Seaman v. Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

GUY J. SEAMAN, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:25-cv-775-G-BN

§

JUDGE MARY BROWN, ET AL., §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Guy J. Seaman filed this pro se action for violations of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against three state judges, a state district court administrator, and a state

appellate clerk of court sued in their official and individual capacities, a private

attorney representing his wife in a state court divorce proceeding, and various John

and Jane Doe officials. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 11. Seaman has also filed various motions

seeking relief, including a motion seeking preliminary injunctive relief barring the

state court from, among other things, issuing orders or holding hearings, mediation,

or trial “without explicit federal court authorization,” Dkt. No. 5 at 3, and a motion

titled “Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Notice of Federal

Collapse Risk, and Demand for Expedited Intervention,” asking this Court to “[a]ssert

control, freeze the timeline, and preserve federal adjudication,” Dkt. No. 12 at 8.

Because Seaman is proceeding pro se, Senior United States District Judge A.

Joe Fish referred this lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for

pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

recommendation that the Court should deny the request for injunctive relief and

dismiss this lawsuit.

Legal Standards

A district court may “consider the sufficiency of the complaint on its own

initiative.” Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991) (citation

omitted); accord Bell v. Valdez, 207 F.3d 657 (table), 2000 WL 122411, at *1 n.1 (5th

Cir. Jan. 4, 2000) (per curiam) (“[I]t is well-established that the district court may

dismiss a complaint on 12(b)(6) grounds sua sponte.” (citations omitted)). “The broad

rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the

procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both

notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua

sponte with prejudice.” Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations

omitted).

A magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide

notice, and the period for filing objections to them affords the parties an opportunity

to respond. See, e.g., Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018

WL 6069969, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citations omitted), rec. accepted, 2018

WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F. App’x 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

140 S. Ct. 142 (2019).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint

contain detailed factual allegations, just “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely

consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility

and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 557). On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual

matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v.

Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of

categories of statements, including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels;

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and

naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60

F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th

1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).

And, so, to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that

the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and

directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,

Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));

see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899

(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’

is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

As to Seaman’s request for preliminary injunctive relief, such an injunction is

“an extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be granted routinely, but only when the

movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” White v. Carlucci, 862

F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To be entitled to

a preliminary injunction, the applicant must show (1) a substantial likelihood that

he will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that he will suffer irreparable

injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his threatened injury outweighs the

threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to enjoin, and (4) granting the

preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Bluefield Water Ass’n,

Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted)

Analysis

The complaint alleges claims against the district judge and associate judge

handling his divorce proceedings, the court administrator, the administrative judge

for the region, the attorney representing his wife in the divorce, and ten “unknown

judicial assistances, clerks, coordinators, and court officers.” See Dkt. 1 at 7-9.

Seaman asserts that the state court judges and staff violated due process, equal

protection, and the right to petition through their handling of his divorce case,

including more than 30 motions that he filed and the denial of motions to recuse. See

id. He also alleges that they implicitly conspired or colluded with his wife’s attorney.

Id.

Seaman then filed an amended complaint adding the clerk of court for the

Texas Fifth Court of Appeals and incorporating the original complaint by reference.

See Dkt. No. 11. He asserts that the clerk denied him access to the appellate court

because of filing issues that Seaman asserts were “deliberate obstruction.” Id. at 3-5.

As always, the Court must first consider its jurisdiction. See Louisiana v. U.S.

Dep’t of Energy, 90 F.4th 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Jurisdiction is always first.”

(citation omitted)).

“Absent waiver, the immunity of a state from suit as signified by, but not fully

expressed in, the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional barrier.” Stramaski v.

Lawley, 44 F.4th 318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,

954 F.3d 268, 374, 276 (5th Cir. 2020)).

That is, “‘[f]ederal courts are without jurisdiction over suits against a state, a

state agency, or a state official in his official capacity unless that state has waived its

sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.’ Texas has not consented

by statute, and § 1983,” for example, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.”

NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Moore

v. La. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014), then

citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979)).

There is a “narrow exception ... that allows certain private parties to seek

judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing

state laws that are contrary to federal law.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595

U.S. 30, 39 (2021) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). But this

exception does not permit injunctions against state courts or their employees because

“’an injunction against a state court’ or its ‘machinery’ ‘would be a violation of the

whole scheme of our Government.’” Id. (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163).

And Seaman alleges no facts that could overcome judicial immunity for the

judicial defendants, including court staff. “[A] judge generally has absolute immunity

from suits for damages.” Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir.

2009) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991)).

“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment

of damages.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing, in turn, Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985))).

There are only two circumstances under which judicial immunity may

be overcome. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial

actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles,

502 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). “Second, a judge is not immune for

actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Allegations of bad faith or malice

are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Id.

Id.; see also Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Court [employees] ‘have

absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically

required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion.’” (quoting Tarter v. Hury,

646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981))); Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229,

230-31 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he judge’s law clerk, when assisting the judge in carrying

out the former’s judicial functions, is likewise entitled to absolute immunity.”

(citations omitted)).

So Seaman’s claims against the state court judges and state district and

appellate court staff should be dismissed.

And to the extent that Seaman points to various rulings of the Supreme Court

overturning state court decisions, a district court generally does not have jurisdiction

to hear appeals from state court decisions. See Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d

377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘Reduced to its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds

that inferior federal courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state court

judgments’ except when authorized by Congress.” (quoting Union Planters Bank Nat’l

Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004))); accord Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex.,

18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Jordaan v. Hall, 275 F. Supp. 2d 778, 789

(N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that the doctrine prevents “thinly veiled attempt[s] to

circumvent the state appellate process and to collaterally attack – in the guise of a

federal civil rights action – the validity of a state court [judgment] and other related

orders”). Appellate jurisdiction for federal issues lies instead with the U.S. Supreme

Court after an appeal has gone through all state appellate processes.

With respect to the claims against Bybee, generally, in the absence of a

properly pled conspiracy with a government actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1985,

constitutional claims against a private party will fail. See, e.g., Hershner v. City of

Dallas, No. 23-11214, 2024 WL 4471503, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 11, 2024) (per curiam)

(“Without the inclusion of a state official, there is no basis to lodge a claim of

deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution.” (citing 42 U.S.C. 1983)).

“Plaintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under civil rights statutes must plead

the operative facts upon which their claim is based. Bald allegations that a conspiracy

existed are insufficient.” Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (5th Cir.1987)

(footnote omitted); Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381,

389–90 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim

under § 1985 and ... plaintiffs must plead the operative facts upon which their claim

is based.” (cleaned up)).

The claims of a conspiracy do not meet this standard. At best, Seaman alleges

collusion between his wife and her lawyer, but conclusory allegations that ruling or

failing to rule on particular motions imply a conspiracy are insufficient to state a

claim under Section 1985.

For these reasons, Seaman’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice.

Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint

before dismissal, but leave is not required when a plaintiff has already pled his “best

case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009).

Seaman’s complaint fails to state or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts

from which a cognizable claim can be inferred. Based on the most deferential review

of his complaint, it is highly unlikely that, given another opportunity, Seaman could

allege viable legal claims. Thus, the undersigned concludes that granting leave to

amend under these circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay.

But the opportunity to file objections to these findings, conclusions, and

recommendation (as further explained below) allows Seaman another opportunity to

show that this case should not be dismissed and that the Court should instead grant

leave to amend. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021)

(per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, but

a movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her amendments

would be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects. If the

plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects

could be cured, a district court may deny leave.” (citations omitted)).

Finally, for all these reasons, Seaman also has not shown a substantial

likelihood of success on his claims, so the Court should deny the motions for a

preliminary injunction and for a temporary restraining order. See Bluefield Water

Ass’n, 577 at 252-53.

Recommendation

The Court should deny the motions for a preliminary injunction and temporary

restraining order [Dkt. Nos. 5 & 12] and dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: April 14, 2025 : :

DAVIDL.HORAN —s—SsS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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