The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JEREMIE BUTLER,
Plaintiff,
v. CAUSE NO. 3:25-CV-367-JD-AZ
RANGEL,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Jeremie Butler, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 5. “A
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the
merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
Butler alleges that on March 16, 2025, around 5:00 p.m., he verbally called for the
Officer in Charge of B-Cell House at the Indiana State Prison, Officer Rangel, to let him
know he was experiencing extreme abdominal pain that resulted from a popping or
tearing sensation that had just occurred while having a bowel movement. He clearly
stated the severeness of the pain and suffering that he felt in his abdominal area and
asked Officer Rangel to take him to medical. Butler told him, “Something is really
wrong!” ECF 5 at 2. Butler asked that he call a Signal 3000 for a medical emergency.
Officer Rangel did not call a Signal 3000 or take him to medical. He just walked away.
At this point, the pain was so severe that Butler fell to the ground and began
yelling for help. He lost control of his bowels and defecated on himself. Officer Rangel
came back some time later, and saw Butler still laying on the ground. At this time,
Butler was in tears from the pain and was begging for Officer Rangel to take him to
medical. Officer Rangel again walked away.
Butler was now unable to move or talk due to extreme pain. Officer Rangel came
back a third time to find Butler still on the floor, unresponsive and unable to move or
talk. Officer Rangel requested that Butler talk to him or to get up off the floor, but Butler
was unable to comply due to the pain. Officer Rangel again did not take Butler to
medical or call a Signal 3000. Butler alleges that at this time, he lost consciousness.
When he regained consciousness, he was able to crawl over and into his bed. The
process was so painful that once he finally made it into his bunk, he passed out again
from the pain. He woke up in the fetal position, soaked with sweat and unbearable
pain. He tried to stand up, but instead fell to the floor. He crawled to the front of his cell
to attempt to yell for help, but the pain from moving made him pass out again.
Around 9:00 p.m., four hours after the pain began, Officer Ramirez on the night
shift asked if Butler was okay. Seeing that he wasn’t, she asked him to stand up and cuff
up to be taken to medical. He told her he couldn’t stand up or move. She entered his
cell and cuffed his wrists before lifting him into a wheelchair to be taken to medical.
At medical, nursing staff took his vitals and called an ambulance for him to be
taken to a hospital in Michigan City. At the hospital, he was diagnosed with a tear in his
spleen and was air lifted to a hospital in South Bend for emergency surgery to stop the
bleeding. By this point, four units of blood had leaked from his spleen into his
stomach—a life threatening injury. Butler sues Officer Rangel under the Eighth
Amendment for denying him medical treatment for a clear emergency, leaving him in
pain for four hours and allowing his condition to further deteriorate.
Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to constitutionally adequate
medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner
must satisfy both an objective and subjective component by showing: (1) his medical
need was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to
that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A medical need is
“serious” if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Deliberate indifference
means that the defendant “acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the
defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and
decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could
have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). “[I]nexplicable
delay in responding to an inmate’s serious medical condition can reflect deliberate
indifference,” particularly where “that delay exacerbates an inmate’s medical condition
or unnecessarily prolongs suffering.” Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2020)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). Butler may proceed against Officer Rangel for
ignoring the obvious signs that he needed immediate medical attention, resulting in a
harmful delay in obtaining medical care.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Jeremie Butler leave to proceed against Officer Rangel in his
individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for being deliberately
indifferent to his need for immediate medical attention at Indiana State Prison after he
suffered an injury on March 16, 2025, resulting in prolonged pain and a delay in
treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service
from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to
locate and serve process on) Officer Rangel at the Indiana Department of Correction,
with a copy of this order and the complaint (ECF 5);
(4) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name, date
of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive service if
it has such information; and
(5) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Officer Rangel to respond, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to
the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening
order.
SO ORDERED on May 14, 2025
/s/JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT