Eighth Amendment excessive force claim requires that Plaintiff show that force was not used against him in a good faith effort to restore order but was instead used “maliciously or sadistically to cause harm”
How later courts described this case
- Eighth Amendment excessive force claim requires that Plaintiff show that force was not used against him in a good faith effort to restore order but was instead used “maliciously or sadistically to cause harm”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NESTOR MILANES,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No, 22-2225 (KMW) (MIS)
v. MEMORANDUM -OPINION
JOHN POWELL, et al.,
Defendants.
WILLIAMS, District Judge: .
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment in
this prisoner civil rights matter. (ECF No. 73.) By way of background, in Plaintiff's operative
amended complaint in this matter, Petitioner asserted two claims: an Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim raised against Defendants raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state law assault
and battery claim against Defendants. (See ECF No. 61.) Both claims arose out of a confrontation
between Plaintiff and Defendant Gould which occurred in April 2020. Cd. at 2.)
Defendants filed their summary judgment motion on April 11, 2025. CECF No. 73.) In
their motion and statement of material facts, Defendants essentially contended that Plaintiff was
responsible for the confrontation between himself and Gould, goading Gould into a fight, and
thereafter pummeling Gould after Gould pushed Plaintiff away after a verbal spat. (See ECF no.
73-2 at 2-4.) Defendants therefore argued that, because Plaintiff was responsible for starting the
confrontation and in escalating it into violence, the force used against him to restore order was
reasonable and not maliciously deployed, and that Plaintiff therefore could net make out his
excessive force claim. (ECF No. 73-3 at 11-19.) Defendants also argued that they were entitled
to qualified immunity and entitled to summary judgment for that reason as well. (/d.)
In lieu of opposition, Plaintiff filed with this Court a letter. (ECF No. 76.) In that letter,
Plaintiff concedes that his “federal claims do not have merit; [and he therefore does] not object to
their dismissal.” (Ud.) Thus, Plaintiff's letter concedes that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment as to his federal claims, and, in not opposing Defendants’ statement of material facts,
admits to their statement of facts for the purposes of the currently pending motion. See L. Civ. R.
56.1 (a).
Pursuant to Rule 56, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment where the record
“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a}, The moving party bears the initial burden of
“identifying those portions of the pleadings depositions, answer's to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is
material “if it bears on an essential element of the plaintiff's claim,” and is genuine if “a reasonable
jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Blunt vy. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d
247, 265 (3d Cir, 2014). In deciding a motion for summary judgment a district court must “view
the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion,” jd., but must not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing
of the evidence. See Anderson vy. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
[however,] there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsuhita Elec, Indus. Co. vy. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Once the moving party has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party who must provide evidence sufficient to establish that a reasonable jury couid find in the
non-moving party’s favor to warrant the denial of a summary judgment motion. Lawrence v. Nat’]
Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (Gd Cir. 1996); Serodio v. Rutgers, 27 F. Supp. 3d
546, 550 (D.N.J. 2014).
“A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if
it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor
at trial. However, the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment cannot rest on mere allegations, instead it must present
actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for
trial.”
Serodio, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
In this matter, the parties are in agreement that Plaintiff's federal civil rights claims are
without merit and that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants infringed his Eighth Amendment
rights in light of the evidence that Plaintiff instigated the confrontation between himself and Gould,
and that the force used against Plaintiff was in response to his brutally attacking Gould following
a verbal disagreement and Gould pushing Plaintiff away. Having reviewed the facts presented in
Defendants’ motion, and having considered Plaintiff's concessions, this Court finds that
Defendants are entitled (0 summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs federal claims as Plaintiff
concedes that Defendants did not use excessive force against him and the facts presented support
that concession, See, e.g., Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim requires that Plaintiff show that force was not used against him in a good faith effort
to restore order but was instead used “maliciously or sadistically to cause harm”), Defendants’
motion shall therefore be granted as to Plaintiff's federal excessive force claims, and judgment
shall be entered in favor of all Defendants as to Plaintiffs federal claims.
Because this Court will enter judgment in favor of all Defendants as to Plaintiff’s federal
claims, the Court is left with Plaintiff's state law assault and battery claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3), where a district court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the
court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over any pendent state law claims. The
Third Circuit has long held that where all federal claims are “dismissed before trial, the district
court must decline to decide the pendent state claims” absent sufficient affirmative justification for
doing otherwise, Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). As this Court will enter
judgment in favor of Defendants as to all of Plaintiff's federal claims, this Court therefore must
decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law assault and battery claims, Those
claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice at this time.!
In conclusion, Defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment (ECF No. 73) is granted as
to Plaintiffs federal claims, judgment shall be entered in favor of all Defendants as to Plaintiff's
federal claims, and Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed without prejudice at this time as this
Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, An appropriate order follows.
a cs
a ‘\ ee
ie Karen M. Williams,
United States District Judge
To the extent Plaintiff wishes to pursue those claims, he may do so by filing a complaint in state
court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the limitation period for Plaintiff's state law claims is
deemed tolled for the time it was pending in this Court and for thirty days after the dismissal of
this matter.