The State of Texas v. Nonparty Patient No. 1, Nonparty Patient No. 2, Nonparty Patient No. 3, Nonparty Patient No. 4, Nonparty Patient No. 5, Nonparty Patient No. 6, Nonparty Patient No. 7, and Nonparty Patient No. 8, Nonparty Patient No. 9, Nonparty Patient No. 10, and Nonparty Patient No. 11

ACCEPTED

15-25-00023-CV

FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 15-25-00023-CV AUSTIN, TEXAS

5/16/2025 12:20 PM

In the Court of Appeals CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

for the Fifteenth Judicial District FILED IN

CLERK

Austin, Texas 15th COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

5/16/2025 12:20:49 PM

State of Texas, CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

Clerk

Appellant,

v.

NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 1, NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 2,

NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 3, NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 4,

NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 5, NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 6,

NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 7, AND NONPARTY PATIENT NO.

8, NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 9, NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 10,

AND NONPARTY PATIENT NO. 11,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court, Dallas County

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Ken Paxton Abigail E. Smith

Attorney General of Texas Assistant Attorney General

State Bar No. 24141756

Brent Webster

First Assistant Attorney General Rob Farquharson

Assistant Attorney General

Ralph Molina State Bar No. 24100550

Deputy First Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

Austin Kinghorn Consumer Protection Division

Deputy Attorney General for 12221 Merit Drive, Ste. 650

Civil Litigation Dallas, Texas 75251

Tel: (214) 290-8830

Johnathan Stone

Fax: (214) 969-7615

Chief, Consumer Protection Division

Counsel for Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ...................................................................................................ii

Index of Authorities ............................................................................................... iii

Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1

Argument................................................................................................................ 2

I. Sovereign Immunity Protects the State from this Cause of Action .............2

A. This case stems from a new cause of action, and is thus

subject to sovereign immunity. ............................................................ 2

B. Sovereign immunity applies, and the Hidalgo framework is

inapposite for this case. ....................................................................... 4

C. No statute affirmatively waives sovereign immunity for

subpoena challenges against the State. ................................................ 7

1. Texas Gov’t Code § 22.0004(a) and Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure 815 and 816 both confirm that sovereign

immunity is not waived. ................................................................ 8

2. Whether the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure contain a

carveout provision is irrelevant to sovereign immunity. ................ 9

3. As explained in the State’s opening brief, there is no

implied waiver under Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylor. ........ 11

II. Non-party Patients Lack Standing to Challenge the Subpoena for

the 10 Unrepresented Patients, and Standing Cannot Be Waived. ........... 12

Prayer ................................................................................................................... 14

Certificate of Compliance ..................................................................................... 14

ii

Index of Authorities

Page(s)

Cases

Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 3 v. Hidalgo Cnty. Irrigation

Dist. No. 1,

669 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2023) ................................................................... 4, 5, 6, 9

Nazari v. State,

561 S.W.3d 495 (Tex. 2018) .................................................................. 1, 3, 9, 10

Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty. Appraisal Dist.,

925 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1996) ............................................................................. 12

Russell v. Jones,

49 F.4th 507 (5th Cir. 2022) .............................................................................. 7

State v. Naylor,

466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015) ............................................................................. 10

Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik,

355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011)............................................................................ 5, 6

Tex. Office of Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Saito,

372 S.W.3d 311 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) ...................................... 7

Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor,

106 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2003) ........................................................................ 8, 11

Statutes

Texas Gov’t Code § 22.0004(a) ......................................................................... 8, 9

iii

Other Authorities

Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(e) .................................................................................. 8, 9, 11

Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(a) ........................................................................................... 9

Tex. R. Civ. P. 815 .............................................................................................. 8, 9

Tex. R. Civ. P. 816 .............................................................................................. 8, 9

iv

Introduction

Nonparty Patients’ brief gets a few things backwards. For example, when a pri-

vate party files a new petition in a new court with new parties, that is a new cause of

action, not merely a “privilege”—though of course a cause of action may assert a

privilege. And when the State is entitled to sovereign immunity from a cause of ac-

tion, that sovereign immunity derives from the common law and the State’s inherent

sovereignty, not from the Texas Rules of Procedure. That is why the Supreme Court

has expressly held that even though the Rules apply to the State as a litigant, they

have no bearing on “whether sovereign immunity protects the state from having to

defend certain actions to begin with.” Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tex.

2018). Finally, standing is an issue that can never be waived, because like sovereign

immunity, it implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Once those issues are cleared up, the ruling in this case is clear. Sovereign im-

munity protects the State from suit except in cases of clear and unambiguous waiver,

and there is no waiver in any of the Rules or statutes that Nonparty Patients rely on.

The State is immune from this suit, and the case should have been dismissed.

1

Argument

I. Sovereign Immunity Protects the State from this Cause of Action

A. This case stems from a new cause of action, and is thus subject to

sovereign immunity.

Many of Nonparty Patients’ arguments stem from a fundamental misunder-

standing about the nature of their case. They argue that because this case is a sub-

poena challenge, it is not a new cause of action, but rather merely an “assert[ion] of

evidentiary privilege.” Appellee’s Br. at 13 (emphasis in original).

While that may have been true had Nonparty Patients chosen to file this chal-

lenge in Collin County, it is unequivocally false for a new cause of action filed in

Dallas County. The lawsuit that this appeal stems from bears all the hallmarks of a

new cause of action. It involves a new petition filed in a new court. There are new

parties in this lawsuit (the Nonparty Patients, who, as their name suggests, are not a

party to the Collin County lawsuit), and parties from the original Collin County law-

suit that are not party to this one—for example, Dr. Lau is not even a party here, and

it is her medical records being sought. The Dallas County judge overseeing this mat-

ter has refused to heed rulings from the Collin County judge overseeing the Lau case,

and the Collin County judge has similarly ordered discovery to proceed in her own

case regardless of what the Dallas County judge ordered—thus creating the jurisdic-

tional fight between two courts that has led to this and three other consolidated ap-

peals before this Court. If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it probably is a

duck—and likewise, this is a new cause of action.

2

This matters for several reasons. First, it makes clear that Nonparty Patients’

decision to file a new cause of action, and only this, grants the State sovereign im-

munity from this Dallas County challenge. Had Nonparty Patients challenged the

medical records subpoenas in Collin County, the State would not have claimed sov-

ereign immunity because the State filed suit against Dr. Lau there and thus waived

immunity for the purposes of that case. But because they filed a new cause of action

where the State had not waived sovereign immunity, the State is immune from suit.

Second, this matters because contrary to Nonparty Patients’ arguments, see Appel-

lee’s Br. at 26–27, the Supreme Court’s holding in Nazari that sovereign immunity

is not waived in suits for civil penalties does apply here, as discussed below infra at

section I.C.

Third, this matters because none of Nonparty Patients’ claimed parade of horri-

bles will come to pass from upholding the State’s sovereign immunity in this case.

Contrary to their argument, recognizing sovereign immunity will not “mean that

most of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence do not apply to the State.” Ap-

pellee’s Br. at 14. Rather, sovereign immunity protects the State only in isolated in-

stances where a party chooses to file a new, unrelated cause of action against the

State. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence continue to apply to the

State where the State is a proper litigant, like they do in the Collin County lawsuit.

But as the Supreme Court held in Nazari, see infra Section I.C.2 (discussing this

holding in more detail), when the State cannot even be properly haled into court due

to sovereign immunity, the case must be dismissed in its entirety regardless of what

the Rules say.

3

B. Sovereign immunity applies, and the Hidalgo framework is

inapposite for this case.

The Hidalgo case relied upon by Nonparty Patients, see Hidalgo Cnty. Water Im-

provement Dist. No. 3 v. Hidalgo Cnty. Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 669 S.W.3d 178 (Tex.

2023), dealt with a very specific set of facts that are not present in this case, and thus

the Hidalgo “framework” for sovereign immunity does not apply here. Indeed, Hi-

dalgo never claims to apply to all cases. Because this case bears no similarities to Hi-

dalgo and has much more in common with declaratory judgments, the default rule

for such cases applies: Private suits against the State are subject to sovereign immun-

ity, unless there is waiver.

In Hidalgo, one political subdivision (a water improvement district) brought an

eminent-domain condemnation proceeding against another political subdivision (a

water irrigation district). Id. at 181. The Supreme Court held that “sovereign im-

munity does not apply in eminent-domain proceedings and that the Irrigation Dis-

trict is not immune from the Improvement District’s condemnation suit.” Id. at 188.

In so holding, the Court laid out the framework it used to determine whether sover-

eign immunity applied in that specific case, examining whether sovereign immunity

in eminent-domain proceedings would “(1) protect[] the public fisc by shielding tax

resources from being diverted to pay litigation costs and money judgments and (2)

preserv[e] the separation of powers and the Legislature’s prerogative to apportion

tax dollars to their intended purposes.” Id. at 183. The Court further noted that the

State of Texas has a long history of “resolv[ing] issues arising from the condemna-

tion of land already dedicated to a public use, including publicly-owned land, by

4

applying the paramount-public-importance doctrine,” including applying this doc-

trine “to condemnation suits against political subdivisions.” Id. at 184–85. Thus, be-

cause of the long history of allowing such suits, the Court held that the lawsuit could

go forward.

However, it is an overreading of Hidalgo to hold that sovereign immunity only

applies to suits that implicate the public fisc and that reapportion tax dollars from

their intended purposes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly held that “[w]hile

the doctrine of sovereign immunity originated to protect the public fisc from unfore-

seen expenditures that could hamper governmental functions, it has been used to

shield the state from lawsuits seeking other forms of relief.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.

Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011) (emphasis added).

Take declaratory judgment suits, for example. While declaratory judgment suits

can implicate monetary relief, by and large they do not. Yet the State is still immune

from suits under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act “unless the Legislature has

waived immunity for the particular claims at issue.” Id. at 620. For example, in

Sefzik, a man sued the Texas Department of Transportation under the UDJA seek-

ing a declaration that he was entitled to a hearing on the denial of his sign permit. Id.

This did not involve the payout of “money judgments,” nor did the lawsuit implicate

“the separation of powers and the Legislature’s prerogative to apportion tax dol-

lars.” Hidalgo, 669 S.W.3d at 183. Rather, it was a simple sign dispute. Nevertheless,

the Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity applied. That is because Hidalgo

laid out a framework that can guide whether sovereign immunity applies in a suit

5

between two governmental units. But it does not set a threshold that must be met for

sovereign immunity to apply in every case.

Hidalgo’s own language supports this more limited reading. For example, it

states that the default position generally is sovereign immunity when the State is

sued. See id. at 182 (“Sovereign immunity generally bars lawsuits against the State

absent legislative consent to be sued.”). The opinion further states that “shield[ing]

the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of their govern-

ments” is “an important purpose” of sovereign immunity. Id. at 186 (quoting Tooke

v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006)). But it does not state that that is

the only purpose of sovereign immunity. Cf. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621 (noting that

sovereign immunity “has been used to shield the state from lawsuits seeking other

forms of relief” than just the public fisc).

Comparing the facts of this case to Hidalgo, it is clear that the Hidalgo framework

is inapposite. That case involved two governmental entities suing each other over

eminent-domain, which has a long history of being litigated in Texas courts without

sovereign immunity. By contrast, this cause of action involving Nonparty Patients is

much more traditional: A private party has sued the State seeking an order to prevent

the State from doing something (obtaining medical documents), and there are no

claims that the State’s actions are ultra vires. While the lawsuit does not seek money 1,

1

Even if this case were analyzed under the Hidalgo framework, it is clear that the

Nonparty Patients’ choice of venue has dramatically increased litigation costs for

this case far beyond the State’s expectations, contrary to their assertions. See Appel-

lee’s Br. at 23. By virtue of the jurisdictional crisis between Collin and Dallas County

courts that Nonparty Patients have engineered, the State has been forced to engage

6

it does seek a declaration that the State may not receive medical records under the

law, which is akin to a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that some-

thing is illegal under the law.

Furthermore, there is no established history of litigating these kinds of cases in

Texas because so far as both parties can tell, this case is the first of its kind in Texas

state court. See Appellee’s Br. at 25 (noting that their review of the case law did not

turn up a single case that applied or rejected sovereign immunity in a discovery dis-

pute involving the State). However, cases on the federal level have held that sover-

eign immunity does apply to discovery disputes, including subpoena challenges. See,

e.g., Russell v. Jones, 49 F.4th 507, 513–14 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding that sovereign

immunity attached to third-party subpoenas against state government officials); see

also id. at 519 (holding that history and cases at common law did not conflict with a

holding that sovereign immunity attaches to third-party subpoenas). Sovereign im-

munity applies here, and there has been no waiver.

C. No statute affirmatively waives sovereign immunity for subpoena

challenges against the State.

Contrary to Nonparty Patients’ claims, there is not a single statute, rule, or code

that affirmatively waives sovereign immunity for the subpoena challenges against the

State. Cf. Tex. Office of Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Saito, 372 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (“The State and its agencies enjoy sovereign

in several weeks of emergency late-night briefing, respond to various emergency stay

requests, and file or respond to numerous mandamus petitions that would not have

arisen had this challenge been filed in Collin County.

7

immunity from suit and from liability unless the legislature expressly waives that im-

munity.”). Appellees concede that the relevant Rule at issue, Rule 176.6(e), “does

not contain any ‘magic words’ specifically waiving immunity.” Appellee’s Br. at 27.

Instead, at various times throughout its brief Nonparty Patients alternatively argue

that the Texas Government Code and the Rules themselves disclaim sovereign im-

munity; that sovereign immunity is waived by mere virtue of the State being subject

to the Rules at all, id. at 10–14; and that the Legislature implicitly waived sovereign

immunity under a four-factor test set forth in Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106

S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2003), Appellee’s Br. at 27–31. None of these are correct—rather,

because the Legislature has unambiguously not waived sovereign immunity, it ap-

plies to this case with full force.

1. Texas Gov’t Code § 22.0004(a) and Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure 815 and 816 both confirm that sovereign immunity is not

waived.

In a rare show of unity, the parties seem to agree that Texas Government Code

section 22.0004(a) and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 815 and 816 prevent the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure from being used to abridge or modify sovereign im-

munity, or to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts. See Appellee’s Br. at 15.

But Nonparty Patients appear to misunderstand the true implications of this argu-

ment. Because the Rules cannot alter sovereign immunity, they cannot be relied

upon to waive or abridge sovereign immunity where it otherwise applies.

The State has sovereign immunity from causes of action filed by private parties

absent an express waiver from the Legislature. See supra Section II.B, infra Section

8

II.C.3. This immunity does not come from the Rules; rather, it derives from the com-

mon law and the State’s inherent sovereignty. Yet Nonparty Patients argue that the

Rules preclude the application of sovereign immunity in a case where it would oth-

erwise apply, simply because Rules 176.6(e) and 192.6(a) authorize a subpoena chal-

lenge. That is the exact type of argument prohibited by Texas Government Code

section 22.0004(a) and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 815 and 816. To permit this

argument would “abridge . . . the substantive rights of” the State, Tex. Gov’t Code

§ 22.0004(a), “diminish [the] substantive rights” of the State, Tex. R. Civ. P. 815,

and “extend . . . the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Texas” to a case where

it otherwise would lack jurisdiction, Tex. R. Civ. P. 816. Because the Nonparty Pa-

tients’ arguments in this regard rely on the Rules to abrogate the State’s sovereign

immunity and extend the courts’ jurisdiction, they must be rejected.

Additionally, it is unclear what Nonparty Patients are getting at when they argue

that “the Court cannot use the Rules as a substantive source for determining its sub-

ject matter jurisdiction.” Appellee’s Br. at 15. The State has never argued that the

Rules determine jurisdiction over this case—rather, regardless of the Rules, sover-

eign immunity applies. And sovereign immunity from suit, which is at issue here, is

always “properly raised in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Hidalgo, 669 S.W.3d at 182; cf.

Appellee’s Br. at 15 (arguing this could have been raised as an affirmative defense).

2. Whether the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure contain a carveout

provision is irrelevant to sovereign immunity.

Whether the Rules apply to the State in litigation is irrelevant, because in Naz-

ari, the Supreme Court held that the Rules cannot be used as a basis to overcome

9

sovereign immunity. It is blackletter law that as a matter of ordinary course, when

the State is a litigant, it is subject to the same Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence

as any other litigant, absent an express carveout provision. The State does not dis-

pute this—indeed, it is complying with the Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence in

the Collin County Lau matter, where the State has waived sovereign immunity.

But in Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495 (Tex. 2018), the Supreme Court held that

the Rules cannot be used to abrogate sovereign immunity where it otherwise exists.

In Nazari, the private plaintiffs argued that the Attorney General waived sovereign

immunity to related causes of action by filing its original suit, because “when the

state becomes a party to a suit it is subject to the same rules that govern other par-

ties.” Id. at 500–01 (cleaned up). The State disagreed, arguing that “while the state

may be bound to follow certain procedures when it appears in court, . . . procedural

rules cannot waive the state’s immunity.” Id. at 501.

The Supreme Court agreed with the State. It expressly held that the cases cited

by plaintiffs, including cases relied upon by Nonparty Patients like State v. Naylor,

466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015), “stand simply for the proposition that procedural rules

apply to the state just as they would to any other litigant when the state appears in

court. That proposition, though sound, does not answer the question whether sov-

ereign immunity protects the state from having to defend certain actions to begin

with.” Nazari, 561 S.W.3d at 501.

In sum, the mere fact that the Rules apply to the State is not sufficient to over-

come sovereign immunity. Cases like Naylor are therefore irrelevant to the sovereign

immunity analysis.

10

3. As explained in the State’s opening brief, there is no implied waiver

under Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylor.

The State has already explained at length in its opening brief why the four factors

to show implied waiver of sovereign immunity do not apply here. See Appellant’s Br.

at 11–13 (discussing Wichita Falls, 106 S.W.3d 692). None of Nonparty Patients’ ar-

guments to the contrary hold weight. Indeed, many of their arguments implicitly

acknowledge that the factors weigh in favor of sovereign immunity. For example,

Nonparty Patients concede that “the Rule [176.6(e)] does not require the State to be

joined in every proceeding,” Appellee’s Br. at 29—indeed, it makes no mention of

the State. But to show implied waiver of sovereign immunity, the statute at issue

must “require[] that the State be joined in a lawsuit,” such as where the Declaratory

Judgments Act “authoriz[es] declaratory judgment actions to construe the legisla-

tive enactments of governmental entities and authoriz[es] awards of attorneys fees.”

Wichita Falls, 106 S.W.3d at 697–98 (quoting Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d

432, 446 (Tex. 1994)). Similarly, Nonparty Patients concede that Wichita Falls finds

support for implied waiver when a law contains “simultaneous measures that insu-

late public resources from the reach of judgment creditors, such as statutory caps or

limitations on liability.” Appellee’s Br. at 30. But Nonparty Patients never argue that

Rule 176.6(e) contains any such caps or liability limitations.

The main holding of Wichita Falls is that implicit waiver of sovereign immunity

is “rare,” and can only be found in very extreme circumstances. Wichita Falls, 106

S.W.3d at 697. None of those circumstances are present here. There is no waiver,

and sovereign immunity applies.

11

II. Non-party Patients Lack Standing to Challenge the Subpoena for the

10 Unrepresented Patients, and Standing Cannot Be Waived.

Nonparty Patients raise two arguments to defend against their suit on behalf of

unrepresented patients: First, they argue they did not seek relief for the unrepre-

sented patients at all; and second, they argue the issue of standing is waived because

the State did not raise it below.

Taking these arguments in reverse, it is blackletter law that standing is a juris-

dictional requirement that cannot be waived and can be addressed by a court sua

sponte at any point on appeal. See, e.g. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty. Appraisal

Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996) (“Although Nootsie never raised standing at

trial, it may raise the issue on appeal for the first time because standing implicates

the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”).

With regard to the first argument, Nonparty Patients’ second amended petition

(the operative petition in this case) clearly does seek relief for the ten unrepresented

patients. For example, the petition requests that the court “enter an order prevent-

ing the Hospital Systems from producing the materials sought in the Subpoenas”—

not just the materials sought from Nonparty Patients. CR.237 ¶ 9. Later, Nonparty

Patients request the ability to review “any proposed productions from the Hospital

Systems”—not just productions for their own patients. CR.240 ¶ 16 (emphasis

added); see also CR.242 ¶¶ 19–20 (similar). This would likely be a HIPAA violation

in itself, since Nonparty Patients’ counsel have no right to review the medical rec-

ords of patients they do not represent. The Dallas court clearly understood Nonparty

Patients’ request to encompass relief for all 21 patients, because its improperly

12

issued stay order blocked “any and all production obligations with respect to the

State’s subpoenas,” and ordered UTSW and Children’s to “not produce any docu-

ments to the State” pending appeal—not just the documents related to the 11 Non-

party Patients. CR.402.

Furthermore, Nonparty Patients never alleged their medical records may be

commingled with those of the 10 unrepresented patients. 2 Not once does the second

amended petition or the attached declaration suggest that any records among pa-

tients may be commingled, or that the production of the unrepresented patients’

records “will implicate the represented patients.” Appellee’s Br. at 32. Rather, this

is a factual contention that Nonparty Patients have raised for the first time on appeal.

Nonparty Patients had no basis to challenge production of their records, and any

such requests should be dismissed.

2

Nonparty Patients did claim commingling of some records in the Collin County Lau

case, see 15-25-00031-CV, but that has since been disproven, as explained in the

State’s brief opposing mandamus relief in that case.

13

Prayer

The Court should reverse the district court’s denial of the State’s plea to the

jurisdiction and direct the district court to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

Respectfully Submitted,

Ken Paxton Johnathan Stone

Attorney General of Texas Chief, Consumer Protection Division

Brent Webster

/s/ Abigail E. Smith

First Assistant Attorney General

Abigail E. Smith

Ralph Molina Assistant Attorney General

Deputy First Assistant Attorney General

Rob Farquharson

Austin Kinghorn Assistant Attorney General

Deputy Attorney General for

Civil Litigation Office of the Attorney General

Consumer Protection Division

12221 Merit Drive, Ste. 650

Dallas, Texas 75251

Tel: (214) 290-8830

Fax: (214) 969-7615

Counsel for Appellant

Certificate of Compliance

Microsoft Word reports that this document contains 3,557 words, excluding ex-

empted text.

/s/ Abigail E. Smith

Abigail E. Smith

14

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