Opinion

Kugler v. Donathan

Court
District Court, C.D. Illinois
Filed
May 14, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.4%

providing that a good-faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonable person could suppose . . . has some merit" from a legal perspective

How later courts described this case

  • providing that a good-faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonable person could suppose . . . has some merit" from a legal perspective
  • “Among these prudential restrictions is the general rule that a litigant must assert his own legal rights and cannot assert the legal rights of a third party.”
  • stating that an appellant should be allowed to submit a statement of the grounds for appealing so that the district judge "can make a reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

DEVIN KUGLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) 24-4108

)

GREG DONATHAN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and civilly detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention

Center (“Rushville”) pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS

207/1, pursues an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations. (Doc. 15).

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3). The “privilege to proceed without

posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within

the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were

not afforded to them.” Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972).

A court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court will grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis only if the

Amended Complaint states a federal claim.

This case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court

must “screen” Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the

entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v.

Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”

Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff files suit against Facility Director Gregory Donathan and Assistant Facility

Director Erin Posey. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his and other residents’ constitutional

rights by implementing an “illegal policy creating a token society where this Plaintiff and other

residents at the TDF are pa[id] for their labor in the form of points ‘cashless vending system’ where

[they] can only spend these ‘token points’ at the onsite TDF commissary.” (Doc. 15 at p. 5).

Plaintiff alleges this policy violates their First Amendment right to be paid in U.S. currency for

their labor. Plaintiff also alleges Defendants created a policy to require residents to pay cash for

services, such as for medical treatment and room and board. Plaintiff alleges this policy places an

undue financial burden on him and other residents and violates their constitutional rights because

they were involuntarily committed.

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, it is not permissible for Plaintiff to attempt to raise claims on behalf

of other residents. See Hunt v. Reagle, No. 3:23-CV-1012-DRL-MGG, 2023 WL 8598139, at *1

(N.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2023) (plaintiff lacked standing to assert constitutional claims of other inmates

and could not pursue injunctive relief on their behalf) (citing Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727,

739-40 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Among these prudential restrictions is the general rule that a litigant must

assert his own legal rights and cannot assert the legal rights of a third party.”)).

Plaintiff is “not constitutionally entitled to be paid in cash” for jobs he performs at the

facility. Carpenter v. Saddler, No. 12-CV-3227, 2012 WL 5471953, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2012)

(dismissing Rushville detainees’ claim to be paid in cash for their work). Plaintiff alleges he is

required to pay cash for services, such as room and board and health care treatment, based on a

policy Defendants created. Plaintiff does not explain what “room and board” consists of or how

much he is allegedly charged. “[T]he imposition of a modest fee for medical services, standing

alone, does not violate the Constitution.” Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim

under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any additional amendments

would be futile because Plaintiff cannot allege a cognizable claim on these facts.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any further

amendment would be futile because Plaintiff cannot allege a cognizable claim on these facts.

This case is closed. The Clerk is directed to enter a judgment.

2) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [3] is DENIED.

3) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice of appeal with this

Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to

appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist

the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P.

24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that an

appellant should be allowed to submit a statement of the grounds for appealing so that the

district judge "can make a reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith"); Walker v.

O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (providing that a good-faith appeal is an appeal

that "a reasonable person could suppose . . . has some merit" from a legal perspective). If

Plaintiff chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee regardless of

the outcome of the appeal.

Entered this 14th day of May, 2025.

s/Sara Darrow

SARA DARROW

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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