Thompson v. Reagle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JERRY THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-25 DRL-AZ

CHRISTINA REAGLE et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Jerry Thompson, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint against

eight defendants alleging they violated his right under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because he has been housed in a cell

at the Indiana State Prison (ISP) that is not handicap-accessible and does not

accommodate his physical disability. ECF 6. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court

still must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous

or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

Mr. Thompson, who is currently housed at ISP, is a 57-year-old inmate who

underwent reconstructive right hip surgery due to a gunshot wound and, as a result, has

a physical condition called avascular necrosis. ECF 6 at 7. He has three screws in his right

hip and a bullet lodged in his right pelvis, which limits his ability to walk, stand, bend,

squat, climb stairs, and maintain balance. Id. He has also had reconstructive surgery of

his left knee, and a herniated disk removed from his back. Id. at 7-8.

Mr. Thompson states he is a qualified individual with a physical disability under

the ADA and Wabash Valley Correctional Facility’s medical staff classified him with a

disability code of “C” when he began his sentence in 2020. Id. at 8, 10. He was assigned a

wheelchair to accommodate his disability. Id. at 10.

In 2020, he was assigned to cell number 307 in P-Housing Unit (PHU) at Wabash,

a handicap-accessible cell, which included grab bars, an ADA compliant toilet and sink,

and adequate door and cell space to use his wheelchair. Id. at 10-11. The shower in PHU

was equipped with a shower chair, grab bars, and wheelchair accessible entry, all which

complied with ADA and Rehabilitation Act regulations. Id. at 11.

In 2021, Mr. Thompson was moved from cell number 307 in PHU to a cell in G-

Housing Unit (GHU), which was not handicap-accessible. Id. After Wabash staff

recognized its error, he was moved back to PHU and housed in cell number 320, a

handicap-accessible cell. Id.

In August 2022, Mr. Thompson was moved to cell number 307 in C-Housing Unit

because he was sanctioned with a disciplinary offense. Id. He asserts cell number 307 was

not compliant with ADA or Rehabilitation Act regulations because it did not have a

handicap-accessible toilet, sink, and desk, or grab bars. Id. at 11-12. Because the cell did

not have grab bars, he fell while he was transferring himself from his wheelchair to the

toilet. Id. at 12-13. The fall exacerbated his existing conditions and caused his back, neck,

right hip, and left thumb to be painful. Id. at 13. An x-ray showed Mr. Thompson’s left

thumb had been fractured. Id. at 13-14. He was later moved to a handicap-accessible cell

and given regular access to shower areas that complied with the ADA and Rehabilitation

Act. Id. at 14.

In December 2022, Mr. Thompson was transferred from Wabash to ISP by van. Id.

During the transport, he was handcuffed, chained around his stomach, shackled, and

wore a seatbelt for eight hours, which exacerbated his injuries and caused him extreme

pain. Id. When he arrived at ISP, he was assigned to cell number 105 in D-Housing Unit

(DHU), which is not handicap-accessible and does not comply with ADA or

Rehabilitation Act regulations. Id. at 15. He was later moved to B-Housing Unit (BHU),

a unit that is not handicap-accessible. Id. Mr. Thompson asserts the cells in BHU do not

have grab bars, a handicap-accessible toilet or sink, or adequate floor space to maneuver

his wheelchair. Id. The shower area does not have a mounted shower chair or a shower

mat to keep him from slipping and falling. Id.

In January 2023, Mr. Thompson filed a grievance and wrote to Warden Ron Neal

asking to be transferred to a facility that would accommodate his disability. Id. at 22. He

also sent a letter to ADA Coordinator D. Taylor and submitted a request for interview

form to Unit Team Manager Pamela Bane asking that he be afforded reasonable

accommodations or be transferred to a facility that could accommodate his physical

disability. Id. at 23.

In mid-July 2023, Mr. Thompson was reclassified and assigned to cell number 102

in DHU which was not handicap-accessible. Id. at 24. Several days later, Nurse Deanna

Laughlin went to Mr. Thompson’s cell and took his assigned wheelchair from him. Id. He

asserts this act was vindictive, retaliatory, and done without justification. Id. Nurse

Laughlin told him she was taking his wheelchair because Assistant Warden Dawn Buss

observed him on video footage in BHU out of his wheelchair. Id. at 24-25. He asserts,

however, that the wheelchair was only prescribed for long distance transport. Id. at 25.

Mr. Thompson filed a grievance about the incident, but received no relief and was denied

access to the grievance appeal process. Id.

On August 2, 2023, Mr. Thompson sent a letter to Warden Neal and copies of the

letter to Assistant Warden Buss, Unit Team Manager Bane, and ADA Coordinator Taylor

informing them that he was a qualified individual with a disability and the Indiana

Department of Correction was denying him access to reasonable accommodations for his

physical disability. Id. He requested that he be transferred to a facility equipped to

accommodate his disability. Id. On August 9, 2023, Mr. Thompson was released back to

BHU where he was assigned to a cell that was not handicap-accessible. Id. at 25-26. He

asserts that Unit Team Manager Joseph Schneider, who was in charge of managing BHU,

and responsible for making reasonable accommodations for inmates with disabilities,

failed to ensure that BHU met ADA and Rehabilitation Act standards. Id. at 26.

Mr. Thompson claims the defendants violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

because they have not provided him with a handicap-accessible cell and shower at ISP

and because they transported him in a van that did not accommodate his disability. Id. at

15-18. He avers they knew or should have known he is a qualified individual with a

physical disability who required reasonable accommodations. Id. Mr. Thompson has

sued eight defendants and seeks monetary damages. Id. at 29-30.

Title II of the ADA provides that qualified individuals with disabilities may not

“be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Prisons and correctional facilities are

public entities within the purview of Title II. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,

210 (1998). Officials can be sued under the ADA for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Radaszweski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 2004). When an inmate

seeks monetary damages, the law favors replacing a prisoner’s ADA claim with a parallel

claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C`. § 701, given the uncertainty about the

availability of damages under Title II and because the relief available is “coextensive.”

Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2012).

Under the Rehabilitation Act, damages are available against a state that accepts

federal assistance for prison operations, as all states do. Id. To state a claim under the

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a qualified person (2) with a

disability and (3) the defendant denied him access to a program, service, or activity or

otherwise discriminated against him because of his disability.1 Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778

F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015). “Refusing to make reasonable accommodations is

1 “[W]ith respect to this lawsuit, the analysis governing each statute is the same except that the

Rehabilitation Act includes as an additional element the receipt of federal funds, which all states

accept for their prisons.” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670; see also Conners v. Wilkie, 984 F.3d 1255, 1260 (7th

Cir. 2021) (noting that the standards under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are the same

except that under the Rehabilitation Act “the plaintiff’s disability must be the sole reason for the

alleged discriminatory action” while the ADA “requires only that [it] be a reason for the

challenged action”) (emphasis in original).

tantamount to denying access[.]” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 (citation omitted). Additionally, a

plaintiff can establish intentional discrimination through a showing of deliberate

indifference. Lacy v. Cook Cty., Illinois, 897 F.3d 847, 863 (7th Cir. 2018). In other words,

discrimination occurs when the defendant knows that a violation of these rights is

“substantially likely” yet fails to act. Id. (citation omitted). A claim under either the ADA

or Rehabilitation Act cannot be brought against individual employees. Any claim under

these statutes is a claim against the state agency itself.2 See Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670.

Therefore, Mr. Thompson may not proceed against the defendants pursuant to the ADA

or Rehabilitation Act. However, because Mr. Thompson has been denied access to

reasonable accommodations for his physical disability at ISP, he will be permitted to

proceed against the Indiana Department of Correction, which is an arm of the State. See

Lembach v. Indiana, 987 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (“the IDOC is an arm of the

State of Indiana, since it is established as part of the executive branch of state

government”).

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Jerry Thompson leave to proceed against the Indiana Department of

Correction for compensatory and punitive damages for denying him reasonable

2 It is unclear whether Mr. Thompson will need to demonstrate direct liability or whether

respondeat superior applies. This issue has not yet been decided by the Seventh Circuit. Ravenna

v. Vill. of Skokie, 388 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (holding that, to prevail, the plaintiff

would need to show that an official with authority to take corrective action had actual knowledge

of the alleged wrongdoing); Royer v. City of Elkhart, No. 3:22-CV-254 JD, 2022 WL 17600377, at *16

(N.D. Ind. Dec. 13, 2022) (requiring a showing of direct liability).

accommodations at ISP, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and section

504 of the Rehabilitation Act;

(2) DISMISSES all other claims;

(3) DISMISSES Commissioner Christina Reagle, Warden Ron Neal, Assistant

Warden Dawn Buss, Unit Team Manager Pamela Bane, Unit Team Manager Joseph

Schneider, Nurse Deanna Laughlin, Jane Doe 1, and ADA Coordinator D. Taylor;

(4) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service from

(and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to locate

and serve process on) the Indiana Department of Correction, with a copy of this order

and the amended complaint (ECF 6); and

(5) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), the Indiana Department of Correction

to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-

1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this

screening order.

SO ORDERED.

May 19, 2025 s/ Damon R. Leichty

Judge, United States District Court