Chafin v. Caudill

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER CHAFIN,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-cv-00135

STEVE CAUDILL, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Steve Caudill, Jason Hutson, and Joseph Wood’s

(“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 85.) For the

reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Christopher Chafin (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action on March 19, 2024. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff’s Complaint was amended on December 19, 2024. (ECF No. 78.) This action

arises from Plaintiff’s allegations of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm that Plaintiff was exposed to at the North Central Regional Jail and Correctional

Facility (“NCRJ”). (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint was submitted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violations of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

(Id.) Plaintiff was at all relevant times a pre-trial detainee incarcerated at NCRJ. (Id.)

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Relevant to the present motion are Counts V and VI of the Amended Complaint. (Id. at

¶¶ 153-69.) In Count V, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Hutson, Wood, and Caudill violated

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights when they were “deliberately indifferent to the serious

risk of substantial harm to [Plaintiff’s] health and safety posed by the well-known and long-

tolerated pattern and practice of correctional officers at NCRJ using excessive force on inmates,

including pepper spraying, beating and otherwise using physical violence against inmates like

[Plaintiff], for no legitimate, nonpunitive purpose.” (Id. at ¶ 154.) In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants Hutson1 and Wood “knew of or should have known of the substantial risk of

serious harm to [Plaintiff] posed by failing to restrict access to razors to inmates prone to self-

harm.” (Id. at ¶ 160.) Defendant Wood was the Superintendent of NCRJ in February and early

March 2023, at which time Defendant Hutson became the Superintendent. (ECF No. 78 at ¶¶ 5-

6.) Defendant Caudill was at all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint the Director of Security

Services at the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“WVDCR”). (Id. at ¶

4.)

As alleged in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff suffers from major depression, post-

traumatic stress disorder, schizoaffective disorder, borderline personality disorder, antisocial

personality disorder, frequent suicidal ideation, and substance use disorder. (ECF No. 78 at ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff requires psychiatric medications to quell hallucinations and suicidal ideation. (Id.)

Plaintiff previously attempted suicide in other WVDCR facilities prior to his incarceration at NCRJ

in 2023. (Id. at ¶ 16.)

1 References to “Hutson” only apply to Defendant Jason Hutson, as the parties stipulated to the voluntary dismissal

of this civil action with prejudice as to Valerie Hutson. (ECF No. 136.)

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Plaintiff arrived at NCRJ on February 2, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 19.) As alleged, shortly after

arriving, Correctional Officer (“CO”) Daniel Brill (“Brill”) sprayed Plaintiff in the face with

oleoresin capsicum spray (“OC”) without first issuing an order or directive. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff was not violating an order or posing a threat to himself, others, or state property. (Id. at

¶ 21.) Brill then tackled Plaintiff to the ground and Plaintiff was escorted to the shower in the

medical unit by Brill and CO Austin Craig (“Craig”). (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) While in the shower area

and out of camera view, Craig deployed his OC against Plaintiff without issuing an order and while

Plaintiff was not posing a threat. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.)

Craig and Brill uncuffed Plaintiff, had him remove his clothes, and allowed him to take a

brief shower. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiff was redressed in the same clothes he was wearing when

sprayed, which resulted in a continuing burning sensation, then Plaintiff was placed by Brill and

Craig in a temporary holding cage2 for the rest of the night. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30.) That morning,

Plaintiff was assigned to suicide watch and was shortly thereafter issued a mental health discharge

by licensed professional counselor Valerie Hutson, who also did not recommend razor restrictions

for Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32.) Plaintiff was placed back into segregation but suffered seizures

over the following days and was transferred to two different hospitals and returned to segregation

on February 18, 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.) Upon his return to NCRJ, Plaintiff’s cellmates attacked

Plaintiff by smashing his electronic tablet on his head. (Id. at ¶ 35.) COs arrived and separated

Plaintiff from his cellmates, after which Plaintiff explained he was attacked by his cellmates. (Id.

at ¶ 36.) As alleged, CO Jameson told the other COs that Plaintiff was lying. (Id.) CO Graff

2 A temporary holding cage, also known as a bird cage, is a free-standing, barred cage large enough for one individual

to sit or stand inside. These cages are placed at regular intervals throughout the various areas of the jail facility,

including in hallways. (ECF No. 78 at ¶ 93 n.4.)

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issued Plaintiff a write-up for assaulting his cellmates and breaking the tablet on his own head.

(Id. at ¶ 37.)

Between February 19 and February 27, 2023, Plaintiff was evaluated by mental health

clinicians, during which time the clinicians were informed of Plaintiff’s previous suicide attempts,

ongoing hallucinations, and Plaintiff’s past experience of sexual assault. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-43.)

During this time, Plaintiff was placed on-and-off suicide watch, but no mental health clinician

added a razor restriction for Plaintiff. (Id.) On February 28, 2023, Plaintiff was released from

suicide watch and placed into segregation, and within a week of his release, COs gave Plaintiff a

razor upon his request. (Id. at ¶ 44.) COs also placed unmonitored boxes of razors by the

showers and Plaintiff regularly found razors left behind in shower areas. (Id.) Between February

28 and March 4, 2023, Plaintiff submitted grievances about the fight with his cellmates and about

COs tackling him and spraying him with OC in early February. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-49.) On March 4,

2023, Plaintiff was served a write-up by CO Graff alleging that Plaintiff admitted to CO Graff that

Plaintiff had broken the tablet on February 18 by smashing it against his own head. (Id. at ¶ 50.)

On March 6, 2023, a hearing occurred where Plaintiff was found “guilty” of breaking the tablet on

his own head and was issued a $350 fine. (Id. at ¶ 51.) Two days later, Plaintiff attempted

suicide by swallowing razors blades and was placed on suicide watch upon his return from the

hospital. (Id. at ¶ 52.)

Plaintiff alleges that upon his return to NCRJ from the hospital on March 9, 2023, Plaintiff

asked CO Craig for a “suicide blanket.” (Id. at ¶ 54.) CO Craig returned with a blanket along

with CO Brandon Gier (“Gier”). (Id. at ¶ 55.) Craig and Gier removed Plaintiff from the

booking cell without handcuffs and walked him to the shower and instructed Plaintiff to step into

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an area where there were no security cameras. (Id.) Craig and Gier handcuffed Plaintiff, who

was wearing a paper suicide shirt and underwear, and Plaintiff complied. (Id.) Without further

orders, Gier and Craig pushed Plaintiff’s head into the wall, pushed him to the ground, and tore

off his clothes. (Id. at ¶ 56.) Craig strangled Plaintiff with both hands until Plaintiff lost

consciousness. (Id. at ¶ 57.) Plaintiff woke up to Craig slapping him and asked why “this was

being done to him.” (Id. at ¶¶ 58-59.) As alleged, Craig replied that it was because Plaintiff was

a “pain in the ass” who needed to “learn a lesson.” (Id.) Craig then sprayed Plaintiff with OC

directly in the face despite Plaintiff being handcuffed on the floor, not resisting, and posing no

threat to person or property. (Id. at ¶ 61.) Craig and Gier then sprayed Plaintiff’s entire body

with OC, including his genitals, “exhausting multiple cans of OC.” (Id. at ¶ 62.)

Plaintiff was then wrapped in a blanket and walked to a nurse by Craig, who then sent

Plaintiff to the shower for decontamination. (Id. at ¶ 63.) Plaintiff was escorted back to booking

where he remained on a cell floor for the night until he was placed in the suicide watch unit. (Id.

at ¶¶ 64-65.) Plaintiff requested grievance forms to report Gier and Craig but was not given the

requested forms because individuals on suicide watch are not permitted to have any items in their

possession. (Id. at ¶¶ 66-67.) The following day, Plaintiff told Valerie Hutson that he was

sprayed but did not do anything wrong and wished that he could be dead. (Id. at ¶ 68.)

On March 22, 2023, Plaintiff was removed from suicide watch and he began filing

grievances relating to the fight with his cellmates and the incident involving Gier and Craig. (Id.

at ¶ 69.) On April 4, 2023, Hearing Officer Gary Sigler issued Plaintiff a write-up from CO Gier

alleging that on March 9, the night Gier and Craig beat and sprayed Plaintiff, Plaintiff disobeyed

an order and created a disturbance. (Id. at ¶ 71.) Plaintiff alleges that Gier and Craig falsified

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the allegations to “cover up their abuses.” (Id. at ¶ 72.) Hearing Officer Sigler found Plaintiff

guilty of the alleged offense and Plaintiff remained in disciplinary detention until May 16, 2023,

when he was transferred to administrative segregation. (Id. at ¶¶ 73-74.) In June 2023, after

witnessing other inmates get sprayed by COs, Plaintiff filed a third-party grievance. (Id. at ¶¶ 75-

76.) Several hours later, COs entered Plaintiff’s cell and destroyed his property. (Id. at ¶¶ 77-

82.)

On August 9, 2023, after a change in medication, Plaintiff attempted suicide by cutting

himself and swallowing razor blades to “get the demon out.” (Id. at ¶ 83.) Two days later, COs

told Nurse Dustyn Isner that having a one-on-one constant suicide watch was “not a real thing due

to staffing.” (Id. at ¶ 84.) On August 12 and September 11, 2023, health professionals placed

razor restrictions on Plaintiff’s mental health discharge order. (Id. at ¶¶ 85-87.) Despite this, on

September 16, 2023, Plaintiff found and swallowed a razor. (Id. at ¶ 88.)

On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff was in his cell and speaking to a CO when CO Jesse Smith

(“Smith”) entered the unit and told Plaintiff to “cuff up.” (Id. at ¶ 93.) Smith traded insults with

Plaintiff while escorting Plaintiff to the temporary holding cages. (Id.) Upon arriving at the

cages, Smith squeezed and pinched Plaintiff’s forearm then slammed Plaintiff against the back of

the cage. (Id.) While pressed against the wall, Smith punched Plaintiff in the head twice and put

Plaintiff in a wrist lock, during which Plaintiff heard his arm “pop.” (Id. at ¶ 94.) As alleged,

Smith said something to the effect of “add that to your lawsuit, bitch. I hope I broke your hand.”

(Id. at ¶ 95.) Because of the write-ups he received at NCRJ, Plaintiff was transferred to the Mt.

Olive Correctional Complex in fall 2023 and remains in administrative segregation on the quality-

of-life program. (Id. at ¶ 100.)

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Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) on January 21, 2025. (ECF No. 85.) Plaintiff

filed his response on February 4, 2025. (ECF No. 103.) Finally, Defendants filed their reply on

February 11, 2025. (ECF No. 105.) As such, this motion is fully brief and ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or

pleading. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts must accept as true all

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the plaintiff.” Farnsworth v. Loved Ones in Home Care, LLC, 2019 WL 956806, at *1 (S.D. W.

Va. Feb. 27, 2019) (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440

(4th Cir. 2011)). Thus, “a complaint is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice.”

Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 777 (4th Cir. 2017).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's factual allegations, taken as true, must “state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Est. Cos., 679 F.3d

278, 288 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The plausibility standard is not a

probability requirement, but “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To achieve facial

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plausibility, the plaintiff must plead facts allowing the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable, moving the claim beyond the realm of mere possibility. Id. at 663 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the

elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Courts “are not bound

to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 (1986)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count V

In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hutson, Wood, and Caudill “violated

[Plaintiff’s] Fourteenth Amendment rights when they were deliberately indifferent to the serious

risk of substantial harm to [Plaintiff’s] health and safety posed by the well-known and long-

tolerated pattern and practice of correctional officers at NCRJ using excessive force on inmates,

including pepper spraying, beating and otherwise using physical violence against inmates like

[Plaintiff], for no legitimate, nonpunitive purpose.” (ECF No. 78 at ¶ 154.) Plaintiff further

alleges that he suffered serious harm because of Defendants’ deliberate indifference, including

physical injuries resulting from the deployment of OC spray and beatings, and a worsening of

Plaintiff’s pre-existing mental health conditions. (Id. at ¶ 155.)

In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient

facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 86

at 6.) Namely, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “fails to allege facts that could plausibly show that

these Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that the officer Defendants were engaged

in conduct that posed ‘a pervasive and unreasonable risk’ of constitutional injury to inmates such

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as the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 10.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and do

“not plausibly support the conclusion that these Defendants, prior to February 2, 2023, had actual

or constructive knowledge that uses of force at NCRJ were excessive or unconstitutional.” (Id. at

11.) Defendants further argue that there was no “affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s

inaction and the particular constitutional injury allegedly suffered by Plaintiff.” (Id.) Finally,

Defendants raise a qualified immunity defense.

A pretrial detainee’s claim based upon deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm is properly brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th

593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious

harm, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that: (1) the plaintiff was exposed to a substantial risk of

serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to

address the risk posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known of the risk and that that the

defendant’s action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the

plaintiff was harmed. Hartman, 87 F.4th at 611; see Stevens v. Holler, 68 F.4th 921, 931 (4th Cir.

2023).

The plaintiff no longer must show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the condition

causing a substantial risk of serious harm. Hartman, 87 F.4th at 611. “Now, it is sufficient that

the plaintiff show that the defendant's action or inaction was, in Kingsley’s words, ‘objectively

unreasonable’ . . . that is, the plaintiff must show that the defendant should have known of that

condition and that risk, and acted accordingly.” Id. (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson¸ 576 U.S.

389, 397 (2015). This standard is equivalent to civil recklessness where the plaintiff must show

that the defendant acted or failed to act “in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is

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either known or so obvious that it should be known.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836

(1994). “[I]t is still not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or

accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.” Hartman, 87 F.4th at 611-12.

“The deliberate indifference standard generally applies to cases alleging failures to

safeguard the inmate's health and safety, including failing to protect inmates from attack,

maintaining inhumane conditions of confinement, or failing to render medical assistance.”

Thompson v. Commonwealth, 878 F.3d 89, 97 (4th Cir. 2017). Deliberate indifference claims can

also apply to supervisors of jails and prisons. See Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d

1388, 1396 (8th Cir. 1997). A claim that a supervisor is deliberately indifferent to a substantial

risk of serious harm is different from a claim brought under a theory of supervisory liability.

Supervisory liability is a theory of liability to hold supervisory officials responsible for the

“constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th

Cir. 1994.)

Before examining the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings, it should be noted that

Defendants confuse supervisory liability with deliberate indifference. Defendants argue that the

“claims are clearly based on supervisory liability, regardless of semantics.” (ECF No. 105 at 7.)

This is incorrect, as Plaintiff is not alleging that Defendants are responsible for the actions of their

subordinates, but rather that the Defendants themselves were deliberately indifferent to a

substantial risk of serious harm. (ECF No. 78 at ¶ 154.) One element of such an allegation

requires the plaintiff to plead that a defendant “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or

failed to act to address the risk posed.” Hartman, 87 F.4th at 611. Furthermore, “[a] state official

can be liable in a § 1983 suit in three ways: in his personal capacity, his official capacity, or in a

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more limited way, his supervisory capacity.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 223 (4th Cir.

2016). This is not a claim based on Defendants’ supervisory capacity or the actions or inactions

of a subordinate, but rather, a claim based on the actions or inactions of the Defendants, who just

happen to be supervisors. See Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1396 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding

a finding that a prison superintendent was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious

harm when he had notice of an officer’s prior excessive force and failed to take appropriate action).

1. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm

To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, the first

factor requires a plaintiff to sufficiently plead that he was exposed to a substantial risk of serious

harm. Hartman, 87 F.4th at 611. The alleged risk is analyzed using an objective standard.

Carmona v. Martin, 2024 WL 4490695 at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 2024). Beatings by COs have

been found to be the type of “serious harm” contemplated in this factor. See Younger v. Crowder,

79 F.4th 373, 381-83 (4th Cir. 2023) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that a

substantial risk of serious harm would occur due to a pattern of assaults and retaliations by COs);

see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that a prison warden is deliberately

indifferent for failing to act despite knowing that COs would retaliate against inmates

by beating them and spraying them with a fire hose).

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff makes numerous allegations that an objective

substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff existed at the facility through a pattern and practice of

violence against inmates. (ECF No. 78 at ¶¶ 106-12.) However, many of these allegations are

legal conclusions and do not provide sufficient supporting facts. While a complaint does not need

to contain detailed factual allegations, the law “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

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unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For example, Plaintiff alleges that

“[t]here is a general pattern and practice among many correctional officers at NCRJ to use pepper

spray and other modes of physical force in excess of any legitimate nonpunitive governmental

purpose” and “Correctional Officers at NCRJ make a practice of taking individuals into showers .

. . where there are no cameras and using pepper spray against them or otherwise physically

assaulting them in a manner that is not rationally related to any legitimate nonpunitive

governmental purpose.” (ECF No. 78 at ¶¶ 106-07.) These are simply legal conclusions without

any factual backing. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges throughout the Amended Complaint that there

are numerous use of force reports. However, use of force reports, without more, do not mean that

such uses of force were excessive.

Despite the many conclusory allegations, Plaintiff still makes a sufficient pleading as to

the first factor. For example, Plaintiff alleges that, based on Defendants’ reviews of use of force

reports, there were “conspicuous instances of spraying in the absence of any legitimate nonpunitive

governmental objective.” (Id. at ¶ 113.) Rather than just alleging in a conclusory manner that

there were instances of spraying in the absence of any legitimate nonpunitive governmental

objective, the allegation is based on use of force reports, which is a supporting fact. Further,

Plaintiff alleges that “Wood and Hutson each knew, or should have known, from general

discussion at NCRJ among staff and employees that CO Defendants regularly took handcuffed or

otherwise immobilized inmates into the shower area and other areas without security camera

coverage to assault them, including spraying them with oleoresin capsicum.” (Id. at ¶ 126.)

These claims of “regular[]” physical assaults are not conclusory because the information is derived

from “general discussion at NCRJ among staff and employees,” which is also a supporting fact.

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In accepting these allegations as true, drawing “all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,”

and construing the “complaint liberally as to do substantial justice,” Plaintiff sufficiently alleges

that a substantial risk of serious harm existed to Plaintiff, satisfying the pleading for the first

element. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d at 440; DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d at 777.

2. Intentional, Knowing, or Reckless Actions

Second, deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm requires that the

defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to address the risk posed.

Hartman, 87 F.4th at 611. It is “not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant

negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.” Id. at 611-12. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants Wood and Hutson “did nothing to stop or investigate these practices, nor to

terminate, discipline, or otherwise take adverse employment action against correctional officers

who engaged in these practices, including CO Defendants” and that Defendant Caudill “did

nothing to stop or to investigate these practices, nor to recommend termination, discipline or other

adverse employment action against CO Defendants.” (ECF No. 78 at ¶¶ 128, 130.)

Because Plaintiff is alleging inaction on the part of Defendants, there are little-to-no facts

that Plaintiff can provide other than the resultant harm of the alleged inaction. Here, Plaintiff

alleges that the inaction led to assaults by the Defendant COs which resulted in injuries such as

gagging, difficulty breathing, coughing, and a painful burning sensation as a result of the OC spray,

and physical pain from beatings, including a “persistent knee injury following Defendant Gier’s

and Craig’s assault and pain in his arm due to Officer Smith’s beating, which required a medical

visit.” (Id. at ¶¶ 97, 99). Plaintiff also alleges that as a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff

experienced “mental and emotional distress, including a fear for his life, exacerbated symptoms of

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PTSD related to his previous assaults at correctional facilities, humiliation, embarrassment,

anxiety and stress.” (Id. at 98.) Combining the alleged substantial risk of serious harm with the

severity of Plaintiff’s resultant injuries, the Court can draw a reasonable inference that the alleged

inaction was intentional, knowing, or reckless. Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently met the

second factor of the claim.

3. Knowledge of the Risk of Harm

The third factor requires that the defendant knew or should have known of the risk of harm

and that the defendant’s action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm. Hartman, 87

F.4th at 611. Plaintiffs do not have to show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the risk,

“it is sufficient that the plaintiff show that the defendant’s action or inaction was . . . ‘objectively

unreasonable.’” Id. (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397). “[T]hat is, the plaintiff must show that

the defendant should have known of that condition and that risk, and acted accordingly.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that, upon information and belief, “Wood and Hutson saw inmate grievances,

requests and other communications accusing the various CO Defendants of physically striking the

grievants as well as using pepper spray against them and other inmates without provocation.”

(ECF No. 78 at ¶ 125.) Plaintiff also alleges that “Wood and Hutson each knew, or should have

known, from general discussion at NCRJ among staff and employees that CO Defendants regularly

took handcuffed or otherwise immobilized inmates into the shower area and other areas without

security camera coverage to assault them, including spraying them with oleoresin capsicum.” (Id.

at ¶ 126.) As previously discussed, these are not conclusory because they are based on supporting

facts. Relevant to this factor, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wood and Hutson knew or should

have known of the risks posed to Plaintiff based on “inmate grievances, requests and other

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communications” as well as “from general discussion at NCRJ among staff and employees.”

Therefore, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Hutson and Wood knew or should have known of the

risk and harm posed by their alleged inaction.

However, Plaintiff’s allegations fall short as to Defendant Caudill on this factor. Plaintiff

alleges that Caudill “saw use of force reports by these officers at a rate demanding investigation

and involving conduct that demanded investigation. Upon information and belief, Defendant

Caudill saw use of force reports that were plainly inaccurate and thus demanded an investigation

on that basis. Upon information and belief, Defendant Caudill knows or should know of the

practice of CO Defendants taking inmates into areas without security-camera coverage to beat

them or use oleoresin capsicum spray against them.” (Id. at ¶ 129.) First, merely seeing a high

number of use of force reports does not mean that the uses of force were excessive. Second, just

because a use of force report is inaccurate does not mean that the force used in those instances

were also excessive. Plaintiff also does not provide support as to how the reports were inaccurate.

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that Caudill knows or should know of the practice by COs of taking

inmates into the showers to beat or spray them is not supported by any fact. Therefore, Plaintiff

did not sufficiently allege that Defendant Caudill knew or should have known of the risk of harm

to Plaintiff and that that his inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm.

4. Harm to the Plaintiff

The final factor requires that, as a result of a defendant’s deliberate indifference, the

plaintiff was harmed. Hartman, 87 F.4th at 611. Plaintiff alleges that he “suffered serious harm

because of Defendants’ deliberate indifference. [Plaintiff] suffered injuries from the use of

excessive force against him, including a painful burning sensation on his skin, difficulty breathing,

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and pain to his eyes due to the deployment of pepper spray against him. He also suffered physical

pain from the beating from Defendants Gier and Craig. These physical injuries also caused a

worsening of his pre-existing mental health conditions.” (Id. at ¶ 155.) This is a sufficient

pleading because Plaintiff articulated the harm in a specific manner, including by indicating when

and how the injuries happened to him.

5. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants raise qualified immunity as a defense. Qualified immunity shields

government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability when their conduct

“does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The test for qualified

immunity is “(1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a

constitutional right, and (2) if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the

defendant's alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). “Protections for

pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment are ‘at least as great as the Eighth Amendment

protections available to a convicted prisoner.’” Hartman, 87 F.4th at 607 (citing City of Revere v.

Mass. Gen. Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).

By February 2023, it was clearly established that the use of excessive force against

restrained or subdued detainees, including through OC spray, is a constitutional violation. See

Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2021). Further, by February 2023, it was clearly

established that a supervisory prison official “violates an inmate's Fourteenth Amendment rights

when he knows—based on officers' past behavior and warnings about officers' excessive use of

force—that his officers are likely to attack and seriously injure the inmate in retaliation for the

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inmate's behavior.” Younger, 79 F.4th at 386; see Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373-76 (denying a warden

qualified immunity when he was deliberately indifferent to his officers retaliating against inmates

by beating them and spraying them with a fire hose). Defendants Hutson and Wood are not

entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, as it applies to a pattern of excessive force by COs,

Plaintiff has made a sufficient pleading for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious

harm as to Defendants Wood and Hutson, but not as to Defendant Caudill. On Count V,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Defendant Caudill but DENIED as to

Defendants Wood and Hutson.

B. Count VI

In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hutson and Wood knew of or should have

known of the substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff posed by failing to restrict razor access

to inmates prone to self-harm. (ECF No. 78 at ¶ 160.) Plaintiff also alleges that Hutson and

Wood “knew or should have known of Plaintiff’s tendency to attempt suicide by swallowing razors

and cutting himself with razors,” and alleges that they “did not take measures to ensure that razors

were properly distributed (or not) to inmates like [Plaintiff], did not adequately train COs to

distribute razors safely and collect razors from the shower area or to verify that inmates were not

hoarding razors, or to discipline COs who failed to follow safe-razor-distribution procedures.”

(Id. at ¶¶ 163-64.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that this deliberate indifference resulted in injuries

from Plaintiff’s suicide attempts, including “scarring in his throat, gastric problems, and worsening

of his pre-existing mental health conditions.” (Id. at ¶ 165.) Defendants again argue that

Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for

deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 86 at 13.)

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1. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm

The first factor requires plaintiff to be exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm. As

alleged, Plaintiff suffers from major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, schizoaffective

disorder, borderline personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, frequent suicidal

ideation, and requires psychiatric medications to quell hallucinations and suicidal ideation. (ECF

No. 78 at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff has previously attempted suicide by cutting himself and swallowing

razors at WVDCR facilities prior to his incarceration at NCRJ. (Id. at ¶ 16.) On various

instances, Plaintiff informed mental health clinicians of his suicide attempts and desires, and told

clinicians not to give him razors. (Id. at ¶¶ 40-41.) Mental health clinicians failed on various

occasions to place razor restrictions on Plaintiff. (See id. at ¶¶ 32, 38, 41.) When Plaintiff did

get access to razors, he attempted suicide by cutting himself or swallowing them on three separate

occasions. (Id. at ¶¶ 52, 83, 88.) Based on these allegations, plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that a

substantial risk of serious harm existed by exposing Plaintiff to razors.

2. Intentional, Knowing, or Reckless Actions

The second factor requires that the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted

or failed to act to address the risk posed. In a conclusory fashion, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

Wood and Hutson “were responsible for ensuring that razor restrictions on mental health orders

were followed by Correctional Officers.” (Id. at ¶ 133.) However, elsewhere in the Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that mental health clinicians failed to recommend razor restrictions

for Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 38, 41.) In the one instance where Plaintiff was on a razor restriction

and swallowed a razor, it was only alleged that Plaintiff “found” the razor, not that any intentional,

knowing, or reckless act or inaction by Defendants or COs resulted in Plaintiff obtaining the razor.

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(Id. at ¶ 88.) At most, Plaintiff alleges negligence on behalf of the COs and mental health

clinicians when it came to placing razor restrictions or handling razors – this is not enough to plead

deliberate indifference on factor two as to Defendants Hutson and Wood.

3. Knowledge of the Risk of Harm

The third factor requires that the defendant knew or should have known of the risk of harm

and that that the defendant’s action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm. Here,

Plaintiff alleges, again in conclusory fashion, that Defendants Hutson and Wood “knew or should

have known of [Plaintiff’s] tendency to attempt suicide by swallowing razors and cutting himself

with razors.” (Id. at ¶ 163.) However, Plaintiff offers no facts to back the allegation. Further,

Plaintiff did not allege that there was a systemic problem of razors not being properly distributed

or collected to where Defendants should have known about the problem before the alleged

incidents. There is also no allegation that Defendants’ inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk

of harm, particularly considering Plaintiff’s frequent mental health visits and the failures of the

mental health clinicians to place proper razor restrictions. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint is insufficient as to factor three.

4. Harm to the Plaintiff

Finally, the fourth factor requires that, as a result of a defendant’s deliberate indifference,

the plaintiff was harmed. While Plaintiff was certainly harmed by his access to razors, which

included three suicide attempts requiring surgery, Defendants Hutson and Wood were not

deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff posed by failing to restrict

his access to razors because Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts as to factors two and three.

Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VI is GRANTED.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the above-mentioned reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on Count V is

GRANTED as to Defendant Caudill but DENIED as to Defendants Hutson and Wood.

Furthermore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on Count VI is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any

unrepresented party.

ENTER: May 14, 2025

THOMAS E. JOHNSTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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