Roberts v. Parris

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

LEVIE ROBERTS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:22-cv-02479-SHL-atc

)

MIKE PARRIS, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY DOCKET, DENYING PETITION

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2254, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,

CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, AND

DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

Before the Court is the pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by a Person in State Custody (“§ 2254 Petition”) filed on July 21, 2022, in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee by Petitioner Levie Roberts, an inmate

at the Morgan County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”) in Wartburg, Tennessee. (ECF No. 1.)

On July 26, 2022, the court transferred the case to the United States District Court for the

Western District of Tennessee. (ECF No. 8.) The MCCX Warden1 filed Respondent’s Answer

to Petition for A Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 1, 2022. (ECF No. 18.) For the reasons

stated below, the Court DENIES the § 2254 Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. State Court Procedural History

1 Shawn Phillips is currently the MCCX Warden. See Tennessee Department of

Correction, Morgan County Correctional Complex (last accessed Apr. 21, 2025). The Clerk is

DIRECTED to modify the docket to terminate all references to Mike Parris and to add Shawn

Phillips as the Respondent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

On November 26, 2013, a grand jury in Shelby County, Tennessee, returned an

indictment charging Roberts with the second-degree murder of David Williams. (ECF No. 17-1

at PageID 34–35.) A jury trial began in the Shelby County Criminal Court on August 8, 2016.

(See ECF No. 17-6 at PageID 536–37.) William Massey and Joseph McClusky represented

Roberts at trial. (See id. at PageID 536.) On August 12, 2016, the jury returned a guilty

verdict. (ECF No. 17-8 at PageID 1019; see ECF No. 17-1 at PageID 81.) On January 12,

2017, the trial court sentenced Roberts to twenty years in prison. (See id. at PageID 82–88, 91.)

Roberts filed a notice of appeal. (Id. at PageID 96.) On July 14, 2017, Roberts’

appellate counsel, Barry Kuhn, filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal saying that “[a]fter several

discussions with appellate counsel, the appellant advised counsel on June 15, 2017 that he

wished to waive his right to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals.” (ECF No. 17-11 at

PageID 1095.) Kuhn said he discussed with Roberts the issues that would be raised and

presented on appeal. (Id. at PageID 1096.) Kuhn had advised Roberts that an order dismissing

the appeal would be final and that Roberts would have one year from the date of the order to file

a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.)

On July 26, 2017, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) granted the

Motion to Dismiss Appeal. (ECF No. 17-12.) The TCCA noted that, pursuant to Rule 11 of

the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Kuhn had included a signed statement from Roberts

that he understood his rights. (Id. at PageID 1100; see Affidavit in Support of Motion to

Dismiss Appeal, ECF No. 17-11 at PageID 1098–99.)

On November 1, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition For Post-Conviction Relief.

(ECF No. 17-13 at PageID 1114–42.) On June 19, 2018, Roberts, through appointed counsel J.

Shae Atkinson, filed an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Shelby County

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Criminal Court. (Id. at PageID 1145–51.) A post-conviction hearing was held over two days.

(See ECF Nos. 17-15 and 17-16.) On November 22, 2019, the post-conviction court entered an

order denying post-conviction relief, finding that Roberts was not prejudiced. (ECF No. 17-13

at PageID 1154–61.)

On post-conviction appeal, Roberts asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1)

not noticing that the State’s key witness gave prior inconsistent statements; and (2) failing to

recall the State’s key witness after the trial court gave the defense an opportunity to correct the

mistake. (ECF No. 17-18 at PageID 1300.) The TCCA affirmed. See Roberts v. State, No.

W2019-02165-CCA-R3-PC, 2021 WL 5495828, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2021). (ECF

No. 17-20). On March 28, 2022, the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal.

(ECF No. 17-23.)

B. Evidence at Trial

At about 10:00 p.m. on April 14, 2013, Williams, the victim, left his home on Philwood

Avenue, where he lived with his father and stepmother, and drove to a gas station on Summer

Avenue to buy a newspaper. Roberts, 2021 WL 5495828, at *1. Williams got into a brief

verbal altercation at the gas station with Roberts, Demarcus Allen, and Steven Weathersby. Id.

Roberts was driving a white Mercury Grand Marquis. Id. The men went into the store, and

Williams purchased his newspaper and left. Id. When Roberts, Allen, and Weathersby came

out of the store, they saw that the Mercury had been damaged and believed that the victim had

intentionally run into the car. Id. The three men asked the store manager where the victim

lived and to see the store’s surveillance video. Id. The manager refused and told the men to

call the police. Id.

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Instead, the three men drove around the neighborhood looking for Williams’ red Ford

Focus. Id. They found the car in front of his house and vandalized it. Id. Williams’ father, a

retired Memphis Police Department (“MPD”) detective, heard glass breaking, saw the men

“messing” with the Focus, and alerted his son. Id. While Williams ran outside, his father got a

pistol out of bedroom and went outside with the pistol in the pocket of his bathrobe. Id. He

saw the Mercury speed away, but he did not see his son. Id. Williams’ father went to the street

and saw his son lying on the pavement in a pool of blood, his legs apparently broken. Id.

Dr. Anna Winter Slagle, a medical resident who lived across the street from Williams,

tended to him. Id. at *1–2. Slagle testified that she heard loud banging noises, looked out her

living room window, and saw a white car “sitting in the middle of the street.” Id. at *2. Slagle

saw Williams run from his house waving his hands before he “planted himself in front of the car

with his hands up in the air.” Id. Williams was standing several feet in front of the car, but did

not touch it. Id. The car “went from pretty much 0 to 60,” according to Slagle. Id. Slagle

“did not notice ‘any hesitation’ from the car before it accelerated.” Id. The car ran over

Williams and sped away. Id.

Slagle testified that blood was coming out of Williams’ right ear and that her “doctor

instinct” kicked in, so she checked the victim’s pulse. Id. He had a pulse and was breathing,

but was unresponsive. Id. Slagle looked for a weapon, but she did not find one. Id. She then

called 911. Id.

Roberts’ counsel asked to recall Slagle to ask an omitted question. Id. Counsel noted

that Slagle’s primary statement, given to an “Officer Craig,” was similar to her testimony. Id.

However, there was another statement given to a different officer, Sergeant Kent, that “we didn’t

really see until right after [Slagle] testified” that said Slagle saw “a white four-door vehicle

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speeding down the street with a male white running next to it on the passenger’s side.” Id.

Slagle told Kent that the man “ran out in the street in front of the car and raised his hands but the

car kept going.” Id. Counsel said this statement shows that the car was speeding and Williams

moved in front of the car. Id. After some questioning, the trial court said that Roberts’ counsel

could call Slagle as a defense witness. Id. at *3. (See ECF No. 17-6 at PageID 631–36.)

Allen, who was in the car with Roberts, testified for the State. Id. He said that

Weathersby broke the rear window on the driver’s side of the Focus, and that someone came to

the door of Williams’ house. Id. Allen said that he, Weathersby, and Roberts got into the

Mercury, and Roberts “crunk the car up,” pushed the gas pedal, and the car moved forward

slowly. Id. Allen said that Williams ran outside, was hitting the passenger-side window of the

Mercury, and then “jumped in front of the car.” Id. Allen testified that someone said that

Williams had a gun and that Williams reached for something on his hip. Id. Allen said that the

three men in the Mercury “started ducking” down, and the Mercury “finally caught up with the

accelerator,” sped up, and ran over Williams. Id. Allen felt a “bump,” and he opened the car’s

door and looked back at Williams, who was “moving, getting up.” Id.

Weathersby also testified for the State. Id. He said that he and Allen were vandalizing

Williams’ car, and Williams ran outside. Id. Weathersby saw a “white lady” at the bus who

yelled that Williams had a gun. Id. According to Weathersby, the three men got into the

Mercury, and “everybody just put their head down.” Roberts “threw the car in drive and we just

pulled off.” Id. Weathersby said he saw a black pistol in Williams’ hand. Id. The Mercury

picked up speed, and Weathersby “heard a bump.” Id.

Weathersby acknowledged that he told police that Williams ran in front of the Mercury,

that Williams put his hand on the car’s hood like he was trying to stop the car, and that Roberts

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“put the car in drive and sped off and ran over” Williams. Id. Weathersby said that Roberts’

“old” Mercury was slow to accelerate and “[y]ou got to be pushing it . . . for it to pick up speed.”

Id.

Weathersby’s “audio-recorded statement to a defense investigator” was played for the

jury. Id. at *3. In the statement, Weathersby said, “[o]nce we back into [Roberts’] car, I

screamed out that [the victim] had a gun because he was running out the door with a gun in his

hand, which I seen was a gun.” Id. at *4. Everyone in the car ducked down to avoid getting

shot, and Roberts put the car in drive, while his head was ducked down, and just hit the gas. Id.

MPD Sergeant Robert Wilkie testified that, on April 17, 2013, Roberts waived his rights

and gave a statement. Id. In this statement, Roberts said Williams came outside with a gun, a

brown “wooded rifle,” in his hand and approached the Mercury. Id. Roberts ducked down

because he thought Williams was going to shoot and “pulled off as soon as possible.” Id.

Roberts ran over Williams “trying to get away.” Id. Wilkie asked Roberts if the Mercury had

mechanical problems, and he responded no. Id.

Williams died after spending a couple of hours at the hospital following the incident. Id.

Dr. Karen Chancellor, an expert in forensic pathology, performed Williams’ autopsy and

determined that he died of multiple blunt force injuries. Id. Williams had several skull

fractures; bleeding and swelling of the brain; numerous contusions, lacerations, and abrasions;

several broken ribs; a broken breastbone; and a broken left tibia. Id. Chancellor determined

that the head injury was fatal. Id. Williams had marijuana in his system. Id.

The defense called Kent to testify about his response to the incident. Id. Kent said he

spoke with Slagle about 11:40 p.m. and was “jotting stuff” on his notepad as she spoke. Id.

Kent wrote a supplement to his notes later in his office. Id. Kent said Slagle told him that she

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heard something outside, and when she looked out, “she saw a car speeding down the road and at

some point[,] she saw a man out there I guess with his hand up in front of the car and this car ran

over this man.” Id. Kent acknowledged that Slagle said the man was running alongside the

moving car and ran in front of the car. Id. On cross-examination, Kent testified that Williams

“tried to stop a light colored sedan who was speeding down the street.” Id. Kent testified that

Slagle did not say that Williams had a gun. Id.

After Kent’s testimony, the trial court asked if there were other witnesses Roberts wanted

to call, and Roberts responded that he thought Slagle was coming back to testify. Id. at *5.

The court responded, “I believe we got the statement in through the officer. We got it before the

jury.” Id.

MPD Officer David Wagner testified on rebuttal for the State. Id. Wagner responded

to the scene, spoke with Slagle, and typed her statement into a “PDA.” Id. Wagner wrote his

report from the “PDA” within an hour. Id. Wagner said that Slagle saw Williams running

alongside the passenger side of the white car and “step in front of the white car with his arms

outstretched in what appeared to be an attempt to get the car to stop.” Id. Slagle said the white

car then accelerated forward and struck Williams, who was knocked back several feet and fell to

the ground. Id. Slagle said the car continued accelerating, and Williams was run over. Id.

According to Wagner, Slagle said she first saw the car move “once the victim had stopped and

put his hands outstretched [in] what appeared to her to be an attempt to stop the car.” Id.

MPD Sergeant Kevin Craig testified on rebuttal about the statement that he took from

Slagle. Id. According to the formal, three-page, typed statement, Slagle saw “a white car with

a Caucasian male . . . running beside the passenger side of the vehicle.” Id. The man ran in

front of the vehicle waving his hands to stop. Id. Slagle said he “then planted himself in front

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of the car with his hands in the air.” Id. The driver “slammed on the accelerator and hit the

male directly,” and the man “then flew back a few feet and landed on his back . . . and the

vehicle then ran over him and fled the scene.” Id. Craig said that Slagle did not say anything

about the car moving before the victim planted himself in front of the car. Id.

C. The Post-Conviction Hearing

McClusky, Roberts’ lead trial counsel, testified that the defense had “quite a bit” of

discovery and that he either hand-delivered it or mailed it to Roberts. Roberts, 2021 WL

5495828, *6. (See ECF No. 17-15 at PageID 1180–81.) McClusky met with Roberts several

times while Roberts was in jail awaiting trial and was sure they reviewed the discovery. Id.

McClusky reviewed the discovery himself at least once before trial and prepared a trial

notebook. Id.

He did not remember if the State made a plea offer, but he testified that he would have

communicated any offer to Roberts. Id. McClusky noted that Williams’ father was a former

MPD officer and was “pretty upset,” and McClusky did not think the father would be satisfied

with a plea. Id.

Because Roberts claimed the victim jumped in front of the moving vehicle, the defense’s

theory was that Roberts was trying to leave when the victim came out of the house and that

Roberts could not see the victim in front of the vehicle because Roberts had ducked down. Id.

McClusky described the incident as “heated” and said that there was provocation because the

victim was approaching the vehicle and the victim’s father had a gun. Id. McClusky testified

that he would have “definitely” discussed voluntary manslaughter with Roberts. Id.

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The defense hired a private investigator. Id. However, Williams’ father refused to

speak with the investigator, and the defense did not speak with any of the police officers before

trial. Id. The defense reviewed the police reports. Id.

McClusky thought he spoke with Slagle before trial and the “details” of her statements

were in discovery. Id. McClusky said that, although he saw Kent’s supplement in the

discovery materials, he did not notice that it said the victim ran in front of a speeding car. Id.

McClusky put Kent on as a witness “instead of recalling [Slagle], due to some scheduling.” Id.

McClusky did not think it was necessary to bring Slagle back after Kent testified. Id.

McClusky advised Roberts to pursue direct appeal, but Roberts “wanted to go straight for post-

conviction.” Id. at *7.

On cross-examination, McClusky testified that there was some indication that the State

might re-indict Roberts for first-degree murder and that the State would not negotiate for less

than second-degree murder. Id. McClusky acknowledged that a weapon was not recovered

from the victim. Id. Further, McClusky said that Slagle was a “very good witness” and that

she probably did not need “coaching.” Id. McClusky said that, if Slagle had been called back

to testify, she would have been able to explain the inconsistent statement she made to Kent. Id.

Roberts called Slagle as a witness at the post-conviction hearing. Id. She said that she

would have told them that the white car was “stationary in the middle of the street,” and the

victim ran in front of the car with his hands in the air. Id. She said “then that car proceeded to

go from what I perceived as stationary, to full speed and ran over the individual, and fled the

scene.” Id. After reviewing Kent’s supplement, Slagle said that Kent’s description of the

events was not true and that the car was stationary, and was “never, never moving.” Id.

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Kent testified that he wrote the supplement from his notes, that it was not a formal

statement, and that he would not have written something that the witness did not tell him. Id.

On cross-examination, Kent acknowledged that he did not write down “verbatim” what Slagle

said; that the supplement did not have all the details about the incident; and that the supplement

did not specify whether the car was moving or stationary when the victim moved in front of it.

Id. at *8.

Roberts testified that his family retained counsel for him, that his counsel met with him

“maybe five times” in jail, that counsel provided discovery, that Roberts reviewed the discovery,

and that Roberts pointed out to counsel what his defense would be at trial. Id. Roberts said

there was a plea offer for twenty years and an offer for thirteen and one-half years and that he

and his counsel talked about his defense and the offers.2 Id. Roberts’ co-counsel said he would

fight for a lesser-included offense at trial and that he would show the jury that the victim’s father

had a gun. Id. Defense counsel did not cross-examine Slagle on her inconsistent statements,

and Roberts “had to point it out” at trial. Id. Still, defense counsel did not call Slagle back to

testify, despite the trial court granting permission to recall her because they were “trying to save

time.” Id. Roberts acknowledged that he turned down a twenty-year offer, but he said that, if

he had known his counsel was not going to cross-examine witnesses, he “may would have pled

guilty.” Id.

Roberts testified that Slagle gave two statements on the scene to two different officers

and that her third statement, made at the police department two to three hours later, was

inconsistent with her prior statements at the scene. Id.

2 The district attorney general affirmed that a twenty-year plea deal was offered to Roberts.

Id.

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II. ROBERTS’ § 2254 PETITION

On July 21, 2022, Roberts filed his § 2254 Petition, alleging the following grounds for

relief:

1. He received ineffective assistance of counsel (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4–5); and

2. The Warden is depriving Roberts of freedom from bodily restraint and punishment

without the procedural safeguards secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution (id. at PageID 6–7).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Claim 1, Roberts alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to review

discovery before trial, interview Slagle, and subpoena Slagle for further questioning at trial.

(ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) Roberts contends that, on the second day of trial, his trial counsel

admitted it was the first time he reviewed the discovery documents. (Id.) Roberts asserts that

the discovery documents included police statements with Slagle’s conflicting statements about

whether Roberts’ car was speeding down the street or stationary when Slagle first saw it. (Id.)

He argues that, because his trial counsel did not review discovery, he failed to interview Slagle

before trial and to cross-examine her about the conflicting statements. (Id.) Even after the trial

court allowed the defense to call Slagle as a defense witness, Robert’s counsel refused to call her

for cross-examination about the inconsistent statements, and the jury never had the opportunity

to hear, in Slagle’s own words, why the statements were inconsistent. (Id. at PageID 5.)

Respondent argues that Roberts is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance

claims because they are procedurally defaulted and/or without merit. (ECF No. 18 at PageID

1410–16.) First, Respondent argues that Roberts did not properly exhaust the claim that counsel

failed to review discovery because, although it was raised in the post-conviction trial court,

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Roberts failed to raise it before the TCCA on post-conviction appeal, and Roberts has not argued

cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default. (ECF No. 18 at PageID 1411–12.)

Second, Respondent contends that the claim that counsel should have interviewed Slagle was not

exhausted and is procedurally defaulted. (Id. at PageID 1412–13.) Respondent also analyzes

this claim as it was raised in his post-conviction appeal, and argues that it is without merit

because Roberts was not prejudiced. (Id. at PageID 1413.) Third, Respondent asserts that,

although Roberts did exhaust his claim about failure to recall Slagle to testify as a defense

witness, that claim lacks merit. (Id. at PageID 1414–15.)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) “requires habeas

petitioners to exhaust their claims in state court before turning to a federal court for relief,” and

“a state court’s resolution of a claim on the merits receives deference in federal habeas

proceedings.” Chandler v. Brown, 126 F.4th 1178, 1188 (6th Cir. 2025); see 28 U.S.C. §§

2254(b)(1)(A), (c), and (d)(1)–(2). “Ordinarily, a state prisoner satisfies this exhaustion

requirement by raising his federal claim before the state courts in accordance with state

procedures.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 378 (2022). The prisoner must present to the

state courts “the same claim under the same theory,” argue the claim’s factual and legal basis at

each level of the state court system, and make the state court aware of the “federal nature of the

claim.” Davis v. Jenkins, 115 F.4th 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2024). If a claim has never been

presented to the state court but a state-court remedy is no longer available (such as when an

applicable statute of limitations bars a claim), the claim is technically exhausted, but

procedurally barred. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32 (1991). To avoid

procedural default, a habeas petitioner in Tennessee must present his federal claims to the trial

court and, on appeal, to the TCCA. Covington v. Mills, 110 F. App’x 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2004).

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A prisoner may overcome procedural default by showing cause and prejudice or factual

innocence. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004); Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 527–28

(2017) (describing procedural default as a corollary to the exhaustion requirement).

1. Failure to Review Discovery & Interview Slagle

Respondent contends that Roberts’ claims of counsel’s failure to review discovery and

failure to interview Slagle before trial are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 18

at PageID 1411–13.) On post-conviction appeal, Roberts asserted that trial counsel was

ineffective for “not noticing” that Slagle gave inconsistent statements and for failing “to call

Slagle back to testify.” Roberts, 2021 WL 5495828, at *9. (See ECF No. 17-18 at PageID

1300.) Although related to Roberts’ post-conviction ineffective assistance claims, Roberts’s

habeas claims about discovery and interviewing Slagle before trial do not assert the same facts

and same theory as in the post-conviction proceedings, were not fairly presented before the

TCCA, and were not exhausted. Roberts does not argue cause and prejudice or actual innocence

to overcome the procedural default. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320–21 (1995); see

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Roberts’ ineffective assistance claims about failure to review

discovery and to interview Slagle are procedurally defaulted and DENIED.

2. Failure to Recall Slagle

Roberts’ ineffective assistance claim related to counsel’s failure to recall Slagle to testify

was exhausted on post-conviction appeal. See Roberts, 2021 WL 5495828, at *9. The TCCA

cited the relevant case law in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which provides that

a convicted defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that “counsel’s

performance was deficient” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 466

U.S. at 687. “[B]ecause a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove

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either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective

assistance claim.” Roberts, 2021 WL 5495828, at *10 (quoting Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363,

370 (Tenn. 1996). The TCCA agreed with the State and the post-conviction court that Roberts

had not demonstrated deficiency or prejudice. Roberts, 2021 WL 5495828, at *9–10.

Where, as here, a state prisoner’s claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court,

a federal court can issue a writ only if the adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The petitioner carries the burden of proof

for this “difficult to meet” and “highly deferential standard[.]” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.

170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A state court’s decision is “contrary” to federal law when it “arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached” by the Supreme Court on a question of law or “decides a case

differently than” the Supreme Court has “on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). “[A] run-of-the-mill state-court decision

applying the correct legal rule . . . to the facts of a prisoner’s case” does not “fit comfortably

within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Id. at 406.

An “unreasonable application” of federal law occurs when the state court “identifies the

correct governing legal principle from” the Supreme Court’s decisions “but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. This application of federal law

must be “objectively unreasonable” for the writ to issue. Id. at 409. It is not sufficient that the

habeas court, in its independent judgment, determines that the state court decision applied clearly

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established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010)

(citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411). Indeed, as a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a

federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented

in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

Regarding his ineffective assistance claim, Roberts has failed to demonstrate that the

TCCA’s decision was contrary to or unreasonably applied established Federal law or resulted in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

To establish deficient performance, the first prong of Strickland, a defendant “must show

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. A

court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that

counsel’s representation was within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.

at 689. The challenger’s burden is to show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at

687. “The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under

‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best practices or most common

custom.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

To demonstrate prejudice, a prisoner must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. “It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable

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effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel’s errors must be so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 111–12 (“In assessing prejudice under

Strickland, the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel’s performance had no effect

on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if

counsel acted differently. . . . The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just

conceivable.”) (internal citations omitted); Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27 (2009) (per

curiam) (“But Strickland does not require the State to ‘rule out’ [a more favorable outcome] to

prevail. Rather, Strickland places the burden on the defendant, not the State, to show a

‘reasonable probability’ that the result would have been different.”).

The deference to be given a state-court decision under Strickland is magnified when

reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all

the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly

deferential.” Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997). When the two standards apply in

tandem, review is “doubly” deferential. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)

(internal citation omitted). The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable

applications is substantial. 556 U.S. at 123. Federal habeas courts must guard against the

danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d).

“When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The

question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (parallel citations omitted).

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Roberts argues that, without consulting him, his trial counsel, refused to recall Slagle for

cross-examination on the inconsistent statements made before trial and that the jury never heard,

in Slagle’s own words, why she gave conflicting statements. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.)

Respondent argues that Roberts did not show deficient performance and prejudice; that the

TCCA’s opinion was “run-of-the-mill” and not contrary to established Supreme Court precedent;

and that the TCCA’s opinion was not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement” under the unreasonable application clause of § 2254(d)(1). (ECF No. 18 at

PageID 1414–15.) Respondent asserts that the record supports the TCCA’s reasoning because

the defense’s strategic decision resulted in Slagle’s contradictory statements coming into

evidence without her having the opportunity to deny the statement or contend that Kent got it

wrong. (Id. at PageID 1415.) According to Respondent, the jury heard Slagle’s statements

through Kent’s testimony; the TCCA’s factual determination is presumed to be correct under 28

U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1); and Roberts has not rebutted the presumption about this factual

determination by showing clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. (Id.)

Roberts does not argue his habeas claims within the context of the AEDPA and does not

contend that the TCCA’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland

or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented

in state court. However, even if he did so argue, the TCCA cited and applied Strickland in its

analysis. See Roberts, 2021 WL 5495828, at *9–10. The TCCA addressed counsel’s decision

to call Kent to testify instead of Slagle and the benefit to the defense of not giving Slagle the

opportunity to explain her conflicting statements, as well as counsel’s closing argument that

Slagle’s statement to Kent was correct and closer in time to the incident. Id. at *10. The

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TCCA considered counsel’s approach to be a strategic choice that should not be second-guessed

in hindsight. Id. The TCCA cited state case law consistent with Strickland and its progeny that

applies a strong presumption of reasonableness to counsel’s strategic decisions. Id. (citing Irick

v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 652 (Tenn. Crim. App. (1998)), and Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9

(Tenn. 1982)); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“the defendant must overcome the presumption

that, . . . the underchallenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy’”). The TCCA

decided that “[t]rial counsel were able to correct their mistake . . . by getting the information to

the jury through Sergeant Kent’s testimony.” Roberts, 2021 WL 5495828, at *6. The TCCA

focused on Slagle’s and Kent’s testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing and noted

that “post-conviction counsel confronted Dr. Slagle with Sergeant Kent’s statement as the

Petitioner had wanted trial counsel to do at trial.” Id. at *10. The TCCA concluded that Slagle

“reiterated that Petitioner’s car did not move until the victim stood in front of the car, that

Sergeant Kent’s supplement was incorrect, and that [Slagle] would have said so if asked about

the supplement at trial.” Id. The TCCA opined that “even if trial counsel were deficient for not

noticing Dr. Slagle’s inconsistent statements in the discovery materials, we agree with the post-

conviction court that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice.” Id.

The TCCA’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland

and is based on a reasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented. Roberts’

claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to recall Slagle is without merit and is

therefore DENIED.

B. Freedom From Bodily Restraint & Punishment

Roberts asserts that the Warden is depriving Roberts of the “Freedom Bodily Restraint

and Punishment” without the procedural safeguards of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to

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the United States Constitution through his enforcement of Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-1-

101, et seq., the state statutes for correctional institutions and inmates. (ECF No. 1 at PageID

6.) Roberts then alleges the same facts used to support his ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claim. (Id.) Roberts admits that he did not exhaust state remedies for this purported grounds

for relief. (Id. at PageID 6–7.)

Respondent contends that the claim is procedurally defaulted and not cognizable. (ECF

No. 18 at PageID 1416–17.) Respondent argues that Roberts did not exhaust his claim and that

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot establish cause for the procedural

default. (Id. at PageID 1416.) Respondent asserts that Roberts’ attempt to connect the

Tennessee statute about imprisonment to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is not a

sufficient connection to present a cognizable constitutional claim. (Id. at PageID 1417.)

The Court construes Roberts’ assertion that he should be free from bodily restraint and

punishment as a request for relief based on the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (Sixth

Amendment violations) instead of an independent constitutional claim. As stated supra, the

Court has determined that Roberts is not entitled to relief on his Sixth Amendment claim and

therefore not entitled to relief for his claim to freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because every claim asserted by Roberts is procedurally defaulted and/or without merit,

the Court DENIES the § 2254 Petition. The § 2254 Petition is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. Judgment shall be entered for Respondent.

V. APPEAL ISSUES

No § 2254 petitioner may appeal without a certificate of appealability (“COA”). 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make “a

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substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2);

Dennis v. Burgess, 131 F.4th 537, 539 (6th Cir. 2025). A petitioner must demonstrate “that

jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to

proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). If the district court denies

relief on a procedural ground without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the petitioner demonstrates “that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because jurists of reason would not debate the

district court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claims, the Court DENIES a COA.

A party seeking pauper status on appeal must first file a motion in the district court, along

with a supporting affidavit. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). If the district court certifies that an

appeal would not be taken in good faith or otherwise denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis,

the prisoner must file his motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the appellate court. See Fed.

R. App. P. 24(a)(4)–(5). For the same reasons the Court denies a COA, the Court CERTIFIES

that any appeal would not be taken in good faith. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is

DENIED.3

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 20th day of May, 2025.

s/ Sheryl H. Lipman

SHERYL H. LIPMAN

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3 If Roberts files a notice of appeal, he must pay the full $605 appellate filing fee or file a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis and supporting affidavit in the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals within 30 days of the date of entry of this order. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5).

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