Rico v. Doe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

MIGUEL RICO, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-1038-SEM-DJQ

)

JOHN DOE, )

Defendant. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff pro se Miguel Rico has filed a Complaint (Doc. 1)

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is now before the Court for

screening. Also pending before the Court are two Motions (Docs. 7,

9) filed by Plaintiff.

I. SCREENING STANDARD

The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and

fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who,

within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without

legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster

v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972).

Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma

pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to

state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court grants

leave to proceed in forma pauperis only if the complaint states a

federal cause of action.

In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual

allegations as accurate, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s

favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient.

Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418,

422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. FACTS ALLEGED

Plaintiff Miguel Rico is incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional

Center (“Pontiac”). He lists as the Defendant “John Doe (Illinois

Department of Corrections).” The Complaint also lists nine other

Plaintiffs by name and prison identification number, all of whom

are also incarcerated at Pontiac. However, the Complaint was

signed only by Plaintiff Rico, not by any of the other Plaintiffs.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) requires that any

pleading, written motion, or other paper filed on behalf of any

unrepresented party must be signed by that party. In a case

involving multiple pro se plaintiffs, one plaintiff cannot sign on

behalf of other pro se plaintiffs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also

Abdul-Wadood v. DeBruyn, 89 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. June 26, 1996)

(unpublished); Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829, 830 (7th

Cir. 1986). Therefore, this case proceeds only as to Plaintiff Rico,

and all remaining references to Plaintiff refer only to Miguel Rico.

Plaintiff alleges that he previously had access to over 110

television channels at Pontiac. However, Doe Defendant allegedly

changed to a new cable company and now Plaintiff and others at

Pontiac have access to only 59 channels. Plaintiff alleges that the

current channels do not have helpful or educational programming.

He also alleges that the new cable company offers more than 59

channels, so Pontiac should be offering those additional channels.

Plaintiff complains that no one provided him with an explanation

for the change.

Plaintiff alleges the foregoing decision to reduce the number of

television channels violates his First Amendment right to freedom of

speech as well as his Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected

to cruel and unusual punishment.

III. ANALYSIS

Upon review of the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim for relief.

First, Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim

for cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment is

concerned with “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “Inmates cannot

expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel[.]”

Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235-36 (7th Cir. 1988). Access

to more than 59 cable television channels is plainly an amenity

rather than a necessity of life.

Next, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s allegation of a First

Amendment violation. The First Amendment generally prevents the

government from proscribing speech based on disapproval of the

ideas expressed. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382

(1992).

“[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that

are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections

system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). See

also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60

L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“our cases have held that sentenced

prisoners enjoy freedom of speech and religion under the First

and Fourteenth Amendments”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408

U.S. 753, 762, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972) (“[T]he

Constitution protects the rights to receive information and

ideas.”) (further citations omitted).

Thomas v. Leslie, 176 F.3d 489 (unpublished), 1999 WL 281416, at

*7 (7th Cir. Apr. 21, 1999).

In that context, Courts have recognized the right of prisoners

to read newspapers and books. Id. (collecting cases); Munson v.

Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). Similarly, video games

and movies are forms of expression protected by the First

Amendment, even in correctional facilities. Brown v. Phillips, 801

F.3d 849, 854-55 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Brown v. Entertainment

Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (First Amendment

protections are applied to “ever-advancing technology,” and “the

basic principles of freedom of speech and the press…do not vary

when a new and different medium for communication appears”

(internal quotations omitted)).

Therefore, a prison’s limitation on access to materials that

communicate ideas and information “presents a substantial First

Amendment issue.” Munson, 673 F.3d at 633.

[T]he Supreme Court has held that “when a prison regulation

impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is

valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.” Turner [v. Safley], 482 U.S. [78,] 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254

[(1987)]. To determine reasonableness, the Court must

consider four factors: whether the regulation is rationally

connected to a legitimate and neutral government objective;

whether alternative means of exercising the right remain open

to the inmate; what impact accommodation of the

asserted right will have on guards and other inmates; and

whether there are obvious alternatives to the regulation that

show that it is an exaggerated response to prison concerns.

Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91, 107 S.Ct. 2254). “The burden ... is

not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but

on the prisoner to disprove it.” Overton [v. Bazzetta], 539 U.S.

[126,] 132, 123 S.Ct. 2162 [(2003)].

Koger v. Dart, 114 F.Supp.3d 572, 578 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2015).

However, in the instant case Plaintiff’s Complaint does not

contain any allegation that there is a prison regulation or restriction

in place. Rather than any government proscription or censorship,

Plaintiff simply alleges that the prison changed cable providers and

the new channel offerings do not match the prior offerings. While

Plaintiff characterizes the new channel offerings as “not helpful”

(sic), he has not plausibly alleged that the change in offerings was

due to any prison policy of censorship designed to prohibit certain

ideas, information, or viewpoints.

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a First Amendment

claim.

IV. OTHER MOTIONS

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Revisit Previous Motion

(Doc. 7) and a Motion for Identity of Case (Doc. 9).

In the first Motion (Doc. 7), Plaintiff indicates that he already

filed a motion for in forma pauperis status and states that he could

not provide a trust fund ledger. The Court granted Plaintiff’s

Petition to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5) in a Text Order

entered February 27, 2025. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 7)

asking the Court to revisit or review his IFP Petition is moot.

The Court cannot discern what Plaintiff is requesting in his

second Motion (Doc. 9). The substance of the Motion reads, in its

entirety (errors in original):

Plaintiff ask this Court for identity of this case because was

not give a document of complaint but rather the front page.

Plaintiff is not able to know which case is who because of not

knowing the case but a case number instead.

The Court speculates that Plaintiff may have received only a

file-stamped copy of the first page of his Complaint in this case.

Therefore, while he knows that he has filed a Complaint with the

instant case number, he may have other cases pending and does

not know which case was assigned this case number.

Plaintiff will receive a copy of this Merit Review Order, which

should clarify his confusion about which facts and allegations are

contained in the Complaint assigned this case number. Plaintiff’s

Motion (Doc. 9) is moot, with leave to file a renewed motion if this

Order does not provide Plaintiff with the clarification he was

seeking.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] is dismissed, without prejudice,

for failure to state a claim.

2) Plaintiff’s Motions [7], [9] are MOOT.

3) Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint,

within 21 days. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint

by that date, or if the amended complaint still fails to state a

claim, then this case will be dismissed with prejudice.

ENTERED May 16, 2025.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

____________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE