Crawley v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CASE NO. 1:24-cv-1760

PAUL E. CRAWLEY, JR.,

DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff, BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

vs. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

REPORT &

Defendant. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Paul E. Crawley, Jr., filed a Complaint against the

Commissioner of Social Security seeking judicial review of a decision denying

his application for disability insurance and social security income benefits.

Doc. 1. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). The

Court referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1)

for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation. Following review, and

for the reasons stated below, I recommend that the District Court affirm the

Commissioner’s decision.

Procedural Background

Previous application. In July 2016, Crawley filed an application for

disability insurance benefits alleging a disability onset date in September

2015.1 Tr. 88. His application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Id.

In May 2017, Crawley requested a hearing before an administrative law judge

(ALJ). Id. In June 2018, ALJ Traci Hixson held a hearing. Id. In November

2018, ALJ Hixson issued a decision denying Crawley’s application. Tr. 85–108.

In December 2019, the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s November 2018

decision. Tr. 109–114. Because Crawley did not further appeal, the ALJ’s

November 2018 decision became the final decision of the Commissioner as to

his July 2016 application.

Current application. In March 2020, Crawley filed applications for

disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits alleging a

disability beginning in September 2015. Tr. 218–228. In pertinent part,

Crawley alleged that he was disabled and limited in his ability work, due to:

back issues, kidney problems, gout, knee issues, arthritis, diabetes, and neck

problems. Tr. 252. The Commissioner denied Crawley’s application initially

and on reconsideration. See Tr. 159, 170.

In January 2021, Crawley requested a hearing. Tr. 177. In October 2021,

ALJ Catherine Ma held a telephonic hearing. Tr. 47. Crawley appeared,

testified, and was represented by counsel at the hearing. Tr. 47. Qualified

vocational expect Brett Salkin also testified. Tr. 74. In December 2021, ALJ

1 “Once a finding of disability is made, the [agency] must determine the

onset date of the disability.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 193 F. App’x

422, 425 (6th Cir. 2006).

Ma issued a written decision, in which she found that Crawley was not entitled

to benefits. Tr. 12–36.

In January 2022, Crawley appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals

Council. Tr. 215. In February 2023, the Appeals Council denied Crawley’s

appeal. Tr. 1. In April 2023, Crawley filed a Complaint against the

Commissioner, docketed as case no. 1:23-cv-799, challenging the ALJ’s

decision. In September 2023, this Court remanded, based on the parties’

stipulation, for “further administrative proceedings pursuant to Sentence Four

of Section 205 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).” Tr. 1098. In

December 2023, the Appeals Council issued an Order vacating ALJ Ma’s

December 2021 decision, finding that “the hearing decision does not contain an

adequate evaluation of the medical source opinions from Jonathan Belding,

M.D., and Joseph Konieczny, Ph.D.” See Tr. 1101 The Appeals Council also

directed the ALJ to consider the following on remand:

• Give further consideration to the medical

source opinion(s) and prior administrative

medical findings pursuant to the provisions of

20 CFR 404.1520c and 416.920c. As

appropriate, the Administrative Law Judge

may request the medical sources provide

additional evidence and/or further

clarification of the opinions (20 CFR

404.1520b and 416.920b). The Administrative

Law Judge may enlist the aid and cooperation

of the claimant's representative in developing

evidence from the claimant's medical sources.

• Give further consideration to the claimant's

maximum residual functional capacity and

provide appropriate rationale with specific

references to evidence of record in support of

the assessed limitations (20 CFR 404.1545

and 416.945 and Social Security Ruling 85-16

and 96-8p).

• If warranted by the expanded record, obtain

supplemental evidence from a vocational

expert to clarify the effect of the assessed

limitations on the claimant's occupational

base (Social Security Ruling 83-14). The

hypothetical questions should reflect the

specific capacity/limitations established by

the record as a whole. The Administrative

Law Judge will ask the vocational expert to

identify examples of appropriate jobs and to

state the incidence of such jobs in the national

economy (20 CFR 404.1566 and 416.966).

Further, before relying on the vocational

expert evidence the Administrative Law

Judge will identify and resolve any conflicts

between the occupational evidence provided

by the vocational expert and information in

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)

and its companion publication, the Selected

Characteristics of Occupations (Social

Security Ruling 00-4p).

Tr. 1102.

In April 2024, ALJ Ma held a telephonic hearing. Tr. 1035–1066. During

the hearing, Crawley‘s counsel amended Crawley’s alleged onset date to

November 10, 2018. Tr. 17. In July 2024, the ALJ issued a partially favorable

decision, Tr. 999–1023, which Crawley now appeals.

Crawley timely filed this action in October 2024. Doc. 1. In it, he asserts

three issues:

1. The ALJ erred when she applied the wrong

standard of review when she adopted the

residual functional capacity (RFC)2 of the

prior Administrative Law Judge.

2. The ALJ erroneously failed to comply with the

Order of Remand when she improperly

assessed the opinions of the treating and

examining sources.

3. The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform

work at the light level of exertion and did not

require the use of a cane for balance was not

supported by substantial evidence and was

contrary to Social Security Ruling 96-9p.

Doc. 7, at 1.

Evidence3

Personal, Educational, and Vocational Evidence

Crawley was born in March 1969, making him 46 on the original alleged

onset date in 2015 and 49 on the amended alleged onset date in 2018. Tr. 248.

Crawley graduated from high school and completed a “computerized

machinery program.” Tr. 253.

Medical Evidence

In June 2018, Dr. Cherrica Davis, of Lake Health Physician Group,

noted Crawley’s sciatic nerve pain, which had caused him to twice visit an

emergency room in the interim since his last visit to the practice. Tr. 431.

2 An RFC is an “assessment of” a claimant’s ability to work, taking his or

her “limitations … into account.” Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235,

239 (6th Circ. 2002). Essentially, it is the Social Security Administration’s

“description of what the claimant ‘can and cannot do.’” Webb v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Howard, 276 F.3d at 239).

3 The recitation of evidence is not intended to be exhaustive and is

generally limited to the evidence cited in the parties’ briefs.

In September 2019, Crawley visited the emergency room due to chest

pain, diabetes, and chronic lower back pain Tr. 320–325.

In an October 2019 follow-up appointment, Dr. Davis treated Crawley

for shortness of breath. Tr. 425-427.

In February 2020, Dr. Jonathan E. Belding, M.D., saw Crawley for a

follow-up appointment as to a laminectomy and fusion that Dr. Belding

performed in October 2018. Tr. 472. Dr. Belding noted that “[t]hings [were]

improving” since Crawley’s back surgery and that he was working on physical

therapy and had lost weight, but that he still had tingling in his right leg. Id.

In June 2021, Dr. Belding completed a two-year follow-up appointment

related to Crawley’s laminectomy. Tr. 959. Dr. Belding noted that Crawley

“feels like his back pain is better but he still has trouble with long distance

walking.” Id. Dr. Belding continued to encourage weight loss and

recommended an injection in Crawley’s lumbar spine to see whether

decreasing inflammation would help with his claudicatory4 symptoms. Id.

Also in June 2021, Patrick Convery, M.D., identified pain and

osteoarthritis in both of Crawley’s knees. Tr. 1399. Dr. Convery instructed

Crawley on activities to improve his strength and pain and advised him on

4 Claudication is pain in the legs or arms caused by lack of oxygen which

generally occurs while walking or using arms. It is typically a symptom of

artery disease due to a buildup of plaque in artery walls. Claudication, Mayo

Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-

conditions/claudication/symptoms-causes/syc-20370952

[https://perma.cc/YHE8-3K3L].

appropriate use of Tylenol for pain. Id. Dr. Convery also administered

Cortisone injections in each of Crawley’s knees. Id.

In November 2021, Crawley was admitted to a hospital for observation

based on reported shortness of breath. Tr. 1459. He received a primary

diagnosis of “COVID-19.” Tr. 1459.

Also in November 2021, Brenda Beck, D.O., administered “[b]ilateral L3

and L4 medial branch nerve blocks and bilateral L5 posterior rami nerve

blocks under fluoroscopic guidance.” Tr. 1762.5

In October 2022, Dr. Beck again administered nerve block injections. Tr.

1748.

In November 2022, Dr. Beck performed a “[r]ight sided L3, L4, and L5

medial branch nerves nerve radiofrequency ablation under fluoroscopic

guidance.” Tr. 1744.

In December 2022, Dr. Beck again performed a radiofrequency ablation

on Crawley’s lumbar spinal region. Tr. 1736.

5 Vertebrae in a person’s spine are given letter and number designations

according to their location. The neck—the cervical spine—has seven vertebrae

designated as C1 through C7. See Thomas Scioscia, MD, Vertebrae in the

Vertebral Column, Spine-health Resources, https://www.spine-

health.com/conditions/spine-anatomy/vertebrae-vertebral-column

[https://perma.cc/R9MM-TBZT]. The twelve vertebrae compromising the upper

spine—the thoracic spine—are labeled at T1 through T12. Id. The five

vertebrae in the lower spine—the lumbar spine—are L1 through L5. Id. The

five vertebrae at the bottom of the spine—in the sacrum—are labeled as S1

through S5. Thomas Scioscia, MD, Sacrum (Sacral Region), Spine-health

Resources, https://www.spine-health.com/conditions/spine-anatomy/sacrum-

sacral-region [https://perma.cc/S2BR-RBTB].

In January 2023, Dr. Beck, examined Crawley for generalized pain. Tr.

1716. She noted Crawley’s history of hypertension, diabetes, depression,

obstructive sleep apnea, laminectomy, and low back pain. Id. Dr. Beck noted

that when she spoke to Crawley earlier that month, “he was very pleased after

his results of his lumbar [radiofrequency ablation],” and he “[h]as been doing

some more walking, felt good, but flared pain.” Id. Dr. Beck also noted some

stiffness, tingling, and radiating pain in both legs. Id. She described Crawley’s

past medical history and noted that they discussed a treatment plan to include

physical activity, medication, and interventional treatment including

continued lumbar medial branch nerve ablations, as needed. Id.

On August 2023, Anthony Esparaz, M.D., interpreted x-ray images of

Crawley’s knees and remarked that the images demonstrated severe

osteoarthritic degenerative changes in both knees. Tr. 2917.

In November 2023, Crawley presented to the emergency room for

lightheadedness and generalized weakness, which was caused by low blood

sugar resulting from intermittent fasting. Tr. 1330–35.

In February 2024, Christine Dearth, APRN-CNP,6 provided continuing

treatment for Crawley’s “poorly controlled” Type 2 diabetes. Tr. 1295. Nurse

Dearth noted that Crawley’s blood sugar levels would elevate whenever he

6 APRN is an abbreviation for Advanced Practice Registered Nurse.

Advanced Practice Registered Nurse (APRN), OhioAPRN.com,

http://www.ohioaprn.com/what-is-an-aprn-.html [https://perma.cc/69UR-

XX65]. CNP is an abbreviation for Certified Nurse Practitioner. Id.

received steroid injections in his knee and back, id., and that his diabetes was

“complicated by hypertension, nephropathy, and peripheral neuropathy.” Tr.

1300.

In April 2024, Crawley presented to the emergency department with

facial drop, nausea, vomiting, and loss of consciousness. Tr. 2541–42. After

diagnostic testing, doctors determined that he had an acute ischemic stroke.

Tr. 2542. Crawley was treated with medication and his initial symptoms

resolved during inpatient care. Tr. 2542, 2555. Crawley has since participated

in outpatient physical and occupation therapy for stroke rehabilitation. Tr.

2554, 2624.

State Agency Consultants

In June 2020, state agency medical consultant Abraham Mikalov, M.D.,

reviewed Crawley’s medical records from 2018 through 2020. Tr. 125–26. Dr.

Mikalov concluded that Crawley could perform a limited range of light

exertional level work. Tr. 129. Specifically, Dr. Mikalov determined that in an

eight-hour workday, Crawley could sit for six hours and stand or walk for four

hours. Id. Dr. Mikalov also noted that Crawley could occasionally reach

overhead but had the ability to reach in front as well as the ability to handle,

finger, and feel. Id. He also found that Crawley could frequently balance;

occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl; occasionally climb ramps or stairs; and

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Id. Finally, Dr. Mikalov noted that

Crawley must avoid all exposure to unprotected heights and commercial

driving. Id. Dr. Mikalov explained that after consideration of the applicable

record evidence between November 2018 through the present, he determined

that it was appropriate to adopt the prior RFC under Social Security

Acquiescence Ruling 98–4(6). Id.; see 1998 WL 283902 (June 1, 1998). State

agency physician Mehr Siddiqui, M.D., affirmed Dr. Mikalov’s findings on

reconsideration and noted that “[p]rior administrative medical findings are

consistent and supported by the initial level documentation.” Tr. 139.

In August 2020, state agency psychological consultant Paul Tangeman,

Ph.D., reviewed Crawley’s mental health records including Dr. Konieczny’s

2016 opinion and Dr. Josell’s 2020 opinion. Tr. 128-29. Dr. Tangeman found

those opinions persuasive and concluded that Crawley could perform simple,

routine tasks with simple, short instructions; make simple decisions; and have

a job that involves few workplace changes and no fast-paced production. Tr.

129. Dr. Tangeman explained that he was adopting the prior mental RFC

“under AR 98-4 (Drummond Ruling).” Tr. 130. In November 2020, state agency

psychologist Jennifer Swain, Ph. D., affirmed Dr. Tangeman’s findings on

reconsideration and noted that the “[p]rior administrative medical findings are

consistent and supported by the initial level documentation.” Tr. 141.

Consultative Examiners

In December 2016, Dr. J. Joseph Konieczny conducted a psychological

consultative examination of Crawley at the request of the State Agency. Tr.

306–311. Dr. Konieczny opined that Crawley’s “IQ place[d] him in the average

range of adult intellectual function” with memory capabilities in the low to

average range and processing speed in the extremely low range. Tr. 309. He

further noted that Crawley’s working memory was in the low range, but his

perceptual reasoning was in the high average range. Id. Konieczny remarked

that Crawley experienced significant deficits in some nonverbal areas,

including visual memory and discrimination, but significant strengths in serial

reasoning. Id. Crawley’s memory was generally in the extremely low-level

range and was significantly lower than anticipated for his age, but Dr.

Konieczny opined that Crawley appeared sincere in testing despite the results

being “quite inconsistent with his apparent education and vocational history.”

Tr. 309.

Dr. Konieczny ultimately concluded that Crawley “suffered from a

diagnosis of Major Neurocognitive Disorder, Without Behavioral Impairment.”

Id. He also found that Crawley experienced a depressive disorder. Tr. 310. Dr.

Konieczny opined that Crawley would have significant limitations in his ability

to understand, remember, and carry out instructions and with maintaining

attention, concentration, and persistence. Id. Dr. Konieczny also assessed a

diminished tolerance for responding appropriately to supervision and co-

workers and diminished ability to respond to pressure in the work setting. Id.

In August 2020, Paul G. Josell, Psy.D., performed a consultative

psychological evaluation of Crawley at the request of the State Agency. Tr.

582–85. On exam, Crawley completed serial 7’s, making two early errors before

smoothy completing the task. Tr. 584. Dr. Josell estimated Crawley’s

intelligence to be generally within the average range. Id. He noted that

Crawley had a history and current presentation of some processing difficulties,

which were most likely related to focus and concentration and which may have

been a side effect of his medication, along with significant memory impairment,

the origin of which was unknown. Id. Ultimately, Dr. Josell concluded that

Crawley experienced moderate persistent depressive disorder and opined that

Crawley’s mental impairments would affect his work-related abilities of:

understanding and following directions; maintaining attention, concentration,

persistence, and pace; and, withstanding stress and pressures associated with

day-to-day work. Tr. 584–85.

Opinion Evidence

In August 2021, Dr. Belding completed a Physical Medical Source

Statement. See Tr. 955–58. Dr. Belding opined that Crawley could stand or

walk for less than two hours, in an eight-hour day, sit for four hours, in an

eight-hour day, occasionally lift 10 pounds, and rarely lift 20 pounds. Tr. 956–

57. Dr. Belding also checked a box indicating that, due to pain and weakness,

Crawley needed to use a cane or other hand-held assistive device. Tr. 957. He

wrote that “yes” the cane needed to be used for walking, standing, or both, but

did not specify which of the three for which Crawley would need it. Id. He

responded that “no” the devices did not need to be used all the time, but did

not explain the circumstances under which they needed to be used. Id. Dr.

Belding also noted that Crawley would be off-task 20% of the workday and

absent four days per month. Tr. 957–58.

Function Report

In June 2020, Crawley completed a function report detailing how his

symptoms and conditions limited his activities. See Tr. 259–266. Crawley

explained that he was unable to sit or stand very long and that he had swelling

and nerve pain in his legs and feet. Tr. 259. Crawley described difficulty in

using the bathroom when his neck stiffened and that he became “winded” when

getting dress. Tr. 260.

Hearing Testimony7

In April 2024, Crawley testified at a telephonic hearing. Tr. 1037–60.

He testified that he lived with his mother. Tr. 1044. Crawley explained that

owing to his stroke and the fact that he used a walker, it was easier to move

around at his mother’s home, which was “a little more friendly to [his]

condition.” Tr. 1044. Crawley explained that his income consisted of long-term

disability insurance payments from his previous employment. Tr. 1047.

The ALJ asked Crawley to explain “how [he’s] been doing with [hi]s

conditions and treatment” since the 2021 hearing. Tr. 1049. Crawley testified

that he had a stroke in April 2024 and that his “physical abilities have

7 Discussion of the hearing testimony from both Crawley and the

vocational expert is limited to the post-remand hearing in April 2024 because

the decision resulting from that hearing is the only decision challenged in this

matter.

declined” to the extent that he is “unable to take a shower by” himself and

needed an outpatient nurse to assist with his care. Tr. 1049. He explained that

he had a stroke earlier in April, which required a week of inpatient care,

followed by care from outpatient nurses and therapists, who came to his house

to assist with speech and mobility. Tr. 1051. Crawley stated that, during the

time before his stroke, he drove with his mother to the store, but he did not go

into the store to shop because he quickly lost his breath. Tr. 1053. He testified

that he does not do chores but did “try to clean up behind himself.” Tr. 1053–

54. When asked about his condition before his stroke, he described swelling,

primarily in his feet or ankles, which he dealt with by sitting down and

elevating his feet. Tr. 1056. He stated that he previously used a cane to aid

with balance and that it’s use slowed him down. Tr. 1058. Crawley also

explained that he could previously stand seven or eight minutes before the pain

developed and could walk 30 to 40 yards before he was exhausted. Tr. 1059.

Vocational Expert

Qualified Vocational Expert Lauren Petkoff testified that a hypothetical

individual who could perform work at the light level of exertion with additional

limitations could not perform Crawley’s past work, but that the hypothetical

individual could perform other jobs. Tr. 1062-1063. In response to questions

from Crawley’s attorney, Petkoff testified that if the hypothetical individual

was further limited to standing and walking only two hours in an eight-hour

workday, he could not perform those occupations. Tr. 1063–64. And, if the

hypothetical individual needed a cane for balance at a workstation, the

additional limitation would preclude all work. Tr. 1064.

ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The claimant meets the insured status

requirements of the Social Security Act

through June 30, 2021.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since November 16, 2018, the

alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.,

and 416.971 et seq.).

3. Since the alleged onset date of disability,

November 16, 2018, the claimant has had the

following severe impairments: degenerative

disc disease, neurocognitive disorder,

diabetes mellitus, obesity, chronic ischemic

heart disease, osteoarthritis and allied

disorders, and stroke (20 CFR 404.1520(c)

and 416.920(c)).

4. Since November 16, 2018, the claimant has

not had an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals

the severity of one of the listed impairments

in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire

record, I find that since November 16, 2018,

the claimant has the residual functional

capacity to perform light work as defined in

20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except:

the claimant could stand or walk for 4 hours

in an 8-hour workday. He could occasionally

climb ramps or stairs. He could never climb

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He could

frequently balance. He could occasionally

stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. He could

perform occasional bilateral overhead

reaching. He would be limited to no exposure

to unprotected heights or commercial driving.

He would be limited to perform simple,

routine tasks, but not at a production rate

pace; and limited to occasional routine

workplace changes.

6. The claimant has no past relevant work (20

CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. Prior to the established disability onset date,

the claimant was an individual closely

approaching advanced age. On March

14.2024, the claimant’s age category changed

to an individual of advanced age (20 CFR

404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has at least a high school

education (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in

this case because the claimant does not have

past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1568 and

416.968).

10. Prior to March 14, 2024, the date the

claimant’s age category changed, considering

the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity,

there were jobs that existed in significant

numbers in the national economy that the

claimant could have performed (20 CFR

404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and 416.969a).

11. Beginning on March 14, 2024, the date the

claimant’s age category changed, considering

the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity,

there are no jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that the

claimant could perform (20 CFR 404.1560(c),

404.1566, 416.960(c), and 416.966).

12. The claimant was not disabled prior to March

14, 2024, but became disabled on that date

and has continued to be disabled through the

date of this decision. His disability is expected

to last twelve months past the onset date (20

CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

13. The claimant was not under a disability

within the meaning of the Social Security Act

at any time through June 30, 2021, the date

last insured (20 CFR 404.315(a) and

404.320(b)).

Tr. 1003–1014.

Standard for Disability

Eligibility for social security benefit payments depends on the existence

of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), 1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).

An ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis to make a

disability determination:

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

2. Does the claimant have a medically

determinable impairment, or a combination of

impairments, that is “severe”? If not, the

claimant is not disabled.

3. Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal

one of the listed impairments and meet the

duration requirement? If so, the claimant is

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

4. What is the claimant’s residual functional

capacity and can the claimant perform past

relevant work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

5. Can the claimant do any other work

considering the claimant’s residual functional

capacity, age, education, and work

experience? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

If not, the claimant is disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d

417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008). Under this sequential analysis, the claimant has the

burden of proof at steps one through four. Jordan, 548 F.3d at 423. The burden

shifts to the Commissioner at step five “to prove the availability of jobs in the

national economy that the claimant is capable of performing.” Id. “The

claimant, however, retains the burden of proving her lack of residual functional

capacity.” Id. If a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis and meets the

duration requirements, the claimant is determined to be disabled. Walters

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).

Standard of Review

A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions unless it

determines “that the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has

made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”

Jordan, 548 F.3d at 422. “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’” under which

“a court … asks whether” the “existing administrative record … contains

‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek

v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citations omitted). The substantial

evidence standard “is not high.” Id. at 103. Substantial evidence “is ‘more than

a mere scintilla’” but it “means only[] ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (citations

omitted). The Commissioner’s “findings … as to any fact if supported by

substantial evidence [are] conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek, 587 U.S. at

99.

A court may “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or

decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.

2007). Even if substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence

supports a claimant’s position, a reviewing court cannot overturn the

Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial evidence also supports the

conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,

477 (6th Cir. 2003). This is so because there is a “zone of choice within which”

the Commissioner can act, without fear of judicial “interference.” Lindsley v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Felisky v.

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)).

Discussion

1. The ALJ properly applied the current Earley standard for

subsequent applications based on a new period of time.

Crawley first asserts that ALJ Ma erred by adopting ALJ Hixson’s RFC

while also finding that there was new and material evidence. See Doc. 7, at 10

(citing Tr. 1003). He claims that the ALJ’s adoption of the prior RFC was the

result of an “incorrect application of res judicata as set forth by the Sixth

Circuit in Earley[,]” which required a “fresh look for a new period of alleged

disability.” Doc. 7, at 10. For the reasons discussed, the ALJ did not err.

In Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., the Sixth Circuit held that

previous decisions “clearly demonstrate that the principles of res judicata can

be applied against the Commissioner. When the Commissioner has made a

final decision concerning a claimant’s entitlement to benefits, the

Commissioner is bound by this determination absent changed circumstances.”

126 F.3d 837, 842 (6th Cir. 1997).

The Social Security Administration adopted this decision as

Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6), 63 Fed. Reg. 29,771 (June 1, 1998). In this Ruling

the Administration instructed that:

When adjudicating a subsequent disability claim

with an unadjudicated period arising under the

same title of the Act as the prior claim, adjudicators

must adopt such a finding from the final decision by

an ALJ or the Appeals Council on the prior claim in

determining whether the claimant is disabled with

respect to the unadjudicated period unless there is

new and material evidence relating to such a finding

or there has been a change in the law, regulations or

rulings affecting the finding or the method for

arriving at the finding.

Id. at 29, 773 (emphasis added).

As it turned out, the Social Security Administration overread

Drummond. And in Earley, the Sixth Circuit corrected that error. The Court

in Earley explained that “[w]hen an individual seeks disability benefits for a

distinct period of time, each application is entitled to review. There is nothing

in the relevant statutes to the contrary. And res judicata only ‘foreclose[s]

successive litigation of the very same claim.’” 893 F.3d at 933 (“a claim that

one became disabled in 1990 is not the same as a claim that one became

disabled in 1994.”). Rather, under Earley, a claimant is entitled to a “fresh

review,” id. at 934, free from the presumption that a previous “RFC remains

the correct RFC for” a later claim, Nadjl v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-cv-

01578, 2022 WL 2820413, at *9 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2818444 (N.D. Ohio July 18, 2022); see also

Anthony L.M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-cv-00525, 2022 WL 10638159,

at *3–4 (S.D. Ohio June 27, 2022); DiLauro v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-cv-

2691, 2021 WL 1175415, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2021); Ferrell v. Berryhill,

No. 16-cv-0050, 2019 WL 2077501, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. May 10, 2019) (“The point

of Earley, … is that regardless of her chances of success, an applicant should

have the opportunity for a full hearing, with no presumptions applied, when

the claim covers a new period of time not addressed in the prior hearing”)

(emphasis added).

The Sixth Circuit also said in Earley that “it is fair for an administrative

law judge to take the view that, absent new and additional evidence, the first

administrative law judge’s findings are a legitimate, albeit not binding,

consideration in reviewing a second application.” 893 F.3d at 933 (emphasis

added). An ALJ may “consider a previous ALJ’s RFC” determination but “errs

… when he considers the previous RFC a mandatory starting point for the

analysis.” Gale v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-cv-00859, 2019 WL 8016516, at

*5 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL

871201 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2020).

Here, ALJ Ma did what Earley and its progeny instruct––she took a

“fresh look” and considered the entire record including the new evidence. 893

F.3d at 934. The fact that she ultimately reached a similar conclusion as ALJ

Hixson does not itself demonstrate an error. Crawley even acknowledges that

the ALJ did not state that she relied on ALJ Hixson’s determination. Doc. 7, at

13, see also id. at 11 (recognizing that the ALJ stated she did not apply

Drummond). Crawley also provides no citation to support his claim that the

“ALJ’s RFC effectively adopted the findings of the prior ALJ and failed to

independently review Plaintiff’s impairments for the new period of disability.”

Id. at 14. And review of the ALJ’s decision belies this claim and shows that

Crawley is effectively trying to fell a strawman.8

While ALJ Ma recognized that Crawley had previously filed an

application in 2016, she also specifically recognized that this case arose out of

a new application for a new period of disability. Tr. 1002. She further found

that “the record shows new and additional evidence indicating change in the

claimant’s condition since the prior decision.” Tr. 1003. And ALJ Ma’s decision

demonstrates that she considered the new evidence. See e.g., Tr. 1008

(considering the effect of Crawley’s April 2024 stroke); Tr. 1009 (discussing

medical records from, for instance, September 2022, January 2023, November

2023, and March 2024).

Crawley also argues that ALJ Ma erred by relying on state agency

reviewers’ opinions because they “violated the law in this matter and relied on

the prior ALJ’s findings.” Doc. 7, at 14. But ALJ Ma did not exclusively rely on

those state agency opinions in crafting the RFC, Tr. 1010–12, or fail to consider

their consistency or supportability, Tr. 1010. (explaining that the assessments

“were supported by the evidence relied upon” and “consistent with the medical

evidence”). The ALJ explained that the state agency consultants’ opinions were

persuasive based on the evidence considered by those consultants, not based

8 Crawley repeatedly asserts that ALJ Ma applied the wrong standard of

review. See Doc. 7, at 9, 11, 14. But a standard of review is what a court

performing an appellate function applies when reviewing a subornative

adjudicator’s decision. See Standard of Review, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th

ed. 2024).

on their application of Drummond. Id. ALJ Ma’s explanation also makes clear

that she evaluated the state agency consultants’ opinions through the lens of

the current record, including Crawley’s current condition. Id. (considering

those opinions in connection with records of Crawley’s treatment for various

conditions including records from 2021 through 2024, such as his back and

knee injections). Further, nothing in the record suggests that ALJ Ma adopted

the state agency consultants’ opinions based on a belief that she was bound to

under Drummond. Instead, her decision as a whole demonstrates that she

considered the broader record to render a decision based on substantial

evidence while also finding that the state agency consultants’ opinions were

persuasive. Tr. 1010–11. This finding does not, without more, justify remand.

2. The ALJ properly assessed the medical opinions of record on

remand.

Crawley’s second argument is somewhat disconnected from its heading.

His argument heading, which alleges that “[t]he ALJ erroneously failed to

comply with the order of remand when she improperly assessed the opinions

of the treating and examining sources[,]” suggests that this section would

contain an argument about whether the ALJ complied with the Remand

Order.9 Doc. 7, at 15. But, on review, this portion of Crawley’s argument is

9 Neither party discusses whether this Court has jurisdiction to

adjudicate an ALJ’s alleged failure to adhere to an Appeals Council’s remand

order. But most courts in this Circuit have found that federal courts lack

jurisdiction to consider this issue. See Sisson v. Colvin, No. 5:15-CV-552, 2016

WL 8671906, at *12 (N.D. Ohio June 14, 2016) (internal citations omitted). So

if this is Crawley’s argument, it fails.

better characterized as challenging the ALJ’s consideration of medical opinion

evidence in compliance with applicable regulations. See Doc. 7, at 16–22.

Although Crawley generally explains certain directives in the Remand Order,

albeit without any specific citation to the directives in that order, his

arguments in this section contest the ALJ’s consideration of certain medical

opinions. See e.g. Doc. 7, at 16–17 (arguing that the ALJ erred in evaluating

the Dr. Belding’s opinion and otherwise failed to support her decision that his

opinion was unpersuasive with substantial evidence); id. at 21 (challenging the

ALJ’s explanation for excluding certain limitations from the RFC). So the

Court interprets Crawley’s argument as taking issue with the ALJ’s evaluation

of opinion evidence.10

The Commissioner is required to evaluate the persuasiveness of all

medical opinions using the following factors: supportability; consistency;

treatment relationship, including the length, frequency, purpose, and extent;

specialization; and other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(a), 416.920c(c)(1)–(5).

Supportability and consistency are the most important factors. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920c(a). Supportability means that “[t]he more relevant the objective

medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source

are to support his or her medical opinion[] … the more persuasive the medical

10 Crawley briefly argues that ALJ Ma failed to comply with this Court’s

order remanding his case. Doc. 7, at 22. But this Court’s order only generally

remanded for “further development of the administrative record, as necessary

to determine whether Plaintiff is disabled.” Tr. 1098. Crawley doesn’t explain

how ALJ Ma violated this directive.

opinions … will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency means “[t]he more

consistent a medical opinion[] … is with the evidence from other medical

sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical

opinion[] … will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2). The Commissioner must

explain the supportability and consistency factors when discussing a medical

opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). “[A]n ALJ need not,” however, “specifically

use the terms ‘supportability’ or ‘consistency’ in his analysis.” Cormany v.

Kijakazi, No. 5:21-cv-933, 2022 WL 4115232, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2022)

(citing cases). The Commissioner is not required to discuss the remaining

factors. Id. “A reviewing court evaluates whether the ALJ properly considered

the factors as set forth in the regulations to determine the persuasiveness of a

medical opinion.” Toennies v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 2841379, at *14

(N.D. Ohio June 1, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As to Dr. Belding’s opinion, the ALJ properly considered the

supportability and consistency of that opinion as required under the

regulations cited. See Tr. 1010. Crawley argues that the ALJ’s “conclusion” on

remand that Dr. Belding’s opinion remained inconsistent “is incorrect.” Doc. 7,

at 17. A major issue with this argument, however, is that Crawley did not

include a summary of Dr. Belding’s medical source statement in the factual

summary in his brief. See Doc. 7, at 2–5. Instead, nearly all of the evidence that

Crawley cites in an attempt to show that Dr. Belding’s opinion is consistent is

cited for the first time in the argument section of his brief. Compare Doc. 7, at

2–5 with id. at 16–18 (citing portions of Dr. Belding’s records and other

evidence of record in an effort to show that “medical records detailing

[Crawley’s] physical limitations supported and were consistent with the

opinion of Dr. Belding.”). Nevertheless, he relies on this evidence in the

Argument section of his brief. This matters because, as the Court’s Initial

Order states: “[t]he Court will not consider facts referenced in a party’s

argument unless those facts have been set out in the Facts section of the party’s

brief.” Doc. 4, at 4. Crawley’s counsel has been repeatedly warned that evidence

cited for the first time in a given argument section will not be considered. See,

e.g., Milliron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-cv-1200, 2023 WL 4211041, at *8

n.10 (N.D. Ohio March 20, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023

WL 4205214 (N.D. Ohio June 27, 2023); Mencke v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case

No. 21-cv-2298, 2022 WL 2758577, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Ohio July 14, 2022). Since

the evidence on which Crawley relies for this argument was not set out in the

Facts section of his brief, the Court need not consider it and Crawley’s

argument is left with little-to-no record support.

But, even if this evidence were considered, Crawley’s argument is

meritless because the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that she considered the

supportability and consistency factors when assessing the persuasiveness of

Dr. Belding’s opinion. Tr. 1010. The ALJ explained that:

Dr. Belding’s assessment is not persuasive because

the restrictions were unsupported by the medical

evidence relied upon, including Dr. Belding’s

treatment notes containing the claimant’s repeated

reports of significant improvement in his back pain

following his surgeries. The limitations were also

excessive and inconsistent with the medical evidence,

such as the claimant’s presentation with normal

gait, normal balance, and full motor strength during

treatment.

Id. (emphasis added). The face of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that she

considered the required factors. Moreover, the fact that Crawley can point to

evidence that he believes supports a different conclusion than the one that the

ALJ reached does not make the ALJ’s conclusion “incorrect” or otherwise

provide a basis for remand. See Jones, 336 F.3d at 477 (explaining that even if

a claimant can point to evidence in support of their preferred outcome, a

reviewing court cannot overturn the Commissioner’s decision “so long as

substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ”). So, the

ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Belding’s opinion does not support remand.

As to Dr. Konieczny’s consultative opinion from 2016, which the ALJ

found partially persuasive, Tr. 1011, Crawley claims that “the RFC in this

matter failed to include limitations consistent with these restrictions regarding

[Crawley’s] memory and concentration capabilities.” Doc. 7, at 21. Specifically,

Crawley asserts that the ALJ erred when she excluded certain limitations from

her ultimate RFC, in violation of Kinney v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3889,

2024 WL 2273365, at *3–4 (6th Cir. May 20, 2024). Id.

In Kinney the Sixth Circuit held that an ALJ need not incorporate every

limitation set out in a medical opinion, even where that medical source’s

opinion is considered persuasive. 2024 WL 2273365, at *3 (citing Reeves v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2015)). But the Court

clarified that if an ALJ finds that a medical opinion is persuasive but decides

not to include all limitations set out in that medical opinion, then the ALJ must

explain why the ALJ did not include all of the limitations. Id. (citing Social

Security Ruling 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474 (July 2, 1996)).

Here, because the ALJ found Dr. Konieczny’s opinion only partly

persuasive, Kinney, which addresses the exclusion of limitations from

persuasive opinions, is distinguishable. See Tr. 1010-11 (explaining that only

portions of the opinion were persuasive). Additionally, the ALJ expressly

explained why certain portions of Dr. Konieczny’s opinion were or were not

persuasive. See Tr. 1011. As the ALJ recognized, Dr. Konieczny offered his

opinion based on an examination that “was performed significantly prior to the

alleged onset date of November 16, 2018.” Id. So:

the opinion is still relevant for the purposes of

background/historical information. I find Dr.

Konieczny’s assessment was persuasive in terms of

his recommendation for simple work with limited

workplace pace/changes because the limitations

were supported by the medical evidence relied upon,

such as the claimant’s presentation with very

significant deficits in the area of processing speed

and deficits in memory during the clinical exam. I do

not find the remaining limitations were persuasive

because the restrictions were inconsistent with the

medical evidence, including the claimant’s

presentation with normal mental status exam

findings throughout treatment.

Id. (emphasis added). The face of the ALJ’s evaluation directly undercuts

Crawley’s argument. It shows that the ALJ did not find Dr. Konieczny’s

opinion persuasive and that the ALJ explained why certain limitations were

or were not included from that opinion due to their inconsistency with the

entire record of treatment.

A similar issue exists as to Crawley’s challenge to Dr. Josell’s

psychological evaluation. See Doc. 7, at 20. He first points out that the ALJ

found Dr. Josell’s opinion “persuasive in terms of his recommendation for

impaired understanding and following direction; maintaining attention,

concentration, and pace; and withstanding stress and pressures associated

with day-to-day work.” Id. Immediately after recognizing that the ALJ found

Dr. Josell’s opinion persuasive in these limited terms, Crawley argues that the

ALJ erred by excluding other limitations. Id. This argument ignores the face

of the ALJ’s decision, and Crawley’s own argument, because those other

limitations were not included in the ALJ’s description of what she found

persuasive. See id.; see also Tr. 1011. Crawley provides no support for his

conclusory assertion that the ALJ was required to adopt limitations she did

not find persuasive.

So, none of the arguments contained in Crawley’s second issue provide

a basis to remand.

3. The ALJ appropriately considered the evidence when assessing

the functional limitations to Crawley’s RFC.

As his third issue, Crawley makes two arguments. He asserts that

substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that he could

perform light work and he asserts that the ALJ erred when she failed to include

a limitation in Crawley’s RFC for use of a cane. See Doc. 7, at 23–25.

The first argument is easily dispatched. The entirety of this aspect of

Crawley’s third issue comes down to the assertion that evidence supports his

assertion that he can’t “stand/walk [for] the time necessary to perform work at

the light level of exertion.” Id. at 24. But Crawley’s task before this Court is to

show that substantial does not support the ALJ’s determination. Opining that

other evidence supports his preferred conclusion does not help him shoulder

his burden. See Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The

decision of an ALJ is not subject to reversal, even if there is substantial

evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so

long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.”).

As to the second half of Crawley’s third issue, it should be acknowledged

that Dr. Belding indicated that, due to Crawley’s pain and weakness, Crawley

needed “a cane or other hand-held assistive device” for walking and standing

but “not at all times.” Tr. 957. For the reasons explained below, however,

neither this opinion nor any of Crawley’s arguments demonstrate a basis to

remand based on exclusion of a cane limitation.

If an assistive device is “not a necessary device for [a] claimant’s use, it

cannot be considered an exertional limitation that reduce[s] [the claimant’s]

ability to work.” Carreon v. Massanari, 51 F. App’x 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2002). To

be considered a necessary restriction or limitation, an assistive device “must

be so necessary that it would trigger an obligation on the part of the Agency to

conclude that the [device] is medically necessary.” Murphy v. Astrue, No. 11-

cv-114, 2013 WL 829316, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. March 6, 2013) (citations omitted).

To be medically necessary, the record must reflect “more than just a subjective

desire on the part of the plaintiff as to the use of a[n] [assistive device].” Id.

(citation omitted). And there must be medical documentation “describing the

circumstances for which it is needed (i.e., whether all the time, periodically, or

only in certain situations; distance and terrain; and any other relevant

information).” Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, *7 (S.S.A. July 2,

1996); see Golden v. Berryhill, No. 1:18-cv-636, 2018 WL 7079506, at *19 (N.D.

Ohio Dec. 12, 2018) (“a cane prescription [that] does not indicate ‘the

circumstances for which [the cane] is needed,’ … does not fulfil the

requirements under SSR 96-9p”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019

WL 415250 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2019).

“If the ALJ does not find that such device would be medically necessary,

then the ALJ is not required to pose a hypothetical to the V[ocational] E[xpert]”

which includes the use of an assistive device. Murphy, 2013 WL 829316, at *10

(citing Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir.

1993)). Generally, an ALJ’s finding that an assistive device is not medically

necessary is error when the claimant is prescribed an assistive device and the

ALJ does not include the use of the device in the RFC and fails to provide an

explanation for omitting it. Cruz-Ridol v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-cv-1075,

2018 WL 1136119, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2018) (citing Watkins v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 16-cv-2643, 2017 WL 6419350, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22,

2017)), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1083252 (N.D. Ohio Feb.

28, 2018).

Crawley cites four matters in support of his argument for a cane

limitation. First, he cites his testimony that he used a cane. Tr. 70, 1058.

Second, Dr. Belding’s August 2021 evaluation indicated that Crawley needed

“a cane or other hand-held assistive device” for walking and standing due to

Crawley’s pain and weakness. Tr. 957. Third, he cites certain medical records

that reported Crawley used a cane. See Tr. 307, 583; see also Doc. 7, at 24

(citing other instances of using a cane in the record for the first time in his

argument). And fourth, the vocational expert testified in response to Crawley’s

attorney’s question that a limitation requiring “a cane for balance would

preclude all work.” Doc. 7, at 25 (citing Tr. 1064); see also id. (citing earlier

vocational expert testimony that use of a cane due to pain and weakness “would

limit the person to work at the sedentary level of exertion.”).

To find that a “hand-held assistive device is medically required, there

must be medical documentation establishing the need for a hand-held assistive

device to aid in walking or standing, and describing the circumstances for

which it is needed.” SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7. To show that an

assistive device must have been required, a claimant “must also show that his

medical records specifically document the circumstances in which he required

an assistive device—i.e., whether he required one at all times, during all

activities, and on all terrains.” Barnes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-

01688-JDA, 2023 WL 2988346, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2023) (emphasis

added); see SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7.

Here, Crawley points to no evidence from Dr. Belding, or any other

medical source, that “specifically document[s] the circumstances in which he

required an assistive devices” such that Ruling 96-6p required the ALJ to

discuss the use of hand-held assistive devices. See 2023 WL 2988346, at *8.

Indeed, Dr. Belding’s check-the-box opinion provided an insufficient

description of when a cane would be needed. See Tr. 957. It indicates that

Crawley needed a cane when walking or standing, but also said that he did not

need a cane “all of the time” and it failed to provide specific times when

Crawley would need a cane. Id. Crawley has also not pointed to any record

evidence that he had a prescription for a cane. And the fact that Crawley was

observed walking with a cane or testified about using a cane doesn’t show that

a cane was medically necessary. See Parrish v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-1880, 2017

WL 2728394, at *12 (N.D. Ohio June 8, 2017) (“While there are some

indications in the medical records that Plaintiff was using a cane, this is

insufficient to establish that the cane was medically required”), report and

recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 2720332 (N.D. Ohio June 23, 2017).

Perhaps an even greater flaw in Crawley’s argument is that the ALJ

explicitly found that Dr. Belding’s opinion, which is the only medical opinion

indicating that Crawley needed a cane, was unpersuasive. Tr. 1010. As

explained above, the ALJ’s rationale for finding Dr. Belding’s opinion

unpersuasive complied with applicable regulations. Crawley does not address

how this finding affects the ALJ’s evaluation. He likewise does not point to

anything that would support an argument that the ALJ erred by omitting a

limitation from an unpersuasive opinion.

So, Crawley’s third issue does not provide a basis for remand.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Court affirm the

Commissioner’s decision.

Dated: May 20, 2025

/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.

James E. Grimes Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with

the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure

to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–531 (6th

Cir. 2019).