SHEFFIELD v. BROWN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

ANDRE L. SHEFFIELD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:24-cv-281-TKW-MJF

MICHAEL BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Upon review of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the undersigned

recommends that the District Court dismiss this action for maliciousness

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for Plaintiff’s abuse of the judicial process

in failing to disclose completely and honestly his litigation history. The

undersigned makes this recommendation even though—because of the

statute of limitations—dismissal likely will preclude Plaintiff from

asserting his claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a prisoner—as defined by the Prison Litigation Reform

Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)—and

currently in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections.

On December 11, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this civil action. Doc.

1 at 1. On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff requested leave to amend his

complaint so that he could disclose his litigation history. Doc. 5. On

January 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed his proposed first amended complaint.

Doc. 8. The undersigned accepted Plaintiff’s first amended complaint for

filing, and it is now the operative complaint. Doc. 12. The only

substantive difference between the list of cases disclosed in the original

complaint and the list of cases disclosed in the first amended complaint

is the disclosure of three cases filed in the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit: Sheffield v. Brown, No. 23-10698; In re: Andre

Sheffield, No. 12-13882; and Sheffield v. Lamblin, No. 05-11243. Doc. 8-

1 at 5.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Under the PLRA, a federal court is required to screen a prisoner

complaint to determine whether the action is frivolous, is malicious, or

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1). Courts may “oblige prisoners to supply available information

concerning prior lawsuits that concern their incarceration.” In re Epps,

888 F.2d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 1989). “An action is malicious when a prisoner

misrepresents his prior litigation history on a complaint form requiring

disclosure of such history and signs the complaint under penalty of

perjury, as such a complaint is an abuse of the judicial process.” Burrell

v. Warden I, 857 F. App’x 624, 625 (11th Cir. 2021). This is true

“regardless of whether the Plaintiff’s response to the question was

knowing or intentional.” Ballard v. Broling, No. 22-12651, 2023 WL

6799147, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 16, 2023).

B. Plaintiff’s Disclosures

Section VIII of the complaint form utilized by Plaintiff seeks

information regarding Plaintiff’s prior litigation. Doc. 8 at 19; Cf. Doc. 1

at 18. Specifically, the complaint form asks three questions:

A. Have you had any case in federal court, including federal

appellate court, dismissed as frivolous, as malicious, for

failure to state a claim, or prior to service?

B. Have you filed other lawsuits or appeals in state or

federal court dealing with the same facts or issues involved

in this case?

C. Have you filed any other lawsuit, habeas corpus petition,

or appeal in state or federal court either challenging your

conviction or relating to the conditions of your confinement?

Doc. 8 at 20–21; Cf. Doc. 1 at 19–20. Additionally, the complaint form

instructs that if the plaintiff responded, “Yes” to any of these questions,

then plaintiff must disclose all responsive cases. Doc. 8 at 20–21; Cf. Doc.

1 at 19–20.

Plaintiff responded, “Yes” to Questions A, B, and C. Id. He attached

a list of cases responsive to these questions to his original complaint and

first amended complaint. Doc. 8-1; Cf. Doc. 1-1. In total, his first amended

complaint disclosed 113 federal cases and 15 state cases. Doc. 8-1.

At the end of the first amended complaint form, Plaintiff signed his

name after the following statement: “I declare, under penalty of perjury,

that all of the information stated above and included on or with this form,

including my litigation history, is true and correct.” Doc. 8 at 23–24.

C. Plaintiff’s Omissions

The undersigned takes judicial notice that when Plaintiff filed his

original complaint and first amended complaint, Plaintiff failed to

disclose the following appeals filed in the First District Court of Appeals

and the Supreme Court of Florida:

• Sheffield v. State of Florida, No. 1D2015-3337 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov.

12, 2015);

• Sheffield v. State of Florida, No. SC2000-0682 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Jul. 5,

2001) (challenging sentence under Prison Releasee Reoffender Act);

and

• Sheffield v. State of Florida, No. SC2000-0720 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Sep. 6,

2001) (rehearing denied Sept. 6, 2001).

These cases are attributable to Plaintiff because he admitted filing these

cases in other civil actions. Doc. 8-1 at 10. These cases were responsive

to Question C on the complaint form because they are state court appeals

challenging Plaintiff’s conviction.

Because he failed to disclose these cases in his original complaint

and his first amended complaint, Plaintiff violated his duty of candor to

the District Court. See Kendrick v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 21-12686,

2022 WL 2388425, at *3 (11th Cir. July 1, 2022) (noting that pro se

litigants “owe the same duty of candor to the court as imposed on any

other litigant”).

D. The Materiality of Plaintiff’s Omissions

Courts have recognized that information regarding a plaintiff’s

litigation history is useful to federal courts:

[I]t allows efficient consideration of whether the prisoner is

entitled to pursue the current action under the “three strikes”

provision of the [PLRA]; it allows consideration of whether the

action is related to, or otherwise should be considered in

conjunction with or by the same judge who presided over,

another action; it allows consideration of whether any ruling

in the other action affects the prisoner’s current case. All of

these things are appropriately considered in connection with

the preliminary review of such a complaint under the [PLRA].

Spires v. Taylor, No. 3:00-cv-249-RH, Order of Dismissal, Doc. 10 (N.D.

Fla. Oct. 27, 2000). Also, this “information may assist a court in

identifying suits that are repetitious of prior or pending lawsuits and

hence frivolous.” In re Epps, 888 F.2d at 969; see Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d

1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that, in assessing frivolousness,

courts may consider “a litigant’s history of bringing unmeritorious

litigation”). Additionally, because prisoner-plaintiffs generally proceed

pro se, the information helps the court determine their litigation

experience and familiarity with the legal terrain.

“Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional

obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their

ability to carry out Article III functions.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d

1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d

1254, 1261–62 (2d Cir. 1984). Courts also have “a responsibility to

prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial

machinery needed by others.” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. Requiring

prisoner-plaintiffs to divulge their record of litigation serves all of these

compelling interests. Thus, to conserve judicial resources and effectively

manage their dockets, courts may require prisoner-plaintiffs to disclose

their litigation history. See Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253,

1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that district courts have “unquestionable

authority to control their own dockets; this authority includes broad

discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases before them”).

The time spent verifying the cases a plaintiff has filed but failed to

identify can be considerable. This is especially true in this case where

Plaintiff is litigious and has filed a substantial number of cases in state

and federal courts. When courts cannot rely on the statements or

responses made by parties, the quality of justice is threatened. Courts,

therefore, cannot tolerate false or misleading responses in pleadings or

motions.

Here, Plaintiff falsely responded to questions on the complaint

forms as detailed above. He knew from reading the complaint forms that

he was required to disclose all prior federal cases and appeals. Doc. 8 at

21; Cf. Doc. 1 at 20. The complaint forms expressly warned Plaintiff that

the case could be dismissed for failing to disclose all cases. Doc. 8 at 19;

Cf. Doc. 1 at 18 (Be advised that failure to disclose all prior state

and federal cases—including but not limited to civil cases, habeas

cases, and appeals—may result in the dismissal of this case.”).

There is no excuse for Plaintiff’s failure to respond truthfully to the

questions on the complaint form. The questions were straightforward and

easily understandable. See Kendrick, 2022 WL 2388425, at *3 (noting

that the questions on the court-form are not complicated and a plaintiff’s

pro se status was not an excuse for failing to honestly answer the

straightforward questions).

Furthermore, “it is Plaintiff’s responsibility, not the Court’s, ‘to

maintain information (or at least a list of case numbers) for all of his prior

cases, and if he does not have that information, he can (and should)

request it from the appropriate clerks’ offices before filing a new case.’”

Washington v. Dyas, 5:22-CV-285-TKW-MJF, 2023 WL 359508, at *1

(N.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2023) (quoting Torres v. Geo Grp. Inc., 2021 WL 75764,

at *1 (N.D. Fla Jan. 8, 2021)). If Plaintiff did not have information about

all of his cases and appeals, he could (and should) have requested it from

the appropriate clerks’ office before filing a new case. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 11(b)(3) (By signing and presenting a pleading to the court, an

“unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,

information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the

circumstances . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary support.”

(emphasis added))

Assuming Plaintiff could not remember these appeals, or was

unsure whether to disclose them, Plaintiff could have indicated that on

the complaint form. He did not. Rather, he affirmatively and falsely

stated that he had only filed the fifteen state court cases identified in the

original complaint and first amended complaint.

A penalty is warranted both to deter Plaintiff from such conduct

and to deter others from similar misrepresentations and material

omissions. See Jones v. Warden of Statesville Corr. Ctr., 918 F. Supp.

1142, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“The knowing failure of a pro se litigant to

admit to the filing of prior related complaints in answer to the questions

on the civil rights complaint form is conduct subject to sanctions by the

court.”).

E. The Appropriate Sanction is Dismissal Without Prejudice

“[F]ailure to comply with court rules requiring disclosures about a

plaintiff’s previous litigation constitutes an abuse of the judicial process

warranting dismissal.” Sears v. Haas, 509 F. App’x 935, 936 (11th Cir.

2013). Federal courts cannot let false responses to go unpunished. See

Strickland v. United States, 739 F. App’x 587, 588 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A

sanction less than dismissal would signal that a failure to disclose filings

is an infraction without consequence. It would invite other prisoners to

omit their litigation history, thus draining the judicial system’s time and

resources.”). Dismissal without prejudice is an appropriate sanction for

Plaintiff’s abuse of the judicial process in not providing the District Court

with true statements or responses. See Wynn v. Postal Serv., 735 F. App’x

704, 705 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s case for

abuse of the judicial process after the plaintiff failed to disclose a prior

case; noting that the case fell “squarely within the complaint form’s

disclosure requirements”).

Here, the alleged incident giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim occurred

on April 21, 2021. Doc. 8 at 11. Therefore, Florida’s four-year statute of

limitations likely would preclude Plaintiff from refiling this action.

“[W]here a dismissal without prejudice has the effect of precluding the

plaintiff from re-filing his claim due to the running of the statute of

limitations, it is tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice.” Stephenson

v. Warden, Doe, 554 F. App’x 835, 837 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Justice v.

United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1482 (11th Cir. 1993)). Because dismissals

with prejudice are drastic remedies, they are not appropriate unless the

District Court finds both: (1) a clear record of delay or willful misconduct;

and (2) that lesser sanctions are inadequate to correct the conduct. Id.

(citing Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F. 3d. 478, 483 (11th Cir. 2006)). “Mere

negligence is insufficient to justify a finding of delay or willful

misconduct.” Id.

Plaintiff’s repeated failure to fully disclose his litigation history is

not mere negligence and constitutes clearly willful misconduct. Prior to

filing his complaint, Plaintiff filed three separate lawsuits in the

Northern District of Florida stemming from the same set of facts:

• Sheffield v. Warren, (Sheffield I), No. 4:22-cv-409-AW-MJF,

(dismissed for maliciousness because Plaintiff’s complaint disclosed

sixteen state court cases filed with the First District Court of

Appeal but only one federal lawsuit) (N.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2022);

• Sheffield v. Brown, (Sheffield II), No. 5:23-cv-192-TKW-MJF,

(dismissed because Plaintiff had incurred at least “three strikes”

under 1915(g)) (N.D. Fla, July 13, 2023); and

• Sheffield v. Brown, (Sheffield III) No. 5:23-cv-238-TKW-MJF,

(dismissed for maliciousness, in part, because Plaintiff failed to

disclose two state court cases filed with the First District Court of

Appeal) (N.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2023).

In each of these cases, Plaintiff disclosed his prior state court case,

Sheffield v. State of Florida, Case No. 1D2015-3337 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov.

12, 2015), (“Case No. 1D2015-3337”), which he failed to disclose in his

original or first amended complaints.

Upon the filing of every pro se case–including Plaintiff’s recent

filings in Sheffield I, Sheffield II, and Sheffield III–the clerk of the court

mails the litigant a memorandum instructing them to keep a copy of all

documents filed or received in the case. See Doc. 3. Litigants also are

mailed a copy of every order entered in the case, including those disposing

of the case. Plaintiff bears the responsibility to maintain a record of the

cases he has filed and the results of the litigation.

Plaintiff’s disclosures in Sheffield I, Sheffield II, and Sheffield III

demonstrate his direct knowledge of sixteen separate cases filed with the

First District Court of Appeal, including Case No. 1D2015-3337. Plaintiff

has been well-informed of his responsibility to maintain copies of all

documents filed in each case, as well as the requirement to disclose all

prior lawsuits, petitions, and appeals. Given that Plaintiff had disclosed

Case No. 1D2015-3337 in all three prior filings in the Northern District

of Florida arising from the same incident at issue in his current

complaint, his failure to disclose the case demonstrates an intentional

disregard for his responsibility to maintain a record of his cases and

disclose all prior lawsuits.

Plaintiff has also been advised to request his litigation history from

the appropriate clerks of court. See Sheffield III, ECF No. 12, (N.D. Fla.

Dec. 14, 2023). Nevertheless, Plaintiff neglected to request case

information from the Florida Supreme Court or the various circuit courts

that gave rise to his state court appeals. The District Court has cautioned

Plaintiff that the time spent verifying a plaintiff’s litigation history can

be considerable, particularly where the plaintiff is litigious. Id. Plaintiff

made no apparent effort to request his Florida Supreme Court or circuit

court filings–which would have required separate inquiries to each

circuit court. Rather, he ignored his obligation to request and disclose his

case information either to avoid the effort necessary to verify his cases,

or intentionally mislead the court.

Plaintiff’s conduct is especially egregious considering his pattern of

abusing the judicial process. Plaintiff has filed 104 separate cases in the

Middle District of Florida. On May 15, 2023, a district judge issued a

standing order noting that Plaintiff continuously fails to comply with

orders and refuses to provide all the information required by the

complaint form. See In re Andre L. Sheffield, No. 3:23-mc-16-TJC-JBT,

ECF No.1, Standing Order, (M.D. Fla May 15, 2023) (“[U]pon receipt of a

pro se filing by Mr. Sheffield, the Clerk’s Office shall place the filing on

the docket . . . . The District Judge will review the filing, and if the filing

is deemed procedurally deficient, or otherwise due to be dismissed, the

Judge will direct the Pro Se Litigation Specialist to enter this Standing

Order dismissing the case.”). Plaintiff has repeated this pattern in each

of the four cases he has filed in the Northern District of Florida. The

District Court dismissed both Sheffield I and Sheffield III for

maliciousness after Plaintiff failed to disclose completely and honestly

his litigation history. See Sheffield I, ECF No. 17, Order Adopting Report

and Recommendation, (N.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2023); Sheffield III, ECF No. 14,

Order, (N.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2023). Furthermore, the District Court

dismissed Sheffield II under the “three strikes statute” due to repetitive

and procedurally deficient filings. See Sheffield II, ECF No. 15, (N.D. Fla.

Aug. 22, 2023). The orders in each of these cases fully explained the

consequences of abusing the judicial process by filing deficient documents

with the District Court. Nevertheless, Plaintiff once again failed to fully

disclose his litigation history in his current complaint.

Plaintiff is a frequent filer in federal courts and has been explicitly

warned that courts “cannot tolerate false or misleading responses in

pleadings or motions.” Sheffield III, ECF No. 12, (N.D. Fla. Dec. 14,

2023). He has been fully informed of his responsibility to maintain case

information, his obligation to request case information from the courts,

the requirement to disclose all cases when filing a complaint, and the

consequences of failing to do so. Plaintiff’s failure to provide a full

litigation history after filing over 100 cases in the Middle District of

Florida and having three cases arising from the same incident filed in the

Northern District of Florida dismissed for maliciousness or having “three

strikes” constitutes more than mere negligence and reaches the level of

intentional misconduct.

Plaintiff also unnecessarily delayed filing his current complaint for

over one year. The incident giving rise to Sheffield I, Sheffield II,

Sheffield III, and this case allegedly occurred on April 21, 2021. Plaintiff

filed Sheffield I on November 15, 2022, and the case was dismissed by

the Eleventh Circuit on April 18, 2023. Plaintiff filed Sheffield II on July

13, 2023, which was dismissed under the “three strikes” statute on

August 22, 2023, and he filed Sheffield III on September 11, 2023. After

Sheffield III was dismissed on December 29, 2023, Plaintiff waited nearly

one year, until December 11, 2024, to file his complaint. Furthermore, he

did not file his first amended complaint disclosing additional cases

provided by the Eleventh Circuit until January 13, 2025, just three

months shy of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s delay in filing the

current action until just before the statute of limitations. Plaintiff could

have filed his complaint during the nearly 12-month gap between filings,

but inexplicably chose not to, indicating an intentional delay.

Plaintiff has shown both willful misconduct and a record of delay in

filing this action, which justify dismissal without prejudice despite

running of the statute of limitations. For the reasons discussed below,

lesser sanctions would be inadequate to correct Plaintiff’s misconduct.

F. No Lesser Sanction Would Suffice

A sanction less than dismissal would not suffice to deter Plaintiff’s

conduct. For example, providing Plaintiff a second opportunity to amend

his complaint to disclose the previous lawsuits would equate to

overlooking his mendacity and his abuse of the judicial process, because

that course of action would entail no penalty. See Young v. Sec’y for

Dep’t of Corr., 380 F. App’x 939, 940–41 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend the

complaint so that the plaintiff could disclose lawsuits that should have

been disclosed initially); Harris v. Warden, 498 F. App’x 962, 964–65

(11th Cir. 2012) (rejecting prisoner’s argument that it was an abuse of

discretion to dismiss case without allowing him “to correct” his omissions

by disclosing his litigation history; record showed that prisoner

“affirmatively misrepresented the facts” by failing to disclose prior cases

and that he “knew, or from reading the Complaint form should have

known, that disclosure of the relevant prior actions was required”).

Insofar as Plaintiff already is incarcerated, a mere admonition or a

finding of contempt would not deter Plaintiff or other prisoners from

making false representations to the court. Furthermore, neither the

standing order issued by the Middle District of Florida nor the District

Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s three civil actions filed in the Northern

District of Florida have deterred Plaintiff from once again failing to

disclose completely and honestly his litigation history. Dismissal would

serve as a warning to Plaintiff and others that future misrepresentations

to courts might result in more substantial sanctions. See Warren v.

Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In this case, the

substantial sanction, which is tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice,

is justified by Plaintiff’s repeated misrepresentations and willful

misconduct, the record of delay, and the need to deter Plaintiff’s

continued abuse of the judicial process.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS that the District Court:

1. DISMISS this case without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1), for maliciousness and abuse of the judicial process.

2. DIRECT the clerk of the court to close this case.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 22nd day of April, 2025.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The District Court referred this case to the

undersigned to address preliminary matters and to

make recommendations regarding dispositive matters.

See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed findings

and recommendations must be filed within fourteen

(14) days of the date of the report and recommendation.

Any different deadline that may appear on the

electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only

and does not control. An objecting party must serve a

copy of the objections on all other parties. A party who

fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and

recommendation waives the right to challenge on

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-

to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1;

28 U.S.C. § 636. The parties also are advised that if they

dispute the accuracy of any facts taken from judicially-

noticed documents, or if they otherwise wish to be

heard on the propriety of the court taking judicial

notice of those facts, they must raise this issue in an

objection to this report and recommendation.