“It is perhaps ironic that the more extreme or even far- fetched is the asserted theory of liability, the more important it is that the conceptual legal theories be explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader’s supposition.”
How later courts described this case
- “It is perhaps ironic that the more extreme or even far- fetched is the asserted theory of liability, the more important it is that the conceptual legal theories be explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader’s supposition.”
- “[A pro se litigant] is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
- holding that inmates may not obtain release from custody or attack the fact or length of confinement in a civil-rights lawsuit
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-20300-RAR
CHRISTOPHER J. MADAIO,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
SCREENING ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiff Christopher J. Madaio’s pro se “Civil
Action With Respect to Violations of the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,” [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff,
who is presently confined at the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida, principally alleges
that Defendants violated his rights as a “publisher and published photographer” by seizing his
“work product materials” and “other documents” during a July 11, 2024 search and seizure at
Miami International Airport. Id. at 1. He also asserts that Defendants “violate[d] [his] civil rights
. . . by denying him access . . . to pretrial bond” in his federal criminal case “arising from the
indiscriminate seizure of the same materials[.]” Id. (cleaned up). For the reasons below, the Court
finds that Plaintiff’s claims against the United States of America under 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa shall
PROCEED to service, and his remaining claims must be DISMISSED without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a photographer by trade, with over fifty years behind the lens. See Compl. at 4.
He has enjoyed earnings from a nearly thirty-year-old original photobook titled, “Il Ritrato
Giovanile,” as well as international recognition from articles and numerous photo exhibitions. Id.
But Plaintiff’s love for photography became a liability when, in 2004, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) discovered 691 images classified as child pornography on his personal
computers. See Madaio v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. CV-06-BE-00904, 2008 WL
11392887, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2008). In 2006, Plaintiff pled guilty to possessing and
knowingly receiving material containing images of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2252A(a)(2)(A), and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. See id.
Eighteen years later, Plaintiff found himself in financial straits. See Compl. at 5. In March
2024, Plaintiff was contacted by a businessman, Brandon Bello, who “offered to purchase
exclusive rights to all” of Plaintiff’s photos “with the intent of publishing two photobooks[.]” Id.
After several weeks, Plaintiff and Mr. Bello “came to a contractual agreement,” in which they
agreed that Plaintiff would: (1) deliver “all his personal/scanned photos [] taken over the past [fifty-
five] years to Mr. Bello” to facilitate a “final selection of photos” and a “suitable layout of the two
photobooks”; and (2) “work for an indeterminate time as an engineer at Mr. Bello’s biofuel plant
near Yopal, Colombia.” Id. (cleaned up).
Plaintiff left for Colombia with his photographs and contractual information on a separate
flash drive. See id. But when he arrived at the Bogota Airport, Plaintiff “was denied entry to
Colombia” and “immediately returned on the next available flight to Miami International Airport”
in the United States. Id. On July 11, 2024, officials for the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) “proceeded to seize indiscriminately all of [Plaintiff]’s digital media,” including those
materials necessary to fulfill his contractual obligations with Mr. Bello. Id. As a result, a grand
jury in this District charged Plaintiff with one count of knowingly transporting any visual depiction
involving the use of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and one count of knowingly
possessing any visual depiction involving the use of a “prepubescent minor” engaged in sexually
explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§§§ 2252(a)(1), (a)(4)(B), (b)(1), and (b)(2).
Indictment, United States v. Madaio, No. 24-cr-20445 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2024), ECF No. 6 at 1–2.
Plaintiff has been detained ever since.1 See Compl. at 7. Yet, as relevant here, Plaintiff
says that the Government seized materials “intended for publication” that were “clearly marked in
a separate folder” and would not be considered by a reasonable person as constituting child
pornography. Id. at 8. He avers that, to date, the Government continues “to hold all seized
materials,” which has prevented Plaintiff from publishing his anticipated photobooks. Id. Plaintiff
thus filed the instant action principally under the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa,
seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the “excessively malicious actions by the
Defendants[.]” Id. at 9.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court “shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
(emphasis added). The definition of a “prisoner” includes “any person incarcerated or detained in
any facility who is . . . accused of [or] convicted of . . . violations of criminal law.” Id. §
1915A(c). In conducting its screening of a prisoner’s complaint, the Court must “dismiss the
complaint[] or any portion of the complaint,” when it is (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted[;]” or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Similarly, if a plaintiff wishes to proceed in forma
pauperis rather than prepaying the filing fee, § 1915(e)(2) requires the court to “dismiss [a] case
at any time if the court determines that . . . the action” fails for the same enumerated reasons
articulated under § 1915A. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
1 Plaintiff was ultimately convicted by a jury on both counts in the Indictment. See Jury Verdict, United
States v. Madaio, No. 24-cr-20445 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2025), ECF No. 70.
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint’s factual allegations “must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”—with “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).
Under this standard, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and are
insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, “[w]here a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Although the Court must hold the allegations in a pro se civil rights complaint “to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), pro se litigants are still required to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida, see Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th
Cir. 1989) (“[A pro se litigant] is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); see also S.D. FLA. L.R. 1.1 (explaining that the Local Rules
apply in all proceedings unless otherwise indicated and that the word “counsel” shall apply to a
party that is proceeding pro se). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require, in pertinent part,
that a pleading that states a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for
a court’s jurisdiction,” “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,” and “a demand for the relief sought[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). “A party must state its
claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances[,]” and “each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence—and each
defense other than a denial—must be stated in a separate count or defense.” Id. 10(b).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff sues five Defendants in their individual and official capacities—the United States
of America, Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Agent Kenny Silva, Assistant United
States Attorney Angela Benoit, FDC Miami Warden Serrano, and “Unnamed Defendants.”
Compl. at 1. Plaintiff briefly alleges that several Defendants violated his rights by denying him
access to a pretrial bond. See id. That aside, Plaintiff’s central claim falls under the Privacy
Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa et seq. See generally id. The Court will address his claims in
turn.
I. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Defendants Benoit and Serrano
Plaintiff has sued “Serrano,” the Warden at FDC Miami, and Angela Benoit, the lead
prosecutor in his federal criminal case, presumably alleging that they unlawfully kept him detained
without bond. See Compl. at 1. These Defendants are due to be dismissed for two reasons. First,
to the extent Plaintiff is seeking release, this type of relief is unavailable in a civil-rights action.
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488 (1973) (holding that inmates may not obtain release
from custody or attack the fact or length of confinement in a civil-rights lawsuit). Second, Plaintiff
proffers no facts connecting these individual Defendants to any constitutional or statutory
violation. See generally Compl. He has thus failed to establish any affirmative causal connection
between these Defendants’ actions and Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. See Brewer v. Morgan, No. 16-
CV-457, 2016 WL 6987034, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016) (“[L]isting defendants at the beginning
of a complaint is not sufficient to name them in an action without alleging facts as to what each
defendant did or did not do that gives rise to the claim.” (alteration added)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 6986703 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2016). Accordingly, the Court
hereby DISMISSES Defendants Angela Benoit and Warden Serrano as parties to this action.
II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Unnamed Defendants
Next, Plaintiff cannot sue fictitious “Unnamed Defendants.” Compl. at 1. “As a general
matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598
F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). However, “[t]here may be times when, for one reason or another,
the plaintiff is unwilling or unable to use a party’s real name.” Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210,
1215 (11th Cir. 1992) (alterations added). The Eleventh Circuit has thus carved out an exception
to this principle when a plaintiff’s description of a fictitiously named defendant is “sufficiently
clear to allow service of process.” Id. at 1216. But Plaintiff has hardly satisfied this exception,
since the Complaint contains virtually zero description of the identities, badge numbers,
employer(s), or locations of these “Unnamed Defendants.” The Court will therefore DISMISS all
claims against them.
III. Plaintiff’s Claims Under the Privacy Protection Act
Lastly, the Court will address Plaintiff’s central claim against the two remaining
Defendants, DHS Agent Kenny Silva and the United States of America. As explained below, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff, at least for now, has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted
against the United States.
A. The Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa
The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (“PPA” or “the Act”) generally prohibits government
officials from searching for and seizing certain materials possessed by a person reasonably
believed to have a purpose to disseminate information to the public. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa; see
also Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350, 1353 (8th Cir. 1996). The Act’s central purpose was
to fortify First Amendment protection for publication materials during the execution of a search or
seizure, investigation, or prosecution of a criminal offense. See Times Publ’g Co. v. United States,
No. 23-MC-0014, 2023 WL 7411463, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2023); see also Madaio v. Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, No. CV-06-BE-00904, 2008 WL 11392887, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31,
2008) (“The [PPA] was intended to discourage law enforcement officers from targeting publishers
simply because they often gathered ‘mere evidence’ of crime.” (alteration added)). The PPA
creates a civil cause of action for damages arising from such searches or seizures against the United
States; a State which has waived its sovereign immunity to a claim for damages resulting from a
violation of the PPA; “any other government unit”; and an officer or employee of a State while
acting within the scope or color of his office or employment, provided the State has not waived its
sovereign immunity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(a)(1)–(2).
The PPA specifically affords protection for both “work product materials” and
“documentary materials,” providing as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a government officer
or employee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a
criminal offense, to search for or seize any work product materials
possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate
to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public
communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce[.]
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a government officer
or employee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a
criminal offense, to search for or seize documentary materials, other than
work product materials, possessed by a person in connection with a purpose
to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar
form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce[.]
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)–(b) (alterations added).
The PPA defines “work product materials” in part as materials that are “prepared,
produced, authored, or created” “in anticipation of communicating such materials to the public,”
or are “possessed for the purposes of communicating such materials to the public,” and which may
“include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of the person who prepared,
produced, authored, or created such material.” Id. § 2000aa-7(b). “Documentary materials” under
the Act include “written or printed materials, photographs, motion picture films, negatives, video
tapes, audio tapes, and other mechanically, magnetically or electronically recorded cards, tapes, or
discs[.]” Id. § 2000aa-7(a) (alteration added). However, the Act’s definitions for “work product
materials” and “documentary materials” both exclude “contraband or the fruits of a crime or things
otherwise criminally possessed.” Id. § 2000aa-7.
Based on this statutory framework, the Court distills the following three elements necessary
to state a plausible claim under § 2000aa: (1) a government officer or employee, in connection
with a criminal investigation or prosecution, searched for or seized (2) either work product
materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have or documentary materials possessed
by person in connection with (3) a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book,
broadcast, or other similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)–(b).
There are certain statutory exceptions and defenses by which law enforcement can avoid
liability under the Act. Under the “suspect exception,” “[t]he police can avoid the constraints of
the [A]ct . . . when the person possessing the materials is a criminal suspect rather than an innocent
third party.” Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 341 (6th Cir. 2001) (alterations added). To satisfy this
exception, the government must have “probable cause to believe that the person possessing such
materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense to which the materials relate.” §§
2000aa(a)(1), (b)(1) (emphasis added). This exception contains its own caveat, such that even
where the materials relate to the criminal offense, an officer nevertheless “may not search for or
seize such materials . . . if the offense to which the materials relate consists of the receipt,
possession, communication, or withholding of such materials or the information contained
therein.” §§ 2000aa(a)(1), (b)(1) (emphasis added). This caveat is inapplicable where the offense
falls under any one of the statutorily listed offense categories, such as “national defense,”
“classified information,” or “the sexual exploitation of children,” §§ 2000aa(a)(1), (b)(1)—
meaning that an officer can search for and seize the subject materials provided they satisfy the
suspect exception.2
A search or seizure is also permitted when “there is reason to believe that the immediate
seizure of such materials is necessary to prevent the death of, or serious bodily injury to, a human
being.” §§ 2000aa(a)(2), (b)(2). Additionally, and as relevant here, the Act contains a sweeping
“border exception,” providing that “[t]his chapter shall not impair or affect the ability of a
government officer or employee . . . to conduct searches and seizures at the borders of, or at
international points of, entry into the United States in order to enforce the customs laws of the
United States.” § 2000aa-5 (alterations added).
With these standards in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s allegations.
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Defendant DHS Agent Kenny Silva
As an initial matter, it does not appear that Plaintiff can sue DHS Agent Kenny Silva. As
the Court has explained, the PPA only permits suit (1) “against the United States”; (2) “against a
State which has waived its sovereign immunity under the Constitution to a claim for damages
resulting from a violation of this chapter”; (3) “against any other government unit”; and (4)
“against an officer or employee of a State . . . while acting within the scope or color of his office
2 The seizure of documentary materials other than work product materials comes with two additional
statutory exceptions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b)(3)–(4) (permitting a search or seizure of documentary
materials when “there is reason to believe that the giving of notice pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum
would result in the destruction, alteration, or concealment of such materials”; or “such materials have not
been produced in response to a court order directing compliance with a subpoena duces tecum,” where “all
appellate remedies have been exhausted” or “there is reason to believe that the delay in an investigation or
trial occasioned by further proceedings relating the subpoena would threaten the interests of justice”).
or employment, if such State has not waived its sovereign immunity[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-
6(a)(1)–(2) (alterations added). None of these categories apply to DHS Agent Silva, who is
demonstrably an individual officer or employee of the United States. Accordingly, the Court will
TERMINATE Defendant DHS Agent Kenny Silva as a Defendant to this action.
C. Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Against Defendant United States of America
For now, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently pleads each element of the PPA and
therefore states a plausible claim for relief against the United States. First, Plaintiff has alleged
that a government officer or employee conducted a search or seizure connected to a criminal
investigation. Specifically, he proffers that DHS Agent Kenny Silva was acting within the scope
or under color of his office or employment as an “agent and investigator for the [DHS],”3 and
Agent Silva’s “primary responsibility” was “the search and seizure of all Plaintiff’s digital media
at Miami International Airport” and the “forensic analysis of same,” resulting in Plaintiff’s
indictment and detention in his related criminal case. Compl. at 2 (alteration added).
Second, Plaintiff’s seized materials satisfy the meaning of “documentary materials” under
the Act. He avers that DHS agents seized his “digital media, including those necessary” to fulfill
his contractual obligations to Mr. Bello. Compl. at 6. This “digital media” included “all his
personal/scanned photos[] taken over the past 55 years,” id. (alteration added), which plainly
comports with the Act’s definition of “documentary materials,” which include “photographs,” 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(a). Further, since Plaintiff contends that “none of the images intended for
3 For this reason, Plaintiff has properly sued the United States of America. The PPA explicitly states that
“a person aggrieved by a search for or seizure of materials in violation of this chapter shall have a civil
cause of action for damages for such search or seizure . . . against the United States[,] which shall be liable
for violations of this chapter by their officers or employees while acting within the scope or under color of
their office or employment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(a)(1) (alterations added). And the United States “may
not assert as a defense to a claim arising under this chapter the immunity of the officer or employee whose
violation is complained of or his reasonable good faith belief in the lawfulness of his conduct[.]” Id. §
2000aa-6(c) (alteration added).
publication,” which were “clearly marked in a separate folder[,] would be considered by a
reasonable person to be child pornography,” Compl. at 8 (alteration added), he has averred that the
seized materials do not constitute “contraband or the fruits of a crime or things otherwise
criminally possessed,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7.
Third, Plaintiff possessed such documentary materials “in connection with a purpose to
disseminate to the public a . . . book . . . or other similar form of public communication, in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b) (alterations added). This is
evident from Plaintiff’s allegations that he and Mr. Bello intended to incorporate such digital media
into a photobook for publication. See Compl. at 6. Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a plausible
claim for relief under the PPA.
Moving on, Plaintiff attempts to overcome two of the PPA’s exceptions to liability. For
instance, Plaintiff alleges that the images do not trigger the suspect exception because the seized
digital media was “clearly marked in a separate folder” and plainly did not constitute child
pornography, meaning that Plaintiff’s materials did not relate to the criminal offense underlying
any probable cause for the seizure. Compl. at 8; see also §§ 2000aa(a)(1), (b)(1). Moreover,
Plaintiff insists that the PPA’s border exception does not apply in his case. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-
5. Ordinarily, the PPA will not restrain the actions of officers who conduct searches and seizures
at international points of entry into the United States to enforce customs laws. See id. But Plaintiff
alleges that officers “maneuver[ed] [] Plaintiff into a position at Miami International where a
search and seizure was unavoidable.” Compl. at 7 (cleaned up). By “rerouting” Plaintiff to Miami
International Airport, he avers that Defendants “intentionally and maliciously” forced him “into a
situation . . . where he would be deprived of the protections afforded to him under the [Fourth]
Amendment[.]” Id. at 7–8 (cleaned up).4
Due to the PPA’s infrequent application, existing judicial precedent offers little to no
guidance on how to resolve these remaining issues without further briefing. It is also unclear
whether Plaintiff must advance allegations under any of the PPA’s exceptions to state a plausible
claim for relief under the statute. The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that courts “should be
especially reluctant to dismiss on the basis of the pleadings when the asserted theory of liability is
novel” or presents issues of first impression. Moore v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, No. 23-
12468, 2024 WL 1765706, at *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2024) (cleaned up); cf. Shull v. Pilot Life Ins.
Co., 313 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1963) (“It is perhaps ironic that the more extreme or even far-
fetched is the asserted theory of liability, the more important it is that the conceptual legal theories
be explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader’s supposition.”). Thus, the Court
will permit Plaintiff to proceed to service of process on his PPA claim against the United States.
4 Notably, Plaintiff is not challenging the reasonableness of the subject search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment’s contours. Rather, Plaintiff—upon a liberal construction of his allegations—challenges the
applicability of the PPA’s border exception. Plaintiff’s allegations that he was intentionally maneuvered
by government officials into an international port of entry suggests that agents intended to pursue a law
enforcement objective with the benefit of the border’s substantially relaxed restrictions under the Fourth
Amendment. See Compl. at 7. Plaintiff essentially argues that these circumstances were not contemplated
under § 2000aa-5. Whether § 2000aa-5’s reference to border searches is read coextensively with the range
of border searches permitted under the Fourth Amendment is a matter of first impression. However,
Plaintiff’s interpretation of § 2000aa-5 is at least colorable and not foreclosed by any existing caselaw; at
this juncture, therefore, the Court expresses no opinion on the exception’s applicability to Plaintiff’s case
or how it affects the plausibility of his claims.
Further, the commingling of Plaintiff’s digital media with criminal evidence, and how such circumstances
may foreclose liability under the Act, is a developing issue among courts. Plaintiff alleges that DHS agents
seized his digital media, which Plaintiff appears to have kept in a “flash drive” on his way to Colombia.
Compl. at 6. One circuit court has determined that liability will not attach where PPA-protected materials
are “commingled . . . with criminal evidence that is unprotected by the act[.]” Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325,
342 (6th Cir. 2001). However, due to the novelty of Guest’s holding and the limited attention it has received
by courts, the Court again expresses no opinion on how this issue may affect the plausibility of Plaintiff’s
claims going forward.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Plaintiff Christopher J. Madaio’s claim against Defendant United States of America
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, [ECF No. 1], may PROCEED to service of process. All remaining
claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. Defendants DHS Agent Kenny Silva, Angela Benoit, Warden Serrano and
“Unnamed Defendants” are TERMINATED as parties to this action.
3. Since Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis in this action, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure require him to serve the United States with a copy of the summons and the
Complaint. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1) (“The plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and
complaint served[.]” (alteration added)); see also id. 4G) (directing the manner in which a plaintiff
must serve the United States). At Plaintiff’s request, the Court “may order that service be made
by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed by the court.” Id.
4(c)(3). The deadline for service of process in this case is August 11, 2025.
4. This case shall remain administratively closed.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 13th day of May, 2025.
RODOLEFO A. RUIZ I
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: Christopher J. Madaio
25435-001
Miami FDC
Federal Detention Center
Inmate Mail/Parcels
Post Office Box 019120
Miami, FL 33101
PRO SE
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