The opinion
Filed 5/21/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337098
(Super. Ct. No. LA043272)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
MYRON DIJON BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Myron Dijon Brown appeals from an order denying his
petition for dismissal pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.41.1
He contends the trial court erred by concluding that an
antecedent failure on probation precluded section 1203.41 relief.
The People concede the matter should be reversed. We accept the
confession of error and reverse.
Procedural Background
In 2003, appellant pleaded guilty to sale or transportation
of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
(a).) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed
appellant on probation for three years.
In 2005, appellant admitted violating probation. The trial
court revoked probation and sentenced appellant to state prison
for three years.
In 2023, appellant filed a petition for dismissal of his 2003
conviction pursuant to section 1203.41. The People opposed the
petition. The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition. It
noted appellant was “originally placed on probation and violated
probation and sent to state prison, so he didn’t successfully
complete his probationary term. If he was originally sentenced to
state prison, then he might have gotten an expungement.”
Appellant argued his conviction should be dismissed pursuant to
section 1203.41 because he was sentenced to prison. The trial
court responded, “But that wasn’t the original sentence.” It
denied the petition on this basis.
Discussion
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his
petition because he was not originally sentenced to state prison.
The People now agree.
Section 1203.41 originally only permitted defendants
sentenced to jail pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(A)-
(B) to petition for dismissal. Senate Bill No. 731 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) amended section 1203.41 to permit defendants sentenced
to state prison to petition for relief. (See § 1203.41, subd. (a)(2).)
This presents a question of statutory interpretation, which
we review de novo. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)
In interpreting a statute, our fundamental task is to determine
the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.
(Ibid.) We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a
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plain and common sense meaning. (Ibid.) If there is no
ambiguity, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and
the plain meaning of the language governs. (People v. Superior
Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 192.) If the statutory
language is ambiguous, we may consider other aids, including the
statute’s legislative history. (People v. Verduzco (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 1406, 1414.)
Section 1203.41 provides: “If a defendant is convicted of a
felony, the court, in its discretion and in the interest of justice,
may order” relief subject to certain conditions. (Id., subds. (a),
(b).) For example, when a defendant has been sentenced to
prison, two years must elapse since the completion of the
defendant’s sentence, the defendant cannot be on parole or
probation or charged with the commission of an offense, and the
defendant cannot be a person who is required to register as a sex
offender. (Id., subds. (a)(2),(a)(3), (a)(6).)
Here, the plain language of the statute applies “if the
defendant was sentenced to state prison.” (§ 1203.41, subd.
(a)(2).) Nothing in the language of the statute requires an
original prison sentence. And nothing in the language of the
statute disqualifies a person if he or she violates probation before
being sentenced to state prison.
Thus, we agree with the parties that the trial court
erroneously denied the petition. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand. Appellant is facially eligible for relief. We express no
opinion as to how the trial court should rule on remand.
Disposition
The order denying appellant’s petition is reversed. The
matter is remanded for the trial court to consider whether, in the
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exercise of its discretion, appellant should be granted relief
pursuant to section 1203.41.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
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John H. Reid, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
_____________________________
Neighborhood Legal Services and Samantha Cox, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.