms were amended

as to both Robert and Tayten’s murder because it was unknown to

which count the question pertained or whether it pertained to both

counts.

After rereading the relevant instructions and providing the

amended verdict forms, the jury was sent to continue deliberations

at 6:31 p.m. At 6:36 p.m., the jury returned with verdicts of “guilty

as charged of first-degree murder” on counts one and two. After the

guilt phase verdicts, Wilson filed a motion to preclude instruction or

argument on CCP in the penalty phase. In his motion, Wilson

acknowledged that where a jury returns a general verdict of guilty of

first-degree murder, the State may pursue the CCP aggravating

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factor. Even so, Wilson argued that the jury should not be

instructed on CCP because

[w]here the jury in the first phase of a capital trial cannot

agree that premeditation has been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt, as a practical matter that same jury—

absent additional proof—will be unable to agree that the

heightened premeditation required for the CCP

aggravator has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The motion was denied, and the jury found that the CCP aggravator

was proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to both murders. The

trial court agreed.

As to the murder of Robert Baker, the court wrote:

d) The Defendant’s argument on this factor centers

on a question from the jury at the close of the case on the

merits. Specifically, the Defendant attacks the

heightened premeditation necessary to find this factor

and cites to the jury’s question. The jury asked a

question during deliberations that suggested that some of

the jurors were considering finding premeditation as the

basis for First-Degree murder, while others found felony

murder as the basis. In the merits phase, a jury may

find an individual guilty of first-degree murder under a

theory of either felony murder or premeditated murder.

No special verdict is required. The merits jury here

ultimately entered a general verdict which does not

specify whether they found felony murder or

premeditated murder. Indeed, under existing Florida

law, the jury may return a finding of guilty of first-degree

murder even if they disagree as to whether premeditation

or felony murder is proven.

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e) The Court finds that in the penalty phase, the

jury reflected on the evidence and concluded that the

Defendant did indeed[] premeditate and plan this

murder. The Defendant’s argument that they could not

have found sufficient additional premeditation to sustain

CCP is not founded. The Court specifically notes that

other than his own claims, there is no objective evidence

demonstrating that the Defendant was impaired at or

near the time of the offense. No one who observed him

reported or suggested that he was acting as if [he] were

under the influence of substances. The overall sequence

of events argued by the State has been convincingly

proven. The Defendant’s argument is that he had

concluded the Baker boys presented a threat to him and

his family. The Court finds that he planned these

homicides with precision, even, apparently taking the

time to sharpen the fil[l]et knife in front of the boy[s’]

mother the night before. He took the time, in the middle

of the murders, to change weapons to make sure the

victims were dead. Finally, the Court concludes there

wasn’t the slightest pretense of moral justification.

Robert was asleep and defenseless. Tayten was awake,

but brutally butchered as he sought to escape and

perhaps call for help. Neither of these boys did anything

to the Defendant to justify this crime. The [Court] finds

this factor proven beyond and to the exclusion of a

reasonable doubt and affords it GREAT WEIGHT.

(Citations omitted.)

And as to the murder of Tayten Baker, the court wrote:

The arguments on this factor are the same as for

Robert Baker with one exception. Tayten appears to have

been awake and conscious for some part of the murder.

However, there is no evidence, other than the defensive

wound on Tayten that might even suggest any action by

Tayten which could even hint at a moral justification.

The Court finds there is no basis whatsoever to conclude

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that Tayten did anything to provoke the murder. The

wound to his hand was defensive. There is no evidence

to conclude he did anything to provoke the attack.

Therefore, the same conclusions apply on this factor.

The jury found this factor proven beyond a reasonable

doubt as to Tayten as well. The Court finds it proven

beyond a reasonable doubt and for the same reasons

affords it GREAT WEIGHT.

Wilson argues that the trial court erred in submitting the CCP

aggravator to the jury “because minutes before the guilt-or-

innocence verdict was announced, the jury foreman spontaneously

indicated the jurors had not achieved unanimity as to

premeditation.” He also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that

the jury reflected on the matter during its penalty phase

deliberations and concluded that premeditation was proved beyond

a reasonable doubt.

“[T]his Court has held [that] ‘[t]he trial court must instruct the

jury on any aggravators for which credible and competent evidence

is presented.’ ” Doty v. State, 170 So. 3d 731, 739 (Fla. 2015) (third

alteration in original) (quoting Hall v. State, 87 So. 3d 667, 671 (Fla.

2012)). In other words, there is no error when a trial court

instructs on any aggravator for which credible and competent

evidence is presented.

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Here, the trial court properly instructed on CCP because there

was credible and competent evidence to establish CCP as detailed in

the sentencing order. For example, Wilson took the time to sharpen

his fillet knife before the murders; he received no provocation from

either boy, as both were either sleeping when the attack began or

just before it, and everything had been normal at the house the day

before; Wilson hit both boys on their heads with a hammer multiple

times and stabbed, slashed, and/or sawed both of their necks

multiple times; Wilson changed weapons during the murders to

make sure the victims were dead; Wilson told law enforcement that

he preplanned the murders; and there was no pretense of legal or

moral justification for the killings, nor does Wilson argue that the

murders were justified. See, e.g., Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 499

(Fla. 2011) (concluding that legally sufficient evidence exists to

support CCP where the defendant procures a murder weapon in

advance, receives no resistance or provocation on the part of the

victim, and carries out the killing as a matter of course); Franklin v.

State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007) (“In a number of cases, we have

cited the defendant’s procurement of a weapon in advance of the

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crime as indicative of preparation and heightened premeditated

design.”).

Wilson’s argument concerning the jury’s question about the

verdict form is predicated on a mischaracterization of the facts. His

assertion that “the jury foreman spontaneously indicated the jurors

had not achieved unanimity as to premeditation” is erroneous. The

jury’s question was purely hypothetical—“if we are not unanimous”

(emphasis supplied). It did not suggest that any jurors had reached

any conclusion on premeditation. Even assuming that when the

question was posed, the jury was not unanimous on premeditation,

a lack of unanimity on one or both counts at sometime during the

guilt phase deliberations—even if shortly before the verdict was

rendered—does not mean that the jury did not reach a unanimous

decision that the murders were premeditated before the verdict was

rendered. 9 Regardless of speculation that some juror may have

9. The record indicates that the jury retired to begin

deliberations at 4:30 p.m., that it continued deliberations after

receiving the answer to the question about the verdict forms at 6:31

p.m., and that it returned its verdicts at 6:36 p.m. But there is no

indication in the record as to what time the jury posed the question

about the verdict forms. In accordance with the standard

instructions, the jury was instructed that “it may take some time”

for the court to talk with the attorneys before it answers any

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concluded at some point during the guilt phase that only felony

murder was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the general verdict

permitted the State to pursue the CCP aggravator. And as the trial

court concluded, the jury’s unanimous finding that CCP was proven

beyond a reasonable doubt—after being instructed that “in order for

this aggravating factor to apply, a heightened level of premeditation,

demonstrated by a substantial period of reflection, is required”—

demonstrates that the jury reflected on the evidence during the

penalty phase and concluded that Wilson did indeed premeditate

and plan the murders.

Although Wilson challenges the trial court’s finding that the

jury reflected on the matter during its penalty phase deliberations

and concluded that premeditation was proven beyond a reasonable

question, and that the jury “may continue . . . deliberations while” it

waits for the court’s answer. Indeed, it is not uncommon for it to

“take some time” for the attorneys to reassemble in the courtroom

before a jury question is discussed. Nor is it unheard of for a jury

to pose a question and then to continue deliberations, determine

that an answer is not needed, and reach a verdict before the court

has answered its question. It is possible that the jury here

continued to deliberate after asking the question and reached

unanimous decisions as to premeditation even before the court had

the jury return to the courtroom for the reinstruction and new

verdict forms.

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doubt as an attempt by the trial court to “divine” “what was in the

jurors’ minds,” the trial court reached this conclusion based on the

jury’s unanimous findings. In reality, Wilson is attempting to

“divine” what was in the jurors’ minds. He argues in his initial brief

that between the time the jury posed its question about the verdict

forms in the guilt phase and the time it rendered its guilty verdicts,

“[i]t seems vanishingly unlikely . . . that the verdict after all was

based on a unanimous finding that premeditation was shown.” He

argues in his reply brief that “[t]he jury’s discussion of the

mitigating effect of voluntary intoxication . . . may have been short-

circuited by the State’s emphasis on the CCP factor,” and therefore

“the State has failed to show” that the alleged error in submitting

CCP to the jury was harmless as to the penalty phase. These

arguments are purely speculative, unlike the trial court’s

conclusion, which was based on the jury’s unanimous findings that

CCP was proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to each murder.

B. Methamphetamine Intoxication

Wilson next claims that the trial court erred in rejecting

proposed mitigating evidence that Wilson was intoxicated by

methamphetamine at the time of the murders. Methamphetamine

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intoxication was not offered as a standalone mitigating

circumstance, but Wilson appears to argue that whether he was

intoxicated by methamphetamine at the time of the murders was

relevant to three proposed mitigating circumstances: (1) the capital

felony was committed while Wilson was under the influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) the capacity of Wilson

to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired;

and (3) Wilson abused methamphetamine as an adult.

As to extreme mental or emotional disturbance, the court

wrote:

The Defendant argues that he was under the influence of

methamphetamine. There is scant proof of this. All

contemporaneous observations indicate he was not under

the influence. The Defendant argues his memory of the

events was impaired by the methamphetamine use.

There is also scant proof of this. Instead, there is proof of

a claim [of] selective memory. He remembers every detail

of the morning, to include sexual relations with Cindy

Guinan, the details of the drive to the convenience store

and to the doctor, and the stay at the doctor’s office. Yet

he cannot recall the moments of the attack, or the

actions he took immediately afterwards to clean himself

and the weapons and hide the weapons. The Court

listened to the audio recording of the three short

interviews on the day of the attack. There is no

indication of the influence of drugs or altered thinking.

- 25 -

Indeed, he wanted to make sure he “had his story

straight” when he spoke to the detective.

As to the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of

law, the court wrote:

[T]here is little contemporaneous proof, other than the

Defendant’s self-serving claims, that he was actually

under the influence of methamphetamine as he claimed.

In the Defendant’s Spencer hearing materials, there is

evidence that Cindy Guin[a]n tested positive for

amphetamines approximately 48 hours after the

murders. This is consistent with his claim that he and

Cindy were using methamphetamine contemporaneously

with the murder[s]. However, there is no other

corroboration. Indeed, the Court finds the greater

quantum of evidence suggests that even if he had used

methamphetamine, it was not having the deleterious

effect his arguments suggest. Nor is there evidence of

any of the other psychiatric diagnoses coming to the fore.

He claims memory deficit, yet is able to describe, in what

the Court found to be exquisite detail, everything around

the murders. The Court finds the State’s experts

convincing when they assert that there is no scientific

evidence supporting the kind of selective amnesia the

Defendant claims. Therefore, the Court concludes that

this statutory mitigating factor was not proven by a

preponderance of the evidence. Consequently, the Court

affords it NO WEIGHT.

As to the abuse of methamphetamine as an adult, the court

made the following findings:

This is proven. There is testimony as well as to the

serious deleterious effects of methamphetamine.

However, as discussed above, the Court finds there is

only the barest of proof suggesting the Defendant was

- 26 -

actually under the influence of methamphetamine at the

time of the offense. The Court does accept the testimony

regarding the deleterious effects, in general, of

methamphetamine use. Therefore, as a general matter

worthy of generalized consideration in mitigation the

Court only affords this circumstance SLIGHT WEIGHT.

Wilson argues that the trial court erred in declining to accept

that he was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of

the murders as demonstrated by: (1) unspecified “bizarre

statements” made by Wilson during his confession; (2) the several

occasions during his confession in which Wilson “le[ft] reality

behind”; (3) unspecified “irrational accusations”; and (4) Dr. Skolly-

Danziger’s testimony that paranoia and delusions can accompany

intoxication by methamphetamine.

Because Wilson has failed to identify the “bizarre statements”

or “irrational accusations” to which he refers, these points are not

sufficiently briefed to warrant relief. See Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d

1017, 1029 n.8 (Fla. 2009) (“Vague and conclusory allegations on

appeal are insufficient to warrant relief.”); Murthy v. Missouri, 603

U.S. 43, 67 n.7 (2024) (“[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for

truffles buried [in the record].” (second alteration in original)

(quoting Gross v. Cicero, 619 F.3d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 2010))).

- 27 -

As for the “several occasions” during his confession when

Wilson allegedly “leaves reality behind,” Wilson specifies only one

such occasion, which was when “he told the officers . . . that Cindy

was ‘so mischievous’ she might well have silently conveyed to him

her view that multiple members of her family ought to be murdered

in their sleep.” Assuming that this “silent conveyance” was a

delusion that Wilson actually had, there is no evidence that it

occurred at the time of the murders, especially considering Wilson’s

statement that the murders were preplanned. Nor is there any

evidence that any such delusion resulted from methamphetamine

use.

Dr. Skolly-Danziger testified that paranoia and delusions can

accompany intoxication by methamphetamine, but she did not

opine whether Wilson was intoxicated by methamphetamine at the

time of the murders or whether any such methamphetamine

intoxication would have caused Wilson to experience paranoia and

delusions at the time of the murders.

Dr. Meadows said that it is obvious when someone is

intoxicated by methamphetamine, but he found no evidence that

Wilson was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of

- 28 -

the murders. Dr. Meadows reviewed the recordings of Wilson’s

conversations with Detective Higginbotham on the day of the

murders and determined that Wilson’s behavior was inconsistent

with methamphetamine intoxication. When Dr. Meadows evaluated

Wilson, Wilson exhibited selective, nonsequential amnesia, which

Dr. Meadows found indicative of malingering. Dr. Meadows also

noted that the “higher functioning activities” in which Wilson

engaged near the time of the murders and the fact that the murders

were planned and premeditated were inconsistent with

amphetamine-induced psychosis or amnesia.

Detective Higginbotham testified that in the three

conversations he had with Wilson shortly after the bodies were

discovered, he saw no indication that Wilson was at all impaired.

Mitigating evidence must be reasonably established by the

greater weight of the evidence, but may be rejected if there is

competent, substantial evidence to support its rejection. E.g.,

Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1001 (Fla. 2006). “As long as the

court considered all of the evidence, the trial judge’s determination

of lack of mitigation will stand absent a palpable abuse of

discretion.” Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177, 1184 (Fla. 1986).

- 29 -

The weight assigned to a mitigating circumstance is also within the

trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

discretion. Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1133 (Fla. 2000).

Here, there was no objective evidence establishing by the

greater weight of the evidence that Wilson was impaired at the time

of the murders. No one who observed him close in time to the

murders saw any indication that he was under the influence of any

substance. The evidence to support this claim was limited to

Wilson’s own statement made during his confession and the fact

that Cindy tested positive for amphetamines forty-eight hours after

the murders, which the court found to be “consistent with [Wilson’s]

claim that he and Cindy were using methamphetamine

contemporaneously with the murder[s].” The court found “no other

corroboration” of Wilson’s claim of intoxication at the time of the

murders, and none appears in the record. Far more evidence

suggested that Wilson was not intoxicated or that “even if he had

used methamphetamine, it was not having the deleterious effect his

arguments suggest.”

To the extent that some evidence of methamphetamine

intoxication was presented, the trial court was within its discretion

- 30 -

to determine that it was outweighed by the evidence demonstrating

that Wilson was not intoxicated or impaired. And even if this

limited evidence could be deemed to establish some level of

intoxication or impairment at the time of the murders, the trial

court still did not abuse its discretion in declining to find that any

intoxication rose to the level of extreme mental or emotional

disturbance; that Wilson was so intoxicated that his capacity to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct

to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired; or that

any intoxication at the time of the murders warranted more than

slight weight being given to the fact that Wilson abused

methamphetamine as an adult.

The trial court did not err in declining to find that Wilson was

intoxicated by methamphetamine at the time of the murders or in

ruling on the three proposed mitigating circumstances identified in

this issue. Wilson is not entitled to relief.

C. Victim Impact Evidence

Wilson alleges that the trial court erred in allowing victim

impact testimony about past traumas to the victims’ family. A trial

court’s decision to admit victim impact evidence is reviewed for an

- 31 -

abuse of discretion. Miller v. State, 379 So. 3d 1109, 1128 (Fla.

2024). This Court “will not find an abuse of discretion unless the

trial court makes a ruling which no reasonable judge would agree

with.” Id. (quoting Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005, 1013 (Fla.), cert.

denied, 144 S. Ct. 385 (2023)).

Wilson appears to take issue with portions of the testimony of

the victims’ step-grandmother, Deborah Benson, discussing two

tragedies that occurred within the victims’ family in the three years

before the murders in this case.10 Wilson objected to the reading of

these portions of Benson’s prepared statement, but the trial court

allowed them, noting that the family history was necessary to

understand the context of the impact of the murders on the family.

Wilson now argues that admission of these portions of Benson’s

statement constitutes reversible error because they were “offered,

10. Under this issue in his brief, Wilson does not indicate the

testimony with which he takes issue except to say that “[t]he

statement objected to in this case recounted tragic events that took

place in the victims’ family before the victims moved to the area.”

Thirty-two pages earlier in his brief, in his “Statement of the Case

and Facts,” Wilson refers to a “disputed statement” from Benson. It

appears that the portions of Benson’s statement quoted under the

“Statement of the Case and Facts” is the statement that serves as

the basis for this claim.

- 32 -

and admitted, to show how difficult it has been for the extended

family to recover from the boys’ violent deaths” and “only indirectly

related to the offenses charged in this case, or to the victims of

those offenses.”

The portions of Benson’s statement at issue explained the role

that the earlier family tragedies played in the victims’ move to

Putnam County—where the murders occurred—less than two weeks

before the crimes. Wilson concedes that “the disputed testimony in

this case explained the extent of loss,” but claims that “it did not

tend to demonstrate the victims’ uniqueness as individuals,” and

that victim impact testimony must do both.

Section 921.141(8), Florida Statutes (2022), provides that

victim impact evidence “shall be designed to demonstrate the

victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being and the

resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s death.

Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and

the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a part of victim

impact evidence.” But the statute does not say that every word,

sentence, or paragraph of a victim impact statement must cover

both the victim’s uniqueness and the resultant loss to the

- 33 -

community. Benson’s statement, even the portions discussing the

earlier tragedies, did both demonstrate the victims’ uniqueness as

individuals and the loss to the community’s members as a result of

their deaths. Moreover, the testimony was not unnecessarily

emotional or inflammatory, did not mention Wilson or the facts of

the murders, did not ask for specific sentences or punishments,

and did not mention revenge or retribution. Thus, it cannot be said

that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to hear

the portions of Benson’s statement referencing the earlier tragedies

within the victims’ family.

D. Special Jury Instruction Regarding a Life Sentence

Wilson argues that the trial court erred in declining to give a

special jury instruction indicating that a life sentence virtually

precludes a defendant’s release from prison.

Before trial, Wilson filed a “Motion for Preliminary Jury

Instruction (‘Life’ Means ‘Life’).” In that motion, Wilson requested

that prospective jurors be instructed that if Wilson is found guilty of

first-degree murder, the two possible sentences are life in prison or

death and “that in the State of Florida a life sentence is in fact a life

sentence.” The motion was granted in part only to the extent that

- 34 -

the court agreed to read Florida Standard Jury Instruction 7.10

(Criminal) before voir dire. The trial court denied the motion as to

the language requested, noting that preliminary instruction 7.10

already informs the jury that a life sentence means life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole and that the

instruction is repeated sufficient times within the standard

instructions that the jury should be adequately instructed. 11 “A

trial court’s denial of special jury instructions is reviewed for abuse

of discretion.” Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 255 (Fla. 2012).

In addition to the numerous times that the phrase “life

without the possibility of parole” is mentioned in standard jury

instructions 7.10 and 7.11 (which was read after penalty phase

closing arguments), defense counsel advised the jurors no less than

five times during voir dire and the penalty phase opening statement

and closing argument that a life sentence in Florida means no

chance of release or parole and that a person under a life sentence

11. Florida Standard Jury Instruction 7.10 informs the jury

three times that the penalty for first-degree murder is either life in

prison without the possibility of parole or the death penalty.

- 35 -

will die in prison. The State also announced that fact to the jurors

during voir dire.

Wilson has not met his burden to demonstrate that the trial

court abused its discretion in giving the standard instructions. See

Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d 747, 755-56 (Fla. 2001). “[S]tandard

jury instructions are presumed correct and are preferred over

special instructions.” Id. at 755. “[T]he failure to give special jury

instructions does not constitute error where the instructions given

adequately address the applicable legal standards.” Loyd v. State,

379 So. 3d 1080, 1095 (Fla. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting

Stephens, 787 So. 2d at 755), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 188 (2024).

As the trial court noted, the standard instructions already

repeatedly informed the jury that a life sentence in Florida means

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. It would have

been redundant to also advise the jury that “a life sentence is in fact

a life sentence.” Wilson has not shown that he is entitled to relief

on this claim.

E. “Reasonable” Qualifier

At the time of Wilson’s trial, both the preliminary and final

standard jury instructions for capital penalty phases stated that “a

- 36 -

mitigating circumstance may include any aspect of the defendant’s

character, background, or life or any circumstance of the offense

that reasonably may indicate that the death penalty is not an

appropriate sentence in this case.” Fla. Std. Jury Instrs. (Crim.)

7.10, 7.11 (2022). Wilson filed a pretrial motion for a special jury

instruction requesting the removal of the word “reasonably” from

the instructions. Wilson asserted in his motion:

4. The “reasonably” qualifier may suggest to jurors

that they must reject any proffered mitigation which

appeals to emotion rather than reason. A majority of

jurors might well argue that a holdout’s concerns are not

reasonable, and that for the group to consider them

would violate the Court’s instructions.

5. Requiring proof of mitigation to meet a

“reasonableness” test presents a risk that deliberations

regarding relevant mitigating evidence will be curtailed.

Creation of that risk is both improper and unnecessary,

and appears to have been unintentional.

The trial court denied the motion after hearing from the parties, and

Wilson argues that the trial court erred in denying his request.

“A trial court’s denial of special jury instructions is reviewed

for abuse of discretion.” Bevel v. State, 376 So. 3d 587, 596-97

(Fla. 2023) (quoting Snelgrove, 107 So. 3d at 255), cert. denied, 144

S. Ct. 2570 (2024). Here, the jury was properly instructed in

- 37 -

accordance with then-current standard instructions 7.10 and 7.11.

The instructions were not confusing, contradictory, or misleading.

Nothing about the use of the word “reasonably” in the instructions

suggested that jurors must reject any proffered mitigation that

appeals to emotion. The instructions clearly stated that the jury

was entitled to consider any mitigating circumstances, which can

be “anything that supports a sentence of life imprisonment” or

“which might indicate that the death penalty is not appropriate.”

The jury was also instructed that “[t]he consideration of a mitigating

circumstance does not require unanimity by the jury.” Thus,

Wilson’s arguments about a holdout juror versus a majority and his

concern that the word “reasonably” might have led to deliberations

about relevant mitigating evidence being curtailed are unfounded.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reading standard

instructions 7.10 and 7.11 without removing the word “reasonably.”

F. Denial of a “Mercy” Instruction

Before trial, Wilson filed a “Motion for Special Penalty Phase

Jury Instruction re: Mercy.” Wilson argues that the denial of this

motion was erroneous, but this Court has repeatedly determined

that Florida Standard Jury Instruction 7.11 (Criminal) adequately

- 38 -

informs jurors of the applicable legal standard. E.g., Bevel, 376 So.

3d at 597; Woodbury v. State, 320 So. 3d 631, 656 (Fla. 2021);

Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 210 (Fla. 2020). We have even

referred to the relevant provision of Standard Instruction 7.11—

which states that “the law neither compels nor requires you to

determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death”—as the

“mercy instruction.” See Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 656 (quoting

Reynolds v. State, 251 So. 3d 811, 816 n.5 (Fla. 2018)). “Thus, the

court did read an instruction on mercy, and although [the

defendant] might have preferred the wording of his proposed

instruction, Standard Jury Instruction 7.11 is not ambiguous when

it comes to addressing the jurors’ options.” Id. Wilson is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

G. Failure to Allow Consideration of Sympathy

The trial court also denied Wilson’s pretrial motion asking (a)

that the State be precluded from arguing that sympathy is an

improper jury consideration and (b) that any statement that

sympathy for Wilson is an improper consideration be omitted from

the jury instructions. Wilson argued that “[a]ny argument by [the]

prosecution against sympathy for the defendant is an improper

- 39 -

consideration [that] would fail to comport with the principle

announced in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), i.e., that the

sentencer in a capital case may not be precluded from giving effect

to all mitigating circumstances.”

Wilson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

and that the instruction given to the jury that its “decision must not

be based upon the fact that you feel sorry for anyone or are angry at

anyone” violated the Eighth Amendment. The trial court and

Wilson both used the “sorry for” language in the standard

instruction interchangeably with “sympathy,” and Wilson confirms

in his reply brief that he was actually requesting to exclude the

“sorry for” language from the jury instructions rather than any

“sympathy” language.

The Supreme Court has already held in California v. Brown,

479 U.S. 538 (1987), that it does not offend the Eighth Amendment

to instruct a jury to reach a verdict based on the evidence rather

than emotion, which would include feeling “sorry for” an individual.

As Brown concludes, such an instruction “serves the useful

purpose of confining the jury’s imposition of the death sentence by

- 40 -

cautioning it against reliance on extraneous emotional factors.” Id.

at 543. Thus, Wilson is not entitled to relief.

H. Lawrence v. State

Wilson next argues that this Court wrongly decided Lawrence

v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 548-52 (Fla. 2020), in which we receded

from the judge-made requirement to review the comparative

proportionality of death sentences as contrary to the conformity

clause of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution. We have

repeatedly declined invitations to reconsider our decision in

Lawrence and have reaffirmed that comparative proportionality

review is not mandated by the Eighth Amendment. See Johnson v.

State, 397 So. 3d 626, 643 (Fla. 2024); Loyd, 379 So. 3d at 1097-

98; Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015; Gordon v. State, 350 So. 3d 25, 36

(Fla. 2022); Bevel, 376 So. 3d at 597. Wilson has not offered any

compelling reason to change course now. 12

12. Wilson also asks us to recede from our decision in Cruz v.

State, 372 So. 3d 1237, 1245 (Fla. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.

1016 (2024), in which we held that “[a]s an integrated part of

comparative proportionality review, relative culpability review was

rendered obsolete by the Lawrence decision.” That case is

completely inapposite here because Wilson did not have a

codefendant, so relative culpability review would not be a factor

here even if it were not obsolete.

- 41 -

I. Class of Persons Eligible for the Death Penalty

Wilson argues that Florida’s death penalty scheme fails to

narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty to comport

with the Eighth Amendment. As Wilson acknowledges, this Court

has repeatedly rejected the argument that Florida’s death penalty

scheme fails to sufficiently narrow the class of murderers eligible for

the death penalty and thus violates the Eighth Amendment. See

Joseph v. State, 336 So. 3d 218, 227 n.5 (Fla. 2022); Cruz v. State,

320 So. 3d 695, 730 (Fla. 2021); Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 15-16

(Fla. 2020); Bush, 295 So. 3d at 214; Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015;

Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 961 (Fla. 2007); Miller v. State,

926 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 2006). Wilson presents no new or

compelling argument that would require this Court to revisit its

prior decisions.

J. Death Qualifying the Jury

As Wilson acknowledges, the argument that death qualifying a

jury is unconstitutional was recently raised and rejected in Loyd,

379 So. 3d at 1095-96. See Initial Brief of Appellant at 96-100,

Loyd, 379 So. 2d 1080 (No. SC2022-0378). In Loyd, we wrote:

- 42 -

Loyd argues that death qualifying the jury skews it

towards guilt and violates the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. Loyd concedes that this

Court has rejected this claim before, yet raises it to

preserve it for federal review. We have indeed repeatedly

rejected this claim. See Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857,

873 (Fla. 2010); Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087,

1096 (Fla. 2004); San Martin v. State, 717 So. 2d 462,

467 (Fla. 1998); San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337,

1343 (Fla. 1997). So too has the United States Supreme

Court. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986)

(“[T]he Constitution does not prohibit the States from

‘death qualifying’ juries in capital cases.”). We again

deny this claim.

Loyd, 379 So. 3d at 1095-96 (alteration in original).

Nothing has changed since Loyd that would warrant

consideration of a different outcome here. Wilson is not entitled to

relief.

K. Unconscionability of the Death Penalty

Wilson also acknowledges that his arguments that the death

penalty is unconscionable were also recently raised and rejected in

Loyd, 379 So. 3d at 1096-97. See Initial Brief of Appellant at 101-

07, Loyd, 379 So. 2d 1080 (No. SC2022-0378). Concerning the

argument that the death penalty no longer comports with society’s

evolving standard of decency, we wrote in Loyd:

Loyd’s argument (1), that the death sentence is now

inconsistent with our society’s standard of decency, is

- 43 -

similarly unavailing. Again, Loyd relies on Justice

Breyer’s dissent in Glossip [v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863

(2015)]. The Court’s opinion in Glossip, however, upheld

the constitutionality of the death penalty. 576 U.S. at

867 (majority opinion); see also id. at 869 (recognizing

that it is settled law that capital punishment is

constitutional). Loyd argues that because other states

have outlawed capital punishment, it is now

unconstitutional. We addressed a similar argument in

Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 2019). Responding to

an argument that Florida’s three-drug method of

execution was unconstitutional because other states

have adopted a one-drug protocol, this Court concluded

that “Florida’s current protocol does not violate the

constitution simply because other states have altered

their methods of lethal injection.” Id. at 945 (quoting

Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 196-97 (Fla. 2013)).

In a similar vein, the death sentence is not

unconstitutional just because other states have chosen

to abolish it. At bottom, the Constitution itself

contemplates, in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,

that the government may take a life if the government

affords the person due process of law. Loyd falls well

short of the hurdle it takes to prove that something the

Constitution permits is at the same time

unconstitutional.

Loyd, 379 So. 3d at 1096-97.

As to the argument that the death penalty is unreliable, we

wrote:

We also can quickly dispose of argument (2). The

State correctly notes that exonerations undermine not

the sentence but the conviction. Responding directly to

Justice Breyer’s dissent in Glossip, Justice Scalia

characterized this argument as internally contradictory

and “gobbledy-gook.” Glossip, 576 U.S. at 895 (Scalia, J.,

- 44 -

concurring). We too find it hard to understand how

alleged issues in the guilt phase render a certain

punishment unconstitutional. The same logic would

make life imprisonment unconstitutional if enough

people serving life are exonerated. This argument has no

merit.

Id. at 1096.

As to the argument that the death penalty is arbitrary in its

application, we wrote:

Turning to argument (3), we are persuaded by

Justice Thomas’s Glossip concurrence, which adequately

explains why this argument is meritless. Justice Thomas

stated that relying on the studies that conclude that

locality plays too heavily a role in death sentencing “to

determine the constitutionality of the death penalty fails

to respect the values implicit in the Constitution’s

allocation of decisionmaking in this context.” Id. at 901

(Thomas, J. concurring). Indeed, the two provisions in

the Constitution memorializing that crimes are tried by a

local jury “ensure that capital defendants are given the

option to be sentenced by a jury of their peers who,

collectively, are better situated to make the moral

judgment between life and death than are the products of

[these studies].” Id. at 902-03. Additionally, “the results

of these studies are inherently unreliable because they

purport to control for egregiousness by quantifying moral

depravity in a process that is itself arbitrary” and

dehumanizing. Id. at 903. For these reasons, Loyd’s

argument (3) is unconvincing.

Id. (alteration in original).

As to the argument that unconscionably long delays

undermine the death penalty’s penological purpose, we wrote:

- 45 -

[W]e have recently rejected argument (4). In Dillbeck v.

State, 357 So. 3d 94, 103 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.

856 (2023), we emphasized our longstanding precedent

that these claims “are ‘facially invalid,’ including when

the defendant’s stay on death row exceeded 30 years.”

Loyd has not persuaded us here to change our position

on this argument.

Id.

Wilson has not directed us to anything that has occurred since

Loyd was decided that would make any of these arguments more

convincing now. Wilson is not entitled to relief on this claim.

L. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Although Wilson does not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain his convictions for the first-degree murders, this

Court independently reviews the record in death penalty cases to

determine whether competent, substantial evidence supports the

conviction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5) (“On direct appeal in death

penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence is an

issue presented for review, the court must review the issue and, if

necessary, remand for the appropriate relief.”). Our duty on appeal

is “to review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing

theory and to sustain that theory if it is supported by competent[,]

- 46 -

substantial evidence.” Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla.

1996).

Wilson confessed to killing the boys. He admitted entering

their home and beginning the attack while they were sleeping, using

his hammer to hit each of them multiple times, and cutting their

throats with his fillet knife. Wilson admitted being “cold and

emotionless” while he was committing the murders. The jury was

instructed on theories of both premeditated murder and felony

murder and returned a general verdict of guilty of first-degree

murder. A “general guilty verdict rendered by a jury instructed on

both first-degree murder alternatives may be upheld on appeal

where the evidence is sufficient to establish either felony murder or

premeditation.” Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 73 (Fla. 2004). The

evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain both convictions on

both theories.

To establish first-degree premeditated murder, the State was

required to prove the following elements: (1) the victim is dead; (2)

the death was caused by the criminal act of Wilson; and (3) there

was a premeditated killing of the victim. The medical examiner’s

testimony and Wilson’s confession were sufficient to sustain the

- 47 -

first two elements. As explained above, there was sufficient

evidence of the heightened premeditation necessary to support the

jury and judge’s finding that the CCP aggravator was proven beyond

a reasonable doubt; thus, there is competent, substantial evidence

of premeditation sufficient to sustain convictions for first-degree

premeditated murder.

To prove first-degree felony murder, the State was required to

prove the following three elements: (1) the victim is dead; (2) while

engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary,

Wilson caused the death of the victim; and (3) Wilson was the

person who actually killed the victim. To prove the crime of

burglary for purposes of felony murder, the State was required to

prove: (1) Wilson had permission or consent to enter a structure

owned by or in the possession of Chad and Sarah Baker; and (2)

Wilson, after entering the structure, remained therein with the

intent to commit or attempt to commit an aggravated assault or

aggravated battery or manslaughter or second-degree murder or

first-degree premeditated murder inside the structure. Sarah

Baker’s testimony that Wilson had permission to access the home

and Wilson’s admission that he accessed the home that morning

- 48 -

with a fillet knife and a hammer to kill the boys provide competent,

substantial evidence to sustain felony murder convictions.

III. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed each of Wilson’s claims, we affirm the

judgments of conviction and sentences, including the sentences of

death.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and

SASSO, JJ., concur.

LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION

AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

I fully concur in the decision to affirm Wilson’s convictions in

this case. I concur in result only to reaffirm my dissent in

Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (abandoning this

Court’s decades-long practice of comparative proportionality review

in the direct appeals of sentences of death).

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Putnam County,

Howard O. McGillin, Jr., Judge

Case No. 542020CF001021CFAXMX

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant

Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,

- 49 -

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Naomi

Nichols, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Appellee

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