Bryson v. Kremar

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARIA BRYSON, : CIVIL NO. 3:24-CV-208

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

JESSICA KREMAR, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Factual Background

This pro se civil rights lawsuit comes before us for consideration of the

defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 10). With respect to this motion, the plaintiff’s

complaint and its accompanying exhibits, disclose the following essential facts which

guide us in our consideration of this case:

Ms. Bryson’s complaint names a Schuylkill County Children and Youth

Services case worker, Jessica Kremar, as the sole defendant. (Doc. 1). While the

complaint demands a good deal from the reader, it is evident that the gravamen of

this lawsuit entails Bryson’s objections to actions taken by Kremar at the request of

New York officials with respect to a child neglect petition which was filed against

Bryson in New York state. On this score, it appears that in August of 2023 Bryson

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the welfare of a child. These charges were resolved in January 2024 through

imposition of a fine on the disorderly conduct charge and dismissal of the child

endangerment charge. (Doc. 1-1, at 1).

Concurrently, state child neglect proceedings were lodged against Bryson in

the Sullivan County New York Family Court. (Doc, 1-1, at 2-6). These proceedings

were resolved in November of 2023 through an order of adjournment in

contemplation of dismissal. (Id.) In pertinent part, that New York state court order

required Bryson to establish pediatric care for her daughter, maintain stable housing,

ordered Preventive Services supervision for a one-year period and directed that

Bryson “must cooperate with Preventive Services.” (Id., at 3). Notably, Bryson

appears to have consented to this resolution which was reported to the court in New

York by November 9, 2023. (Id., at 4).

At the time of the entry of this order directing Bryson to maintain stable

housing for her child, imposing children and youth supervision for one year, and

instructing Bryson to cooperate with child safety officials, Bryson and her daughter

moved to Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. Ms. Kremar and Schuylkill County

Children and Youth were contacted by their New York counterparts on October 24,

2023, to conduct a home assessment of Bryson’s living arrangements with her

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New York authorities:

Information received noted [Bryson’s daughter] was in placement due

to mother's mental health; parenting; home conditions / unstable housing

as the family was reportedly residing in a travel trailer with no running

water or utilities; and concerns with substance abuse. Also being

addressed was domestic violence, including information Ms. Bryson

attempted to set her paramour on fire and during the incident [her

daughter] was present.

(Id., at 11).

By November 11, 2023, Ms. Kremar was informed that Bryson’s daughter was

living with the plaintiff in Schuylkill County, and in accordance with the provisions

of the New York court order directing supervision of Bryson, endeavored to further

assess the suitability of this living arrangement. (Id.) As part of this effort, Ms.

Kremar made an unannounced home visit at Bryson’s residence on November 14,

2023. (Id.)

Accounts of the visit vary. For her part, Ms. Kremar described Bryson as

minimally cooperative, but found that home conditions, hygiene, and food supplies

were appropriate. (Id.) However, according to Ms. Kremar, Bryson declined to

undergo drug screening and refused to sign a release allowing Children and Youth

access to her daughter’s medical records. (Id., at 11-12). Bryson’s refusal to fully

cooperate with Schuylkill County authorities, who were attempting to ensure her

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a dependency petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County. (Id.) On

January 15, 2024, the Pennsylvania Court dismissed this petition, finding that

jurisdiction over Bryson’s case remained with the Sullivan County New York court.

(Id., at 10).

For her part, Ms. Bryson perceived these events in a very different light.

Apparently misunderstanding the terms of the New York state court order, Bryson

alleged in her complaint that her child dependency proceeding had been dismissed.

(Doc. 1). Bryson then asserted, without reference to the New York court order, that

Ms. Kremar attempted to inspect her home on November 14, 2023, in violation of the

Fourth Amendment since she acted without a warrant or court order authorizing the

home assessment. Specifically, Bryson contends that Ms. Kremar told her during this

unannounced visit that she could not leave until she saw where Bryson’s daughter

slept. Finally, Bryson insisted that Ms. Kremar wrongfully attempted to institute a

dependency proceeding in the Schuylkill County courts. (Id.) Based upon these

averments Bryson sought injunctive relief and damages from Ms. Kremar.

It is against this backdrop that the defendant has moved to dismiss this

complaint. (Doc. 10). This motion is fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. For the

reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted.

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A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the

legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal

court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the

possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

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bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions

will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which

relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss,

a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the

Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a

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that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the

factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District

Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but

may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,

a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.

A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the court of appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

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at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-

step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,

attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,

268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]

that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims

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Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose

contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but

which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express

Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a

district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document

integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without

converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court

may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when

determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

B. Guiding Legal Benchmarks Governing Child and Youth Service

Case Workers

When performing their important child safety and protection responsibilities,

child and youth case workers like Ms. Kremar are cloaked in two forms of immunity

from civil liability.

At the outset, child and youth case workers are absolutely immune from

liability for their role instituting and litigating dependency proceedings in court. As

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CYS defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions on

behalf of the state in preparing for, initiating, and prosecuting

dependency proceedings. Their immunity is broad enough to include the

formulation and presentation of recommendations to the court in the

course of such proceedings. We reach this conclusion because (1) the

functions performed by the CYS defendants in dependency proceedings

are closely analogous to the functions performed by prosecutors in

criminal proceedings; (2) the public policy considerations that

countenance immunity for prosecutors are applicable to child welfare

workers performing these functions; and (3) dependency proceedings

incorporate important safeguards that protect citizens from

unconstitutional actions by child welfare workers.

Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d Cir. 1997).

While this absolute immunity is confined to the litigative role of CYS workers,

it is well-settled that child and youth case workers are also cloaked in qualified

immunity from damages for their child safety investigative activities. Bayer v.

Monroe Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2009). Qualified

immunity shields officials from liability for civil damages brought pursuant to section

1983 “so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Bland v. City

of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11

(2015)). To determine whether an official is entitled to the affirmative defense of

qualified immunity for a section 1983 claim, a court must determine (1) whether the

official violated a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the right was clearly

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v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (permitting federal courts to exercise discretion

in deciding which of the two Saucier prongs should be addressed first).

A right is clearly established if “every reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11. To be

clearly established, there does not have to be a case that is directly on point, “but

existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). In determining

whether a right is clearly established, courts must not define the right “at a high level

of generality.” Id. (quoting Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). Rather, the analysis should

focus on “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”

Id. On this score, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right

is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. It is

the plaintiff who bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the constitutional right

at issue was clearly established at the time of the claimed violation. See Davis v.

Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) (“A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of

constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified

immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of

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(“Where a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary

judgment, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant's

conduct violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional right”).

To determine whether a right is clearly established, the court may look to cases

from the Supreme Court, controlling circuit precedent, or “a robust consensus of

cases of persuasive authority” from other circuit courts. Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs.,

974 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther

Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2017)). Unpublished cases cannot

establish a right because they do not constitute binding authority. El v. City of

Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 340 (3d Cir. 2020). In rare cases, the unlawfulness of a

government official's conduct may be established from the obviously unlawful nature

of the defendant's conduct “even though existing precedent does not address similar

circumstances.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (citing

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).

Applying these legal yardsticks, courts have frequently rebuffed efforts to hold

children and youth case workers personally liable for decisions which they make

when inquiring into child safety concerns, holding that these officials are entitled to

qualified immunity. See e.g., Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. &

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Youth Servs., 577 F.3d at 192–93; Breakwell v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep't of Hum.

Servs., 406 F. App'x 593, 597 (3d Cir. 2010); Jarovits v. Monroe Cnty. Child. &

Youth Servs., 345 F. App'x 784, 786 (3d Cir. 2009).

These guideposts govern our consideration of the instant case.

C. The Motion to Dismiss Will Be Granted.

While there is an element of ambiguity to Bryson’s constitutional claims,

liberally construed we believe that the plaintiff is alleging both that Ms. Kremar

wrongfully instituted a dependency proceeding against her and violated her Fourth

Amendment rights when she engaged in an unannounced home inspection of

Bryson’s residence on November 14, 2023.

In our view, both of these claims fail in light of the uncontested information

set forth in Bryson’s complaint and the accompanying exhibits appended to that

complaint. Turning first to any claim arising out of Ms. Kremar’s actions instituting

and litigating a dependency proceeding in the Schuylkill County Court of Common

Pleas, given the settled proposition that “CYS defendants are entitled to absolute

immunity for their actions on behalf of the state in preparing for, initiating, and

prosecuting dependency proceedings,” Ernst, 108 F.3d at 495, Ms. Kremar’s conduct

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should be dismissed.1

As for any Fourth Amendment claims lodged by Bryson relating to Ms.

Kremar’s unannounced November 14, 2023 home visit, while we acknowledge that

CYS case workers are not entitled to a blanket exemption from the requirements of

the Fourth Amendment, given the fact specific approach that we are enjoined to apply

to questions of qualified immunity, we find that the defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity for her role in this inspection that was designed to ensure the safety of

Bryson’s child.

At the outset, we note that, despite her protestations that there were no court

orders in place at the time of these events, Bryson’s complaint reveals that she was

subject to a court order from the Sullivan County New York court. That consented to

order required Bryson to establish pediatric care for her daughter, maintain stable

housing, ordered Preventive Services supervision for a one year period, and directed

that Bryson “must cooperate with Preventive Services.” When Ms. Kremar was

notified by her Sullivan County New York counterparts that Bryson—who had

1 In the alternative, we note that, in light of the court’s holding in Ernst, Ms. Kremar

could not have reasonably understood her actions to transgress Bryson’s clearly

established constitutional rights. Therefore, Ms. Kremar would also be entitled to

qualified immunity with respect to his claim.

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moved with the child to Schuylkill County, she could reasonably conclude that the

concurred-in New York state order, which required Bryson to maintain stable housing

and obliged Bryson to cooperate with children and youth services, authorized her to

conduct a home inspection in order to ensure this child’s continued safety. Indeed,

given Ms. Kremar’s legal responsibility to “[p]revent abuse, neglect and

exploitation,” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6373 (a)(2), she would likely have been derelict in

her duties if she had not followed up on this information and conducted an inspection

to determine whether this child was living in a secure and safe environment.

Moreover, there is no robust consensus of case law which would have admonished

Ms. Kremar to avoid inquiring into the safety of this child. Therefore, in this factual

context, it simply cannot be said that the home inspection conducted by Ms. Kremar

violated Bryson’s clearly established constitutional rights. Accordingly, any claim

for damages arising out of this home inspection is barred by the doctrine of qualified

immunity and will be dismissed.2

2 Finally, we note that with respect to Bryson’s requests for injunctive relief, at the

time she filed this complaint in February of 2024, she was still subject to the orders

of the Sullivan County New York court. Therefore, her request for injunctive relief

essentially invited us to intervene in an ongoing state child protection case, something

we should refrain from doing, especially since her legal claims for damages otherwise

fail on immunity grounds. See Hook v. Pike Cnty., No. 3:23-CV-1204, 2024 WL

15

S/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: May 13, 2025

3249662, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2024), report and recommendation adopted as

modified, No. 3:23-CV-1204, 2024 WL 3237142 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2024).

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