The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
JERRY A. REYNOLDS )
and STEVEN LOUPE, )
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:25-cv-4019-SEM-DJQ
)
GREG DONATHAN, et al., )
Defendants. )
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs pro se Jerry Reynolds (also known as Cynthia
Reynolds) and Steven Loupe (also known as Samantha Loupe) filed
a Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is now before
the Court for screening.
I. Screening Standard
The Court must “screen” Plaintiffs’ Complaint and dismiss any
legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. In addition, this Court has an
independent duty to satisfy itself that federal subject matter
jurisdiction exists in any case. See Smith v. American General Life
and Accident Insurance Company, Inc., 337 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir.
2003).
In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as accurate, liberally construing them in the plaintiffs’
favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).
However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient.
Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418,
422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
II. Facts Alleged
Plaintiffs are residents at the Illinois Department of Human
Services’ Rushville Treatment and Detention Center (“Rushville”).
The Complaint identifies the following Defendants: Rushville staff
Greg Donathan, Erin Posey, and Cherryle Hinthorne, and Rushville
resident Jacob McGlasson.
Plaintiffs allege that they were legally married in December
2018, at Rushville in Schuyler County, Illinois. However, Plaintiffs
allege that fellow Rushville resident McGlasson filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in Schuyler County Circuit Court on their
behalf and without their consent. Plaintiffs allege that at least one
of them went before the Circuit Court to dispute the petition.1
However, a judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered in the
Circuit Court on July 6, 2021.
Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants Donathan, Posey, and
Hinthorne had some knowledge of McGlasson’s actions but did not
take any steps to investigate or to stop McGlasson. Defendants at
Rushville have not allowed Plaintiffs to share a room together.
Plaintiffs seek the following relief. First, Plaintiffs ask this
Court to open an investigation regarding the handwriting on the
Schuyler County petition for dissolution of marriage. Second,
Plaintiffs ask that this Court grant them the right to remarry and to
be housed in the same room at Rushville. Third, Plaintiffs ask this
Court to grant a writ for Plaintiffs to go to the Cook County
Courthouse to renew their marriage vows. Fourth, Plaintiffs want
1 This Court takes judicial notice of Schuyler County Circuit
Court case 2017-D-7, in which public records show that Reynolds
was the petitioner and Loupe was the respondent. According to the
public docket in that case, Reynolds appeared, by video, on at least
two occasions, including on the date that the judgment of
dissolution entered.
money damages for each day that they are not housed in the same
room. Finally, Plaintiffs ask for a restraining order against
Defendants, to prevent them from interfering with Plaintiffs’
marriage or property.
III. Analysis
First, the Court also takes judicial notice of Central District of
Illinois case 23-cv-4035, Loupe v. Donathan. In that case, filed on
March 2, 2023, the Court allowed Plaintiff Loupe2 to pursue a
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim based upon allegations
that Rushville had not allowed Loupe to live with Reynolds, even
though the two had been married for several years. At summary
judgment, the record established that the marriage between Loupe
2 The complaint filed in 2023 initially named both Loupe and
Reynolds as Plaintiffs. However, in screening that complaint, the
Court noted that it was “not entirely clear that both Plaintiffs ha[d]
signed the Complaint” and allowed only Loupe to proceed as
Plaintiff.
The Court observes that there are several purported
signatures by Reynolds in the instant Complaint and the
declarations/affidavits attached thereto. Although many of those
signatures are followed by Plaintiff Loupe’s initials, at least one
signature by Reynolds appears to have been notarized. For the time
being, the Court is satisfied that both Loupe and Reynolds have
signed the Complaint and may proceed as Plaintiffs in this matter.
and Reynolds had been dissolved on July 6, 2021. Therefore, the
Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant Donathan,
holding that Plaintiff Loupe’s Fourteenth Amendment rights had not
been violated by Rushville’s decision not to allow Loupe to reside
with Reynolds and that Plaintiff was not entitled to any injunctive
relief.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims in this case may be subject to
claim or issue preclusion.
Regardless, Plaintiffs’ suit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, which is a “limitation on the subject-matter jurisdiction of
lower federal courts.” Arnold v. KJD Real Estate, LLC, 752 F.3d
700, 704 (7th Cir. 2014).
Lower federal courts are not vested with appellate authority
over state courts. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought
by state court losers challenging state court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.
The rationale for the doctrine is that no matter how wrong a
state court judgment may be under federal law, only the
Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review
it.
Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2017), quoting
Sykes v. Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741–42 (7th Cir.
2016) (citations omitted).
This Court has no authority to grant Plaintiff’s request that
this Court interfere in the Schuyler County or Cook County Circuit
Courts by investigating the dissolution of marriage entered in
Schuyler County Circuit Court or by issuing a writ for Plaintiffs to
go to Cook County Circuit Court to have their marriage vows
“renewed.” To the extent that Plaintiffs are challenging the validity
of the judgment of dissolution of marriage, that should be taken up
in the Schuyler County Circuit Court (i.e., the state court that
entered that judgment).
Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiffs are seeking an order of
protection against any Defendants, that request is not properly
made in federal court. Typically, orders of protection are issued by
state Circuit Courts pursuant to Illinois state law. See 75 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 60/21 et seq.
In addition, fellow Rushville resident Jacob McGlasson is not
properly sued pursuant to § 1983. “Section 1983 only permits an
individual to sue a ‘person’ who deprives that individual of his or
her federally-guaranteed rights under color of state law.” Snyder v.
King, 745 F.3d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
McGlasson is a private citizen and civil detainee whom Plaintiffs
may not plausibly allege was acting under color of state law when
he allegedly fraudulently petitioned for the dissolution of Plaintiffs’
marriage.
Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiffs allegations that
Defendants Donathan, Posey, and Hinthorne should be held liable
for failing to stop McGlasson and for denying Plaintiffs requests to
room together. Complaints may be filed under § 1983 due to
officials’ failure to protect prisoners or detainees from a serious risk
to their health or safety. But the Court is not aware of any failure
to protect claims that are based upon a risk of allegedly fraudulent
legal filings, rather than risks to physical health or safety.
Moreover, the Court returns to the limitations placed upon its
jurisdiction by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiffs clearly
alleged that one or both of them appeared before the Schuyler
County Circuit Court to testify in the dissolution proceedings.
There is no basis for this Court to hold Defendant officials at
Rushville liable for refusing to house Plaintiffs together when they
were relying on a state court judgment that dissolved Plaintiffs’
marriage. To allow Plaintiffs to pursue a claim against Defendants
because they knew, or should have known, that another resident
had falsely filed the petition in state court would call into question
the underlying state court judgment of dissolution. See Edwards v.
Illinois Board of Admissions, 261 F.3d 723, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“In the Seventh Circuit, the test for whether a claim is ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with a state court judgment is whether the alleged
injury resulted from the judgment itself or is distinct from that
judgment. If the former, the federal court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, even if the state court judgment was erroneous or
unconstitutional.”).
“When the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, there is only one
proper disposition: dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction.”
Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 904. “A jurisdictional disposition is
conclusive on the jurisdictional question: the plaintiff cannot re-file
in federal court. But it is without prejudice on the merits, which
are open to review in state court to the extent the state’s law of
preclusion permits.” Id.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiffs’ Complaint [1] is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2) This matter is terminated, and all pending motions are
MOOT.
ENTERED May 21, 2025.
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
____________________________________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE