Amie Villarini v. Iowa City Community School District

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 23–1220

Submitted April 3, 2025—Filed May 16, 2025

Amie Villarini,

Appellant,

vs.

Iowa City Community School District,

Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Andrew

Chappell, judge.

A former school district employee seeks further review of the court of

appeals decision affirming the district court’s dismissal of her claims of

defamation and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Decision of

Court of Appeals and District Court Judgment Affirmed.

Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

James K. Weston II (argued) of Tom Riley Law Firm, Iowa City, for

appellant.

Erek P. Sittig (argued), Crystal K. Raiber, and Hayley M. Masching (until

withdrawal) of Phelan Tucker Law LLP, Iowa City, for appellee.

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Christensen, Chief Justice.

After a school district dismissed claims of inappropriate touching and

harassment against a former high school tennis coach, two students brought the

matter before the district’s school board at a public meeting. The students

detailed their experiences and called on the school board to update its

investigation procedures. The district subsequently posted an unaltered video of

the meeting online and placed the coach on paid administrative leave while later

declining to renew her contract. The coach asked the district to remove or alter

the video with the students’ comments, but it refused.

Consequently, the coach brought claims of defamation and wrongful

termination in violation of public policy against the district. The district moved

for summary judgment, and the district court dismissed the case, reasoning that

the republication of the statements was protected by the fair-report privilege and

that the coach failed to demonstrate a well-established public policy. The coach

appealed and we transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the

district court. We agree on further review.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 2013, Amie Villarini was hired by the Iowa City Community School

District (ICCSD) as the varsity girls’ tennis coach at Iowa City West High School.

She coached the team for several years under a series of one-year contracts. See

Iowa Code § 279.19A(1) (2022).

At the end of the 2021 tennis season, four tennis team players, along with

four parents of the players, issued complaints to West High School Athletic

Director Craig Huegel. The complaints alleged that Villarini inappropriately

touched players, engaged in favoritism, lied to players, made insensitive or

belittling remarks to players, ignored players’ mental health, retaliated against

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players, and asked players to miss religious services. An investigative report by

ICCSD concluded that Villarini had not inappropriately touched any players or

engaged in bullying or harassment but recommended that Villarini refrain from

touching players as often as possible “[t]o protect herself from future allegations.”

At some point after the investigation and before the 2022 tennis season

began, Villarini posted her feelings of being undervalued and her opinions on

what makes a good teammate on her private Facebook page. ICCSD staff learned

of this post and determined that it was directed at former players who did not

return for the 2022 season. Huegel addressed the issue with Villarini, and she

removed the post.

However, the matter did not end there. On April 12, 2022, former tennis

players attended a meeting of the ICCSD board of directors.1 During the available

public-comment time, two former players addressed their concerns with the

investigation and their disappointment with its results, but did not directly state

Villarini’s name. The first student detailed the unwanted touching that Villarini

subjected her to and expressed her opinion that the investigation protected

Villarini, not the players. The second student expressed her displeasure with the

investigation, asked the board of directors to revise this procedure to better

protect players, and highlighted Villarini’s social media posts that she believed

targeted the former players. The board of directors did not address these

statements after they were made, but the next speaker during the public-

comment time did.

1Meetings held by the ICCSD board of directors are open to the public. See Iowa Code

chs. 21, 279. Although not required, ICCSD’s policy is to allocate time during each meeting to

take comments from the public but the school board does not immediately respond to the

comments made.

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The day after the meeting, Villarini was placed on paid administrative leave

for the rest of her current year-long contract. Deputy superintendent Chace

Ramey’s affidavit explained that:

After the April 12, 2022, school board meeting, ICCSD staff was

made aware of another social media post made by Ms. Villarini. The

post appeared to target students who spoke at the April 12 meeting

in a negative way. ICCSD aims to be a safe place for all students and

staff felt that Ms. Villarini’s social media posts were unprofessional

and disrespectful to students. As a result of the second post,

Ms. Villarini was placed on administrative leave, as staff did not

believe it was appropriate for her to continue coaching at West High.

The social media post in question was posted on Villarini’s private Facebook page

and was mostly a tribute to her late grandmother. However, at the end of the

post Villarini stated, “I’m doing my best to ‘turn the page.’ And to pray for those

who are against me and who spread hate and false judgments.”

Villarini disagrees with this explanation and believes that she was placed

on leave and her contract was not renewed because of the students’ comments

at the meeting. To support this conclusion, Villarini argues that Ramey had not

seen the post before placing her on leave, as shown by an email where he asks

Huegel and the principal of West High School, Mitch Gross, for a screenshot of

the post while simultaneously requesting that Villarini be placed on leave. She

also notes Huegel’s statement that he believes the public comments “influenced

[the] decision” to place her on leave and that he would have renewed her contract.

Two days after the meeting, a complete, unaltered video of the meeting was

posted on the board of director’s YouTube channel.2 Villarini and her counsel

made multiple requests to have the video removed, the comments redacted, or a

disclaimer added. However, ICCSD refused to alter the video after consulting

2Detailed minutes of the meeting were also posted on ICCSD’s website.

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with counsel, and it remains on YouTube as of the filing date of this decision. In

fact, ICCSD does not have a history of removing or altering videos because of

objectionable speech during the public-comment section.

On June 2, Villarini brought two claims against ICCSD for defamation and

“breach of contract/violation of public policy.” She alleged that ICCSD defamed

her by republishing slanderous statements and that the school district placed

her on leave and did not renew her contract in violation of public policy. In

response, ICCSD moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted

the motion. Regarding the defamation claim, the district court reasoned:

[T]he Restatement supports a finding of a privilege on the District’s

behalf in this situation. Specifically, the Restatement (Second) of

Torts counsels that “[t]he publication of defamatory matter

concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or

of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public

concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair

abridgement of the occurrence reported.” Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 611 (1977). . . . The Court finds this reasoning persuasive

and believes the Iowa Supreme Court would as well.

Additionally, the district court analyzed the second claim as a wrongful

termination in violation of public policy claim and determined that Villarini failed

to provide a “well-established public policy” that ICCSD violated. In the same

order, the district court denied ICCSD’s motion to amend its answer to raise a

new affirmative defense under Iowa Code section 670.4A because it was moot

once summary judgment was granted.

Villarini timely appealed the dismissal of her two claims and ICCSD cross-

appealed the district court’s denial of its motion to amend. We transferred the

case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision. We then

granted Villarini’s application for further review. “We review summary judgment

rulings for correction of errors at law.” Myers v. City of Cedar Falls, 8 N.W.3d

171, 176 (Iowa 2024) (quoting Feeback v. Swift Pork Co., 988 N.W.2d 340, 346

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(Iowa 2023)). Summary judgment should be granted when the moving party

establishes “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ.

P. 1.981(3). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, who is entitled to every legitimate inference that we may draw from the

record.” Myers, 8 N.W.3d at 176 (quoting Nelson v. Lindaman, 867 N.W.2d 1, 6–

7 (Iowa 2015)).

II. Analysis.

A. Defamation. Villarini claims that ICCSD defamed her by republishing

the statements made by the former players at the school board meeting.

Regarding the dismissal of this claim, we will only address the district court’s

application of the fair-report privilege.3

1. Slander. First, Villarini argues that the statements made by the students

were slanderous per se and that ICCSD can be liable for republishing these

statements. In a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove that “the defendant

(1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the

plaintiff.” Bauer v. Brinkman, 958 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Iowa 2021) (quoting

Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 464 (Iowa 2013)). In general, defamation is a

published false statement of fact that harms the reputation of an individual. Id.

The cause of action is split into two torts: slander, which involves an oral

statement, and libel, which involves a written statement. Id.

3The district court gave four other reasons for dismissing the defamation claim: Iowa Code

section 291.6 requires school districts to keep a complete record of meetings, the court found no

caselaw holding a governmental entity liable for defamation because they reposted comments

from a public meeting, ICCSD was protected by a qualified privilege, and the school district did

not adopt the students’ statements or make any defamatory statements of its own. ICCSD also

argued that it was not liable because of the privilege afforded to municipalities by Iowa Code

section 670.4(1)(c) and First Amendment protections. The district court chose not to address

these two arguments. We choose only to address the fair-report privilege, which resolves the

defamation issue in this case.

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This case concerns slander per se. “Words are [slanderous] per se if they

are of such a nature, whether true or not, that the court can presume as a matter

of law that their publication will have a [slanderous] effect.” Wilson v. IBP, Inc.,

558 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Iowa 1996) (en banc) (quoting Vinson v. Linn–Mar Cmty.

Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 116 (Iowa 1984)). Parties do not have to prove malice,

falsity, or special harm when statements are slanderous per se. Id. We have

noted that “[s]landerous imputations affecting a person in his or her business,

trade, profession, or office are also actionable without proof of actual harm.” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Iowa

1994)). ICCSD does not seem to contest that the statements made at the meeting

fall into this category.

Additionally, we have long recognized that parties can be liable for

republishing defamatory statements, as ICCSD did here. See Morse v. Times–

Republican Printing Co., 100 N.W. 867, 870 (Iowa 1904). ICCSD also is a

nonmedia defendant, so it does not get the same protection that media

defendants receive. See Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 118 (designating a different school

district as a nonmedia defendant). Therefore, the question in this case is whether

ICCSD’s republication of the statements was protected by a privilege that allowed

the district court to grant summary judgment in its favor.

2. The fair-report privilege. In its summary judgment motion, ICCSD

argued that it could not be liable for posting a video of its unaltered school board

meeting, which could be construed as an assertion of the fair-report privilege.

Cf., e.g., Fenceroy v. Gelita USA, Inc., 908 N.W.2d 235, 240, 242 (Iowa 2018)

(concluding that the defendant raised the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense

without specifically naming it). The privilege was applied by the district court,

which Villarini did not object to until the case was on appeal. See Rottinghaus v.

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Lincoln Sav. Bank (In re Est. of Franken), 944 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Iowa 2020)

(noting affirmative defenses may be raised in a summary judgment motion); Bill

Grunder’s Sons Constr., Inc. v. Ganzer, 686 N.W.2d 193, 197–98 (Iowa 2004) (“[I]f

the movant has failed to establish its [summary judgment] claim and the court

nevertheless enters judgment, the nonmovant must at least preserve error by

filing a motion following entry of judgment, allowing the district court to consider

the claim of deficiency.”). It is a well-documented and long-standing privilege.

See, e.g., Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Publ’g Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 842 (Ill. 2006)

(“The fair report privilege is a qualified privilege, which promotes our system of

self-governance by serving the public’s interest in official proceedings, including

judicial proceedings.”); 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611, at 297 (Am. L.

Inst. 1977) [hereinafter Restatement (Second)]. Here, we formally adopt this

privilege as articulated in the Restatement (Second) and supported by our

caselaw.

The fair-report privilege protects

[t]he publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a

report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the

public that deals with a matter of public concern . . . if the report is

accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence

reported.

3 Restatement (Second) § 611, at 297.4 It covers the report of official proceedings

or actions conducted by any level of government, including judicial proceedings.

Id. § 611 cmt. d, at 299. The privilege is most commonly exercised by news

outlets, but it may be exercised by other defendants. Id. § 611 cmt. c, at 299. For

example, courts have determined that the privilege covers authors and political

4This privilege is an affirmative defense. Peoples Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Baird, 346 N.W.2d 1,

4 (Iowa 1984) (“In determining what matters must be pleaded as affirmative defenses, we have

previously defined an affirmative defense as ‘one resting on facts not necessary to support

plaintiffs’ case.’ ” (quoting Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 114 (Iowa 1975))).

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candidates. See, e.g., Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282, 286, 296–97 (1st Cir. 2002)

(authors); Jha v. Khan, 520 P.3d 470, 475, 485 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022) (political

candidates).

This defense is a qualified privilege, but unlike most qualified privileges, it

is not defeated by a showing of actual malice. See, e.g., Barreca v. Nickolas, 683

N.W.2d 111, 118 (Iowa 2004) (“A qualified privilege is abused, for example, when

a defamatory statement is published with ‘actual malice.’ ”). Instead, the privilege

may be defeated by a showing that the report of the proceedings or action was

not a “substantially correct account” or was edited or altered in a way that is

misleading or “convey[s] an erroneous impression to those who hear or read it.”

3 Restatement (Second) § 611 cmt. f, at 300. Inaccuracy is the measure for this

privilege because a defendant’s reason for publishing a public proceeding or

action is generally irrelevant. Patrick J. McNulty, The Law of Defamation: A

Primer for the Iowa Practitioner, 44 Drake L. Rev. 639, 664 (1996).

Although we are fully articulating this privilege for the first time, we have

recognized a version of it since the early 1900s. At the time, the privilege only

covered judicial proceedings and could be defeated by a showing of malice. See,

e.g., Flues v. New Nonpareil Co., 135 N.W. 1083, 1085 (Iowa 1912). Here, we are

expanding the privilege and updating it so that it covers the report of more

proceedings and is defeated by inaccuracy instead of malice, as several other

jurisdictions have done. See, e.g., Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276, 279–80 (Colo.

App. 2005); Solaia Tech., 852 N.E.2d at 843–44; Moreno v. Crookston Times

Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 331–33 (Minn. 2000) (en banc).

3. This case. As the district court recognized, the fair-report privilege

protects ICCSD’s republication of the students’ statements. Villarini argues that

the fair-report privilege is defeated because ICCSD posted the video with actual

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malice and the comments at issue were not about a matter of public concern.

But her first argument is meritless because this privilege is defeated by

inaccuracy, and her second argument fails because the video is an accurate

report of an official proceeding, not just a meeting open to the public. ICCSD

republished statements that the parties seem to agree were slanderous per se,

but the republication was in an accurate and completely unabridged report of

an official proceeding of the ICCSD board of directors that only expanded access

to a meeting that any member of the public could have attended. This case may

have been different if ICCSD edited the video, but as the parties agree, the report

at issue is an exact reproduction of the meeting.

Moreover, the application of the fair-report privilege to this case furthers

Iowa’s open meeting laws. Iowa’s open meeting laws are meant to “assure,

through a requirement of open meetings of governmental bodies, that the basis

and rationale of governmental decisions, as well as those decisions themselves,

are easily accessible to the people.” Iowa Code § 21.1. Government entities,

including school boards, must prioritize the accessibility of public meetings. See

id. §§ 21.3(2), .4(1)(a). School districts specifically must “[k]eep a complete record

of all the proceedings of the meetings of the board.” Id. § 291.6(2). ICCSD has

chosen to comply with these laws with the most transparency possible, and that

should not be punished. The fair-report privilege protects those government

bodies that provide the public with a full account of their meetings.

Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Villarini’s defamation

claim. The district court also did not err in dismissing ICCSD’s motion to amend

as moot once the defamation claim was dismissed.

B. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. Villarini titled

her second claim “breach of contract/violation of public policy.” In its order, the

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district court analyzed the claim as a wrongful termination in violation of public

policy claim.5 To prove a wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim,

Villarini must demonstrate:

(1) the existence of a clearly defined and well-recognized public

policy that protects the employee’s activity; (2) this public policy

would be undermined by the employee’s discharge from

employment; (3) the employee engaged in the protected activity, and

this conduct was the reason the employer discharged the employee;

and (4) the employer had no overriding business justification for the

discharge.

Carver-Kimm v. Reynolds, 992 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Berry v.

Liberty Holdings, Inc., 803 N.W.2d 106, 109–10 (Iowa 2011)). The first two

elements are questions of law for the district court to decide. Id. We have

recognized this tort in three circumstances: “(1) when an employee is discharged

‘in retaliation for enforcing a statutory right’; (2) when an employee is discharged

for ‘refus[ing] to participate in an illegal activity’; and (3) when an employee is

discharged for whistleblowing ‘by reporting illegalities in the workplace.’ ” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Dorshkind v. Oak Park Place of Dubuque II, L.L.C.,

835 N.W.2d 293, 300–01, 303 (Iowa 2013)).

Villarini failed to identify a clearly defined and well-recognized public

policy that ICCSD violated. She argues that there is a clear public interest in

stopping school employees from being removed for unfounded allegations. To

5Villarini argues that the district court ignored her other claim for breach of contract.

While contract employees may bring wrongful termination in violation of public policy claims,

breach of contract is a separate cause of action that addresses different issues. Ackerman v.

State, 913 N.W.2d 610, 617, 618–21 (Iowa 2018). The district court did not ignore Villarini’s

breach of contract claim because she only pleaded a wrongful termination in violation of public

policy claim. A party must prove five elements for a breach of contract claim: “(1) the existence

of a contract; (2) the terms and conditions of the contract; (3) that it has performed all the terms

and conditions required under the contract; (4) the defendant’s breach of the contract in some

particular way; and (5) that plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the breach.” Iowa Mortg.

Ctr., L.L.C. v. Baccam, 841 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Iowa 2013). Villarini did not even include the terms

of the contract in her petition.

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support this, she notes that Ramey admitted that it would have been improper

for ICCSD to place Villarini on leave over the statements made at the meeting

because those allegations had already been investigated.

However, “we have consistently refused to recognize the existence of

alleged public policies based in general and vague concepts of socially desirable

conduct, internal employment policies, or private interests.” Berry, 803 N.W.2d

at 110. Instead, we look at statutes, administrative regulations, and

constitutional provisions as sources of public policy. Id. Villarini’s belief, and

even Ramey’s admission, that it would be improper for school employees to be

fired for unfounded allegations does not demonstrate an established public

policy. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Villarini’s second claim.

III. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals

and the district court’s dismissal of this case.

Decision of Court of Appeals and District Court Judgment Affirmed.