Opinion

Marsh, Jr. v. Stratton

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
May 15, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL MARSH, JR., :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-899

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

A. STRATTON, counselor, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is pro se Plaintiff’s, Daniel Marsh, Jr. (“Marsh” or

Plaintiff), motion for reconsideration of the court’s March 28, 2025

memorandum and order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss and closing

the case. (Doc. 36). Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the court’s order—without

more—is not an adequate reason to justify a reconsideration of the order,

nor is a motion for reconsideration an opportunity for Plaintiff to present new

claims to the Court. For the reasons below, the court will deny Plaintiff’s

motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Marsh is a convicted state prisoner who commenced this civil action

by filing a complaint, which the Clerk of Court docketed on June 1, 2023.

(Doc. 1.) In the complaint, Marsh named certain correctional officials as

defendants, namely: (1) A. Stratton (“Stratton”), a counselor at Pennsylvania

State Correctional Institution at 1100 Pike Street, Huntingdon Pennsylvania

(“SCI Huntingdon”); (2) J. Rivello (“Rivello”), Superintendent at SCI

Huntingdon; (3) Johnny Johnson (“Johnson”) of the Pennsylvania Board of

Pardons and Parole (“Parole Board”);1 and (4) the Secretary of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC

Secretary”). (Id. at 1–3.) A detailed background of the case and the

allegations made are set forth in the court’s prior memorandum dated March

28, 2025, (Doc. 34 at 1-17), which is incorporated herein by reference.

On September 13, 2023, Defendants timely filed their motion to

dismiss (Doc. 13), which this court granted, finding, inter alia, that (1) any

claims regarding the appeal of Plaintiff’s PCRA petition and the denial of a

grievance requesting legal boxes are barred by statute of limitations, (id. at

21-24); (2) the claims against Defendants Harry, Johnson, and Rivello must

be dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement, (id. at 24-29); (3) the

Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to the contents of Plaintiff’s cell,

including his birth certificate and social security card, (id. at 29-30); (4)

Plaintiff failed to establish that he had been subject to cruel and unusual

punishment, (id. at 30-33); (5) the deprivation of property Plaintiff alleged is

1 Marsh misspells “parole” as “paroll” in the caption and body of the

complaint. (Doc. 1 at 1, 3.) The Court uses the proper spelling in this

Memorandum.

insufficient to raise a due process claim and the inmate grievance system

provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy available to Plaintiff, (id. at

33-37); and (6) the Fifth Amendment does not apply to Defendants who are

state employees, (id. at 38-39). On April 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration. (Doc. 36). With the filing of Defendants’ brief in opposition,

(Doc. 37), the motion is now ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

A court may alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(e). See Keifer v. Reinhart Foodservices, LLC., 563 F. App’x 112, 114 (3d

Cir. 2014). “A motion under Rule 59(e) is a ‘device to relitigate the original

issue’ decided by the district court, and used to allege legal error.” United

States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Smith v. Evans,

853 F.2d 155, 158-159 (3d Cir. 1988)). A motion to alter or amend “must rely

on one of three major grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law;

(2) the availability of new evidence not available previously; or (3) the need

to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” N. River Ins. Co.

v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194,1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal

quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also, Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel.

Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). However,

“motions for reconsideration should not be used to put forward arguments

which the movant ... could have made but neglected to make before

judgment.” United States v. Jasin, 292 F.Supp.2d 670, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2003)

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Reich v.

Compton, 834 F.Supp.2d 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993) rev’d in part and aff’d in

part on other grounds, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995)). Nor should they “be used

as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an

attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the

litigant.” Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F.Supp.2d 212, 226 (M.D. Pa. 2012)

(quoting Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa.

2002)).

Plaintiff’s motion cannot succeed under Rule 59(e). As correctly noted

by Defendants, Plaintiff presents no errors of law or fact to correct, nor is

there any newly discovered evidence. Plaintiff does not contest the court’s

decisions regarding his Fourth, Fifth, or Eighth Amendment claims and only

contests dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. As the

court has already resolved this issue in its earlier memorandum, it will not

entertain Plaintiff’s attempt to relitigate the matter. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration inappropriately introduces new claims of fraud,

Brady violations, prosecutorial misconduct,2 false arrest and false

imprisonment, among others. Motions for reconsideration are not the proper

means for plaintiffs to bring forward new claims that may have been sought

prior to judgment. Rinaldi v. United States, 2015 WL 9304105, at *4 (M.D.

Pa. Dec. 22, 2015) (stating that a plaintiff cannot amend a complaint through

a motion for reconsideration). In fact, all of these claims, cases and

arguments cited by Plaintiff in the instant motion were available to him at the

time of filing his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss. The arguments

he presents (other than in support of his new claims) have already been

addressed by the court. Mere dissatisfaction with the court’s ruling does not

constitute a valid basis for reconsideration. Accordingly, the motion for

reconsideration will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration (Doc. 36). An appropriate order follows.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: May 15, 2025

23-899-02

2 The prosecutors who Plaintiff refers to are not even parties to this

case.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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