The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD K. ISENBERG, JR., No. 4:24-CV-01662
Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)
v.
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF
PAROLE, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MAY 20, 2025
Petitioner Ronald K. Isenberg, Jr., initiated this action by filing a pro se
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his
September 2024 denial of parole, claiming that the Pennsylvania Parole Board’s
decision violated his constitutional rights. For the following reasons, the Court
will deny Isenberg’s Section 2254 petition.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Isenberg is currently serving an 18- to 40-year sentence after pleading guilty
to criminal homicide, which sentence was entered in March 2000 by the Court of
Common Pleas of Blair County, Pennsylvania.1 His controlling minimum and
maximum incarceration dates are April 11, 2015, and April 11, 2037, respectively.2
1 See Doc. 10-2 at 5-7; Commonwealth v. Isenberg, No. CP-07-CR-0000690-1997 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. Blair Cnty.).
Isenberg was most recently denied parole on September 16, 2024, and this appears
to be the parole decision he is collaterally attacking.3
In its September 2024 denial, the Parole Board provided the following
reasons for its decision:
[Isenberg’s] failure to demonstrate motivation for success.
[Isenberg’s] minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the
offense(s) committed.
[Isenberg’s] refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed.
[Isenberg’s] lack of remorse for the offense(s) committed.
The negative recommendation made by the prosecuting attorney.
The nature of [Isenberg’s] crime.4
The Parole Board further noted that Isenberg would next be reviewed for parole “in
or after” September 2029.5
Isenberg filed the instant Section 2254 petition almost immediately after
receiving his parole denial.6 Respondent was served with Isenberg’s petition and
timely filed a response after one extension request.7 Isenberg did not file a traverse
and the time in which to do so has passed. His Section 2254 petition is therefore
ripe for disposition.
3 See Doc. 1-1.
4 Id. at 1.
5 Id.
6 See generally Doc. 1 (dated September 19, 2024).
7 See Doc. 10.
II. DISCUSSION
Isenberg’s form petition contends that the Parole Board’s September 2024
parole denial violated his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 He appears to argue that the reasoning provided by the Parole Board
is contradicted by his accomplishments toward rehabilitation during his
incarceration, and therefore the Parole Board’s denial was “arbitrary, egregious, or
consci[ence-]shocking.”9 The Court disagrees.10
The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause “contains a substantive
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”11 With respect to parole
determinations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held
that a parole board’s decision can violate an inmate’s substantive due process
rights if it applies “standards that are divorced from the policy and purpose of
parole” or other “impermissible criteria.”12 Specifically, the specter of a
8 Doc. 1 at 1.
9 See id.
10 Respondent contends that Isenberg failed to exhaust administrative remedies, so his petition
should be dismissed. The Court, however, may forgo an exhaustion analysis and deny a habeas
petition that fails on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of
habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to
exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”).
11 Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.
113, 125 (1990)).
12 See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Burkett v. Love,
89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In Block, the . . . panel majority concluded that in [using
arbitrary criteria for denying parole], the [Parole Board] violated substantive due process in
substantive due process violation is raised only when “a parole board considers a
factor that ‘shocks the conscience.’”13 If, however, there is “some basis” for the
parole board’s decision, and that basis is not “constitutionally impermissible” or
conscience-shocking, a substantive due process challenge will fail.14
Isenberg’s substantive due process claim is meritless. As recited above, the
Parole Board’s decision included numerous, constitutionally permissible reasons
for its denial of parole. None of its reasons are conscience-shocking or arbitrary.
The Court does not discount Isenberg’s claims that he has made significant
progress toward rehabilitation during his incarceration.15 Such efforts are
commendable. But his disagreement with the Parole Board’s decision does not
establish a right to habeas corpus relief. “[F]ederal courts, on habeas review, are
not to ‘second-guess parole boards,’ and the requirements of substantive due
process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.”16 The Parole
Board clearly provided “some basis” for its denial, and Isenberg’s dispute with its
findings does not provide this Court with a basis to “second-guess” that decision.
grounding its action on constitutionally impermissible reasons.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
13 Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Newman, 617 F.3d at 782).
14 See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001).
15 See Doc. 1-2.
16 Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Isenberg’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court likewise declines to issue a
certificate of appealability, as Isenberg has failed to make a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right,17 or that “jurists of reason would find it
debatable” whether this Court’s procedural rulings are correct.18 An appropriate
Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
17 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
18 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).