Morris v. Hymes

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

CHADD MORRIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:23-cv-04051-JEH

HEATHER HYMES, et al.

Defendants.

Order

Plaintiff, Chadd Morris, a civil detainee in the Illinois Department of Human

Services (“IDHS”), filed suit against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to

the Court’s Merit Review (Doc. 7), Plaintiff stated a Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process claim for failure to provide adequate mental health counseling against

Defendants Hymes, Lodge, Colon, Cale, and Sheldon; a First Amendment retaliation

claim against Defendant Jumper; and a Monell claim against Defendant Liberty

Healthcare Corporation (“Liberty”).

This matter is now before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

57) filed by Defendants. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I

The following background facts are taken from the statement of undisputed

facts sections in Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Doc. 57, p. 2-46 ¶¶ 1-316,

and Plaintiff’s responses thereto, Doc. 62, p. 9-78 ¶¶ 1-40, Doc. 62-1, p. 2-78 ¶¶ 41-77,

Doc. 62-2, p. 2-71 ¶¶ 78-109. Plaintiff has not proposed any additional material facts.

See Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b)(5).

To the extent that facts are in dispute, the Court has reviewed each party’s

position on those facts and consulted the record. If a fact is incompatible with the

record, the court has stated the fact as it appears in the record. If a fact is fairly in

dispute even after reviewing the record, the Court has also provided the parties’

positions on the disputed fact.

Given the extensive list of undisputed facts (numbering 316) the Court

summarizes herein only those facts that are most relevant to the resolution of the

instant motion.

Plaintiff is currently detained at IDHS’s Rushville Treatment and Detention

Facility (“Rushville”) as a Sexually Violent Person (“SVP”). Doc. 57, p. 3 ¶¶ 2-3. His

SVP action is pending in Cook County Circuit Court. Doc. 57, p. 3 ¶ 3.

Treatment at Rushville is provided through Phase Treatment. Doc. 57, p. 14 ¶

97. Phase Treatment incorporates the use of groups specific to sex offenders, such as

Disclosure group. Doc. 57, p. 15 ¶ 99. It also includes the use of ancillary groups, some

of which are designed to help residents with issues common to reentering society.

Doc. 57, p. 14 ¶ 100. It is also common for residents to have or develop treatment

barriers while at Rushville. Doc. 57, p. 33 ¶ 222. Another ancillary group, Power to

Change, is used to assist residents with various barriers to progressing in treatment.

Doc. 57, p. 15 ¶ 101. In other words, Power to Change is designed to assist residents

who are struggling in core groups, so that they may return to their group as more

productive members rather than being left behind. Doc. 57, p. 15 ¶ 102. Power to

Change referrals are never done to punish a resident. Doc. 57, p. 41 ¶ 277.

Phase Treatment is an accepted method of providing treatment to sex offenders

in a confined setting, and all of these types of core and ancillary groups (albeit with

different names) are commonly used by sex offender therapists. Doc. 57, p. 14-15 ¶¶

98, 101.

Decisions regarding a Rushville resident’s status in treatment groups are up to

the collective judgment of the resident’s treatment team. Doc. 57, p. 20 ¶ 143.

During all times relevant to this suit, Defendant Hymes was Plaintiff’s primary

therapist. Doc. 57, p. 5 ¶ 20. Defendant Lodge was the relevant “Blue Team” treatment

team leader, and Defendants Colon, Sheldon, Cale were other members of the Blue

Team. Doc. 57, p. 5-6 ¶¶ 17, 21, 23, p. 8 ¶ 42.

Plaintiff was in the Blue Team Disclosure group facilitated by Defendant

Hymes beginning in approximately September 2021. Doc. 57, p. 22 ¶¶ 158, 161.

Defendant Hymes regularly documented when Plaintiff’s behavior was compliant

and appropriate and when he engaged in Disclosure group in a positive manner,

which occurred from approximately October 2021 through August 2022. Doc. 57, p.

22-26 ¶¶ 162-167, 172-175, 177-179, p. 30 ¶ 201.

On one occasion during that period, in May 2022, Plaintiff requested to speak

individually with Defendant Hymes and shared that he had feelings of love for

another group member, had apologized to the group member and expressed hopes

of moving forward, and sought feedback from Defendant Hymes on how to do so.

Doc. 57, p. 25 ¶ 176.

Beginning around late October to November 2022, Plaintiff exhibited behavior

that showed blatant disregard for the peers in his Disclosure group, including

preoccupation with a fellow group member which became distracting for him. Doc.

57, p. 28 ¶ 189. The team worked with Plaintiff during this time to try to redirect him

while he remained in Disclosure group. Doc. 57, p. 28 ¶ 190. However, these efforts

were unsuccessful. Id.

On December 1, 2022, Defendant Hymes and nonparty co-facilitator Mr.

Stauffer documented that Plaintiff was not receptive to direction given to him during

group. Doc. 57, p. 28 ¶ 191. On December 6, 2022, Plaintiff arrived at group and

reported that he needed to process an incident that transpired between him and

another group member. Doc. 57, p. 28 ¶ 193. Other group members challenged

Plaintiff to consider that he might be experiencing feelings of rejection from this other

member. Id. Plaintiff acknowledged that he had accosted a fellow group member in

the hallway, which was inappropriate and presented safety concerns. Doc. 57, p. 29 ¶

194. As he was leaving group on December 6, Plaintiff made a statement of ill wishes

towards the other group member. Doc. 57, p. 29 ¶ 196.

Plaintiff was informed that he would be transferred to Power to Change on

December 13, 2022. Doc. 57, p. 29 ¶ 194. Defendants Hymes, Colon, Lodge, Sheldon,

and Cale made a team decision to refer Plaintiff to Power to Change due to barriers

to treatment that included a failure to follow directions provided by facilitators as

well as preoccupation with another group member and other behaviors that

interfered with the progress of other group members. Doc. 57, p. 35 ¶¶ 234-235, p. 46

¶ 314. Plaintiff was assured that his measures of progress in Disclosure group had

been noted but that ineffective behavioral patterns continued to impede his ability to

consistently be a productive group member. Doc. 57, p. 29 ¶ 195.

As Plaintiff had been in Power to Change before and successfully returned to

Disclosure group, the Blue Team determined that attending Power to Change was in

his best interest in December 2022. Doc. 57, p. 30 ¶ 204. Plaintiff would not have

progressed in treatment in Disclosure group without attending Power to Change.

Doc. 57, p. 30 ¶ 203. Plaintiff was in a Power to Change group facilitated by

Defendants Sheldon and Cale from approximately January to late June 2023, when he

was referred back to the Disclosure group. Doc. 57, p. 39-40 ¶¶ 261, 265, 267, 269, 271,

p. 42-44 ¶¶ 287, 291, 293, 295, 297.

However, Plaintiff believes Defendants Sheldon and Cale should have

immediately referred him back to Disclosure group. Doc. 57, p. 10 ¶ 63. Plaintiff

believes that Defendant Lodge could have immediately transferred Plaintiff to a

different Disclosure group, where Plaintiff did not have a history of issues with other

group members. Doc. 57, p. 11 ¶¶ 65, 67.

In addition, while Plaintiff was being treated by the Blue Team, he regularly

sent 15 to 20 pages of notes to Defendant Lodge each week. Doc. 57, p. 38 ¶ 257.

Defendant Lodge advised Plaintiff that she was not able to respond directly to each

note he submitted. Id. Often, Defendant Lodge determined that Plaintiff’s notes and

requests were distracting from the tasks he was assigned in group sessions. Id.

Nothing that Plaintiff stated in his notes suggested to Defendant Lodge that any Blue

Team providers were acting outside of the boundaries of standard sex offender phase

treatment. Doc. 57, p. 38 ¶ 258.

Defendant Jumper is the Clinical Facility Director at Rushville. Doc. 57, p. 14 ¶

95. In this role, Defendant Jumper does not typically make direct treatment decisions

for Rushville residents. Doc. 57, p. 14 ¶ 96. Defendant Jumper was not personally

involved in referring Plaintiff to Power to Change, nor did he make any other direct

treatment decisions for Plaintiff. Id., Doc. 57, p. 15 ¶ 103. Defendant Jumper did not

have more or better knowledge about Plaintiff than did his treatment team. Doc. 57,

p. 20 ¶ 141.

After Plaintiff was referred to Power to Change in December 2022, Plaintiff

alleges he requested that Defendant Jumper move him to a different treatment team

or another Disclosure group but Jumper did not respond to that request. Doc. 57, p.

11 ¶ 72. Typically, requests submitted through the IDHS mail system at Rushville

would be stamped upon receipt. Doc. 57, p. 16 ¶ 111-112. The requests that Plaintiff

alleges he sent to Defendant Jumper are not stamped, and Plaintiff admits he has no

evidence that Jumper received any of his complaints. Id., Doc. 57, p. 12 ¶ 77.

Regardless, the copies of the requests at issue do not include specific complaints that

staff were violating applicable standards, nor did Defendant Jumper have

information from any source suggesting that Plaintiff’s transfer to Power to Change

violated any professional rules or regulations or was so far afield from professional

standards that it required Jumper’s intervention. Doc. 57, p. 17 ¶¶ 117, 119. Based

upon a subsequent review of the written referral by Defendant Hymes, Defendant

Jumper concludes that the identified reasoning for recommending Plaintiff be

transitioned to Power to Change was appropriate. Doc. 57, p. 18 ¶ 122.

Plaintiff alleges Jumper’s inaction was retaliation due to a prior lawsuit that

Plaintiff filed against Jumper. Doc. 57, p. 12 ¶¶ 76, 79, 80. In that lawsuit, Central

District of Illinois Case Number 28-cv-4121, Plaintiff alleged that an earlier referral

from the Disclosure to Power to Change group violated his Fourteenth Amendment

rights to treatment. Doc. 57, p. 13 ¶ 91, Doc. 57-7. The Court in that case entered

summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Id. Defendant Jumper denies that his

failure to interfere in Plaintiff’s assignment to Power to Change in December 2022 had

anything to do with Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit against him. Doc. 57, p. 19 ¶ 137.

All individual Defendants named in this suit are employed by Liberty. Doc. 57,

p. 14 ¶ 95, p. 21 ¶ 148, p. 32 ¶ 212, p. 38 ¶ 259, p. 42 ¶ 285.

Defendants attest that Liberty does not have policies and procedures directing

therapists to transfer residents to Power to Change. Doc. 57, p. 19 ¶ 133, p. 20 ¶ 145,

p. 31 ¶ 208, p. 37 ¶ 251, p. 41 ¶ 283, p. 45 ¶¶ 309, 313. Plaintiff disputes this assertion,

arguing that certain exhibits allude to criteria for referral. Doc. 62-1, p. 11 ¶ 47, Doc.

62-2, p. 6 ¶ 80, Doc. 62-2, p. 29 ¶ 93, Doc. 62-2, p. 56 ¶ 104. Specifically, Plaintiff cites

to four Power to Change Monthly Progress Notes, which include a section entitled

“Treatment Barriers / Ratings as Identified at Time of Referral, and Current Ratings.”

Doc. 57-1, p. 15-20, Doc. 57-2, p. 1-2. In that section of the form, the Power to Change

facilitators are directed to circle whether the resident is rated as high, medium, or low1

with respect to ten pre-identified barriers:

Perceived importance of change in Perceived personal ability to change

comparison to conflicting goals

Perceived need for change Perceived personal ability to maintain

the change

Perceived level of personal Perceived costs associated with the

responsibility to change means to change

1 The final portion of this Monthly Progress Note form includes “Criteria for

Rating Identified Barriers (…included for reader reference)” which consists of the

applicable criteria for applying low, medium, or high ratings. Doc. 57-1, p. 16, 18, 20,

Doc. 57-2, p. 2.

Perceived cost-benefit analysis of change Perceived suitability and efficacy of the

means to change

Perceived sense of urgency to change The realities of change

now

Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the identified barriers on the Progress Notes form depart

from standard sex offender regulations. The forms in question have the IDHS logo on

the upper righthand side and the center header reads: “State of Illinois Department

of Human Services Treatment and Detention Facility”. Doc. 57-1, p. 15, 17, 19, Doc.

57-2, p. 1.

II

Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in

his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). The party moving for

summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must

be more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude

the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

III

A

The Court turns first to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Defendants Hymes, Lodge, Colon, Cale, and Sheldon for failure to provide adequate

mental health counseling, by allegedly modifying his progression plan without

justification or professional basis for doing so. See Doc. 7, p. 2.

Civil detainees are constitutionally entitled to conditions and duration of

confinement that bear some reasonable relationship to the purposes for which they

are committed. Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2003). Officials must

provide “some treatment” for the underlying mental health conditions that led to a

resident’s confinement, but the nature of that treatment is left to the discretion of

qualified mental health professionals. Id. at 1081. Treatment decisions are

“presumptively valid” and entitled to deference, unless the evidence shows that that

a decision constituted “such a substantial departure from accepted professional

judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible

actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 895

(7th Cir. 2009); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 547 U.S. 307, 323 (1982).2

2 Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Supplement (Doc. 73), indicating that he believes

courts in the Central District have “taken the position, prior, that they…do not possess

authority to issue orders to the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility Clinical

Staff” because the “court cannot imp[i]nge against the ‘professional’ treatment

providers issuing sex offender treatment[.]” Doc. 73, p. 3 ¶ 4. Plaintiff asks the Court

to allow him to supplement his Response (Doc. 62) to provide the Court with a copy

of an Illinois Appellate Court Order in People v. Pieroni, 2024 WL 5184095 (Ill. App. Ct.

Dec. 20, 2024) (unreported).

Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement (Doc. 73) is GRANTED, insofar as the Court

has reviewed and considered Plaintiff’s arguments therein. However, the Court has

applied the correct deferential standard towards treatment decisions, absent a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment or practice. See Sain, 512

F.3d at 895; Youngberg, 547 U.S. at 323. In addition, the case cited by Plaintiff was

issued by an Illinois Appellate Court reviewing the civil commitment of another SVP

and constitutes neither binding nor persuasive precedent for a federal District Court

reviewing a § 1983 case. In addition, the Court notes that the Order submitted by

Plaintiff was unpublished and has since been withdrawn. See In re Commitment of

Pieroni, -- N.E.3d --, 2025 WL 354496 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 31, 2025).

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ decision to transfer him from Disclosure to

Power to Change in December 2022 was a departure from standard sex offender

treatment regulations set forth by the Sex Offender Management Board in 20 Ill.

Admin. Code 1905.10 et seq. Throughout Plaintiff’s response to the pending summary

judgment motion, he cites the following specific provisions as the relevant standards

violated by Defendants when they transferred him from Disclosure to Power to

Change:

Research indicates that treatment for criminal justice-involved populations,

including adult sexual abusers, is most effective when it is delivered in

accordance with the evidence-based principles of correctional intervention

(risk, need and responsivity). As applied to treatment interventions for sexual

abusers, this translates into the following:

1) Risk: Sexual abusers presenting a higher risk of reoffending receive a

greater intensity and dosage of treatment services, while lower risk

sexual abusers receive less. Providing an inappropriate intensity of

services may negatively affect treatment effectiveness and recidivism

risk.

20 Ill. Admin. Code § 1905.80(b).

Treatment providers working with sexual abusers shall utilize empirically

supported methods of intervention. Recommended methods include

structured, cognitive-behavioral, and skills-oriented treatment approaches that

target dynamic risk factors.

… 7) Treatment providers assist clients with identifying and enhancing

prosocial interests, skills and behaviors that the clients themselves seek to

enhance or attain (i.e., approach goals that are oriented toward a nonoffending

lifestyle), as opposed to strictly focusing on managing inappropriate thoughts,

interests, behaviors and risky situations (i.e., avoidance goals).

20 Ill. Admin. Code § 1905.100(a)(7).

Treatment providers shall focus treatment interventions primarily on research-

supported dynamic risk factors that are linked to sexual and nonsexual

recidivism (i.e., criminogenic needs) over factors that have not been shown to

be associated with recidivism, as outlined in this subsection (b).

… 3) Attitudes Supportive of Sexual Abuse…C) Treatment providers are aware

that, although clients may hold attitudes, beliefs and values that are

unconventional but unrelated to their risk for sexually abusive or criminal

behaviors, these attitudes, beliefs and values are not deemed appropriate

primary treatment targets.

20 Ill. Admin Code § 1905.100(b)(3)(C).

Treatment Engagement and Goal Setting

2) Treatment providers recognize that, although many clients present for

sexual abuser-specific treatment as direct result of legal or other mandates,

external motivators alone are generally insufficient for producing long-term

change among clients….

4) Treatment providers recognize that client engagement may increase, and

resistance may decrease, when the treatment provider and client are in relative

agreement about treatment goals and objectives. To the extent possible,

treatment providers involve clients in the development of their treatment plans

and in the identification of realistic goals and objectives….

6) Treatment providers are aware that clients present with differing levels of

internal motivation to change (and varied types and levels of denial and

minimization related to sexually abusive behaviors, interests, arousals and

attitudes and beliefs), but that such characteristics do not preclude access to

treatment….

8) Treatment providers support the client in being honest in discussing the

client history and functioning, but acknowledge that it is not the role of

treatment providers to attempt to determine or verify a client’s legal guilt or

innocence or to coerce confessions of unreported or undetected sexually

abusive behaviors.

9) Treatment providers are aware that attempting to provide treatment for

problems that a client persistently denies having results in limitations in

making reliable client recommendations about the individual’s treatment

progress and re-offense risk, and that this has ethical implications.

20 Ill. Admin. Code § 1905.100(c)(2), (4), (6), (8), (9).

The Court recognizes that the foregoing citations are to regulations provided

by Illinois state law. By contrast, Plaintiff’s § 1983 action is based upon alleged

violations of the United States Constitution. The federal constitution does not permit

a federal court to enforce state laws directly, nor is a violation of state law grounds

for a federal civil rights suit. Allison, 332 F.3d at 1079; Guarjardo-Palma v. Martinson,

622 F.3d 801, 806 (7th Cir. 2010).

Still, the Court understands that Plaintiff argues that these administrative

regulations create or reflect the relevant “accepted professional judgment, practice, or

standards” relevant to his Fourteenth Amendment claim. Sain, 512 F.3d at 895.

Drawing all reasonable inference in Plaintiff’s favor as the nonmoving party, and

accepting these Illinois regulations as the relevant standard, the Court nevertheless

concludes that Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence showing that Defendants’

actions constituted a substantial departure from these standards.

Plaintiff’s primary allegations are that Power to Change offered fewer

treatment hours per week, as compared to Disclosure, and that Power to Change

focused only on behavioral issues rather than sex offender specific treatment.

The regulations cited by Plaintiff do provide that abusers at “a higher risk of

reoffending receive a greater intensity and dosage of treatment services, while lower

risk sexual abusers receive less.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 1905.80(b)(1). However,

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that he is a “higher risk” sexual abuser who

should, under the standards, have received more treatment hours, as he alleges he

would have received in Disclosure as compared to Power to Change.

As for the focus of Power to Change on ancillary behavioral issues or treatment

barriers, rather than on sex offender specific or “core” treatment, Plaintiff has not cited

any provisions that prohibit consideration of behavioral issues that are related to a

resident’s ability to successfully complete treatment. In fact, Plaintiff cited to Section

1905.100(a)(7), which provides that treatment should include “prosocial…skills and

behaviors[.]”

Further, in other relevant provisions of Section 1905 not cited by Plaintiff, the

regulations acknowledge the benefits of “using evidence-based behavioral techniques

and interventions (e.g., prosocial modeling, skill practice, rehearsal of strategies…”)

and indicate that treatment providers should assist clients in “[g]eneral [s]elf-

regulation” such as “learning and practicing problem-solving and impulse control

skills.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §§ 1905.90(a)(6), 1905.100(b)(1)(B).

Based upon the undisputed facts, Plaintiff was referred to Power to Change

to address barriers to treatment that included a failure to follow directions provided

by facilitators as well as preoccupation with another group member, whom Plaintiff

admitted he had accosted outside of group. It follows that it was not a substantial

departure from the regulations provided in Section 1905 for Defendants to approve

referral to Power to Change when the record reflects that Plaintiff required assistance

with self-regulation and impulse control skills. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code

1905.100(b)(1)(B).

More generally, although Plaintiff argues that Section 1905 creates the relevant

professional standards, that Section does not prescribe the specific manner in which

sex offender treatment must be provided. Rather, it acknowledges that sex offender

treatment is “an evolving science” and “recognize[s] the importance of

individualized, assessment-driven treatment services.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 1905.90.

In addition, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to remain in any specific

treatment group, and his disagreement with the treatment team’s decisions is

insufficient to impose constitutional liability. Williams v. Ortiz, 937 F.3d 936, 944 (7th

Cir. 2019).

In sum, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Defendants’ treatment

decisions substantially departed from the prevailing standards in the field.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim.

B

Next, the Court considers Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against

Defendant Jumper.

To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must show that

“(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a

deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3)

the First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’

decision to take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir.

2009), quoting Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).

It is undisputed that Plaintiff engaged in First Amendment protected activity

when he filed an earlier lawsuit against Defendant Jumper and others at Rushville.

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff suffered a deprivation that would likely

deter First Amendment activity in the future. However, it is not necessary for the

Court to reach a conclusion on this second element, as the record contains no evidence

that Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit was a motivating factor in Defendant Jumper’s conduct

at issue in this case.

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is based upon a complaint that Defendant Jumper

did not transfer him to another treatment team or immediately return him to

Disclosure after he was referred to Power of Change in December 2022. But the

undisputed facts establish that Defendant Jumper is not typically involved in

treatment decisions for Rushville residents and that, in accordance with this typical

practice, Jumper was not involved in the decision to transfer Plaintiff to Power to

Change or the timeline for his return to Disclosure group. There is no evidence to

suggest that Defendant Jumper’s lack of involvement in Plaintiff’s treatment decisions

was motivated by the fact that Plaintiff filed a previous lawsuit when the undisputed

facts establish this was consistent with Defendant Jumper’s typical practice as

Director.

Plaintiff’s response focuses in large part on the assertion that Defendant

Jumper, as a supervisor, may be held liable if a constitutional violation occurred with

his knowledge or consent, or if he turned a blind eye to such a violation. See

Hildebrandt v. Illinois Department of Natural Resources, 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir.

20203). But Plaintiff’s arguments on this point are inapt, both because his citations do

not relate to a retaliation claim and because the Court has found that there is no

evidence of an underlying constitutional violation that Defendant Jumper could have

known about or condoned.

For these reasons, summary judgment must enter in Defendant Jumper’s favor

on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against him.

C

Finally, Defendant Liberty moves for summary judgment on the Monell claim

brought against it. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Liberty condoned or approved its

employees providing inadequate or improper mental health treatment.

To succeed on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he or she has

suffered a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, and (2) that the

deprivation was caused by an official policy, custom or usage of the municipality” or

other institutional defendant acting under color of state law. Powe v. City of Chicago,

664 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1981); Shields v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 746 F.3d

782, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2014).

In support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants attest that Liberty

maintained no policies related to the treatment issues, i.e., a referral to Power to

Change, alleged by Plaintiff in this matter. Plaintiff disputes this alleged fact, pointing

to a form that lists ten barriers to treatment and criteria for evaluating whether a

Rushville resident faces high, medium, or low barriers in each of those areas. Upon

review, however, there is no indication on the form that it was generated by Liberty

or pursuant to any Liberty policy or practice. There is no reference whatsoever to

Liberty. Rather, the form is identified as an IDHS form.

More significantly, as indicated in the sections immediately prior, the Court

has found no evidence that Plaintiff suffered any deprivation of a constitutionally

protected interest. Therefore, without an underlying constitutional violation, Liberty

cannot be held liable for any alleged policies. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,

799 (1986).

For these reasons, Defendant Liberty is entitled to summary judgment in its

favor on Plaintiff’s Monell claim.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [57] is

GRANTED. Summary judgment shall enter in favor of Defendants and against

Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement [73] is GRANTED.

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with

this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion

for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues Plaintiff wishes to

present on appeal, to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken in

good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398

(7th Cir. 1999) (an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement of

his grounds for appealing so that the district judge “can make a reasonable

assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.

2000) (providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person could

suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to

appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome

of the appeal. If the Court allows him to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis that

finding would allow Plaintiff to pay the appellate filing fee over time but would not

release him from having to pay the fee.

This case is terminated.

It is so ordered.

Entered on May 16, 2025.

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE