The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DONALDSONVILLE GLASS AND CIVIL ACTION
BODY WORKS, INC.
VERSUS 22-817-SDD-RLB
CITY OF GONZALES, ET AL.
consolidated with
SOUTHERN TOWING & TRANSPORT, CIVIL ACTION
LLC, ET AL
VERSUS 23-473-SDD-RLB
CITY OF GONZALES
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Declaratory Relief filed by Plaintiff Gonzales Towing and Repair, Inc. (“Plaintiff’).'
Defendant, City of Gonzales (“Defendant” or the “City”) opposes the Motion. For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion will be denied.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises out of the claims brought by Plaintiffs, Southern Towing &
Transport, LLC (“Southern Towing”) and Gonzales Towing and Repair, Inc. (Gonzales
Towing”) that the City of Gonzales violated their First Amendment rights of political
? Rec. Doc. 87.
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speech and association and created an illegal monopoly by adopting a five-company
towing rotation list for the City.? Plaintiffs also sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs claimed they were not selected to the Defendant’s towing rotation list because
they did not support City of Gonzales Chief of Police Sherman Jackson’s (“Chief
Jackson’) latest re-election bid. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,* which
the Court granted in part and denied in part.5 The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ antitrust
claims with prejudice but denied summary judgment as to their First Amendment and
declaratory/injunctive claims.®
The First Amendment claim proceeded to a jury trial, where a jury returned a
verdict in favor of Gonzales Towing and awarded it $2,500.00 in nominal damages;
however, the jury returned a verdict against Southern Towing, finding that its exclusion
from the towing rotation list was not motivated by any political soeech or conduct.’
At the trial’s conclusion, the Court advised the Parties that it would entertain
briefing on the request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Gonzales Towing has filed
the pending Motion for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, which is opposed by the City of
Gonzales.
Al. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff argues it is entitled to injunctive relief based on a jury verdict finding that
the Defendant violated its First Amendment rights by excluding it from the towing rotation
list in retaliation for its constitutionally protected conduct. Plaintiff maintains it continues
3 Rec. Doc. 18, 916, 13, 15, 16, 19, 22.
4 Rec. Doc. 39.
5 Rec. Doc. 54.
5 Id.
7 Rec. Doc. 83.
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to suffer irreparable harm because the exclusion continues. Plaintiff contends it has
satisfied the standard for injunctive relief, arguing it has shown success on the merits,
irreparable harm, that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest. Plaintiff also cites jurisprudence supporting tts argument that it is
entitled to a permanent injunction based on Defendant's past conduct and lack of
recognition of its transgression. Plaintiff claims the City's conduct was egregious, the
violation recurrent, and the City had actual knowledge of violations of regulations but did
nothing. Plaintiff contends the City is responsible for ensuring compliance with towing
regulations. Plaintiff argues for injunctive relief to prohibit continuing violations of its First
Amendment rights.
Plaintiff also argues declaratory relief is appropriate and asks the Court to declare
the current rotation list illegal and unconstitutional. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's
creation of the towing rotation list, while permitted under law, is unconstitutional as
applied. This premise, Plaintiff argues, is demonstrated by the record of this proceeding
of unlawful patronage and the jury's finding that Plaintiff was excluded from inclusion
because of its engagement in First Amendment protected activity. Plaintiff maintains
declaratory relief is appropriate even without standing for injunctive relief, as a favorable
outcome will redress not only past injuries but future injuries. Plaintiff argues that a
declaration that the City’s towing rotation list is facially invalid would protect others beyond
Plaintiff. Finally, Plaintiff contends the trial evidence established that the towing rotation
list was illegally implemented, as the Defendant refused to undertake its legal mandate
to review and determine compliance with regulations.
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Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief, asserting that it should
not encompass more conduct than requested or exceed the legal basis of the lawsuit:
additionally general injunctions ordering a defendant to “obey the law” are prohibited.
Defendant maintains Plaintiff is not entitled to inclusion on the rotation list, only the
opportunity to apply, and both Gonzales Towing and Southern Towing have submitted
applications since the trial. Further, Defendant contends the trial was about why Plaintiff
was not on the list, not whether the list itself is illegal or unconstitutional. Moreover,
granting declaratory relief would have far-reaching consequences for other towing
rotation lists. Defendant cites jurisprudence explaining that injunctive relief is not
automatically awarded even when a violation is established.
Defendant also argues Plaintiff has not shown irreparable injury, as it provided no
evidence of financial degradation, and it now has the opportunity to apply for inclusion on
the list. Defendant acknowledged that it cannot deny an application based on an
applicant's First Amendment protected conduct but maintains that state law gives it wide
discretion in implementing and selecting companies for the list. Defendant notes that
Plaintiff received a monetary remedy for the First Amendment violation found by the jury;
however, the requested permanent injunction is vague and fails to satisfy the specificity
requirements of FRCP 65(d).
Defendant further claims Plaintiff's requested relief pursuant to LAC Title 55 §§
1931 and 19471 is unavailable because these statutes apply to storage facilities, not the
City.2 Defendant argues LAC 55 §1.1947 gives the agency discretion regarding
participation and removal from the list, and penalties for violations are permissive, not
8 LAC 55:1.1927.
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mandatory.’ Importantly, Defendant notes that the jury did not find any violations of state
law.
Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief is a blanket
statement to follow the law, which is already a requirement. Moreover, striking the City's
list would not resolve Plaintiff's issues because other lists include some of the same
allegedly unqualified companies.
As for declaratory relief, Defendant argues this request is improper because it
operates under a premise that the list is illegal/unconstitutional unless Plaintiff is included.
Defendant argues this perspective is erroneous, as Plaintiff is entitled only to the
opportunity to submit an application, not to absolute inclusion on the list. Defendant
contends granting Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief would have far-reaching
consequences, potentially affecting towing rotation lists throughout the state, including
the State Police rotation list and other non-party law enforcement agencies. Additionally,
Defendant points out that the jury verdict did not find that the towing rotation list was illegal
or that Southern Towing was left off the list because of its constitutionally protected
conduct. Rather, the jury only found that one company's exclusion was substantially
motivated by its exercise of constitutionally protected conduct; it did not consider any
purported violations of state law.
tl. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Declaratory Judgment Act
“The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, ‘in a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction. . any court of the United States. .. may declare the rights and other
9 Id.
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legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought.’”?° The Court must ask “(1) ‘whether an ‘actual controversy’
exists between the parties’ in the case; (2) whether it has authority to grant declaratory
relief; and (3) whether ‘to exercise its broad discretion to decide or dismiss a declaratory
judgment action.’’'!? Moreover, a declaratory judgment “cannot be used to seek an
Juag ry Juag
opinion advising what the law would be on a hypothetical set of facts. . . .”'* “Basically,
the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show
that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”'?
B. Permanent Injunctive Relief
“The standard for determining whether a permanent versus a preliminary injunction
should issue is primarily the same, except that the Court determines the plaintiffs success
on the merits rather than the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits.”'* “To be
entitled to a permanent injunction for a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show (1)
that there has been such a violation, (2) the existence of continuing irreparable injury if
the injunction does not issue, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy at law.”?© However,
10 Donelon v. Altman, 2021 WL 4205654, at *3 (M.D. La. Sept. 15, 2021) (citing Frye v. Anadarko Petroleum
Corp., 953 F.3d 285, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2019)).
11 fd (citing Orix Credit All, Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000)).
12 fd (citing Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., 567 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2009)).
13 Id (citing Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)).
14 Dye v. McKeithen, 856 F.Supp. 303, 306 (W.D.La.1994)(citing Amoco Production Co. v. Village of
Gambel, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1404 n. 12, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987)(other citation
omitted).
18 Causeway Medical Suite v. leyoub, 905 F.Supp. 360, 366 (E.D.La.1995), aff'd 109 F.3d 1096 (5th
Cir.1997)(citing Dye, 856 F.Supp. at 306 (citing Newman v. State of Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th
Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083, 103 S.Ct. 1773, 76 L.Ed.2d 346 (1983))).
Page 6 of 14
even when a plaintiff succeeds at trial, injunctions are matters of “equitable discretion,”
and “[an injunction] does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course.”'6
1. Success on the Merits/Existence of a Constitutional Violation
It is undisputed that Plaintiff obtained a favorable jury verdict and modest award
on its First Amendment retaliation claim. However, the Court finds that the injunctive and
declaratory relief sought by Plaintiff far exceeds the scope of the jury’s verdict and the
success obtained. Plaintiff wants to the Court to declare the City’s towing rotation list
illegal and unconstitutional not just based on the jury’s verdict but specifically on the
grounds that the City has violated Louisiana law and regulations regarding the selection
and operation of towing rotation lists in general. Defendant is correct that the jury was
neither asked nor found any such violations of state law. The only injunctive relief
available that comports with the jury’s verdict would be the type of inappropriate “obey
the law” injunction ordering the City to select companies without violating the First
Amendment. Such broad injunctive relief is improper, and the Fifth Circuit has held that
“obey the law” injunctions cannot be sustained.'”
The issue of statutory compliance was not presented to the jury because these
arguments were made in support of Plaintiffs’ initial requests for injunctive and declaratory
relief; accordingly, the Court is the trier of fact in determining the entitlement to such
relief.‘° The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief on
18 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008): See also Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (holding that a federal judge is not “mechanically obligated” to
grant an-injunction for every violation of law).
17 See Abner v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., No. 03-0765, 2007 WL 1169373 at *1, n. 2, (W.D. La. Apr.
17, 2007)(citing Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1978)); Versata Software, Inc.
v. Internet Brands, Inc., No. 08-cv-313, 2012 WL 3075712, at * 3 (E.D. La. July 8, 2012)(citing Meyer v.
Brown & Root Const. Co., 6671 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981)).
18 See McClanahan v. Wilson, No. 17-1720-JWD-RLB, 2019 WL 3456623, at *
Page 7 of 14
the grounds that the City did not strictly comply with Louisiana law and regulations
regarding the towing industry.
The Louisiana Administrative Code provides that towing companies selected by a
law enforcement agency to participate on their rotation list shall participate at the
discretion of the law enforcement agency and may be removed for any violation of law,
agency rule, or policy.‘9 The controlling regulatory framework vests a high level of
discretion in law enforcement in the implementation and regulation of towing rotation lists.
First, the City is correct that LAC Title 55 § 1931 and 1941 apply to storage and
towing facilities, not the City. The City acknowledges that LAC Title 55 §1.1947 is
applicable to towing rotation lists. However, this section clearly provides that local law
enforcement agencies may establish a towing rotation list, and tow companies selected
by law enforcement “shall participate at the discretion of the law enforcement agency and
may be removed for any violation of law, agency rule, or policy.”2° A violators automatic
removal from the towing rotation list is not mandated by law, as Plaintiff suggests. Rather,
as the City argues, the law provides local law enforcement with discretion both in the
participation and removal from the list.
What the evidence did show at trial was that the City was not compliant with the
selection process, specifically in that it pre-selected towing companies and provided thern
with applications after-the-fact rather than allowing any interested towing companies to
submit applications first and then make subsequent selections. Nevertheless, even
considering this failure, the Court does not find that injunctive or declaratory relief are
appropriate here.
18 La. Admin Code. tit. 55, Pt I, § 1947.
20 LAC Title 55 §1.1947(A)(1) and (2).
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First, as set forth above, the standard for issuance of a permanent injunction for a
constitutional violation requires just that — a constitutional violation. The scope of relief
sought by Plaintiff is specific to the City’s application process violation - a statutory
violation. Second, since the trial concluded, both Plaintiffs have submitted applications
to participate in the City’s towing rotation list. This is all Plaintiff is entitled to — it is not
entitled to be placed on the list. Indeed, the law makes clear that “[p]lacement on the
Louisiana State Police rotation list is a privilege, not a right.”
2. Existence of Continuing Irreparable Injury Without Injunction
As to this requirement, the Court finds that Plaintiff's injury is neither continuing nor
irreparable. The law is clear that past wrongs do not necessarily demonstrate that the
same future wrongs are substantially likely to occur. Additionally, speculative harm is
insufficient to clear the high bar for obtaining an injunction. “Injunctions are forward-
looking remedies that may issue ‘only if future injury is “certainly impending.””’22
“[S]peculation built upon further speculation does not amount to a ‘reasonably certain
threat of imminent harm’ and does not warrant injunctive relief.2° “[B]ecause ‘the court
must decide whether the harm will in fact occur,’ a party seeking injunctive relief must
‘substantiate the claim of irreparable injury’ and ‘must show that the injury complained of
is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent
irreparable harm.”24
24 LAC 55:1.1907(B)(5).
22 Sierra Club v US Army Corps of Engineers, 482 F.Supp.3d 543, 556-557 (W.D. Tex. 2020)(quoting
Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 664 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added)).
23 Friends of Lydia Ann Channel v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 701 F. App'x 352, 357 (5th Cir.
2017) (quoting Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1991)).
4 Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 39 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting
Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
Page 9 of 14
Future injury based on past injury requires a showing there exists a substantial risk
that the conditions that lead to the past injury persist.25 For example, in Stringer v. Whitley,
the plaintiffs brought claims against Texas public officials for alleged violations of the
Equal Protection Clause and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.76 Two plaintiffs
believed the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) system automatically updated
their voter registration, only to later discover it did not when they were unable to vote in
the 2014 federal election.?’ There, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
both of which were granted by the district court on summary judgment.*® However, the
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the alleged injury was only a past injury—not a continuing
or threatened future injury.29 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show a sufficient
probability that they would use the noncompliant DPS system again under conditions
similar during the original injury.°° It was not enough to allege they would continue to use
the DPS system in the future because the only occasions that would trigger the voter
registration system would be (1) if or when the plaintiffs moved within Texas, or (2)
plaintiffs become unregistered to vote and/or wish to renew their driver’s licenses in
DPS.*! The court found any arguments that the plaintiff might move to be purely
speculative,°* and there was no evidence of a substantial risk the plaintiffs would be again
unable to update their voter registration using DPS.*% fel
25 Stringer, 942 F.3d 715.
26 Id, at 719.
27 Id.
28 Id,
29 Id. at 720. (emphasis added)
30 fd. at 722.
34 I.
32 Jd. at 723. (emphasis added)
33 Id,
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In the present case, Plaintiff has not shown a substantial risk that future political
retaliation or application process violations will continue in the City’s towing list selection
process. Unlike Stringer, where the plaintiffs only alleged their intended future use of the
DPS system, Plaintiff herein has submitted a second application to be on the City’s towing
rotation list. While Plaintiff alleges its continued absence on the City’s list is a result of
retaliation, Plaintiff relies solely on the jury verdict that determined past conduct and
speculate that the conduct will persist. This does not support a permanent injunction.
Plaintiff has no actual knowledge or evidence that its post-trial application has been or
will be denied because of retaliation or for any one of a multitude of legally cognizable
reasons. Plaintiff argues:
[T]the defendant in this case showed no “recognition of’ transgression and,
indeed, Officer Dennis admitted that the only reason there was any
consideration of altering behavior was because of the trial. When asked
whether or not the City would now be taking steps to determine compliance
and an actual considered application process, undersigned recalls Officer
Dennis testifying, along the lines of, well, maybe now.*4
Plaintiff interprets this testimony as evidence that the same flippant treatment will be given
to the towing list application process in the future. The Court disagrees. A trial and
partially unfavorable verdict could serve as great motivation to the City to follow the
regulations in the application process and to make selection decisions based on non-
retaliatory grounds. Should the City continue the past behavior, it is subject again to
potential lawsuits and damages. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed fo demonstrate
that the injury suffered will continue absent an injunction.
Plaintiff's injury is also not irreparable. Longstanding Fifth Circuit jurisprudence
holds that, “[w]hen an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts
34 Rec, Doc. 86-1, p. 3.
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hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”*> This is certainly true
when the allegations are that the constitutional violations involve First Amendment free
speech, the right to vote, and the right to privacy.*° Here, however, both Plaintiffs sought
compensatory damages for income they claimed they lost by their exclusion from the
City’s list. As a matter of law, “[i]rreparable injury is harm that ‘cannot be undone through
monetary damages,’ that is, harm for which money damages are inadequate or for which
money damages are ‘especially difficult’ to compute.”’ “The ‘central inquiry in deciding
whether there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff is whether the
plaintiffs injury could be compensated by money damages.’”*8 Accordingly, “there can be
no irreparable injury where money damages would adequately compensate a plaintiff.”>9
Without citation to any authority, Plaintiff contends “whether or not plaintiff
Gonzales obtained damages for the loss of its freedoms does not undercut the finding of
irreparable injury.”4° Further, Plaintiff maintains the Court “denied plaintiff's ability to
pursue damages, other than nominal damages[.]’4 However, the Court’s ruling’? touched
on the evidence that was required under Louisiana law to establish damages for lost
profits; the Court did not simply preclude compensatory damages as unavailable.
35 Book People, Incorporated v. Wong, 91 F.4th 318, 340 (5th Cir. 2024)(quoting Opulent Life Church v.
City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 2012)(quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller
& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995))(internal quotation marks
omitted).
36 See Lambert v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., No. 05-5931, 2006 WL 8456316, at *7 (E.D. La.
Mar. 22, 2006).
37 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Guidry, 724 F.Supp.2d 612, 619 (quoting Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield
Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir.1981); Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc., 878 F.2d
806, 810 fn. 1 (5th Cir.1989)).
38 Id. (quoting Allied Marketing Group, Inc., 878 F.2d at 810 fn. 1).’
38 Id. (citing DFW Metro Line Services v. Southwestern Bell, 901 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir.1990) (citations
omitted)). :
4° Rec. Doc. 86-1, p. 5.
44 Id.
42 Rec. Doc. 77.
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Plaintiffs attempted to establish lost profits damages through only their own testimony
without any supporting documentary evidence. The Court analyzed the applicable
jurisprudence and concluded that, under Louisiana law, “the uncorroborated testimony by
a plaintiff alone is insufficient to provide economic loss damages to a degree of
reasonable certainty.“° The Court made clear that Plaintiff was permitted to present
evidence of lost profits such as tax returns, invoices, or any other measure of
corroborating evidence. Because Plaintiff lacked this documentation, it could not present
evidence of lost profits based solely on the speculative testimony of the Plaintiffs’ owners.
Clearly, the Plaintiff believed its economic injury was monetarily compensable and sought
such a remedy, and with the appropriate evidence, the Court would have allowed Plaintiff
to seek recovery of such damages. Thus, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that its injury
is irreparable.
3. Lack of Adequate Remedy at Law
The final requirement to obtain permanent injunctive relief for a constitutional
violation requires Plaintiff show the lack of an adequate remedy at law. Here, Plaintiff
obtained an adequate remedy at law in the form of nominal damages. Many courts have
held that a jury award for a technical constitutional violation can be considered an
adequate remedy at law, and post-trial injunctive or declaratory relief is not always
warranted. In Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, the Supreme Court held that
damages based on the abstract "value" or "importance" of constitutional rights are not
permissible elements of compensatory damages in Section 1983 cases.44 The Court
emphasized that compensatory damages for actual harm are ordinarily sufficient to deter
43 Id. at p. 7.
44 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
Page 13 of 14
constitutional violations;** this principle aligns with the notion that a jury award for a
technical constitutional violation, which compensates for actual harm, can be deemed
adequate.
Furthermore, in Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, the Supreme Court held that nominal
damages can redress a past injury, emphasizing that even small monetary awards can
provide concrete relief and affect the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.*°
This case illustrates that monetary damages, even nominal ones, can be an adequate
remedy for constitutional violations, potentially negating the need for additional injunctive
or declaratory relief.
Because Plaintiff obtained an adequate remedy at law, the Court finds it is not
entitled to permanent injunctive relief. It is likewise not entitled to a declaratory judgment
declaring the City’s current towing rotation list illegal and unconstitutional.
Ill. © CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or Declaratory
Relief filed by Plaintiff Gonzales Towing and Repair, Inc. is DENIED.*” Judgment shall be
entered in accordance with the jury’s verdict.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this /? day of May, 2025. é
Lyfhick
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
46 592 U.S. 279 (2021).
47 Rec. Doc. 86.
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