The opinion
22-6309
Singh-Kar v. Bondi
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2024
No. 22-6309
RAJANBIR SINGH-KAR,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent. ∗
On Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
SUBMITTED: JANUARY 31, 2025
DECIDED: MAY 21, 2025
Before: CARNEY, PARK, and NARDINI, Circuit Judges.
∗
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the case caption as
indicated above.
Petitioner Rajanbir Singh-Kar, a citizen of India unlawfully
present in the United States, has applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. In
support of his application, Singh-Kar testified that members of a rival
political party attacked him twice and that when he tried to report his
attackers to the police, a police officer slapped him, threatened to jail
him, and threw him out of the police station. An immigration judge
denied Singh-Kar’s application, the Board of Immigration Appeals
affirmed, and Singh-Kar petitioned this Court for review. We
conclude (1) that Singh-Kar’s testimony regarding a single incident of
police misconduct is insufficient to show that the Indian government
is unable or unwilling to protect him, and (2) that general country
conditions evidence in the record does not compel a different result.
Substantial evidence therefore supports the agency’s conclusion that
Singh-Kar is not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal.
Moreover, because Singh-Kar failed to preserve his challenge to the
immigration judge’s denial of his claim for relief under the
Convention Against Torture, that claim is not properly before us.
Accordingly, Singh-Kar’s petition is DENIED.
Jaspreet Singh, Law Office of Jaspreet Singh,
Richmond Hill, NY, for Petitioner.
Robert Michael Stalzer, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation, Brian M.
Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Anna Juarez, Senior
Litigation Counsel, Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for
Respondent.
2
WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Rajanbir Singh-Kar, a citizen of India, has applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming that members of the Akali Dal
Badal Party (the “Badal Party”) attacked him twice due to his work
for the rival Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar party (the “Mann Party”).
Singh-Kar asserts that, when he attempted to report his attackers to
the police, a police officer slapped him, threatened to jail him, and
threw him out of the police station. After receiving testimony from
Singh-Kar, an immigration judge (the “IJ”) denied his application. As
pertinent here, the IJ rejected Singh-Kar’s requests for asylum and
withholding of removal, finding that he had failed to establish that
the government of India is unable or unwilling to protect him from
persecution at the hands of private persons. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed and dismissed Singh-Kar’s
appeal of the IJ’s decision. Singh-Kar now petitions this Court for
review. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
denial of Singh-Kar’s requests for asylum and withholding of
removal, that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his CAT claim, and that he
failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance by his attorney during
proceedings before the IJ. We therefore DENY Singh-Kar’s petition.
I. Background
Singh-Kar unlawfully entered the United States in January
2016. The Department of Homeland Security subsequently took him
into custody and initiated removal proceedings. Singh-Kar conceded
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his removability and filed an application for asylum under section 208
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1158,
withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3), and withholding of removal under CAT, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85 (1984). The application stated that Singh-Kar’s father is a member
of the Mann Party, and that Singh-Kar supports the party’s goal of
establishing a separate Sikh state, known as “Khalistan.” Singh-Kar’s
application further asserted that he was “physically harmed” by
members of the Badal Party due to his father’s political activities, and
that he was “detained and mistreated by the Indian police” when he
tried to report his attackers. Certified Admin. R. (“CAR”) 159–60.
Singh-Kar claimed that, if he returns to India, he is likely to be harmed
due to his political opinions.
On April 29, 2019, the IJ held a merits hearing regarding
Singh-Kar’s requests for relief. During the hearing, Singh-Kar
testified as to the following sequence of events.
On January 26, 2015, Singh-Kar was riding his bike home from
school when two people approached him and told him to stop
working for the Mann Party. When Singh-Kar refused to do so and
voiced support for the establishment of Khalistan, the people hit him
in the legs with a hockey stick, threw him to the ground, and told him
that they would kill him and his family if he did not join the Badal
Party. Later that afternoon, Singh-Kar and his father went to the
police station to report the incident. They waited more than two
hours, but no one would listen to them. Singh-Kar eventually tried to
speak to a police officer, but the officer directed a constable to tell
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Singh-Kar to leave, slapped him in the face twice, and threw him out
of the police station. When Singh-Kar’s father asked the officer why
he had slapped Singh-Kar, the officer responded that it was because
Singh-Kar’s family was “Khalistani people.” The officer stated that
Singh-Kar and his father would be jailed if they did not leave the
police station.
On June 30, 2015, when Singh-Kar was returning home from a
Sikh temple, three people approached him and discussed how he had
not stopped working for the Mann Party. The people then identified
themselves as members of the Badal Party and said that they should
kill Singh-Kar to teach his family a lesson for not listening to them.
They began beating Singh-Kar, but he was able to run away and hide.
After receiving Singh-Kar’s testimony, the IJ issued an oral
decision denying his application. The IJ first rejected Singh-Kar’s
requests for asylum and withholding of removal, finding that a single
incident of police misconduct was insufficient to establish that the
Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. In doing
so, the IJ noted that Singh-Kar’s application, which stated that the
police had detained him, was inconsistent with his testimony, which
made no mention of any such detention. The IJ also denied
Singh-Kar’s CAT claim, finding that he had not established a
likelihood that he would be tortured “at the hands of, with the
acquiescence of, or with the government of India turning a blind eye
to his torture.” Id. at 64.
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Singh-Kar appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. On June 2,
2022, the BIA dismissed the appeal, concluding that the IJ did not
clearly err in finding that Singh-Kar’s testimony regarding the
incident at the police station was insufficient to demonstrate that the
Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The BIA
rejected Singh-Kar’s argument that general country conditions
evidence in the record compelled a different result. The BIA also
rejected Singh-Kar’s attempt to proffer an additional country
conditions report for the first time on appeal, noting that Singh-Kar
had not shown that the report, which was published in 2015, was
previously unavailable. Finally, the BIA concluded that, because he
had not meaningfully challenged the IJ’s denial of his CAT claim,
Singh-Kar had waived that issue.
In the brief he submitted to the BIA, Singh-Kar made the
additional argument that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel in the proceedings before the IJ because his previous attorney
failed to submit certain country conditions evidence and a detailed
statement regarding his claims. The BIA rejected this claim,
concluding that Singh-Kar had not shown that he was prejudiced by
his prior counsel’s performance. The BIA reasoned that Singh-Kar
had neither identified specific facts that were missing from his
testimony nor shown that additional country conditions evidence
would have changed the IJ’s resolution of his claims.
On June 23, 2022, Singh-Kar timely filed a petition seeking our
review of the BIA’s decision. In his briefing in support of his petition,
Singh-Kar challenges the agency’s findings that he failed to establish
6
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, that he
was not prejudiced by the acts of his previous counsel, and that he
had not established a likelihood that he will be tortured if he returns
to India.
II. Discussion
Our jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision arises under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), which authorizes judicial review of final orders of
removal. When, as here, “the decision of the BIA is consistent with
the decision of the IJ, we may consider both decisions for the sake of
completeness.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, “[w]e review factual
findings for substantial evidence and questions of law and the
application of law to fact de novo.” Castellanos-Ventura v. Garland, 118
F.4th 250, 253 (2d Cir. 2024). Because “the administrative findings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), we
“must defer to the factfinder’s findings based on such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,” Singh, 11 F.4th at 113 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The scope of review under the substantial evidence standard is
exceedingly narrow, and we will uphold the BIA’s decision unless the
petitioner demonstrates that the record evidence was so compelling
that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find him eligible for relief.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
A. Asylum and Withholding of Removal
Singh-Kar’s requests for asylum and withholding of removal
both fail for the same reason: He has failed to establish past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution that is
directly or indirectly attributable to the Indian government.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision that
Singh-Kar is not entitled to either form of relief.
An applicant for asylum or withholding of removal “must
establish that he was persecuted or has a ‘well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.’” Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d
540, 543 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). “To qualify as
persecution the conduct at issue must be attributable to the
government, whether directly because engaged in by government
officials, or indirectly because engaged in by private persons whom
the government is unable or unwilling to control.” Scarlett v. Barr, 957
F.3d 316, 328 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
have described this standard as requiring an applicant seeking “to
demonstrate persecution based on private party violence” to “show
either that the government condoned the action or, even if it did not,
that it was completely helpless to protect the victims.” Id. at 332; see
Castellanos-Ventura, 118 F.4th at 254; Singh, 11 F.4th at 114–15. “[A]
close relationship between government officials and private persons
may be probative of the formers’ unwillingness or inability to control
the latter, but the relationship alone does not transform the private
persons into government actors.” Scarlett, 957 F.3d at 331.
8
At the outset, Singh-Kar has failed to establish past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution that is directly
attributable to the Indian government. Although he concedes that his
attackers were not government officials, Singh-Kar argues both that
they were “at a minimum, affiliated with the government” and that
they were “clearly acting on behalf of their party government
(agents).” Pet. Br. at 11–13. But “[a]n applicant’s allegation that he
was persecuted by members of a political party—even one that is in
power nationally or . . . is aligned with a party in power nationally—
does not establish that the applicant was persecuted by the
government.” Singh, 11 F.4th at 115 (footnote omitted). Rather,
because “[m]embers of a political party are not the government[,] for
mistreatment inflicted by party members to amount to persecution,
an applicant must show that the government was unwilling or unable
to control the attackers.” Id. So, despite the purported party
affiliation and political motivations of Singh-Kar’s attackers, their
conduct is not directly attributable to the Indian government. 1
Because Singh-Kar provides no basis to conclude that
government actors have persecuted him or will persecute him, he
must establish that the Indian government is unable or unwilling to
protect him from the persecution of private persons. In attempting to
1 Singh-Kar does not assert that the incident at the police station, standing alone,
constituted persecution; nor would such an argument succeed given the relatively mild
nature of the incident, see Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding
that the petitioner failed to establish past persecution when he had “suffered only minor
bruising from an altercation with family planning officials, which required no formal
medical attention and had no lasting physical effect”); Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454,
456–57 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that the petitioner had not established past persecution
even though he was “threatened by four policemen who came to his house”).
9
meet this burden, Singh-Kar points to the incident at the police station
and general country conditions evidence regarding human rights
issues in India. This evidence is insufficient to show that the
persecution Singh-Kar fears is indirectly attributable to the Indian
government.
First, both the IJ and the BIA considered Singh-Kar’s testimony
regarding the incident at the police station and appropriately
concluded that it was insufficient to meet Singh-Kar’s burden. CAR
3–4, 63–64. Testimony that the police failed to assist a petitioner on
one occasion, without more, does not establish an entire
government’s inability or unwillingness to protect him. See Singh, 11
F.4th at 115–16 (concluding that the petitioner had failed to show that
the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him,
despite his testimony that “the police failed to assist him in
connection with his report of a telephone threat”). 2 Singh-Kar’s
assertion that a police officer slapped and threatened to jail him—a
single instance of relatively mild mistreatment by one officer—does
not change this result. See Kambolli, 449 F.3d at 456–57 (concluding
that the petitioner had not established a well-founded fear of
persecution even though he was threatened by four policemen who
came to his house and “told him to abandon his quest for office or
leave Albania” or else “the police would ‘damage’ him or his family”).
2 See also Singh v. McHenry, No. 22-6289, 2025 WL 302797, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 27,
2025) (summary order) (“The agency reasonably determined that Singh’s one failed
attempt to file a police report was insufficient—in light of country conditions evidence—
for [the petitioner] to demonstrate that the Indian government was unwilling or unable to
protect him.”).
10
Accordingly, Singh-Kar’s evidence of this single incident of police
misconduct falls far short of establishing that the Indian government,
as a whole, is unable or unwilling to protect him from persecution by
private persons.
The general country conditions evidence Singh-Kar submitted
was likewise insufficient to meet his burden of proof. Singh-Kar relies
heavily on reports of the U.S. Department of State and the Refugee
Board of Canada. See CAR 51–57, 184–247. But “[g]eneral
country-conditions evidence does not on its own compel the
conclusion that an individual will be persecuted . . . .” Singh, 11 F.4th
at 116–17. And, in any event, the evidence Singh-Kar submitted does
not definitively establish that Sikhs or Mann Party members face
widespread persecution in India. See CAR 51–52 (noting that,
according to one source, “there is no evidence of widespread or
systematic mistreatment of Sikhs in Punjab during the 2013–2015
period”). Thus, Singh-Kar’s country conditions evidence does not
mandate a finding by a reasonable adjudicator that the Indian
government is unable or unwilling to protect him. 3
Finally, we reject Singh-Kar’s contention that the IJ failed to
create a record regarding his requests for asylum and withholding of
3 In arguing separately that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution,
Singh-Kar relies on a letter from S. Harvinder Singh, an office secretary in the Mann Party,
discussing the possibility that Singh-Kar will be persecuted upon his return to India. “We
generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s
documentary evidence,” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013), including its
decision to accord “little weight” to letters from interested parties who are unavailable for
cross-examination, Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020). Accordingly, we
decline to disturb the agency’s decision based on this letter.
11
removal. Singh-Kar claims that the IJ erred by finding that a single
incident of police misconduct was insufficient to meet his burden of
proof without asking him why he did not seek help from the police
after Badal Party members attacked him a second time. But, in
making this argument, Singh-Kar does not identify any facts he
would have added in response to such questioning; nor does he
explain how those facts would have led the agency to a different
conclusion regarding his application. Accordingly, his assertion that
the agency erred by deciding his case on an incomplete record is
unpersuasive.
B. Convention Against Torture
Because Singh-Kar failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to his CAT claim, that claim is not properly
before us. “A court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the
alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien
as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). As pertinent here, a petitioner must
“raise issues to the BIA in order to preserve them for judicial review.”
Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although Singh-Kar now argues that the
IJ failed to properly analyze his CAT claim, he did not raise that
argument in his appeal to the BIA. Indeed, in his briefing in support
of his petition, Singh-Kar does not contest the BIA’s finding that he
did not “meaningfully challenge” the IJ’s denial of his CAT claim.
CAR 5. Given Singh-Kar’s failure to preserve this issue, we consider
it no further.
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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, we reject Singh-Kar’s assertion that remand is
appropriate because he received ineffective assistance of counsel in
his proceedings before the IJ.
“To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, [a petitioner]
must show that counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness’ and that he was prejudiced as a result of
such deficient performance.” Paucar v. Garland, 84 F.4th 71, 80 (2d Cir.
2023) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)).
“To establish prejudice in this context, [the petitioner] must show
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable
probability the [agency] would have granted the relief [he]
requested.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Such a
probability is demonstrated where a movant makes a prima facie
showing that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, he would have been
eligible for relief, and could have made a strong showing in support
of his application.” Id. at 80–81 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks
omitted).
As the BIA correctly concluded, Singh-Kar has failed to show
that he was prejudiced by his previous counsel’s performance. In
support of his ineffective assistance claim, Singh-Kar argues that his
attorney failed to submit “articles or reports,” including a report from
the Refugee Board of Canada. Pet. Br. at 24–25. But, as discussed,
such general country conditions evidence is insufficient on its own to
“compel the conclusion that an individual will be persecuted.” Singh,
13
11 F.4th at 116–17. And even in conjunction with the rest of the
evidence in the record, including his own testimony, we cannot
conclude that these additional documents would have changed the
result of the proceeding. In short, Singh-Kar has not demonstrated a
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s purported failure to
submit this evidence, the agency would have granted his requests for
relief.
III. Conclusion
This case presents a fact pattern that our Court has repeatedly
considered. 4 In attempting to establish that India’s government is
See, for example, the following summary orders: Singh v. McHenry, No.
4
22-6289, 2025 WL 302797, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 2025) (“Singh testified that he was
a member of and a worker for the [Mann Party], and that he was attacked twice
by members of the [Badal Party]. First, in 2013, while Singh was door-to-door
fundraising for the Mann Party, four men stole the proceeds he had collected, beat
him with iron rods, and tied him to a tree. Second, in 2014, on his way home from
temple, three men brandished a gun and threatened his life in an attempt to recruit
him to the Badal Party. The day after the first attack, Singh tried to file a police
report, but an officer ‘pushed him out’ and refused to assist because the Badal
party was ‘their government.’” (alteration adopted)); Singh v. Garland, No. 22-6457,
2024 WL 1478576, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2024) (“In the application, Singh wrote that
three people on a bike came up to [him] and attacked [him] with hockey sticks and
rods.” (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Singh v. Garland,
No. 21-6651, 2024 WL 1193063, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2024) (describing how the
applicant wrote “that members of opposing parties threatened him to discourage
him from supporting the [Mann Party] and then attacked him twice,” including
once with hockey sticks, and that “he went to the police with his grandfather and
a friend to lodge a complaint”); Singh v. Bondi, No. 22-6576, 2025 WL 863103, at *1–
2 (2d Cir. Mar. 19, 2025) (similar); Singh v. Garland, No. 22-6084, 2024 WL 4356334,
at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 1, 2024) (similar); Singh-Bassi v. Garland, 857 F. App’x 25, 26–27
(2d Cir. 2021) (similar); Singh v. Barr, 795 F. App’x 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2019) (similar).
14
unable or unwilling to protect him from private persecution, Singh-
Kar relies on general country conditions evidence and a single, minor
incident of police misconduct. We hold that the agency acted well
within its discretion in finding that this evidence was insufficient to
establish Singh-Kar’s entitlement to asylum or withholding of
removal. We further hold that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his
challenge to the IJ’s denial of his CAT claim, and that he failed to
demonstrate ineffective assistance by his attorney during proceedings
before the IJ. We therefore DENY Singh-Kar’s petition.
15