Keglovitz v. Illinois Department Of Children And Family Services

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ZARA KEGLOVITZ,

Plaintiff

No. 25 CV 546

v.

Judge Jeremy C. Daniel

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF

CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

et al.,

Defendants

ORDER

The plaintiff’s motion to remand [20] is denied. The defendants’ motion to dismiss

[14] is granted as to defendants Stanley Hamilton, Tracy Marshall, and the Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services and denied as to defendant Tonajah

Hooks. Hooks must answer the complaint on or before June 11, 2025. The May 21,

2025, status hearing is stricken.

STATEMENT

The plaintiff, Dr. Zara Keglovitz, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the

Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, against defendants Tonajah Hooks, Stanley

Hamilton, Tracy Marshall, and the Illinois Department of Children and Family

Services (“DCFS”). (R. 1-1.)1 She alleges the defendants denied services to, and then

removed children from, her foster home because she was transgender, violating the

First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 41–52.) The plaintiff fostered a child,

“Duke,”2 who was “designated as special needs.” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 15.) The plaintiff alleges

that Hooks, the DFCS case manager for Duke, failed to schedule or attend required

visits to her home and failed to act on her requests for specialized care for Duke. (Id.

¶¶ 8, 16–18, 31–35.) The plaintiff also pleads that Hooks misgendered her and

responded to a correction with “whatever you are.” (Id. ¶¶ 21–26). Ultimately, she

alleges that the foster children in her care, including Duke, were removed because

Hooks “did not want to interact with a transgender person,” not because she “failed

to perform her obligations as a foster parent.” (Id. ¶¶ 35–38.) The plaintiff brings a

1 For ECF filings, the Court cites to the page number(s) set forth in the document’s ECF

header unless citing to a particular paragraph or other page designation is more

appropriate.

2 A nickname the parties have use for the child. (R. 16 at 4 n.1.)

First Amendment retaliation claim and a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection

claim under § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 41–52.)3

The defendants removed the case to federal court, (R. 1), and then moved to dismiss

for (1) lack of jurisdiction over DCFS and (2) failure to state a claim against the

individual defendants, (R. 16 at 6). The plaintiff responded by moving to remand to

state court, arguing that the removal was improper if this Court lacks jurisdiction

over DFCS. (R. 20.) She also seeks fees incurred in opposing the removal. (Id.)

The Court starts with whether the removal was proper, and concludes it was. “Any

civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United States

have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants[.]” 28

U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

1331. The plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for deprivation of her rights secured by the First

and Fourteenth Amendments arise under both the Constitution and laws of the

United States, and are removable.

As to the defendants’ arguments, they first argue that DCFS, a state agency, cannot

be sued under § 1983, because § 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity. (R. 16 at 6.) This is correct. Ryan v. Ill. Dep’t of Child. & Fam.

Servs., 185 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 1999) (“DCFS . . . as an agency of the State of

Illinois [is] entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”).

The plaintiff counters that, if her suit against DCFS cannot go forward in federal

court because the Court lacks jurisdiction, then the whole matter should be remanded

to state court, because removal is improper if it destroys jurisdiction. (R. 20 at 2.)

However, this case, containing only federal claims, is different from cases which

involve state law claims. See e.g., McHugh v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 55 F.4th 529, 534

(7th Cir. 2022) (remanding state law claims on the basis of sovereign immunity).

Here, removal did not destroy jurisdiction; the Eleventh Amendment did. DCFS

cannot be sued under § 1983 in federal or state court, because the Eleventh

Amendment prohibits either court from exercising jurisdiction over DCFS based on §

1983. Ryan, 185 F.3d at 758. But, this Court has original jurisdiction over the § 1983

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dismissing an immune defendant does not change the

Court’s jurisdiction over federal claims. In essence, what the plaintiff is asking this

Court to do is relinquish jurisdiction over federal statutory claims because she names

3 The plaintiff identifies three counts in her complaint: a § 1983 claim with no specific

alleged constitutional violation (Count I), a First Amendment retaliation claim (Count II),

and a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim (Count III). (R. 1-1 ¶¶ 41–52.) In the

briefing, the parties treat these as two § 1983 claims for First Amendment retaliation and

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. (See R. 16 at 6–11; R. 27 at 10.) The Court agrees

this is the proper interpretation of the claims at issue.

an immune defendant. The Court will not do so. DCFS is dismissed from this case,

and the plaintiff’s motion to remand is denied.

The defendants also seek dismissal of the individual defendants under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the allegations. McReynolds v. Merrill

Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012). To overcome a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and raises the right

to relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint

as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. In re Abbott Labs.

Derivative S’holder Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir. 2003).

Both sides agree that the plaintiff’s equal protection claim receives intermediate

scrutiny. (R. 27 at 11 (“the intermediate scrutiny referenced by [the d]efendants. . . is

indeed the operative test”).) Therefore, the plaintiff must show she was discriminated

against based on membership in a definable class. Word v. City of Chicago, 946 F.3d

391, 396 (7th Cir. 2020). The defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to make this

showing because she complains only of being misgendered and that the defendants

“delayed in arranging parental visits in violation of administrative rules.” (R. 16 at

10–11.) But this is not a fair summary of her allegations. The plaintiff pled sufficient

facts for the court to draw the reasonable inference in her favor that Hooks had foster

children removed from the plaintiff’s care not because the plaintiff was an inadequate

foster parent, but because of Hooks’ animosity towards transgender individuals. (R.

1–1 ¶ 36.) This suffices for her equal protection claim against Hooks. For much the

same reasons, the plaintiff states a viable claim under the First Amendment against

Hooks—it is plausible to infer from the alleged facts that Hooks removed the foster

children from the plaintiff’s care in retaliation for how the plaintiff presented herself

to the world.

The defendant also argues that the removal of foster children was justified, (R. 16 at

4–5), but the Court cannot accept defendants’ assertions on a motion to dismiss.

Instead, it must accept the plaintiff’s well pleaded allegations as true. See In re Abbott

Labs. Derivative S’holder Litig., 325 F.3d at 803. Here, the plaintiff alleges that the

removal was unjustified, and only done because of Hooks’ animosity towards

transgender individuals. (R. 1–1 ¶ 36.)

However, there are no properly alleged claims against defendants Hamilton and

Marshall. The plaintiff alleges that she reported Hooks’ conduct to them, but neither

took any action to correct or prevent Hooks’ discrimination. (R. 1-1 ¶¶ 29, 30, 39.)

This does not suffice for a §1983 claim, as there is no supervisor liability under the

statute. Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). The defendants’

motion to dismiss is granted as to Hamilton and Marshall.

Last, the defendants argue that this case should be dismissed on qualified immunity

grounds. (R. 16 at 12.) Qualified immunity exists to protect public officials from suit

unless they violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right. Doxtator v.

O'Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 863 (7th Cir. 2022). “If the law at that time did not clearly

establish that the [official's] conduct would violate the Constitution, the [official]

should not be subject to liability or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.” Brosseau

v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). To determine whether a right was clearly

established, the Court first looks to “controlling Supreme Court precedent and

[Seventh Circuit] decisions on the issue.” Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir.

2017). In the absence of a clear answer, the Court considers whether the alleged

conduct was so egregious that no reasonable official could be unaware they were

acting unlawfully. Jd. Taking the facts as alleged in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, this case fits into that latter category. The allegations here are that Hooks’

animosity towards transgender individuals, including the plaintiff, motivated the

removal of foster children from the plaintiff's home. (R. 1-1 { 36.) If true, this would

be egregious discrimination that no one could fairly consider lawful. Therefore, the

Court will not dismiss this case on qualified immunity grounds at the motion to

dismiss stage.

Date: May 20, 2025

JEREMY C. DANIEL

United States District Judge