Opinion

Brown v. Franks

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
May 20, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.5%

“[S]peculation and conjecture may not defeat a motion for summary judgment[.]” (alterations in original) (quoting Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 (3d Cir. 2009))

How later courts described this case

  • “[S]peculation and conjecture may not defeat a motion for summary judgment[.]” (alterations in original) (quoting Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 (3d Cir. 2009))

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TODD ALAN BROWN, No. 4:22-CV-01156

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

CORPORAL FRANKS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MAY 20, 2025

Plaintiff Todd Alan Brown is currently confined at the State Correctional

Institution in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. He filed the instant pro se Section 19831

action, alleging that he was subjected to excessive force during his arrest for the

convictions for which he is currently imprisoned. Brown’s remaining Fourth

Amendment excessive force claim targets two defendants: Corporal Justin Franks

and Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Yaworski. Both Defendants move for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the

following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

On the afternoon of December 21, 2021, Corporal Bledsoe of the Mount

Union Township Police Department encountered Brown at a Sheetz convenience

store on West Water Street.3 Bledsoe was aware that there was an outstanding,

active arrest warrant for Brown.4 Bledsoe informed Brown about the outstanding

warrant and attempted to take Brown into custody in a peaceful manner, grabbing

his arm and pleading, “Please Todd, don’t resist . . . don’t pull away from me.”5

Brown—who admits that he was under the influence of several controlled

substances at the time—twisted out of his jacket and attempted to flee on foot.6 At

his deposition, Brown attested that he had consumed heroin and a large amount of

2 Local Rule of Court 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported “by a

separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to

which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT

56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of

material facts responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement

and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. “Statements of material facts in support of, or

in opposition to, a motion [for summary judgment] shall include references to the parts of the

record that support the statements.” Id. Defendants filed properly supported statements of

material facts. See Docs. 102, 108. Brown eventually responded to these statements. See

Docs. 119, 127. Brown’s responses, however, are not supported by citations to the record and

instead contain nothing more than argument or allegations. See id. This directly contravenes

Local Rule 56.1. See Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018)

(explaining that Local Rule 56.1 “is essential to the Court’s resolution of a summary judgment

motion due to its role in organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and

demonstrating precisely how each side proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible

evidence.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Defendants’

material facts, therefore, are deemed admitted unless plainly contradicted by the record. See

LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.

3 Doc. 102 ¶¶ 6, 7, 10.

4 Id. ¶¶ 8-9.

5 Id. ¶¶ 12-13.

6 Id. ¶¶ 14, 40, 42.

methamphetamine just prior to being dropped off at the convenience store.7

Bledsoe pursued Brown on foot and deployed his taser, striking Brown in the back

and causing him to fall to the ground.8 A physical altercation between Bledsoe and

Brown then ensued, which lasted for more than half a minute.9 During this

altercation, Brown succeeded in breaking free of Bledsoe’s grasp, getting on top of

Bledsoe, and disarming him by wresting away the taser and throwing it to the

ground.10 Brown then fled on foot, running in an eastbound direction.11

Bledsoe radioed for assistance and law enforcement officers from the

Pennsylvania State Police, Huntingdon Borough Police Department, and

Huntingdon County Sheriff’s Office responded.12 Bledsoe, who was familiar with

Brown from a prior incident, informed the other officers that he believed Brown

may have fled to a nearby residence on East Water Street where Brown had

previously overdosed.13

When the officers arrived at the East Water Street residence, Corporal

Franks knocked on the door.14 Dennis Dixon opened the door and, upon

questioning, confirmed that Brown was inside the residence.15 Bledsoe also heard

7 Id. ¶¶ 40, 42-45.

8 Id. ¶ 15.

9 Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.

10 Id. ¶¶ 19-21.

11 Id. ¶ 22.

12 Id. ¶¶ 25-26.

13 Id. ¶ 28.

14 Id. ¶¶ 29, 30.

15 Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.

movement on the second floor.16 Bledsoe gave loud verbal commands for Brown

to come out with his hands raised, but there was no response from Brown.17

Before officers entered the residence, Bledsoe informed Franks that there may be a

rifle upstairs based upon his earlier observations when responding to Brown’s prior

overdose.18 The officers decided to wait for a ballistic shield before entering the

residence, and one was eventually obtained.19

The officers then entered the residence, searching for Brown.20 After

clearing the first and second floors, they discovered Brown hiding in the unfinished

attic.21 Brown was lying on his back between the rafters, partially hidden beneath

the floorboards, with the top portion of his body covered by insulation.22 The

officers gave loud verbal commands for Brown to get up and lie down on his

stomach, but Brown did not respond.23 Corporal Franks and Trooper Yaworski

then approached Brown and went “hands on,” which is when Brown “woke up”

from his overdose.24 Brown once again began struggling and resisting arrest,

16 Id. ¶ 32.

17 Id. ¶¶ 35-36.

18 Id. ¶ 37.

19 Id. ¶¶ 38-39.

20 Id. ¶¶ 60, 62.

21 Id. ¶¶ 51-53, 56, 62.

22 Id. ¶¶ 53, 63.

23 Id. ¶ 65.

24 Id. ¶ 66. Brown attested that, while he was fleeing on foot to the East Water Street residence,

he was holding a baggie of heroin laced with fentanyl that absorbed through his skin and caused

him to overdose. Id. ¶¶ 48-49, 54-57.

refusing to put his hands behind his back.25 The officers then employed several

“compliance strikes” to Brown’s back and shoulders in an attempt to get control of

his hands and place him into handcuffs.26 After Brown was finally handcuffed, he

refused to stand up on his own, so the officers were forced to carry him across the

attic, down the stairs, and out of the residence.27

Brown was then transported by ambulance to Geisinger Lewistown

Hospital.28 Brown was given Narcan in the ambulance to counteract the

overdose.29 He was given a second dose of Narcan at the hospital.30

Brown eventually pled guilty to resisting arrest, disarming a police officer,

and escape with respect to the incident that occurred with Corporal Bledsoe at the

convenience store.31 He pled no contest to two counts of resisting arrest with

respect to his arrest in the attic by Corporal Franks and Trooper Yaworski.32

In July 2022, Brown filed the instant lawsuit.33 His remaining Section 1983

claim against Corporal Franks and Trooper Yaworski alleges excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment regarding the arrest in the attic. Franks and

25 Id. ¶ 67.

26 Id. ¶¶ 68-69.

27 Id. ¶¶ 69-70.

28 Id. ¶ 71.

29 Id. ¶ 73.

30 Id. ¶ 79.

31 Id. ¶¶ 1-2.

32 Id. ¶¶ 3, 83-84.

33 See generally Doc. 1.

Yaworski now move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56.34 Their motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”35 Summary judgment is

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”36 Material

facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are

‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the

position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”37

At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.”38 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented

“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”39 This evidence, however, must be

adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving

34 Docs. 101, 107.

35 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

36 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

37 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).

38 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

39 Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).

party on the claim or claims at issue.40 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the

nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”41 Succinctly stated, summary

judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.42

III. DISCUSSION

Brown alleges that Franks and Yaworski used excessive force during his

arrest in the attic on December 21, 2021. Upon thorough examination of the Rule

56 record, the Court disagrees.

“The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from objectively unreasonable

uses of force in the context of arrests, investigatory stops, or any other seizure.”43

To establish a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show that

a seizure occurred and that it was “unreasonable under the circumstances.”44

Determining if the force used during a particular seizure was reasonable is an

objective determination that requires “a careful balancing of the nature and quality

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

40 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986).

41 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. at 252) (alteration in original).

42 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp.

v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)).

43 Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Graham v. Conner,

490 U.S. 386, 395-97 (1989)).

44 El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 2020).

countervailing governmental interests at stake.”45 After all, effecting a seizure

(like an arrest or investigatory stop) “necessarily carries with it the right to use

some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”46

Courts must consider the following factors when assessing the objective

reasonableness of force employed: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue”; (2)

“whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others”; and (3) whether the suspect was “actively resisting or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.”47 Other relevant factors include “the physical injury to the

plaintiff, the possibility that the persons subject to the police action are violent or

dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the context

of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the

number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.”48

Reasonableness of the force applied is a totality of the circumstances analysis

based on the facts available to the officer at the time of the incident.49

After careful consideration of the record, the Court finds that nearly every

relevant factor militates in favor of an objectively reasonable use of force by

45 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); El, 975 F.3d at 336.

46 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. (citation omitted).

47 Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

48 El, 975 F.3d at 336 (citation omitted).

49 See Curley, 499 F.3d at 207.

Defendants, and therefore no jury could find in Brown’s favor. The Court will

examine each factor in turn.

The first factor is the severity of the crime. At the time of Brown’s arrest in

the attic, he had potentially committed a host of serious criminal offenses,

including resisting arrest, disarming a police officer, and escape (not to mention

the prior offense for which he had an active arrest warrant).50 Brown, in fact, later

pled guilty to these crimes.51 The severity of the offenses weighs against Brown’s

contention of unreasonable force.

As to the second factor, it is obvious that Brown presented a significant

safety threat to the officers and that the officers were cognizant of this threat. Just

a short time earlier, Brown had easily recovered from being tased (likely because

he was intoxicated on a large amount of methamphetamine), overpowered a police

officer in a physical fight, disarmed that police officer, and then fled on foot.

The third factor also plainly cuts in favor of objectively reasonable force.

Brown was both “actively resisting” arrest and “attempting to evade arrest by

flight” when he was arrested by Franks and Yaworski. Brown had fled from

Corporal Bledsoe and was hiding in the attic, attempting to evade arrest. And,

according to Corporal Bledsoe’s report, Franks and Yaworski struggled to take

50 See Doc. 102-1 (Commonwealth v. Brown, No. CP-31-CR-0000619-2021 (Ct. Com. Pl.

Huntingdon Cnty.)).

51 See id.

Brown into custody and to place him in handcuffs, as he resisted arrest by refusing

to put his hands behind his back or stand up on his own.52

Brown suffered only minor injuries from the arrest in the attic. At the

hospital, he was diagnosed with an auricular hematoma (a collection of blood

underneath the skin of the ear), prior bleeding from his mouth and nose, a facial

contusion, and an opioid overdose.53 He was treated only in the emergency room

and was not admitted to the hospital. The minor nature of Brown’s injuries implies

that the force applied was not excessive.54

The fifth factor likewise cuts in favor of objectively reasonable force. It was

more than just a possibility that Brown could be violent or dangerous—he had just

recently shrugged off being tased, overpowered Corporal Bledsoe in a physical

52 See Doc. 102-3 at 4. Brown pled no contest to the charges of resisting arrest stemming from

the attic incident, explaining that he was “overdosing” and “going in and out” of consciousness,

so he did not remember whether he resisted arrest in the attic. See Doc. 102 ¶¶ 56, 84-85; Doc.

102-5 at 5 (Brown Dep. 7:19-21); Doc. 102-5 at 31 (Brown Dep. 130:3-23).

53 See Docs. 102-6, 102-7, 102-8. It is, of course, uncertain what injuries may have occurred

during the first physical altercation with Corporal Bledsoe at the convenience store and what

injuries—if any—came from Brown’s subsequent flight and the arrest in the attic. The Court

will view the facts in a light most favorable to Brown and assume, for summary judgment

purposes, that any injuries diagnosed at the hospital came from the attic arrest.

54 Brown alleges that his finger was broken on December 21, 2021. See Doc. 61 ¶ 17. There is

no evidence in the Rule 56 record of when or how this alleged injury occurred (whether from

falling after being tased, from the physical altercation with Bledsoe, from a fall in the attic as

mentioned in the medical records, or from the purported compliance strikes by one of the

Defendants). This alleged injury is not even mentioned in Brown’s affidavit, the sole piece of

evidence he provides in opposition to summary judgment. See Doc. 118-2. During his

deposition, Brown provided only assumptions and speculation about how his finger was

broken, (see Doc. 102-5 at 27-28 (Brown Dep. 123:17-124:11)), which is wholly insufficient

at the summary judgment stage. See Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 244 (3d Cir. 2017)

(“[S]peculation and conjecture may not defeat a motion for summary judgment[.]” (alterations

in original) (quoting Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 (3d

Cir. 2009))).

wrestling match, and disarmed Bledsoe by gaining control of his taser. Moreover,

the officers were aware that Brown was a drug user (due to his previous overdose

in the same residence) and could have been under the influence of narcotics.

The duration of the action was short. Franks and Yaworski first gave loud

verbal commands for Brown to turn over and lie down on his stomach, to which

Brown did not respond. Only then did they go “hands on,” during which a brief

struggle ensued where they employed compliance strikes on Brown’s back and

shoulders in order to handcuff Brown because he was resisting arrest. The brief

duration of the use of physical force again favors an objectively reasonable

application of force.

The seventh factor requires little discussion and likewise favors an

objectively reasonable use of force. The at-issue force here took place in the

context of effecting an arrest.

There was also a possibility that Brown could have been armed. Corporal

Bledsoe informed the other officers that he had witnessed a rifle55 in the East

Water Street residence during Brown’s prior overdose, and the officers in fact

55 Brown contends that this was a “BB gun,” not an actual rifle. See Doc. 102-5 at 5 (Brown

Dep. 7:1-5). Assuming Brown is correct, it does not mean that Corporal Bledsoe acted

unreasonably by believing there was a rifle in the residence, even if he was mistaken about the

type of weapon he had witnessed. Indeed, it would make little sense that Bledsoe and the other

officers waited for a ballistic shield to arrive if Bledsoe did not truly believe that there was a

firearm in the residence. Moreover, an officer’s conduct is evaluated “from the perspective of

a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight[.]” Davenport

v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at

396-97).

waited until a ballistic shield arrived to enter the residence and search for Brown.

This eighth factor, like all previous factors, weighs in favor of objectively

reasonable force.

The ninth and final factor is the only one that favors Brown’s claim of

excessive force. There were at least five law enforcement officers present in the

attic to arrest a single person. There was, therefore, only one person with which

multiple officers had to “contend,” so this last factor slightly favors Brown.

When viewing the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable juror could

conclude that Corporal Franks or Trooper Yaworski employed objectively

unreasonable force during Brown’s arrest in the attic.56 Every relevant factor, save

one, militates in favor of finding that Defendants used objectively reasonable force

during Brown’s arrest. Summary judgment, therefore, must be granted in

Defendants’ favor.

56 See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that, although reasonableness

under the Fourth Amendment is often a question for the factfinder, a defendant can still prevail

at summary judgment if the district court concludes that “the officer’s use of force was

objectively reasonable under the circumstances” (quoting Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 290

(3d Cir. 1999))). The case at bar is just such a case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. An

appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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